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ABSTRACT
Can t h e r e  be an answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'Which moral  
ju d g e m e n ts  oug ht  anyone t o  make?’ t h a t  does n o t  depend upon 
c o n t e s t a b l e  v a l u e  assumptions? My essay  b r i n g s  t o g e t h e r  
two h i t h e r t o  unconnected ways o f  respo nd ing  t o  t h i s  prob lem  
t o  be found in  r e c e n t  m e t a - e t h i c s ;  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  our  
p a r t i c u l a r  moral  judgem ents  must be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  and t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  our  commonsense moral b e l i e f s  a r e  grounded in  
human needs.  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show how th e s e  two f e a t u r e s ,  
uni  v e r s a l  i zab i  1 i t y  and needs,  g e t  us t o  t h e  h e a r t  o f  our  
o r d i n a r y  moral  b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s .  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show 
a l s o  t h a t  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
t h e s i s ,  based upon human needs,  p r o v i d e s  us w i t h  a t h e o r y -  
n e u t r a l  r u l e  w i t h  which a r a t i o n a l  autonomous j u d g e r  can 
answer t h e  'w h ich  moral ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n .
T h e re  a r e  t h r e e  p a r t s  t o  th e  e s s a y .  I n  P a r t  One, I  w i l l  
show some o f  t h e  fo rm a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
judgm ents  must meet i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  s a t i s f y  my i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
t h e r e  i s  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  conceded r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  when a 
p erson  makes such a judgem ent  he must be c o n s i s t e n t ,  i n  t h e  
sense t h a t  he must be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  same 
judgem en t  f o r  a l l  s i m i l a r  cases jm p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . I  w i l l  
show, however ,  t h a t  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  in  e t h i c s  
r e q u i r e s  more than  t h i s .  S e c o n d ly ,  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
h i s  judgem ent  must be im p e r s o n a l ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  th e  
reason  g iv e n  f o r  i t  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and must  
e l u c i d a t e  th e  judgem en t .  Thus even as a n e c e s s a ry  t h e o r y -  
n e u t r a l  r u l e ,  pace H a re ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i m p l i e s  c e r t a i n  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  p o s s i b l e  c o n t e n t  o f  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e s e  a r e  o n l y  fo rm a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s ; t h e y  do 
n o t  t e l l  us which moral judgem en ts  anyone oug ht  t o  make.  
M ora l  a b o m in a t io n s  can be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and 
u n i v e r s a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  ju d g e m e n ts .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  l e f t  
l i k e  t h i s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  seems t o  be t r i v i a l .  
M u t u a l l y  i n c o m p a t i b l e  and c o n t r a d i c t o r y  judgem en ts  s a t i s f y
Vi t .  I  wi 11 go on t o  a rgue  t h a t  i f  t h e  r u l e  i s  t o  be non­
t r i v i a l ,  i t  must be g iv e n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h is  
i s  t o  sa y ,  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  must r e t a i n  t h e  moral  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  y e t  a l s o  s p e c i f y  
some o t h e r  m o r a l l y  n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  so t h a t  
t h e  r u l e  can have a d i r e c t  b e a r in g  on moral ju d g e m e n ts .  I s  
t h i s  p o s s i b l e ?
I n  P a r t  Two, I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show what  t h e  m o r a l l y  non-  
c o n t r o v e r s i  a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  m ig h t  be. I  wi 11 b eg in  by a r g u i n g  
t h a t  a l l  persons  have c e r t a i n  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs in  
common. They need c e r t a i n  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  i f  
t h e y  a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  and i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I  w i l l  
show t h a t  as w e l l  as hav in g  e m p i r i c a l  s u p p o r t ,  th e s e  c l a i m s  
can be p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  s u p p o r te d  by arguments  o f  an a p r i o r i  
s o r t .  I  w i l l  then  show t h a t  such needs u n d e r l i e  most ,  i f  
n o t  a l l ,  o f  our  commonsense moral  b e l i e f s .  Thus we can see  
why o u r  moral  b e l i e f s  m a t t e r  t o  us; j u d g i n g  and a c t i n g  in  
acc ordance  w i t h  them meets t h e  needs in  q u e s t i o n .
I n  P a r t  T h r e e ,  I  w i l l  b r i n g  t h e  two i m p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e s  o f  
my acc o u n t  t o g e t h e r  i n t o  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e s i s .  I  
w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  where we a t t e m p t  
t o  answer  t h e  'w h ich  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n ,  ( i )  any 
s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  based upon a n e e d - r e a s o n  i s  p r im a  f a c i e  
c o r r e c t  and ( i i )  any f u r t h e r  judgem ent  t h a t  can be d e r i v e d  
by u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n  f rom  ( i )  i s  a l s o  p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t .  
To p u t  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  such s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ents  
w i l l  s a t i s f y  t h e  r u l e  U . R . I I :
I f  A ju d g e s  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  do F f o r  th e  
n e e d - r e a s o n  R, th en  any r a t i o n a l  person  must ju d g e  
t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  ought  t o  do F.
When we b r i n g  th e s e  two a s p e c t s  o f  our  moral  t h i n k i n g  
t o g e t h e r  in  o t h e r  words,  we o b t a i n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .
I  w i l l  show how a number o f  u n c o n t r o v e r s i  a l  moral  
judgem en ts  conform t o  U . R . I I ;  t h e i r  d e n i a l s  can be f a u l t e d  
as b e in g  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  u n i q u e l y  naming,  o r  i n  o t h e r  ways 
r a t i o n a l l y  f l a w e d  ( e . g .  t h e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s
V I
i m p l i e d  by th e  d e n i a l  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  ju dgem en t  i s  
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  as an account  o f  a moral p r a c t i c e ) .  I  w i l l  
a rg u e  a l s o  t h a t  in  c o n t e x t s  where d i f f e r e n t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e -  
needs c o n f l i c t ,  we can and do o b j e c t i v e l y  weigh one a g a i n s t  
a n o t h e r .  F i n a l l y ,  I  w i l l  show how my a c c o u n t  p r o v i d e s  an 
answer t o  some o f  t h e  di lemmas and s e e m in g ly  i n t r a c t a b l e  
moral  c o n f l i c t s  d is c u s s e d  in  t h e  r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e .
I f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h e  arguments in  t h i s  essay  s e r i o u s l y  
underm ine  many r e c e n t  answers t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how our  
e v e r y d a y  moral  b e l i e f s  a r e  t o  be j u s t i f i e d .  More 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  
t h e s i s  p r e s e n te d  h e re  p r o v i d e s  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  c r i t e r i o n  
w i t h  which we can d e t e r m in e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  f rom  wrong  
ju d g e m e n ts .
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Twenty  f i v e  y e a r s  o r  so ago, moral p h i lo s o p h y  was m a in ly  
c o n f i n e d  t o  a d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  moral  d i s c o u r s e .  There  was a h e a te d  d e b a te  i n  th e  
l i t e r a t u r e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o v e r  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  i s  a ne c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a l l  moral  judgem en ts  
and w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  p r im a r y  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t o  
p r e s c r i b e  cou rs es  o f  a c t i o n .  I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  i n t e r e s t  in  
t h e s e  is s u e s  has a b a te d .
A t  l e a s t  f o u r  r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s  seem t o  have p la y e d  a r o l e  
in  t h i s  s h i f t  o f  i n t e r e s t .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  d e b a te  was 
e x c e s s i v e l y  f o r m a l i s t i c  as an a cc o u n t  o f  what  moral  
d i s c o u r s e  i s  a b o u t .  I t  l a r g e l y  ig n o r e d  t h e  b r o a d ly  s o c i a l  
and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  background in  which our  moral  judgem ents  
and s e r i o u s  moral  d i s p u t e s  o c c u r .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  f a v o u r e d  
t h e o r y ,  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m , 1 s e t  few l i m i t s  t o  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  moral jud g em en ts .  I f  he w ish ed ,  a person c o u ld  
r e g a r d  as a moral judgem ent  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  one ought  
n o t  t o  look  a t  hedgehogs in  th e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  moon. T h is  
o v e r l o o k s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  w ide  agreem ent  on what  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  moral judgem ent  and hedgehog-  
w a tc h in g  in  t h e  m o o n l ig h t  i s  no t  one o f  them. T h i r d l y ,  no 
s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s u l t s  appeared t o  f o l l o w  f rom  t h e  fa v o u r e d  
t h e s i s .  As long as a judgem ent  i s  s i n c e r e l y  h e l d ,  one moral  
v iew  i s  t o  be regarded  as good as any o t h e r .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  in  commonsense m o r a l i t y  we have no doubt  t h a t  t o  
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  k i l l  a n o th e r  p erso n ,  t o  b a t t e r  a c h i l d ,  o r  t o  
make f a l s e  p rom ises ,  e t c . ,  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  wrong 
t h i n g s  t o  do, no m a t t e r  how s i n c e r e l y  h e ld  t h e  v ie w  i s  t o  
t h e  c o n t r a r y .  F o u r t h l y ,  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  l a r g e l y  
n e g l e c t e d  t h e  issu e  o f  why our  moral b e l i e f s  and judgem ents  
m a t t e r  t o  us .  To answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n  we c a n n o t  s im p ly  f i x  
o u r  a t t e n t i o n  on th e  meaning o f  moral te rm s and e x p r e s s i o n s  
t a k e n  in  i s o l a t i o n .  We must t r y  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  o v e r a l l  
p o i n t  o f  t h e  d i s c o u r s e  in  which t h e y  o c c u r .  I t  i s  o n l y  when
2we r e f l e c t  on why we have a m o r a l i t y  -  why we have any moral  
p r a c t i c e s  a t  a l 1 -  t h a t  moral  d is c o u r s e  and, in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  w i l l  be found t o  have a p o i n t .  And i f  we 
d i s c o v e r  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l e  we m ig h t  be a b l e  t o  see why our  
moral  b e l i e f s  m a t t e r  t o  us.
I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  then  t h a t  c r i t i c s  o f  u n i v e r s a l  
p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  began t o  look a t  d i f f e r e n t  e t h i c a l  
t r a d i t i o n s .  One such a t t e m p t  was t o  f i n d  an acc o u n t  o f  our  
commonsense moral b e l i e f s  in  human n a t u r e . 2 And one c o n c e p t  
t h a t  has been r e v i t a l i s e d  in  t h i s  endeavour  i s  t h e  c o n cep t  
o f  needs .  When we t a k e  t h e  v iew  t h a t  a l l  human b e in g s  have  
c e r t a i n  f i x e d  needs,  we app ear  t o  be a b l e  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
p urposes  f o r  which a t  l e a s t  some o f  our  moral b e l i e f s  e x i s t ;  
by a c t i n g  on such b e l i e f s ,  we meet t h e  human needs in  
q u e s t i o n .  T h i s  su g g es ts  an answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  why 
o u r  moral  b e l i e f s  m a t t e r  t o  us. We seem t o  be a b l e  t o  
e x p l a i n ,  a l s o ,  d i f f e r e n t  moral p r a c t i c e s  as d i f f e r e n t  ways 
i n  which t h e  needs in  q u e s t i o n  may be m i n i s t e r e d .
However t h e r e  a r e  so many fo rm a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f a c i n g  t h i s  
approach t h a t  a needs t h e s i s  seems t o  c o l l a p s e  under  t h e i r  
w e i g h t .  I t  i s  v e r y  u n c l e a r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  what  e x a c t l y  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  be tween,  on t h e  one hand, o u r  a c t u a l  moral  
b e l i e f s  e . g .  one ought  t o  keep prom ises  and,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  s o - c a l l e d  human needs.  N e i t h e r  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
c l e a r  between need s t a t e m e n t s  and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
judgem en ts  t h a t  we make. I f  a l l  persons  u n i v e r s a l l y  and 
n e c e s s a r i l y  need t o  be o r  t o  do s u c h -a n d - s u c h ,  th e n  i t  seems 
p o i n t l e s s  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  'You ought  t o  be o r  t o  do such-and  
- s u c h ’ . A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i f  needs a r e  n o t  u n i v e r s a l  f e a t u r e s  
o f  human n a t u r e  b u t ,  say ,  norms, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between  
need s t a t e m e n t s  and ' o u g h t ’ - ju d g e m e n ts  i s  c o n t i n g e n t  and in  
a n o t h e r  u n i v e r s e ,  o r  in  unusual  s o c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  our  
own, human needs c o u ld  a t t a c h  th e m s e lv e s  t o  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
moral  b e l i e f s  and ju d g em en ts .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  i s  o f t e n  
argued  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  human needs t h a t  a r e  ha rm fu l  
o r  d e s t r u c t i v e .  How do we d e t e r m in e  t h e  w o r t h i n e s s  o f  some
needs b u t  n o t  o t h e r s ?  The c l a i m  t h a t  human needs o u g h t ,  on 
moral  g rounds ,  t o  be s a t i s f i e d  i s  s e r i o u s l y  undermined i f  
t h i s  ' o u g h t ’ i s  s u b j e c t  t o  in d e p e n d e n t  moral  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
The p o i n t s  above s u g g e s t  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e y  may em phasize  
s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s ,  both  app ro aches  a r e  i n a d e q u a t e  as ac c o u n ts  
o f  what  moral  b e l i e f s  and moral  judgem en ts  a r e  and why t h e y  
a r e  i m p o r t a n t .  The f o r m e r ,  because i t  c o n f i n e s  i t s e l f  t o  
t h e  g e n e r a l  l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  moral  d i s c o u r s e  and 
n e g l e c t s  t h e  broad s o c i a l  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n t e x t s  in  
which such d i s c o u r s e  o c c u r s ;  t h e  l a t t e r ,  because i t  
c o n c e n t r a t e s  on p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i n s i g h t s  a b o u t  human needs a t  
t h e  expense o f  l o g i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I t  sh o u ld  be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  o f f e r  a t h e o r y ,  o f  a s y n t h e t i c  n a t u r e ,  which  
pays due a t t e n t i o n  t o  both  d e s i d e r a t a .  As f a r  as I  know,  
no such a t t e m p t  has been made t o  d a t e .  I t  i s  t h i s  t h a t  I  
propose t o  do in  t h i s  e s s a y .  I n  a n u t s h e l l ,  what  I  w i l l  t r y  
t o  show i s  t h a t  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  based upon human needs,  g e t s  t o  t h e  h e a r t  
o f  o u r  o r d i n a r y  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  I  hope t o  show t h a t  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
p r o v i d e s  us w i t h  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  r u l e  by which a r a t i o n a l ,  
autonomous j u d g e r  can answer th e  q u e s t i o n  'Which moral  
judgem en ts  ought  anyone t o  make?’ .
The essay  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  p a r t s .  I n  P a r t  One, I  
w i l l  i d e n t i f y  some answers t o  t h e  'w h ic h  moral  j u d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l , f o r m a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e  w i l l  p r o v i d e .  And I  w i l l  t r y  t o  
show t h a t  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l ,  m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
r u l e  i s  p o s s i b l e .  L e t  me say b r i e f l y  what  I  mean by ' a  
m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ’ .
I t  i s  w i d e l y ,  though n o t  u n i v e r s a l l y ,  a c c e p te d  t h a t  a 
moral  judgem en t  must conform  t o  som eth ing  v a r i o u s l y  
d e s c r i b e d  as t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ;  o r  -  o f  what  one 
i s  l e d  t o  suppose a r e  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  same t h i n g  -  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  e t h i c a l  c o n s i s t e n c y , 3 t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  r u l e , 4 
t h e  c a t e g o r i c a l  i m p e r a t i v e , 5 t h e  Golden R u l e , 6 t h e  p r i n c i p l e
4o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y , 7 and even t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e . 8 The 
same t h e s i s  i s  a l s o  s a i d  t o  be e x p re s s e d  by t h e  i m p e r a t i v e  
' T r e a t  l i k e  cases  a l i k e ’ 9 and by q u e s t i o n s  l i k e  'What  i f  
e v e ry o n e  d i d  t h a t ? ’ 10 and 'How would you l i k e  i t  i f  someone 
d i d  t h a t  t o  y o u ? ’ . E v i d e n t l y  t h e  t h e s i s  has som eth ing  t o  do 
w i t h  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  i f  an a c t i o n  done by one i n d i v i d u a l ,  
S m i th ,  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  ( o r  w ro n g ) ,  i t  i s  a l s o  r i g h t  ( o r  
wrong)  when done by someone e l s e ,  Jones,  who i s  l i k e  Smith  
i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ,  when Jones i s  in  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  S m i th .  The prob lem  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
s t a n d a r d  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  t h e s i s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  t h e s i s  under  some s o r t  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n t r o l ,  i t  
w i l l  be c o n v e n i e n t  t o  c l a s s i f y  th e  ac c o u n ts  a c c o r d in g  t o  
w h e th e r  t h e y  a r e  fo r m a l  o r  m a t e r i a l  v e r s i o n s  o f  i t . 11 By 
c a l l i n g  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ' f o r m a l ’ what  we w i l l  mean i s ,  
r o u g h l y ,  t h a t  re g a rd e d  as a moral  p r i n c i p l e  such a r u l e  does  
n o t  i m p ly ,  e i t h e r  a l o n e  o r  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  non-m ora l  
p r e m is e s ,  any moral  c o n c lu s io n s  ( o f  t h e  s o r t  t h a t  some 
a c t i o n ,  p e rs o n ,  o r  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s , ought  o r  oug ht  n o t  t o  
be done,  i s  r i g h t  o r  wrong, e t c . ) .  R a th e r  i t  i s  o n l y  when 
i t  i s  combined w i t h  an a d d i t i o n a l  moral s t a t e m e n t ,  t o  th e  
e f f e c t  t h a t  a t h i n g  o f  a c e r t a i n  s o r t  has ,  o r  l a c k s ,  a moral  
p r o p e r t y ,  t h a t  t h e  r u l e  can be used t o  d e r i v e  moral  
c o n c l u s i o n s .  For  most p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  
a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e .  On th e  o t h e r  hand,  what  we w i l l  mean by 
a ' m a t e r i a l ’ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  t h e  c l a i m ,  r o u g h ly ,  t h a t  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  by i t s e l f ,  o r  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  
non-m ora l  p r e m is e s ,  can be used t o  d e r i v e  o r  t o  f u l l y  
j u s t i f y  moral  c o n c lu s io n s .
By t h e  end o f  P a r t  One, I  hope t o  have e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  
c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  a m a t e r i a l  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  r u l e  must meet ,  i f  such a v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  i s  
t o  be p o s s i b l e .  T h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  I  w i l l  have o u t l i n e d  a 
m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  and 
a s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  non-m ora l  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ich ,  when
t h e y  a r e  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  can be used t o  d e t e r m in e  m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t  ju d g e m e n ts .
I n  P a r t  Two, I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show what  t h i s  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i s .  I  w i l l  b eg in  by a r g u i n g  t h a t  a l l  human 
b e in g s  have c e r t a i n  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs in  common. I  w i l l  
show t h a t  as w e l l  as h a v in g  e m p i r i c a l  s u p p o r t  ( i n  b i o l o g y ,  
s o c i o b i o l o g y ,  p s y c h o lo g y ,  p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c  t h e o r y ) ,  t h i s  
c l a i m  can be s u p p o r te d  by a p r i o r i  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a rgum en ts .  
I  w i l l  th e n  show t h a t  n e e d - r e a s o n s  ( v i z .  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  
such needs)  u n d e r l i e  most ,  i f  n o t  a l l ,  o f  o u r  moral  b e l i e f s .  
Our commonsense b e l i e f s  in  f a v o u r  o f  g r a t i t u d e ,  l o y a l t y ,  
t r u t h - t e l l i n g ,  p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ,  f a i r n e s s ,  o r  a g a i n s t  
unn ecess ary  k i l l i n g ,  i n j u r y  o r  s u f f e r i n g ,  e t c . ,  can be 
e x p l i c a t e d  in  te rm s  o f  m e e t in g  c e r t a i n  human needs.  I  w i l l  
arg u e  a l s o  t h a t  w here ,  in  our  moral  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  judgem en t  i s  based upon a reason which d e s c r i b e s  
such a need,  th e  reason i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  a 
moral  ju d g e m e n t .  I n  a r g u in g  t h i s  I  d i f f e r  f rom  th o s e  who, 
on t h e  one hand,  su g g e s t  t h a t  c o r r e c t l y  d e s c r ib e d  th e  
l o g i c a l  gap between f a c t u a l  p rem ises  and moral  c o n c lu s io n s  
d is a p p e a r s  and,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, th o s e  who c l a i m  t h a t  even  
i f  we g r a n t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  such needs,  t h e r e  i s  no a p r i o r i  
l i m i t  t o  t h e  number o f  forms t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  moral  p r a c t i c e s  
can t a k e  based upon them. By t h e  end o f  P a r t  Two, I  hope t o  
have p r o v id e d  an ac c o u n t  o f  human needs,  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  
which e x p l i c a t e  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  b e l i e f s  and s e r v e  as 
p r im a  f a c i  e good reasons  f o r  our  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
j u d g e m e n t s .
I n  P a r t  T h r e e ,  I  w i l l  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  t h e  two i m p o r t a n t  
f e a t u r e s  o f  my a c c o u n t ;  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  and t h e  
needs t h e s i s .  I  hope t o  show t h a t ,  in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
-  where we a t t e m p t  t o  answer t h e  q u e s t i o n  'Which moral  
judgem en ts  ought  anyone t o  make?’ -  s i n g u l a r  moral  
judgem en ts  based upon u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  n e e d - r e a s o n s  a r e  
judgem en ts  t h a t  any in fo rm ed  and r e f l e c t i v e  person must  
a c c e p t  as b e in g  m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t .  I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  o n l y
6c e r t a i n  n e e d - r e a s o n s ,  in  s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n ts ,  can be 
u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  Many p u t a t i v e  needs would  n o t  r e s u l t  in  a 
r a t i o n a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e  a c c o u n t  o f  o u r  own o r  any o t h e r  
p o s s i b l e  (human) moral  p r a c t i c e .  I  hope t o  show a l s o  t h a t  
in  c o n t e x t s  where d i f f e r e n t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  n e e d - r e a s o n s  
c o n f l i c t ,  we can and do o b j e c t i v e l y  weigh them a g a i n s t  each  
o t h e r ,  r a n k in g  d i f f e r e n t  needs in  te rm s  o f  one b e in g  more 
b a s i c ,  u r g e n t ,  c e r t a i n ,  e t c .  th a n  a n o t h e r .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in  
our  o r d i n a r y  moral  d i s c o u r s e ,  I  w i l l  show t h a t  we f a u l t  t h e  
r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  judgem en ts  which f a i l  t o  meet t h e  c r i t e r i a  
above .  I f  a l l  goes w e l l ,  by t h e  end o f  P a r t  T h r e e ,  I  hope 
t o  have s k e tc h e d  and defend ed  t h e  ru d im e n ts  o f  a moral  
t h e o r y .
No dou bt  many o f  t h e  c l a i m s  above w i l l  s t r i k e  t h e  r e a d e r  
as i m p l a u s i b l e .  The aim o f  t h i s  essay  i s  t o  e x p l o r e  them 
and, h o p e f u l l y ,  t o  j u s t i f y  them. L e t  me co n c lu d e  t h i s  
i n t r o d u c t o r y  c h a p t e r  by s a y in g  a few more words ab o u t  how 
t h e  essay  i s  s t r u c t u r e d .
C l e a r l y ,  b e f o r e  we can d e t e r m in e  i t s  s t a t u s  in  e t h i c s  we 
need t o  say j u s t  what  c ou n ts  as u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  a moral  
j u d g e m e n t .  C h a p te r  One w i l l  b eg in  by showing t h a t  a 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  U . R . ,  which has t h e  s t r o n g e s t  c l a i m  
t o  o u r  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a n c e ,  can be based upon a p r i n c i p l e  o f  
c o n s i s t e n c y .  My s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  must be u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e  in  t h e  sense t h a t  i t  must be c o n s i s t e n t ;  t h i s  means,  
a t  t h e  l e a s t ,  t h a t  I  must be both w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  
t h e  judgem ent  f o r  a l l  s i m i l a r  cases j_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . I  
w i l l  th e n  show t h a t  t h e  r u l e ,  in  t h i s  r u d i m e n t a r y  fo rm ,  can 
be used t o  expose c e r t a i n  f a u l t s  in  our  moral  re a s o n in g  e . g .  
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,  d o u b le  s t a n d a r d s .  As i t  s t a n d s ,  however,  
U.R .  i s  u s e le s s  as a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  moral  as opposed t o  
non-m ora l  ju d g e m e n ts .  For  I  can u n i v e r s a l i z e  a lm o s t  
a n y t h i n g  I  l i k e  in  t h e  name o f  m o r a l i t y .
I n  C h a p te r  Two I  w i l l  show t h a t  due t o  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  
in  moral  c o n t e x t s ,  a number o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  must be p la c e d  
on t h e  judgem ents  t o  which t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  can
7be l e g i t i m a t e l y  a p p l i e d .  As a r e s u l t ,  U .R .  needs t o  be 
amended. The amendments in  q u e s t i o n  mean t h a t  our  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  d i f f e r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f rom  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y .  I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  
t o  con form  w i t h  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  one reason r a t h e r  
th a n  a n o t h e r  can be q u i t e  an i d i o s y n c r a t i c  o r  a r b i t r a r y  
m a t t e r ,  whereas  t o  con form  t o  t h e  amended v e r s i o n s  o f  U . R . ,  
one i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u p p o r t  judgem en ts  w i t h  reasons  t h a t  a r e  
im p e r s o n a l .  My reason must be a reason f o r  t h e  ju d g e m e n t ;  
t h a t  i s ,  a reason i n d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I  so r e g a r d  
i t .  I  w i l l  go on t o  show t h a t  t h e  amended v e r s i o n s  o f  U .R .  
( U . R . I  and U . R . I I )  a r e  s t i l l  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  y e t ,  under  
them, non -m ora l  p r a c t i c a l  ju dgem en ts  a r e  n o t  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e .  However t h e  amendments w i l l  n o t  g i v e  us many 
unambiguously  c o r r e c t  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .
I n  C h a p te r  T h ree  I  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  p rob lem  t h a t  f a c e s  us by 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between a fo r m a l  and a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  
A fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  does n o t  a p p ly  d i r e c t l y ,  b u t  o n l y  
m e d i a t e l y ,  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  G iven t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e r e  i s  n o t  a s im p le  l i n k  between  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and what  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t .  F u r th e r m o r e  
I  w i l l  show t h a t  so i n t e r p r e t e d ,  U .R .  i s  t r i v i a l .  M u t u a l l y  
i n c o m p a t i b l e ,  c o n t r a r y  and even c o n t r a d i c t o r y  moral  
judgem en ts  s a t i s f y  i t .  I n  a l l  such ca s e s ,  t h e  burden o f  
moral  d i s t i n c t i o n s  f a l l s  e n t i r e l y  on t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  and 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  assum pt ions  t h a t  a r e  needed t o  
sup p lem ent  th e  fo rm a l  r u l e  when making a ju d g e m e n t .  I f  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  t o  have any s i g n i f i c a n t  b e a r in g  
on r i g h t  o r  wrong con duct  th e n  i t  must be u n d ers to o d  as a 
m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  By th e  l a t t e r  I  mean a p r i n c i p l e  which  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  some o t h e r  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  c o n s t i t u e n t  l e a d s  
i n e l u c t a b l y  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  e t h i c a l  t h e o r y .  I  w i l l  c o n s id e r  
and r e j e c t  both M . S i n g e r ’ s ( 1 9 6 1 )  and R . M . H a r e ’ s ( 1 9 8 1 )  
a t t e m p t  t o  show how u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  a f u r t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  
o r  c a t e g o r y  i s  needed which does n o t  smuggle in  c o n t e n t i o u s
8moral  o r  e v a l u a t i v e  ass um pt ions  and w h ic h ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  
w i l l  p r o v i d e  us w i t h  a w ide  range o f  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  between t h i n g s .
I n  C h a p te r  Four I  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  two t y p e s  o f  non-  
v o l i t i o n a l  needs:  t h o s e  t h i n g s  w i t h o u t  which a person can n o t  
f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l  and th o s e  t h i n g s  w i t h o u t  which a person  w i l l  
be s e r i o u s l y  harmed. My argument  i s  t h a t  such needs p l a y  a 
fu n d a m e n ta l  r o l e  in  most ,  i f  n o t  a l l ,  o f  our  commonsense 
moral  b e l i e f s .  I  w i l l  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  r o l e  needs p l a y  in  our  
moral  t h i n k i n g  c o n c e r n in g  k i l l i n g ,  n o n - a c c i d e n t a l  i n j u r y  and 
s u f f e r i n g .  I n  a r g u i n g  so,  I  w i l l  have t o  d e fen d  my t h e s i s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  t y p e  o f  a t t a c k  t o  which P . F o o t ’ s ( 1 9 5 8 )  t h e s i s  
was s u b j e c t e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  be 
s o c i e t i e s  where p e o p le  a r e  m o r a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  a l l  
k i l l i n g  and t h e r e  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l s  who do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  a 
s e r i o u s  i n j u r y  o r  p h y s i c a l  s u f f e r i n g  i s  a harm. T h e re  a r e ,  
however ,  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between Mrs F o o t ’ s and my 
p o s i t i o n .  I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o t  an 
e n t a i l m e n t  between n e e d - r e a s o n s  and ' o u g h t ’ - j u d g m e n t s . 
A n o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e  between us concerns  th e  e x t e n t  and t h e  
v a r i e t y  o f  a p e r s o n ’ s needs.
T h i s  becomes c l e a r ,  in  C h a p te r  F i v e ,  when I  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  
a number o f  th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs t h a t  someone who makes 
a moral  judgem en t  must p resu ppose .  The j u d g e r  w i l l  need t o  
be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  ( v i z .  he w i l l  need a c o n c e p t io n  o f  
h i m s e l f  as an i n i t i a t o r  o f  a c t i o n s  t h a t  make a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  c o u rs e  o f  e v e n t s ) .  He needs a l s o  a sense o f  h i s  own 
i d e n t i t y .  For t h i s  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  he needs t o  d e v e lo p  h i s  
t a l e n t s ,  t o  have a sense o f  u n i t y  in  h i s  l i f e ,  and so on.  
He w i l l  need r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r  human b e in g s  and he 
w i l l  need,  p a r t i c u l a r 1y , some deg re e  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  
them. Then I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  l i k e  a moral  j u d g e r ,  a l l  
persons  have th e s e  same p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  O b v io u s ly  my 
a c c o u n t  f a c e s  a number o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s ;  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  
needs i d e n t i f i e d  do n o t  ap p ear  t o  p r o v i d e  us w i t h  a b a s is  
f o r  e x p l a i n i n g  o r  j u s t i f y i n g  many o f  our  m a jo r  moral
9b e ! i e f s .
In  C h a p te r  S ix  I  w i l l  show how o u r  b e l i e f s  c o n c e r n in g  
' g r a t i t u d e ’ , ' l o y a l t y ’ , ' t r u t h - t e l l i n g ’ , ' p r o m i s i n g ’ and 
' j u s t i c e ’ can be acc ounted  f o r  in  te rm s  o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
needs .  I  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  a l s o  why my a c c o u n t  s h o u ld  be 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  o t h e r  a c c o u n t s .  We w i l l  c o n s i d e r ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  K a n t ’ s v ie w  t h a t  g r a t i t u d e  i s  a h o l y  d u t y ,  and 
c o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  t h e  ac c o u n t  o f  g r a t i t u d e  in  te rm s  o f  
m e e t in g  c e r t a i n  needs.  We w i l l  c o n s i d e r  and r e j e c t  a t t e m p t s  
t o  e x p l a i n  p r o m is in g  as an a r t i f i c i a l  v i r t u e  and t h e  a t t e m p t  
t o  r e l a t i v i s e  p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  p r a c t i c e s .  
I  w i l l  show t h a t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  persons  t o  keep t h e i r  
prom ises  i s  b e s t  u n d e rs to o d  as based upon t h e i r  psycho­
l o g i c a l  needs.  I  w i l l  th e n  o u t l i n e  R a w ls ’ m o t i v a t i o n a l  
t h e o r y  o f  a sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  which i s  based upon r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and r e c i p r o c i t y .  T h i s  p r e s e n t s  a p rob lem  f o r  
my needs t h e s i s  f o r  i t  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  
needs I  have i d e n t i f i e d ,  such as sympathy ,  a r e  s u p e r f l u o u s .  
I  hope t o  show t h a t  a sense o f  j u s t i c e  has t o  be 
supp lem ented  by t h e  need f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy .
I n  C h a p te r  Seven,  I  w i l l  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  t h e  u n i v e r s a l ­
i z i n g  r u l e ,  U . R . ,  and needs t h e s i s  and show how t h e y  a p p ly  
when making moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  ( v i z .  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e -  
needs t h e s i s ) .  To do t h i s ,  I  w i l l  f i r s t  d e s c r i b e  th e  
d e l i b e r a t i v e  and j u s t i f i c a t o r y  c o n t e x t s  in  w h ic h ,  
p a r a d i g m a t i c a l 1y , my u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  a p p l i e s .  
I  w i l l  th e n  show how in  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm ,  moral  
judgem ents  based on n e e d - r e a s o n s  a r e  judgem ents  t h a t  any 
in fo rm e d  and r e f l e c t i v e  person must a c c e p t  as b e ing  m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t .  We w i l l  f i n d  a l s o  t h a t  c e r t a i n  s i n g u l a r  judgem ents  
based upon p u t a t i v e  n e e d - r e a s o n s  can n o t  be u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  
Where t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm  o f  such a judgem ent  i s  
i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  t h e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n  does n o t  y i e l d  a 
d e f e n s i b l e  acc o u n t  o f  t h e  moral  p r a c t i c e s  o f  a human 
s o c i e t y .  I  w i l l  th e n  show t h a t  i t  makes sense t o  speak o f  
w e ig h in g  d i f f e r e n t  ( u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e )  n e e d - r e a s o n s  and I  w i l l
a t t e m p t  t o  p r o v i d e  n e u t r a l  c r i t e r i a  f o r  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  
w e ig h t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  needs.  N ex t  I  w i l l  s t r e s s  th e  
c o m p l e x i t y  o f  most c o n t e x t s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral  judgem en t  
and I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  what  we have t o  a s c e r t a i n  f o r  t h e  
purpose o f  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g ,  a r e  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  n e e d - r e a s o n s .  
F i n a l l y ,  a t  t h e  end o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  I  w i l l  show how t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  w orks .  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  ( i )  
any s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem en t  based upon a n e e d - r e a s o n  i s
p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t  and t h a t  ( i i )  any f u r t h e r  jud g em en t  t h a t
can be d e r i v e d  by u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n  f ro m  ( i )  i s  a l s o  p r im a  
f a c i e  c o r r e c t .
I n  C h a p te r  E i g h t  we w i l l  c o n s id e r  some o f  t h e  re m a in in g  
o b j e c t i o n s  t o  which t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  app ears  
t o  be v u l n e r a b l e .  F i r s t l y ,  I  w i l l  d e fen d  my t h e s i s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  c l a i m s  made by A . M a c I n t y r e  and P .Winch t h a t  n o t  a l l  
moral  judgem ents  a r e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .  N e x t  I  w i l l  answer  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  why anyone r a t i o n a l l y  s h o u ld  ju d g e  in  t h e  way 
t h a t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  r e q u i r e s .  T h i r d l y ,  I  
w i l l  c o n s id e r  and r e j e c t  an a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
n a t u r e  o f  persons  which d i f f e r s  f rom my own, namely
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  egoism. F o u r t h l y ,  we w i l l  examine and r e j e c t  
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a s i m p l e r  a cc o u n t  o f  m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t
ju d g e m e n ts ,  m e r e ly  based upon r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and 
r e c i p r o c i t y ,  would p r o v i d e  an a d e q u a te  a n a l y s i s  and d e l i v e r  
t h e  same r e s u l t s  as t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y .  
F i f t h l y ,  I  w i l l  show how my a c c o u n t  h e lp s  t o  s e t t l e  some o f  
t h e  more i n t r a c t a b l e  moral  d i s p u t e s  which have been r a i s e d  





A s i n g u l a r  moral  ju dgem en t  i s  a r a t i o n a l  ju d g em en t  i f ,  
and o n l y  i f ,  i t  can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  T h i s  c l a i m  i s  
g e n e r a l l y ,  i f  n o t  u n i v e r s a l l y ,  conceded.  D i f f e r e n t  w r i t e r s  
however ,  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  in  
d i f f e r e n t  ways. And t h e y  make d i f f e r e n t  c l a i m s  a b o u t  i t s  
s t a t u s  and t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i t s  n e c e s s i t y .  I  t o o  want  t o  c l a i m  
t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  a n e c e s s a r y ,  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  
r u l e ,  ( n e u t r a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  a l l  moral  t h e o r i e s ) .  So what  
e x a c t l y  i s  my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  i t ?  How does t h e  r u l e  
f u n c t i o n ?  And why i s  i t  n ec essa ry ?
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I  want  t o  show t h a t  an a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
which has t h e  s t r o n g e s t  c l a i m  t o  o u r  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e  and 
which i s  c a p a b le  o f  p o w e r fu l  employment in  moral  c o n t e x t s ,  
can be based upon a p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y .  To e s t a b l i s h  
t h i s  I  w i l l  b e g in ,  in  s e c t i o n  ( 1 ) ,  by d e f i n i n g  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  in  te rm s  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  v i z .  U .R .  I n  ( 2 ) ,  I  w i l l  
make some p r e l i m i n a r y  comments abo ut  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  
j u d g e m e n t ’ and ' r e a s o n s ’ we a r e  u s i n g .  I n  ( 3 )  I  w i l l  
c o n s i d e r  how U.R.  w orks .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  I  w i l l  show, in  ( 4 ) ,  
t h a t  s i n c e  U .R .  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  
a p p l i e s  in  a l l  r e l e v a n t  c a s e s ,  t h i s  commits t h e  j u d g e r  t o  
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  h i s  judgem ent  in  a number 
o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o n t e x t s .  I n  t h i s  way, U .R .  f u l l y  t e s t s  th e  
c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  h i s  ju d g e m e n t .  I t  can i n d i c a t e  a l s o  th e  
j u d g e r ’ s i n s i n c e r i t y  o r  h i s  use o f  d ou b le  s t a n d a r d s .  I n  ( 5 )  
I  w i l l  e x p l o r e  one o f  th e s e  c o n t e x t s ,  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  in  
p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a , in  more d e t a i l .  I n  ( 6 ) ,  I  w i l l  compare our  
U .R .  w i t h  some o t h e r  approaches  t o  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
t h e s i s .  I n  ( 7 ) ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  say why U .R .  i s  n e c e s s a ry .  
F i n a l l y ,  in  ( 8 ) ,  I  w i l l  p o i n t  o u t  some o f  t h e  m a jo r  problems  
t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f a c e s .
C o n s is te n c y  and u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t v
What i s  i t  f o r  a judgem ent  t o  be uni v e r s a !  i z a b l e  o r  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d ?  Speak ing  g e n e r a l l y ,  f o r  a s i n g u l a r  judgem en t  
t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  i t  must a p p ly  n o t  o n l y  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  t h e  judgem en t  bu t  a l s o  t o  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  
s u b j e c t  in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s .  Thus t o  say 'X i s  good ’ 
i m p l i e s  -  in  some sense o f  ' i m p l i e s ’ -  t h a t  a n y t h i n g  e l s e  
w i t h  t h e  same r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r  i s t i  cs i s  a l s o  good.  
S i m i l a r l y ,  when j u d g i n g  X ’ s conduct  i f ,  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
s u c h -a n d -s u c h  re a s o n s ,  we co n c lu d e  t h a t  X oug ht  t o  do F ( o r  
t h a t  i t  i s  r i g h t  f o r  X t o  do F, e t c . ) ,  then  we a r e  com m it ted  
t o  s a y in g  t h a t  anyone Y, who i s  t h e  same as X in  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ,  ought  t o  do F ( e t c . )  i n  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  In  o t h e r  words,  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  a s i n g u l a r  
ju d g e m e n t  i s  uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e  i s  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  we a r e  a b l e  t o  
e x t e n d  our  judgem ent  t o  a l l  cases which a r e  t h e  same in  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  o u r  o r i g i n a l  ju d g e m e n t .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, by s a y in g  t h a t  i t  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d ,  we 
mean t h a t  t h e  judgem ent  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  
c a s e s .  These a r e  min imal  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  o f  t h e  te rm s  
' u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e ’ and ' u n i v e r s a l i z e d ’ . We w i l l  a t t a c h  
f u r t h e r  c o n n o t a t i o n s  t o  them l a t e r .
One v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  o u r  U . R . ,  
which a p p ears  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  above ,  can be 
d e r i v e d  f rom a more g e n e r a l  r u l e  o f  i n f e r e n c e  w h ic h ,  f o r  
r easons  t h a t  w i l l  become a p p a r e n t  s h o r t l y ,  we w i l l  c a l l  
' c o n s i s t e n c y  A ’ . T h i s  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  i n d i c a t o r  t o  t h e  way 
t h a t  we w i l l  t h i n k  o f  uni v e r s a l  i zab i  1 i t y  in  t h i s  e s s a y .  
C l e a r l y ,  re g a rd e d  in  t h i s  way we have a s t r o n g  b a s is  f o r  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  U .R .  i s  n e c e s s a ry .  For  by r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e y  
conform  t o  U .R .  we a r e  s a y in g  t h a t  s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem en ts  
must be,  in  some sense ,  c o n s i s t e n t .  T h e re  seems t o  be no 
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  judgem en ts  a r e  r a t i o n a l l y  
u n a c c e p t a b l e .
C o n s is te n c y  A can be r e p r e s e n t e d  in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
schem a:-
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I .  I f  X i s  th en  a n y t h i n g  which i s  t h e  same as X in
t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  i s  a l s o  . . . 12 
Someone who a s s e n ts  t o  a g e n e r a l  t e r m  o r  a p r e d i c a t e  
s u b s t i t u t e d  in  t h e  a n t e c e d e n t  c l a u s e  o f  schema I .  i s  t h e r e b y  
c o m m i t te d ,  sub s p e c ie  l o g i c a e , t o  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  s e n te n c e .  A person who r e j e c t s  
t h e  con sequent  w h i l e  a c c e p t in g  th e  a n t e c e d e n t  i s  g u i l t y  o f  
a fo rm  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  The i n c o n s i s t e n c y  in  q u e s t i o n  w i l l  
be a r e f u s a l  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  a 
s t a t e m e n t  which he r e g a r d s  as r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e ,  f o r  some o r  a l l  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  ca s e s .  
However in  some i n s t a n c e s ,  as we s h a l l  s e e ,  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s 
a c c e p ta n c e  w i l l  n o t  be p o s s i b l e  s i n c e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  w i l l  be 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , s e l f - d e f e a t i n g ,  s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g , o r  in  
o t h e r  ways s e n s e le s s  when i t s  l o g i c a l  consequences a r e  
s p e l l e d  o u t .
O b v io u s ly  c o n s is t e n c y  A i s  n o t  a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  moral  
r e q u i r e m e n t .  I t  a p p l i e s  t o  most k in d s  o f  d e s c r i p t i v e  and 
p r a c t i c a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  such as s t a t e m e n t s  o f  o p i n i o n ,  t a s t e ,  
e t c . ,  ( e . g .  ' T h i s  i s  a r a c e h o r s e ’ , ' I  l i k e  s p i n a c h ’ ) .  Thus 
I f  X i s  a r a c e h o r s e  then  a n y t h i n g  which i s  t h e  same 
as X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  i s  a l s o  a r a c e h o r s e ,  
i s  a l e g i t i m a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n t o  schema I .  We would n o t  
u n d e r s ta n d  someone who sa y s ,  w i t h o u t  any f u r t h e r  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h a t  in  h i s  o p i n i o n  X i s  a r a c e h o r s e  and t h a t  
Y i s  t h e  same as X in  th e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ,  y e t  Y i s  n o t  a 
r a c e h o r s e .  We sho u ld  n o t i c e  h e re  t h a t  a lm o s t  a n y t h i n g  can  
be l i k e  X in  some r e s p e c t s  y e t  n o t  be a r a c e h o r s e .  For  one  
t h i n g  can be d e s c r ib e d  as b e ing  s i m i l a r  o r  d i s s i m i l a r  t o  any  
o t h e r  depending  on which f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  we fo c u s  
upon. What we c o u ld  n o t  u n d e r s ta n d ,  however ,  i s  a p e r s o n ’ s 
r e f u s a l  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  Y i s  a r a c e h o r s e ,  i f  he a c c e p te d  t h a t  
X and Y a r e  t h e  same in  t h e  p r im a  f a c i e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s .
D e o n t ic  e x p r e s s i o n s  l i k e  ' . . . i s  good ’ , ' . . . i s  r i g h t ’ 
' . . . i s  under  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  do F ’ , ' . . . o u g h t  t o  do F ’ a l s o  
can be i n s e r t e d  i n t o  t h e  b la n k  spaces o f  t h e  schema I ;
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th u s
I f  X i s  good ( . . . i s  r i g h t ,  . . . i s  under  an o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  do F, . . . o u g h t  t o  do F , )  th e n  a n y t h i n g /  
anyone who i s  t h e  same as X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  
a l s o  i s  good, ( e t c ) .
To c l a i m  c o n s i s t e n c y  A f o r  norms and e v a l u a t i o n s  i s  t o  
c l a i m ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i f  X i s  a good r a c e h o r s e ,  ( p a r e n t ,  
l e c t u r e r ,  i n s t i t u t i o n ) ,  then  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  i s  t h e  same as X 
in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  i s  a l s o  a good r a c e h o r s e ,  ( p a r e n t ,  
e t c . ) .  The same h o lds  f o r  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  r i g h t n e s s  o r  
s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e r n in g  what  ought  t o  be done.  I f  I  c l a i m  
t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F and I  a c c e p t  t h a t  Y i s  t h e  same 
as X t h e n ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  I  must a c c e p t  t h a t  Y 
o u g h t  t o  do F . I f  I  can not  a c c e p t  t h e  l a t t e r ,  th e n  I  am 
c o m p e l le d  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  f o r m e r .  T h a t  I  must r e j e c t  t h e  
f o r m e r  ( i . e .  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F) i s  a m a t t e r  o f  l o g i c ,  
n o t  m o r a l i t y .  Someone who a s s e n ts  t o  a s e n te n c e  in  t h e  
a n t e c e d e n t  p a r t  y e t  who r e j e c t s  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  s e n te n c e  
i s  c o n t r a v e n i n g  c o n s is t e n c y  A.
C o n s is te n c y  A a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  k in d s  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  o r  
u t t e r a n c e s .  I t  a p p l i e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n ts ,  
b oth  d e s c r i p t i v e  and p r a c t i c a l .  By a s i n g u l a r  ju dgem en t  we 
w i l l  mean one which i s  couched in  p a r t i c u l a r  t e r m s ,  as f o r  
exa m ple ,  ' T h i s  horse  i s  a r a c e h o r s e  because i t  has a 
c e r t a i n  p e d ig r e e  and i t  can run f a s t ’ , ' I f  I  go o u t  t h i s  
morning  I  w i l l  g e t  wet  because i t  i s  r a i n i n g ’ , 'The  decay in  
my t o o t h  i s  th e  cause o f  my t o o t h a c h e ’ . S i n g u l a r  judgem en ts  
t o o  can be s u b s t i t u t e d  i n t o  schema I ,  th u s
I f  I  j u d g e  t h a t  X i s  F, because o f  t h e  r e a s o n ( s )
R, th en  f o r  a l l  Y, i f  Y i s  t h e  same as X in  th e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ,  I  must j u d g e  t h a t  Y i s  F.
I n  j u d g i n g  t h a t  F a p p l i e s  t o  X because o f  R, we a r e  s a y in g  
t h a t  R i s  t h e  reas o n ,  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o r  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  why t h e  
p r e d i c a t e  has been a s c r i b e d  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t .  M oreover  i f  F 
a p p l i e s  t o  a s u b j e c t  X because o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s p e l t  o u t  
i n  t h e  reason R, then  F must a p p ly  t o  a l l  o t h e r  s u b j e c t s  Y,
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Z, t o  which R a p p l i e s .  By f a i l i n g  o r  r e f u s i n g  t o
a s c r i b e  F t o  some Y, where R a p p l i e s  t o  Y, t h e  j u d g e r  i s  n o t  
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  h i s  s i n g u l a r  
ju d g e m e n t .
Any s i n g u l a r  d e s c r i p t i v e  ju d g em en t ,  where a p a r t i c u l a r  
reason  o r  cau sa l  e x p l a n a t i o n  shows why a p r e d i c a t e  i s  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  i s  a l e g i t i m a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n t o  
schema I .  So, f o r  exam ple ,
I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X i s  a r a c e h o r s e  because i t  has a 
c e r t a i n  p e d ig r e e  and runs f a s t ,  th e n  I  must ju d g e  
t h a t  a n y t h i n g  which i s  t h e  same as X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
r e s p e c t s ,  i . e .  w i t h  a c e r t a i n  p e d i g r e e ,  t h a t  runs  
f a s t ,  i s  a l s o  a r a c e h o r s e .
We would  n o t  u n d e rs ta n d  someone who, w i t h o u t  any f u r t h e r  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  c l a i m s  t h a t  X i s  r a c e h o r s e  because i t  has  
c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r i  s t i  cs and t h a t  Y has j u s t  t h e  same 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , y e t  Y i s  n o t  a r a c e h o r s e .
We may e x te n d  t h e  p o i n t  h e re  t o  o b t a i n  a b a s ic  v e r s i o n  o f  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  U .R .  Thus
( 1 )  I f  I  j u d g e  t h a t  X i s  good, ( . . . o u g h t  t o  do F, e t c . )
because o f  t h e  r e a s o n ( s )  R, th en  I  must j u d g e  t h a t  
a n y t h i n g / a n y o n e  who i s  t h e  same as X i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
r e s p e c t s  i s  good ( e t c . )  because o f  R, 
i s  a s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n s t a n c e  o f  schema I .  I t  t o o  r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  we must a c c e p t  th e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  a s i n g u l a r  
judgem en t  f o r  a l l  p r im a  f a c i e  l i k e  c a s e s .  T h e re  i s ,  
how ever ,  more t o  t h e  m a t t e r  th a n  t h i s .
I n  any s i n g u l a r  ju d g em en t ,  we n o te d ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  reason  
R w i l l  s t a t e  o r  im p ly  why th e  p r e d i c a t e  F a p p l i e s  t o  X. The  
p r e d i c a t e  a p p l i e s  t o  th e  s u b j e c t  because o f  t h e  r e a s o n ( s )  
g i v e n .  Now n o t  e v e r y  reason g iv e n  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  judgem ent  
i m p l i e s  a g e n e r a l  reason ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  ' I  w i l l  buy some 
s p in a c h  to d a y  so t h a t  I  can e a t  i t  f o r  d i n n e r  to m o r ro w ’ , 
( s e e  a l s o  reasons ( a ) - ( d )  p p . 70-71 a h e a d ) . 13 However where  
R does s t a t e  o r  im p ly  a g e n e r a l  reason i t  w i l l  s t a t e  o r  
im p ly  a l s o  th e  grounds upon which o t h e r  t h i n g s  Y, Z . . . ,  may
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be ju d g e d  t o  be t h e  same as X i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s .  I f  
t h i s  i s  so,  we can drop t h e  c l a u s e  'w h ic h /w h o  i s  t h e  same as  
X i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ’ f rom  schema I  and have an 
e q u i v a l e n t  form  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A th u s
I .  I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X i s  F because o f  t h e  reasons  R,
(w here  t h e  ' b e c a u s e ’ i n d i c a t e s  a s u f f i c i e n t  re a s o n ,  
a p r im a  f a c i e  sound re a s o n ,  o r  a s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n ) ,  
th e n  I  must ju d g e  t h a t  f o r  a l l  Y,  i f  R a p p l i e s  t o  Y 
th en  Y i s  F.
Where a judgem ent  i s  based on g e n e r a l  r e a s o n ( s ) ,  a s i m i l a r  
ju d g em en t  must a p p ly  t o  a l l  th o s e  cases  where t h e  reason  
appl  i e s . 14
T h i s  g i v e s  us an e q u i v a l e n t  form  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  I t  i s  t h e  one t h a t  we w i l l  make use o f  in  
t h i s  ess a y ;  a v e r s i o n  which p l a c e s  t h e  emphasis  on re a s o n s .  
I  w i l l  a rgue  s h o r t l y  t h a t  i f  a s t a t e m e n t  such as 'X oug ht  t o  
do F ( e t c . ) ’ i s  t o  cou n t  as a moral  judgem en t  th e n  i t  must be 
s u p p o r te d  by r e a s o n ( s ) .  And I  w i 11 go on t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  
reason g iv e n  must s t a t e  ( o r  i m p ly )  a g e n e r a l  reason  which  
w i l l  i n  t u r n  s p e c i f y  ( o r  im p ly )  t h e  grounds on which persons  
o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r e  t o  be r e g a rd e d  as t h e  same o r
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  grounds upon which a l l
such cases a r e  t o  be ju d g e d .  We may s t a t e  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  
fo rm  o f  U .R .  thus
( 2 )  I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X i s  good ( . . . m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F,
e t c . )  because o f  th e  reason R th e n  I  must ju d g e  
t h a t  a n y t h i n g / a n y o n e  t o  which R a p p l i e s  a l s o  i s  good 
( e t c . ) .
We m ig h t  e x p re s s  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  ( 2 )  above in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
way: i f  R i s  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem en t  S,  
in  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  T t h e n ,  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  A, i t  must be t h e  
reason f o r  t h e  moral judgem ent  S ’ , in  T ’ v i z .  in  a l l  th o s e  
cases  t o  which th e  reason a p p l i e s .
We need now t o  make a d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  a g e n t  and
t h e  p a t i e n t  o f  an a c t i o n .  The s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n ts ,  in  t h e
a n t e c e d e n t  o f  our  U.R.  schema, have so f a r  concerned  t h e
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f a m i l i a r  case where we e v a l u a t e  an a g e n t  p e r f o r m in g  an 
a c t i o n .  But t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  t y p e  o f  n o r m a t iv e  judgem en t  
which  r e g u l a r l y  o cc u rs  in  moral  d i s c o u r s e ,  nam ely ,  where t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  r e f e r r e d  t o  i s  t h e  p a t i e n t  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e  a g e n t  
o f  t h e  a c t .  I n  such judgem ents  t h e  s u b j e c t  i s ,  so t o  
s p e a k ,  on t h e  r e c e i v i n g  end o f  t h e  proposed a c t i o n  o r  
c o n d i t i o n .  They a r e  judgem ents  c o n c e r n in g  how X m o r a l l y  
o ug ht  t o  be t r e a t e d .  These t o o  can be s u b s t i t u t i o n s  i n t o  a 
l o g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  form  schema I  th u s
( 3 )  I f  I  j u d g e  F i s  good f o r  X, ( . . . o u g h t  t o  be done t o
X, . . . i s  th e  r i g h t  way t o  t r e a t  X ) ,  because o f  t h e  
reason R, then  I  must ju d g e  t h a t  F i s  good ( e t c . )  
f o r  any i n d i v i d u a l  t o  whom R a p p l i e s . 15 
As we s h a l l  s e e ,  we can o b t a i n  ( 3 )  f rom  ( 2 )  above when we 
g i v e  a f u l l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c a s e s ,  so ( 3 )  i s  
n o t  an in d e p e n d e n t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  U .R .  r u l e ,  ( s e e  p . 3 2 ) .
Something abo ut  ( 3 )  le a d s  some p h i l o s o p h e r s 16 t o  t h i n k  
t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  same as th e  demand ' T r e a t  l i k e  cases  a l i k e ’ . 
The l a t t e r  i s  n o t ,  however,  a c o n c is e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  what  ( 3 )  
r e q u i r e s .  For  whenever someone i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  r u l e  
' T r e a t  l i k e s  cases a l i k e ’ t h i s  r u l e  a p p l i e s  n o t  j u s t  t o  h i s  
judgem en ts  b u t  t o  h i s  a c t i o n s  as w e l l .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  we 
m ig h t  c h a r a c t e r i s e  ( 3 )  as r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  we ' j u d g e  l i k e  
cases  a l i k e ’ . We can see th e  d i f f e r e n c e  h e re  i f  we c o n s id e r  
judgem en ts  o f  moral p e r m i s s i b i l i t y .  An a c t  F i s  m o r a l l y  
p e r m i s s i b l e ,  l e t  us s ay ,  i f  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  f o r  someone 
t o  do F, o r  n o t ,  as he chooses.  I n  such c o n t e x t s ,  we must  
j u d g e  l i k e  cases a l i k e  bu t  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  we a lw ays  
o ug ht  t o  t r e a t  them a l i k e .  I f  a c t s  o f  c h a r i t y  a r e  ju d g e d  t o  
be m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e ,  f o r  exam ple ,  ( 3 )  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a 
j u d g e r  makes th e  same ju d g em en t ,  o f  moral  p e r m i s s i b i l i t y ,  
t o  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  ca s e s .  From t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  moral  
p e r m i s s i b i l i t y ,  however,  th e  way he a c t s  can be q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t .  Whether  o r  n o t  he d o n a te s  t o  t h i s  o r  t h a t  good 
cause i s  f o r  th e  j u d g e r  t o  choose.  He can g i v e  a l l  o f  h i s  
money t o  Oxfam to d a y  and n o t h in g  t o  t h e  e q u a l l y  d e s e r v in g
Save The C h i l d r e n  Fund tom orrow.  Hence i n  judgem en ts  o f  
moral  p e r m i s s i b i l i t y  t h e  same o r  a d i f f e r e n t  p e r s o n ,  in  t h e  
same s i t u a t i o n ,  may t r e a t  l i k e  cases d i f f e r e n t l y .
I  am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n s  ( 1 ) - ( 3 )  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  ways 
o f  s t a t i n g  t h e  same r u l e ,  v i z .  a r u l e  t h a t  we a r e  c a l l i n g  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  y e t  which s im p ly  amounts t o  d e o n t i c  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A. By d e f i n i n g  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  in  t h i s  way, I  hope t o  show t h a t  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  can be defend ed  in  a 
r i g o r o u s  way. More complex i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  U .R .  w i l l  be 
r e q u i r e d  because,  as we s h a l l  see in  C h a p te r  Two, t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  in  moral c o n t e x t s  p l a c e s  a number o f  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  reasons t h a t  we can l e g i t i m a t e l y
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  R. For i n s t a n c e ,  a r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  te rm s w i l l  r e s u l t  when we 
b e g in  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  what  a r e  t o  c o u n t  as
' m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  s i m i l a r i t i e s ’ . Y e t  d e s p i t e  such
r e s t r i c t i o n s , I  w i l l  c l a i m  now and a rg u e  l a t e r  t h a t  t h e s e  
f u r t h e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  t h e  
b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e  U . R . ,  which i t s e l f  i s  d e r i v e d  f rom  a t y p e  o f  
c o n s i s t e n c y  r e q u i r e m e n t .
So we have s t a r t e d  w i t h  an a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  r u l e  w h ic h ,  
h o p e f u l l y ,  i s  t o l e r a b l y  u n p r o b le m a t i c .  I t  can n o t  be d e n ie d  
t h a t  moral  judgem ents  need t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  A and t h a t  t h e y  
a r e ,  in  t h i s  l i m i t e d  sense ,  uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e .  We want  t o  see  
i f  U .R .  d e l i v e r s  any s i g n i f i c a n t  answers t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n
'Which moral  judgem ents  ought  anyone t o  make?’ . B e fo r e  
p r o c e e d in g  t o  t h i s ,  however,  I  need t o  say som eth ing  b r i e f l y  
a b o u t  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  ' j u d g e m e n t ’ and ' r e a s o n ( s ) ’ we a r e  
u s in g  h e r e .
Judgement and reasons
F i r s t l y ,  th e  te rm  ' j u d g e m e n t ’ i s  e q u i v o c a l .  Sometimes i t  
i s  used t o  r e f e r  t o  a c o n c lu s io n  o f  an argument  a l o n e  and 
sometimes i t  i s  used t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  reasons ( i . e .  a s e t  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s ) .  When i t  i s
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used in  t h i s  l a t t e r  sen se ,  t h e  l a s t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  s e t  i s  
a p r a c t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n  w h i l e  th o s e  which p re c e d e  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  a r e  r e a s o n ( s )  f rom  which t h e  c o n c lu s io n  can be 
i n f e r r e d ,  o r  by which i t  can be a d e q u a t e l y  s u p p o r t e d .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  when ' j u d g e m e n t ’ i s  u n d e rs to o d  t o  r e f e r  t o  
t h e  c o n c lu s io n  by i t s e l f ,  i t  must be i n f e r r e d  f ro m  o r  
s u p p o r te d  by accompanying r e a s o n ( s ) .  As long as we use t h e  
te r m  ' j u d g e m e n t ’ c o n s i s t e n t l y  I  c an n o t  see t h a t  i t  m a t t e r s  
which a l t e r n a t i v e  we a d o p t .  So we w i l l  use ' j u d g e m e n t ’ t o  
r e f e r  t o  a c o n c lu s io n  by i t s e l f .  And we w i l l  use ' s i n g u l a r  
moral  ju d g e m e n t ’ t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  which U .R .  
a p p l i e s ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  a moral  c o n c lu s io n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  reasons  upon which i t  i s  based.
A second p o i n t  concerns  t h e  k in d  o f  s i n g u l a r  moral  
judgem en ts  t o  which U.R .  a p p l i e s .  Judgements aimed a t  
c o n v in c in g  someone t h a t  we a r e  m o r a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  do 
s o m e th in g ,  a r e  an a s s o r tm e n t  o f  l o g i c a l  t y p e s :  d e d u c t io n  
f rom  acknowledged p rem ises  ( " S m i t h  ought  t o  keep h i s  p rom ise  
t o  rep ay  J o n e s " ) ;  by a n a lo g y  ( " I s n ’ t  t h a t  j u s t  how Brown 
behaved,  which we a l l  th o u g h t  was d i s g r a c e f u l ? " ) ;  a p p e a ls  t o  
s e n t i m e n t  ( " C o n s i d e r  how depressed  i t  w i l l  make J o n e s " ) ;  
s h e e r  b r o w - b e a t in g  ( " I  d o n ’ t  know how you have t h e  a u d a c i t y  
t o  behave l i k e  t h a t  S m i t h ! " )  and so o n . 17 Not  a l l  o f  t h e  
above w i l l  be s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ents  ab o u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  
case in  hand and th u s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  U.R .  r u l e .  Sometimes  
t h e y  w i l l  be i n f e r r e d  d i r e c t l y  f rom a g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e .  
Thus i f  I  h o ld  'One sho u ld  a lw ays  keep o n e ’ s p r o m i s e s ’ t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t  ca s e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  case where Smith  promised t o  repay  Jones money 
t h a t  he has borrowed.  The a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  ju dgem en t  'S m i th  
o ug ht  t o  keep h i s  prom ise  t o  repay  J o n e s ’ c o u ld  be deduced  
f rom  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e .  I t  i s  w i d e l y ,  a l t h o u g h  I  t h i n k  
m i s l e a d i n g l y ,  h e ld  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a n o t h e r  form  o f  t h e  
uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e . 18
Why i s  t h i s  m is le a d in g ?  F i r s t l y ,  a r u l e  l i k e  U.R .  can not  
be t h o u g h t  t o  a p p ly  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  as such;  f o r  any
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p r i n c i p l e ,  w h e th e r  w ide  o r  narrow  in  scope ,  i s  a l r e a d y  in  
g e n e r a l  t e r m s .  Hence t o  t a l k  o f  ' a  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
p r i n c i p l e ’ i s  s im p ly  a p leonasm. Presum ably  what  p e o p le  
have in  mind h e re  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  a uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e  
i s  needed t o  a p p ly  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t o  a l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
cases  t o  which th e  p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s .  Y e t  i t  i s  a n a l y t i c ­
a l l y  t r u e  o f  any k in d  o f  p r i n c i p l e  o r  r u l e  t h a t  i t  a p p l i e s  
t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t  cases w i t h i n  i t s  scope.  So, s e c o n d l y ,  t o  
c a l l  t h i s  p roce ss  ' u n i v e r s a l i z i n g ’ i s  o t i o s e .
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  we a r e  d i s c u s s in g  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
r u l e  where t h i s  a p p l i e s  t o  s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  where  
by a s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  we mean one which i s  e x p re s s e d  
in  p a r t i c u l a r  t e r m s .  In  t h i s  sense ,  i f  we say 'X o ug ht  t o  
do F because o f  R ’ we mean t h a t  R d e s c r i b e s  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  which s u p p o r t  o r  im p ly  t h e  moral  
jud g em en t  in  t h i s  case and w h ich ,  by t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
r u l e ,  s u p p o r t  o r  im p ly  s i m i l a r  judgem ents  where R a p p l i e s .  
And we need t h i s  r u l e .  For w h i l e  somet imes a p a r t i c u l a r  
moral  judgem ent  may be t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a d e d u c t i v e  i n f e r e n c e  
f ro m  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  our  e v e ry d a y  moral  judgem en ts  a r e  
n o t  u s u a l l y  l i k e  t h i s .  They a r e  u s u a l l y  more c o r r i g i b l e .  
The q u e s t i o n  'What m o r a l l y  ought  anyone t o  do in  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ? ’ c o n s t i t u t e s  a p rob lem .  I n  such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
i t  may n o t  be a t  a l l  obv ious  how our  reasons  may be s a i d  t o  
i n s t a n t i a t e  e s t a b l i s h e d  moral p r i n c i p l e s .  O f t e n  d i f f e r e n t ,  
sometimes c o n t r a r y ,  p r i n c i p l e s  may be a p p l i c a b l e .  A 
jud g em en t  has t o  be made based upon p r i o r i t i e s .  One 
p r i n c i p l e  may be c a r r i e d  o u t  o n l y  a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  a n o t h e r .  
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  which c a l l  f o r  a 
moral  judgem ent  a r e  u s u a l l y  complex.  We need t o  know t h a t  
t h e  j u d g e r  re g a r d s  t h e  reason he g i v e s  f o r  h i s  judgem en t  t o  
be,  t o  say t h e  l e a s t ,  th e  w e i g h t i e s t  o f  th o s e  he has 
c o n s id e r e d .  And t h i s  i s  where we need t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  
r u l e .  When he makes a s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  we need t o  
know t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  would  and can a c c e p t  t h e  same judgem ent  
f o r  a l l  l i k e  cases .
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We w i l l  r e s t r i c t  * u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y ’ , t h e n ,  t o  i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  s i n g u l a r  moral ju d g e m e n ts .  Our U .R .  r u l e  
r e q u i r e s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  moral  ju dgem en t  
t o  be r a t i o n a l  t h e  j u d g e r  must be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  
i t  a l s o  in  i t s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm .  And t h e  fo rm  o f  
i n f e r e n c e  in  which one s t a t e s  ( a )  a moral  p r i n c i p l e  and th e n  
s t a t e s  ( b )  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
i s  t o  be a p p l i e d ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  ( c )  t h e  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i s  d e r i v e d  f rom ( a )  and ( b ) ,  l e t  us d e s c r i b e  
as ' a p p l y i n g  a u n i v e r s a l  r u l e ’ .
We sh o u ld  n o t i c e ,  in  p a s s in g ,  t h a t  someone who h o ld s  a 
moral  p r i n c i p l e  and a c c e p ts  t h a t  i t  a p p l i e s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
case and y e t  who th en  does n o t  a p p ly  i t ,  i s  a l s o  g u i l t y  o f  
a fo rm  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  He i s  n o t  making q u i t e  t h e  same 
m i s t a k e ,  however,  as someone who a c c e p ts  a s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju dgem en t  and who w i l l  no t  o r  can not  a c c e p t  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  
t o  a l l  l i k e  c as es ,  v i z .  n e g a t i n g  c o n s is t e n c y  A. For  th e  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  in v o l v e d  when one f a i l s  t o  a p p ly  a u n i v e r s a l  
r u l e  t o  a r e l e v a n t  p a r t i c u l a r  case i s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
p re m is e s  t h a t  th e  j u d g e r  a c c e p t s .  He a c c e p ts  t h a t  'One 
o ug ht  t o  keep o n e ’ s p r o m i s e s ’ and ' T h i s  i s  a case where one 
oug ht  t o  keep o n e ’ s p r o m i s e ’ y e t  c on c lu des  ' T h i s  prom ise  
o ug ht  n o t  t o  be k e p t ’ . H is  " judgem ent"  ( s i c )  i n v o l v e s  
s t a t e m e n t s  o f  th e  form R & - R ,  which i s  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
and can n o t  be a rg u e d .  We w i l l  c a l l  t h e  demand t h a t  o u r  
judgem en ts  must n o t  i n v o l v e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  reasons  o f  t h e  
form  R & - R ,  c o n s is t e n c y  B . 19
T h e re  i s  a t h i r d  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  te rm  ' j u d g e m e n t ’ t h a t  
r e q u i r e s  a p r e l i m i n a r y  e x p l a n a t i o n .  So f a r  I  have assumed 
t h a t  moral judgem ents  a r e  t h e  k in d s  o f  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  must  
be s u p p o r te d  by re a s o n s .  By t h i s ,  I  am n o t  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  in  
any moral  d i s c o u r s e  those  i n v o l v e d  n e c e s s a r i l y  make moral  
j u d g e m e n t s . 20 The assum ption  i s  t h a t  in  any moral  d is c o u r s e  
we must have reasons when we do make ju d g e m e n ts .  T h a t  t h i s  
assum ption  i s  w a r r a n te d  can be seen when we c o n s id e r  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e .  Can a person say ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  ‘ Smith  ought
t o  t a k e  h i s  s i c k  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l 1 and th e n  be u n a b le  t o  
"back u p ” t h e  judgem ent  w i t h  a re a s o n ,  o r  by a r e f e r e n c e  t o  
a g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e ?  A t  f i r s t  b lu sh  t h i s  does n o t  seem t o  
be i n t e l l i g i b l e .  For  t h e r e  seems t o  be a l o g i c a l  m is ta k e  
i n v o l v e d  in  s a y in g  " I  j u d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  o ug ht  t o  do F b u t  
I  d o n ’ t  have any reasons f o r  j u d g i n g  s o " .  T h e re  a r e ,  as we 
s h a l l  s e e ,  a c t s  o f  d e c i s i o n  in  moral  c o n t e x t s  f o r  which  no 
s u p p o r t i n g  reason can be g iv e n  ( s e e  p p . 3 8 4 -3 8 5  a h e a d ) .  
However such d e c i s i o n s  sho u ld  n o t ,  I  t h i n k ,  p r o p e r l y  be 
c a l l e d  ' j u d g e m e n t s ’ . For  one can n o t  j u d g e ,  in  moral  
c o n t e x t s ,  w i t h o u t  some d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  abo ut  which th e  judgem ent  i s  made. So t h a t  i f  I  
say t o  you " I  ju d g e  t h a t  X ought  t o  do F" ,  i t  i s  a lw a y s  in  
o r d e r  t o  ask me "Why ought  X t o  do F?“ , i . e .  i n  v i r t u e  o f  
what  reasons  ought  X t o  do t h e  a c t i o n ?  I  may n o t  be a b l e  t o  
f o r m u l a t e  my r e a s o n ( s )  im m e d ia t e l y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  complex.  But I  must have a r e a s o n ( s )  which in  
t im e  c o u ld  be produced,  i f  what I  say i s  t o  c o u n t  as a moral  
j u d g e m e n t . 21 I f  I  have n o t ,  you would s a y ,  I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  I  
s h o u ld  r e t r a c t  my a s s e r t i o n ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  t h i n k  t w i c e  ab o u t  
r e i t e r a t i n g  i t .
T h e re  i s  a f o u r t h  and q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r  t h a t  needs  
t o  be m ent ioned  c o n c e rn in g  a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  we w i l l  make 
a b o u t  t h e  person who makes such a ju d g e m e n t .  I n  t h e  pages  
ahead I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  o f  making a moral  judgem ent  
r e q u i r e s  th e  j u d g e r  t o  be, indeed  i n s i s t s  on h i s  b e in g ,  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d  in  t h e  sense o f  making h i s  own ju d g e m e n t .  
H is  m o r a l i t y  c o n s i s t s ,  so t o  speak ,  n o t  in  what  o t h e r  p e o p le  
j u d g e  he ought  t o  do b u t  in  what  he ju d g e s  he ought  t o  do.  
I t  i s  on th e s e  grounds t h a t  we ho ld  him r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h i s  
ju dgem en t  and subsequent  b e h a v i o u r .  To p r a i s e  o r  blame him 
f o r  som eth ing  he has done presupposes t h a t  he has ,  o r  c o u ld  
have ,  chosen t o  a c t  in  t h i s  way. For t h e  moment a l l  we 
r e q u i r e  i s  t o  n o te  t h a t  in  c o n t e x t s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral  
ju d g e m e n t ,  our  j u d g e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  choose f o r  h i m s e l f  what  
he w i l l  do, ( w i t h  th e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  t o  U.R .
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u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  j u d g e m e n t ) .
Something needs t o  be s a i d  now a b o u t  t h e  awkward 
e x p r e s s i o n  ' r e a s o n ( s ) ’ I  have been u s i n g .  The f a c t  t h a t  i t  
i s  r a i n i n g  i s  a reason f o r  t h e  judgem ent  ' I  o ug h t  t o  p u t  up 
my u m b r e l l a ’ ; t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I  want  t o  a v o id  c a t c h i n g  a c o l d  
t h i s  w i n t e r  i s  a reason f o r  my t a k i n g  v i t a m i n  C in  t h e  
summer and autumn; t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I  have a d e s i r e  t o  p l e a s e  
my f r i e n d s  i s  a reason f o r  d e c i d i n g  t h a t  I  oug h t  t o  g i v e  a 
p a r t y ,  and so on. Of c o u rs e ,  b e ing  aware o f  a f a c t  o r  
b r i n g i n g  i t  t o  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s a t t e n t i o n ,  does n o t  c r e a t e  
a rea s o n ;  r a t h e r ,  when he i s  in fo rm ed  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
t h e  f a c t ,  t h i s  makes i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  autonomous j u d g e r  
t o  t a k e  i t  i n t o  acc o u n t  as a reason in  h i s  ju d g em en t .
The f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  r a i n i n g  i s  a reason f o r  t h e  judgem ent  
' I  o u g h t  t o  p u t  up my u m b r e l l a ’ . So i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p e o p le  
g e t  w et  i f  t h e y  a r e  o u t - o f - d o o r s  when i t  r a i n s .  So i s  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  I  want  t o  t e s t  my u m b r e l l a  t o  see w h e th e r  i t  i s  in  
w o rk in g  o r d e r .  Assuming t h a t  a l l  o f  t h e s e  f a c t s  o b t a i n ,  do 
we now have t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  reasons f o r  t h e  judgem en t  ' I  
o ug ht  t o  p u t  up my u m b r e l l a ’ ? I  t h i n k  t h e  answer i s  t h a t  
n o r m a l l y  we would say we do n o t .  I t  seems more p l a u s i b l e  t o  
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two d i s t i n c t  re a s o n s .  The f a c t s  ' I t  i s  
r a i n i n g ’ and 'P e o p le  g e t  wet  when t h e y  a r e  o u t - o f - d o o r s  in  
t h e  r a i n ’ be long t o g e t h e r .  They make j u s t  one re a s o n ,  each  
b e in g  p a r t  o f  t h a t  reas o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, my d e s i r e  t o  
t e s t  t h e  u m b r e l l a  forms a second d i s t i n c t  re a s o n ,  ( th o u g h  i t  
may r e i n f o r c e  t h e  o t h e r ) .  In  o t h e r  words,  n o r m a l ly  we would  
say t h a t  some reasons be long t o g e t h e r ,  each o f  them b e in g  
p a r t  o f  a com ple te  reason .
How a r e  we t o  p ic k  o u t  th o se  reasons  which be long
t o g e t h e r  f rom th o s e  w h ich ,  by th e m s e lv e s ,  form  a c o m p le te
reason? As J .R a z  ( 1 9 7 8 : 5 )  a rg u e s :
. . . t h e  te rm  ' r e a s o n ’ does n o t  h e l p . . . i t  i s  used t o  
r e f e r  t o  p a r t i a l  reasons as w e l l  as c o m p le te  ones.
The answer i s  t o  be found in  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between th e
r e a s o n ( s )  and th e  a s s o c i a t e d  ju d g e m e n t .  A judgem ent  can be
s u p p o r te d  by redun dant  reasons;  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  reasons th e
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o m is s io n  o f  which would n o t  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  ju d g e m e n t .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  some reasons  a r e  n e c e s s a r y .  W i t h o u t  them 
t h e  ju dgem en t  c o u ld  n o t  be made. So l e t  us s a y ,  f o l l o w i n g  
Raz ( i b i d ) ,  t h a t  w h e th er  i t  i s  j u s t  one reason  o r  a number 
o f  them t o g e t h e r ,  a l l  o f  t h e  reasons t h a t  a r e  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  
a g iv e n  judgem en t  form a ' c o m p le te  r e a s o n ’ . To p u t  t h e  
p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y :  t h e  reasons s t a t e d  in  t h e  p re m is e s  o f  a 
p r a c t i c a l  ju d g e m e n t ,  w i t h  no re d u n d a n t  p r e m is e s ,  c o n s t i t u t e  
a c o m p le te  reas o n .  And l e t  us,  f rom  h ere  on, use ' r e a s o n ’ 
t o  mean t h e  co m p le te  reason f o r  a c o n c lu s io n  o f  a ju d g e m e n t .  
(Even so ,  as we saw in  th e  u m b r e l l a  exam ple ,  one judgem en t  
can be s u p p o r te d  by a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  co m p le te  r e a s o n s . )
One o t h e r  p o i n t  we shou ld  n o t i c e  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  co n cerns  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  reasons we g i v e  t o  s u p p o r t  a p a r t i c u l a r  
moral  ju d g e m e n t .  We noted  e a r l i e r  t h a t  in  most t y p e s  o f  
s i n g u l a r  e m p i r i c a l  judg em en t ,  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  reason g iv e n  in  
s u p p o r t  o f  i t ,  appears  t o  s t a t e ,  presuppose o r  im p ly  a 
g e n e r a l  re a s o n .  T h is  can be seen c l e a r l y  in  judgem ents  
where ' b e c a u s e ’ -  and r e l a t e d  i n f e r e n t i a l  t e r m s ,  v i z .  ' t h e  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f ’ , ' t h e  e v id e n c e  f o r ’ , ' a  s u f f i c i e n t  reason  
f o r ’ , ' a  p r im a  f a c i e  sound reason f o r ’ -  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
reason  f o r  th e  judg em en t .  C o n s id e r  a g a in  t h e  t h r e e  s im p le  
exam ples  above:  ( i )  T h is  horse  i s  a r a c e h o r s e  because i t  has  
a p e d i g r e e  and i t  can run f a s t ;  ( i i )  I f  I  go o u t  now I  w i l l  
g e t  w et  because i t  i s  r a i n i n g ;  ( i i i )  I  have a t o o t h a c h e  
because o f  t h e  decay in  my t o o t h .  In  each case  i t  i s  
o b v io u s  t h a t  a g e n e r a l  reason i s  i m p l i e d  by t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
which f o l l o w s  th e  ' b e c a u s e ’ c l a u s e .  The reason in  ( i )  w i l l  
im p ly  o r  presuppose th e  g e n e r a l  reason 'Any horse  w i t h  a 
p e d i g r e e ,  t h a t  can run f a s t ,  i s  a r a c e h o r s e ’ ; s i m i l a r l y  t h e  
reason in  ( i i )  i m p l i e s  t h e  g e n e r a l  reason 'When p e o p le  go 
o u t  in  t h e  r a i n  t h e y  g e t  w e t ’ ; and ( i i i )  i m p l i e s  t h e  g e n e r a l  
reason 'Any i n d i v i d u a l  w i t h  h i s  t o o t h  in  s u c h -a n d -s u c h  a 
c o n d i t i o n  o f  decay w i l l  s u f f e r  a t o o t h a c h e ’ . As M .B la c k  
( 1 9 5 2 : 3 2 4 )  w r i t e s :
When we say t h a t  th e  decay in  our  m o la r  i s  t h e  cause
o f  th e  t o o t h a c h e ,  we im p ly  t h a t  i f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s
26
were r e p e a te d  ( t h e  same s t a t e  o f  decay i n  t h e  t o o t h ,
t h e  same c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  n e r v e s ,  and so on f o r  a l l
o f  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  c o n c e rn e d )  -  t o o t h a c h e  would  
r e s u l t .
T h e re  would be no s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  o f  c a u s a t i o n  
h e r e  u n le s s  we meant t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  whenever  a g iv e n  
o c c u r r e n c e  happens (d e c a y in g  t o o t h ,  e t c . )  th e n  a n o t h e r  
o c c u r r e n c e  happens ( t o o t h a c h e ) .  I n  a l l  such ju d g e m e n ts ,  t o  
t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  som eth ing  happens because o f  som eth ing  e l s e ,  
a g e n e r a l  reason i s  i m p l i e d  by t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  which f o l l o w s  
t h e  ' b e c a u s e ’ c l a u s e .  And i f  a g e n e r a l  reason o r  r u l e  i s
g iv e n  o r  i m p l i e d ,  th en  a l l  o f  t h e  in s t a n c e s  o f  i t  a r e
i m p l i e d .
For  t h e  moment, we w i l l  assume t h a t  reasons  in  p a r t i c u l a r
moral  judgem ents  a r e  ana log ous  t o  e m p i r i c a l  ' b e c a u s e ’ -
reasons  in  t h a t  t h e y  possess t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  i m p l i c i t  
g e n e r a l i t y .  T h i s  seems t o  be a r e a s o n a b le  a s s u m p t io n .  We 
have seen t h a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  moral  judgem en t  must be 
s u p p o r te d  by a re a s o n .  I f  we make a moral  judgem ent  o f  t h e  
fo rm  'X o u g h t / o u g h t  no t  t o  do som eth ing  F ’ we a r e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  have a reason R f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  j u d g i n g  so.  I n  t u r n ,  t h e  
reason  w i l l  s t a t e  o r  im p ly  a g e n e r a l  re a s o n .  Though in
s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ents  which a r e  couched e n t i r e l y  in  
p a r t i c u l a r  t e r m s ,  j u s t  what  t h e  g e n e r a l  reason i s  c a n n o t  be 
s t a t e d  a p a r t  f rom  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  reas o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  
u n d e rs to o d  t o  s p e c i f y  o r  im p ly  t h e  grounds on which t h e  
j u d g e r  re g a r d s  persons o r  t h e i r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  be 
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r .
I  w i l l  d is c u s s  a l l  o f  t h e  p o i n t s  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  in
g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  in  th e  pages ahead.  B e fo r e  t h i s ,  we need t o  
d i s c u s s  how t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  U . R . ,  works and t o  
see i f  U .R .  d e l i v e r s  any s i g n i f i c a n t  answers t o  t h e  'w h ic h  
moral  j u d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n .  I t  w i l l  be n e c e s s a ry  t o  
r e s t r i c t  our  d i s c u s s i o n .  Moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  we n o te d ,  can be 
o f  many d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  and t h e y  can be about  many d i f f e r e n t  
t h i n g s ;  f o r  exam ple ,  judgem ents  o f  m o t iv e ,  ab o u t  t r a i t s  o f  
c h a r a c t e r ,  o r  about  th e  q u a l i t y  o r  w o r th  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,
l i f e - s t y l e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and so on. L e t  us fo c u s  f o r  t h e  
moment on moral  judgem ents  ab o u t  a c t i o n s ,  such as th o s e  
e x p re s s e d  by s a y in g  'X o u g h t / o u g h t - n o t  t o  do an a c t i o n ,  o r  
k in d  o f  a c t ,  F ’ . And l e t  us c o n c e n t r a t e  on d e f i n i t i o n  ( 2 )  
above o f  U .R .  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show how U .R .  p r o v i d e s  a way o f  
t e s t i n g  t h e  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  what  an autonomous  
j u d g e r  proposes m o r a l l y  ought  o r  oug ht  n o t  t o  be done.
Some p r e l i m i n a r y  remarks abo ut  how U .R .  works
I n  o r d e r  t o  a p p ly  U .R .  v i z .
I f  I  j u d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F ( . . . i s  
r i g h t  t o  do F, e t c . )  because o f  t h e  reason R, th e n  
I  must ju d g e  t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  a l s o  
oug ht  t o  do F, (e tc . )  
i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  f i l l  in  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  X,  
F and R. I n  a t y p i c a l  s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n t ,  X wi 11 be t h e  
a g e n t  o f  t h e  a c t ;  a p e rs o n a l  pronoun o r  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s name i s  
s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  X; F wi 11 be a m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e d  a c t  ( m o r a l l y  
p r o h i b i t e d ,  m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e )  t h a t  X ought  t o  do; and R 
w i l l  be t h e  reason g iv e n  f o r  X do ing  F. C o n s id e r  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ent:
( 1 )  Smith  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because  
she i s  v e r y  s i c k .
W h i le  ( 1 )  r e f e r s  t o  a s p e c i f i c  a g e n t ,  do in g  a s p e c i f i c  a c t  
in  s p e c i f i c  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i f  ( 1 )  i s  i n te n d e d  t o  be a 
r a t i o n a l  moral  ju dgem en t ,  t h e  j u d g e r  must a l s o  a c c e p t ,  on 
p a i n  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,  th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  ( 1 )  i n t o  U . R . ;  
v i z .
( 2 )  I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  
c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because she i s  v e r y  s i c k  th e n
I  must ju d g e  t h a t  ( y )  ( i f  y ’ s c h i l d  i s  v e r y  s i c k  
th en  y m o r a l l y  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l ) .  
C l e a r l y ,  f rom  ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) ,  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  we can d e r i v e  a 
s u b s t a n t i v e  u n i v e r s a l  judgem ent
( 3 )  ( y )  ( i f  y ’ s c h i l d  i s  v e r y  s i c k  th e n  y m o r a l l y  
ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l ) .
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I n  ( 1 ) - ( 3 )  we a r e  p r e s e n te d  w i t h  a t y p i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  Prem iss  ( 1 )  i s  a s i n g u l a r  
jud g em en t  which t h e  j u d g e r  makes ab o u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e .  
I f  i t  i s  in te n d e d  t o  be a r a t i o n a l  moral  ju dgem en t  th e n  ( 1 )  
must be U .R .  uni  v e r s a l  i z a b l e . Prem iss  ( 2 )  i s  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  U .R .  I f  th e  j u d g e r  w i l l  and can c o n s i s t e n t l y  
s u b s t i t u t e  ( 1 )  i n t o  ( 2 )  he may c l a i m  t h a t ,  t o  t h i s  e x t e n t ,  
( 1 )  has t h e  s t a t u s  o f  a r a t i o n a l  ju d g e m e n t .  And ( 3 )  i s  t h e  
e n t a i l e d  u n i v e r s a l  moral  judg em en t .  L e t  us c o n s i d e r  each  
s t e p  in  a b i t  more d e t a i l .
E v i d e n t l y ,  on l i n e  ( 1 )  we a r e  concerned  w i t h  a s p e c t a t o r  
ju d g e m e n t ,  i . e .  a judgem ent  made by one p e rs o n ,  a b o u t  t h e  
a c t i o n s  o r  d u t i e s  o f  a n o t h e r  ( o r  o f  a n o t h e r  group o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s ) .  T here  can be o t h e r  s u b s t i t u t i o n s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  
f o r  ' X ’ in  'X ought  t o  do F ’ . For i n s t a n c e ,  X c o u ld  be t h e  
e q u a l l y  f a m i l i a r  case where I  am th e  a g e n t  o f  t h e  a c t .  For  
i t  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  w h a te v e r  a c t i o n  I  j u d g e  I  m o r a l l y  
oug ht  t o  do, f o r  t h e  reason R, I  i m p l i c i t l y  j u d g e  o u g h t  t o  
be done in  t h e  same o r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  c a s e s ,  ( v i z .  th o s e  
cases  t o  which R a p p l i e s ) .
Now t h e r e  i s  room f o r  d i s c u s s io n  h e r e .  Are  we t o  s a y ,  as
H. S id g w ic k  ( 1 9 0 7 : 3 7 9 )  says ,
. . . i f  a k in d  o f  conduct  t h a t  i s  r i g h t  ( o r  wrong)  
f o r  me i s  n o t  r i g h t  ( o r  wrong)  f o r  some one e l s e  
i t  must be on th e  ground o f  some d i f f e r e n c e  between  
t h e  two c as es ,  o t h e r  th an  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I  and he a r e  
d i f f e r e n t  pe rso n s .
I n  t h i s  passage S id g w ic k  i s  c l a i m i n g ,  bu t  n o t  a r g u i n g ,  t h a t
in  moral  judgem ents  n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between o n e ’ s own
case and a n o t h e r ’ s a r e  i r r e l e v a n t .  The reason R can n o t
m e r e ly  r e f e r  t o  a n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e .  T h i s  i s  a
c o n t r o v e r s i  a l  a s s u m p t i o n . 22 To a rgue  t h a t  we must
u n i v e r s a l i z e  o v e r  cases which a r e  t h e  same in  t h e  r e l e v a n t
r e s p e c t s  i s  one t h i n g ;  t o  assume t h a t  n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s
a r e  i r r e l e v a n t  -  o n l y  g e n e r i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  r e l e v a n t  -  i s
a n o t h e r .  Someone m ig h t  c l a i m  t h a t  s im p ly  because he i s  th e
p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  he i s ,  he possesses s p e c i a l  r i g h t s  o r
d u t i e s ;  o r  t h a t  because he be longs  t o  a c e r t a i n  group ,  t h i s
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g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a s i g n i f i c a n t  moral  d i s t i n c t i o n .  Or he m ig h t  
t r y  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  one o r  more o f  h i s  p u r e l y  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  -  l i k e  because h i s  name i s  Tom S m i th ,  o r  
because he i s  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  s o - a n d - s o  -  c o n s t i t u t e  r e l e v a n t  
grounds f o r  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  ju d g em en t .
A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  i t  must be s a i d  t h a t  we c a n n o t  a v o id  
p l a c i n g  some such r e s t r i c t i o n  on u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  ju d g e m e n ts .  
No two cases  a r e  e v e r  e x a c t l y  a l i k e .  As J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 8 3 )  
n o t e s :
. . . e v e n  i f  th e y  were ( a l i k e  in  e v e r y  o t h e r  r e s p e c t )  
t h e y  would s t i l l  be n u m e r i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  j u s t  
because t h e y  a r e  two.
So i f  t h e  uni v e r s a l  i zab i  1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  n o t  t o  be
h o p e l e s s l y  o t i o s e  as a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t e s t i n g  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y
o f  a moral  ju d g em en t ,  we need t o  r u l e  o u t  a t  l e a s t  n u m e r ic a l
d i f f e r e n c e s  between i n d i v i d u a l s  as i r r e l e v a n t .  (We w i l l
r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  l a t e r . )  For  t h e  moment, l e t  us
p roceed  on th e  assum ption  t h a t  n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e
i r r e l e v a n t .
On l i n e  1, ' . . . t a k i n g  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l ’ i s  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  a c t  which i t  i s  ju d g ed  t h a t  Sm ith  i s  
m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  do. O b v io u s ly  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  F. For  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  h e re  
c o u ld  be an a c t - d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a m o r a l l y  p r o h i b i t e d  a c t i o n  
e . g . ' . . . t o  cause h i s  c h i l d  t o  s u f f e r  u n n ecessary  p a i n ’ , o r  
t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  co u ld  be a m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  a c t ,  ( o r ,  as  
we s h a l l  see ,  th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  F m ig h t  be a d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  a m o t iv e ,  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t ,  l i f e - s t y l e ,  e t c . ) .
Once a g a in  t h e r e  i s  room f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .  Why r a t i o n a l l y  
sh o u ld  Sm ith  re g a r d  a c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  as o b l i g a t o r y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i f  i t  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  o t h e r  a c t i o n s  t h a t  he has 
p la n n e d  t o  do? And o f  th o s e  t h a t  he does r e g a r d  as 
o b l i g a t o r y ,  how shou ld  he d e c id e  which o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
a c t i o n s  sho u ld  be g iv e n  p recedence  o v e r  o t h e r s ?  These a r e  
c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n s  which any moral  t h e o r y  w o r th  t h e  name 
needs t o  answer.
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F i n a l l y ,  in  p rem iss  ( 1 )  ' . . . b e c a u s e  h i s  c h i l d  i s  v e r y
s i c k ’ i s  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  proposed a c t i o n .  T h e re  m ig h t  be 
o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  Smith  had p lanned  t o  do o r  would  r a t h e r  be 
d o i n g ,  l i k e ,  s a y ,  go ing  t o  th e  t h e a t r e .  However t h e  j u d g e r  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  in  t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  t h e  reason g iv e n  in  ( 1 )  
i s  t h e  w e i g h t i e s t  o r  o v e r r i d i n g  reas o n .
A p o i n t  t o  n o t i c e  h e re  i s  t h a t  I  am p r e s e n t i n g  a model  
o f  a s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ent  in  which f a c t s  a r e  adduced in  
s u p p o r t  o f  a moral  c o n c l u s i o n .  Suppose t h a t  I  am asked "Why 
do you t h i n k  t h a t  Smith  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o
h o s p i t a l ? " .  I  m ig h t  r e p l y  by i n d i c a t i n g  c e r t a i n  f a c t s  a b o u t  
t h e  c h i l d ’ s c o n d i t i o n :  "Because she has broken h e r  le g  and 
i s  in  e x c r u c i a t i n g  p a i n " .  A c tu a l  reasons  t h a t  a r e  g i v e n ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  a r e  n o t  a lw ays  o f  t h i s  k i n d .  Sometimes t h e y  a r e ,  o r  
i n c l u d e ,  n o n - f a c t u a l  a s s e r t i o n s  l i k e  "Because i t  i s  t h e  
r i g h t  t h i n g  t o  do" .  T h is  m ig h t  seem t o  s p o i l  t h e  n e a tn e s s  
o f  my c l a i m  h e r e ,  bu t  i t  does n o t .  For  in  such c a s e s ,  t h e  
reasons  th e m s e lv e s  w i l l  be moral judgem ents  t h a t  w i l l  need 
t o  be defended  by f u r t h e r  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  f a c t .  So t h a t
u l t i m a t e l y ,  as we s h a l l  see ,  t h e  reasons  t h a t  we
u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ents  a r e  f a c t s ,  o r  a r e  
r e d u c i b l e  t o  f a c t s .  L e t  us look now a t  p rem iss  ( 2 ) .
P rem iss  ( 2 )  i s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  U .R .  t o  ( 1 ) .  For  i t  t o  
be a r a t i o n a l  moral ju dgem en t ,  we need t o  check t h a t  our  
s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  i s  g e n u in e ly  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .  To p u t  t h e  
p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  j u d g e r  must r e g a r d  t h e  reason he has 
g iv e n  t o  be t h e  r e l e v a n t  grounds n o t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  o u g h t -  
j u d g e m e n t ’ s a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  Smith  bu t  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
t o  a l l  o t h e r  p a r e n t s  s i m i l a r l y  c i r c u m s t a n c e d .  How i s  he t o  
a s c e r t a i n  t h i s ?
To u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  he must ens ure  t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  and 
t h a t  he i s  a b l e  t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  e x te n d  ( 1 )  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  
s i m i l a r  cases ;  any r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  a g e n t  p e r f o r m in g  a 
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  a c t ,  in  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  
To make s u re  t h a t  ( 1 )  i s  uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e , t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  he 
needs t o  c o n s id e r  n o t  o n l y  a c t u a l  cases b u t  a l s o
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h y p o t h e t i c a l  c a s e s .  The j u d g e r  needs t o  ask h i m s e l f :  i s  R 
a reason ( i )  why X m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  do F ( o r  som eth ing  l i k e  
F) a g a in  in  t h e  same o r  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ?  ( i i )  why 
someone e l s e  Y who i s  th e  same as X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
r e s p e c t s ,  ought  t o  do F, o r  som eth ing  l i k e  F,  in  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ?  and ( i i i )  why F, o r  som eth ing  l i k e  F, 
m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  be done t o  X in  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ?  We 
need t o  c o n s id e r  a l l  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases because o n l y  by 
d o in g  so a r e  we a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  our  judgem en t  i s  
( f u l l y )  c o n s i s t e n t .  I f  t h e  j u d g e r  i s  a b l e  and w i l l i n g  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  so, th e n  he can c l a i m  t h a t  h i s  ju dgem en t  
does n o t  run up a g a i n s t  l o g i c a l  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  o r  o t h e r  
r a t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  o r  t h a t  i t  does n o t  f o r c e  him t o  
en d o rs e  t h i n g s  t h a t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  he i s  u n w i l l i n g  o r  
u n a b le  t o  a c c e p t .  I  w i l l  say more a b o u t  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases  
s h o r t ! y .
For  t h e  moment i t  i s  w or th  s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  U . R . ,  by 
i t s e l f ,  can n o t  p r o v i d e  us w i t h  th e  c o n t e n t  o f  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e  ju d g e m e n ts .  U .R .  has t o  be a p p l i e d  and in  a p p l y i n g  
i t  we have t o  t a k e  i n t o  a cc ount  f a c t s  abo u t  t h e  w o r ld  in  
which i t  i s  a p p l i e d .  Thus i t  i s  a f a c t u a l  c l a i m  ( v i z .  t h e  
reason R) on l i n e  ( 1 )  which p r o v i d e s  us w i t h  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which then  have t o  be combined w i t h  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  on l i n e  ( 2 ) ,  in  o r d e r  t o  
produce  th e  c o n t e n t  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l  ju d g e m e n t ,  on l i n e  ( 3 ) .
L in e  ( 3 ) ,  t h e n ,  i s  n o t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e ­
ment.  I t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g .  The u n i v e r s a l ­
i z i n g  t a k e s  p l a c e  on l i n e  ( 2 ) .  Someone who has doubts  ab o u t  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  in  moral  c o n t e x t s ,  has doubts  
a b o u t  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  an i n f e r e n c e  l i k e  t h a t  on l i n e  ( 2 )  
f o r  c e r t a i n  ty p e s  o f  moral ju d g e m e n t .  T h is  u s u a l l y  t a k e s  
t h e  fo rm  o f  a d e n i a l  t h a t  U .R .  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
c e r t a i n  ca s e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  
i s  t r i v i a l  must be b ro u g h t  a g a i n s t  l i n e  ( 2 ) ,  n o t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
e v e n t u a l  f a i l u r e  o f  l i n e  ( 3 )  t o  g i v e  us a g e n u in e ,  u n i v e r s a l  
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We need now t o  look  in  more d e t a i l  a t  t h e  c l a i m s  made 
above c o n c e r n in g  s t a g e  ( 2 )  o f  our  exam ple .
U n a c c e p ta b le  and i m p o s s ib le  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases
I  have s a i d  t h a t  t o  t e s t  w h e th er  o r  n o t  a s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju d g em en t  i s  f u l l y  U .R .  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  one must i n c l u d e  in  
o n e ’ s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a t  s ta g e  ( 2 )  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  
cases  and ask w h e th er  t h e  same a c t i o n  F oug ht  t o  p e r fo rm e d  
f o r  t h e  reason g i v e n .  So t h a t  where my s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju d g em en t  concerns  an a c t i o n  F t h a t  I  ought  t o  p e r f o r m ,  
s t a g e  ( 2 )  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  must i n c l u d e  n o t  o n l y
( i )  m y s e l f  do ing  th e  same o r  a s i m i l a r  a c t i o n  F in  
s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s
b u t  a l s o
( i i )  o t h e r s  do ing  th e  same o r  a s i m i l a r  a c t i o n  F
and
( i i i )  t h e i r  do ing  F t o  me (when I  am t h e  p a t i e n t  o f  t h e  
a c t ) ,  in  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  ( s e e  p . 1 8 ) .
On t h i s  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  U . R . ,  m oreove r ,  t o  see t h a t  a 
ju d g em en t  i s  g e n u in e ly  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  one must i n c l u d e  n o t  
o n l y  o t h e r  a c t u a l  cas es ,  bu t  a l s o  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cas e s ;  e . g .  
p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  c as es ,  r e l e v a n t  c o u n t e r - f a c t u a l  p a s t  c a s e s ,  
e t c .  Ne ed less  t o  say ,  each o f  ( i )  — ( i i i )  can be q u i t e  
c o m p le x .
C o n s id e r  case ( i ) .  When j u d g i n g  my own c o n d u c t ,  i f  I  
c l a i m  f F i s  what I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  d o ’ , by U .R .  I  am 
com m it ted  t o  j u d g i n g  t h a t  in  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  p a s t  o r  
f u t u r e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  I  ought  t o  have a c t e d / o u g h t  t o  a c t  
l i k e w i s e .  To f u l l y  co v e r  th e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  I  
would need t o  c o n s id e r  cases ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  where I  r e g r e t  
my p r e s e n t  judg em en t .  The p o i n t  h e re  i s  q u i t e  a s im p le  one.  
When d e l i b e r a t i n g  abo ut  w h e th er  o r  n o t  I  m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  
t a k e  my c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because she i s  s i c k  ( r a t h e r  than  
go t o  t h e  t h e a t r e ) ,  I  must c o n s id e r  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case  in  
which I  wake up tomorrow r e g r e t t i n g  t h e  judgem ent  t h a t  I  
made t o d a y .  Tomorrow’ s h y p o t h e t i c a l  r e g r e t a t i v e  judgem ent
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'Would  i t  were t h a t  I  had ta k e n  h e r  t o  h o s p i t a l  l a s t  n i g h t ’ , 
i n  o t h e r  words,  i s  a r e l e v a n t  case t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  my 
p r e s e n t  d e l i b e r a t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  I  sh o u ld  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in  which I  am g la d  a b o u t  my p a s t  
j u d g e m e n t .  ( F o r  th e  purposes o f  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  a ju d g e m e n t ,  
l e t  us r e g a r d  such h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases as i f  t h e y  a c t u a l l y  
o c c u r r e d ,  o r  as b e ing  on equal  f o o t i n g  w i t h  th o s e  t h a t  
a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d . )
We can m ent ion  now one c l a s s  o f  judgem ent  t h a t  i s  f o r f e i t  
as a r e s u l t  o f  a p p l y i n g  U.R.  These a r e  s i n g u l a r  ju dgem en ts  
where t h e  j u d g e r  w i l l  n o t  a c c e p t  one o r  more o f  t h e  f u r t h e r  
h y p o t h e t i c a l - c a s e  judgem ents  which t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm  
e n j o i n s .  I f  he w i l l  no t  a c c e p t  a h y p o t h e t i c a l - c a s e  
ju d g e m e n t  t h i s  can i n d i c a t e  t h a t  he does n o t  r e a l l y  a c c e p t  
t h e  p r e s e n t  one,  h i s  i n s i n c e r i t y  b e ing  shown by h i s  
u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  o r i g i n a l  
ju d g e m e n t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, we m ig h t  add f o r  f u t u r e  
r e f e r e n c e  ( s e e  p . 113)  t h a t  h i s  s i n c e r i t y  i s  d e m o n s tra te d  by 
h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t ,  o r  by t h e  i n d i g n a t i o n  
he shows a t  th e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  o t h e r s  o r ,  p e rh a p s ,  by t h e
g u i l t  t h a t  he f e e l s  a t  h i s  own d e v i a t i o n s  f rom  i t ,  in  p a s t  
o r  p r e s e n t  c as es .
When a j u d g e r  i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  s i n g u l a r  
ju d g e m e n t ,  we n o te d ,  t h i s  can i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  b e l i e f s
i n v o l v e d  a r e  n o t  s i n c e r e l y  h e l d .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  I  say  
' I  o u g h t  t o  t a k e  my c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  to d a y  because she i s  
v e r y  s i c k ’ bu t  I  go on t o  say ,  w i t h o u t  any f u r t h e r
e x p l a n a t i o n  ' I  ought  n o t ,  c e t e r i  s p a r i  b u s . t a k e  h e r  t o
h o s p i t a l  i f  she i s  v e r y  s i c k  to m o rro w ’ . W i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  
e x p l a n a t i o n  i t  seems t o  be t h e  judgem ent  o f  a madman. 
Where t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  so p a t e n t l y  o b v io u s ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  
you would  q u e s t i o n  t h e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  my o r i g i n a l  ju d g e m e n t .
C o n s id e r  now c o n d i t i o n  ( i i )  above.  We have seen t h a t  
U .R .  a p p l i e s  t o  s p e c t a t o r  ju d g em en ts ,  e . g .  'S m i th  oug ht  t o  
t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because she i s  v e r y  s i c k ’ . By 
c o n d i t i o n  ( i i )  th e  same s p e c t a t o r  judgem ent  must be ac c e p te d
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n o t  o n l y  f o r  o t h e r  a c t u a l  cases b u t  a l s o  a b o u t  o t h e r  
h y p o t h e t i c a l ,  p a s t  o r  f u t u r e  c a s e s .  I f  I  make such a 
ju d g em en t  ab o u t  S m i t h ’ s c o n d u c t ,  I  need a l s o  t o  i n c l u d e  in  
my p r e s e n t  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  p a s t  case in  which J o n e s ’ c h i l d  was v e r y  i l l .  L e t  us 
suppose t h a t  I  a d m i t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e  two ca s e s .  I  t h i n k ,  however,  t h a t  Jones oug ht  
n o t  t o  have ta k e n  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l .  I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  
case th e n  I  must ,  on p a in  o f  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  m y s e l f ,  g i v e  up 
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  Smith  ought  t o  do t h i s .  A g a in ,  few o f  us 
would  commit such a b l a t a n t  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  I f  I  do, what  i t  
shows i s  t h a t  e i t h e r  I  do n o t  s i n c e r e l y  h o ld  my p r e s e n t  
ju dgem en t  o r ,  what  i s  more u s u a l ,  I  am u s in g  one s t a n d a r d  
f o r  Sm ith  and a n o t h e r  f o r  Jones.
T h i s  i s  a common e r r o r  t h a t  we use h y p o t h e t i c a l  s p e c t a t o r  
cases  t o  expose .  U s u a l l y  we ask t h e  j u d g e r  t o  a p p ly  a ha rsh  
ju dgem en t  he makes t o  a r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  case i n v o l v i n g  
someone f o r  whom he p a r t i c u l a r  c a r e s .  Suppose t h a t  Smith  
j u d g e s  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  Jones,  a s t r a n g e r ,  i s  m o r a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d .  We can ask him t o  c o n s id e r  a r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  
case in  which he a p p l i e s  th e  same judgem en t  t o  a f r i e n d .  
Would he be w i l l i n g  t o  make th e  same judgem ent  a b o u t  t h e  
f r i e n d ?  I f  n o t ,  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  be t h a t  Smith  i s  u s in g  a d o u b le  s t a n d a r d .
O f t e n  we combine cases ( i )  and ( i i )  in  a rgum en ts .  The 
do u b le  s t a n d a r d  in  q u e s t i o n  u s u a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a case in  which  
t h e  j u d g e r  a c c e p ts  t h e  s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t h a t  he m o r a l l y  
o ug ht  t o  do F h i m s e l f  but  he would n o t  a c c e p t  th e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in  which a n o th e r  person does F. A good 
i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  K a n t ’ s ( 1 7 8 5 : 8 5 )  c e l e b r a t e d  example  
o f  f a l s e  p r o m is in g .  Suppose t h a t  Smith  i s  d r i v e n  t o  borrow  
money because o f  need.  He borrows t h e  money f rom  Jones,  
knowing t h a t  he w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  pay i t  back,  b u t  he sees  
t o o  t h a t  he w i l l  n o t  g e t  th e  loan  u n le s s  he g i v e s  Jones a 
f i r m  prom ise  t o  pay i t  back w i t h i n  a f i x e d  t i m e .  So Smith  
makes a f a l s e  prom ise  t o  Jones.  Now suppose t h a t  Smith
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r e f u s e s  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  i d e a  o f  Jones making t h e  same f a l s e  
p ro m ise  t o  Brown in  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  We would  accuse  
Sm ith  o f  h a v in g  a d o u b le  s t a n d a r d ;  o r ,  more p r o s a i c a l l y ,  o f  
r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  h i s  o r i g i n a l  
ju d g e m e n t .
Double  s ta n d a r d s  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a r e  n o t  a lw a y s  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  Suppose, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  Sm ith  
h a b i t u a l l y  smokes c i g a r e t t e s  and t h a t  he r e f u s e s  t o  s to p  
because he does n o t  re g a r d  h i s  own h e a l t h  as i m p o r t a n t .  L e t  
us suppose a l s o  t h a t  Smith  has te e n a g e  c h i l d r e n  o f  whom he 
i s  v e r y  fo n d .  A l th o u g h  Smith d o e s n ’ t  c a r e  ab o u t  h i s  own 
h e a l t h ,  he w o u ld n ’ t  want  a n y t h i n g  bad t o  happen t o  t h e  
h e a l t h  o f  h i s  c h i l d r e n .  We m ig h t  ask him w h e th e r  he would  
a c c e p t  t h e  judgem ent  'One ought  t o  h a b i t u a l l y  smoke’ when 
a p p l i e d  t o  h i s  c h i l d r e n .  No doubt  Smith  would s h r i n k  f rom  
t h e  i d e a .  I f  he cannot  a c c e p t  t h e  i d e a  o f  h i s  c h i l d r e n  
e n d a n g e r in g  t h e i r  h e a l t h  t h e n ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , he s h o u ld  
n o t  endanger  h i s  own. So once a g a in  t h e  use o f  t h e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case can expose t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  a p p l y i n g  
one s t a n d a r d  o f  r i g h t  and wrong t o  o n e s e l f  and a n o t h e r  
s t a n d a r d  t o  o t h e r s ;  o r  i t  can show t h e  i n s i n c e r i t y  o f  o n e ’ s 
commitment t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  judg em en t .  N eed less  t o  say t h e  
l a t t e r  judgem ent  i s  r a t i o n a l l y  f o r f e i t  when t h e  j u d g e r  w i l l  
n o t  a c c e p t  one o r  o t h e r  o f  i t s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm s .
We come now t o  a d i f f e r e n t  t y p e  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  which  
r e s u l t s  f rom  a p p ly i n g  U.R.  To u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  a j u d g e r  must  
s a t i s f y  h i m s e l f  t h a t  he i s  r a t i o n a l l y  a b l e  t o  both a d o p t  t h e  
ju dgem en t  as a g u ide  t o  h i s  own conduct  and a t  t h e  same t im e  
a c c e p t  t h a t  o t h e r  l i k e  cases c ou ld  do so a l s o .  And many 
s i n g u l a r  judgem ents  a r e  r u l e d  o u t  because t h e y  c a n n o t  
l o g i c a l l y  meet t h i s  demand. To see t h i s ,  we need t o  assume 
t h e  r u l e  t h a t  ' o u g h t ’ i m p l i e s  ' c a n ’ . I f  i t  i s  c l a i m e d ,  in  
a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  sense o f  ' o u g h t ’ , t h a t  X ought  t o  p e r fo r m  
a c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  F t h i s  means, a t  t h e  l e a s t ,  t h a t  i t  must be 
l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  f o r  X t o  p e r fo rm  ( o r  t o  have p e r fo r m e d )  
t h e  a c t i o n  in  q u e s t i o n .  When we assume t h i s  r u l e  th e n  c e r —
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t a i n  s i n g u l a r  judgem ents  must be r e j e c t e d  because t h e y  
l o g i c a l l y  can n o t  be f o l l o w e d  when u n i v e r s a l i z e d . 24 The 
t y p e s  o f  judgem ent  t h a t  I  have in  mind a r e  e i t h e r  
s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g  o r  s e n s e le s s  in  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm .
A s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  i s  s e l f - f r u s t r a t e d  when u n i v e r s a l ­
i z i n g ,  i f  i t s  purpose i s  t h w a r t e d  as soon as one t r i e s  t o  
a p p ly  i t  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  ca s e s .  A f a m i l i a r  
exam ple  h e re  i s  ' I  w i l l  no t  h e lp  o t h e r s  b u t  w i l l  a lw a ys  
a c c e p t  t h e i r  h e l p ’ . Such a judgem ent  i s  n o t  s e l f -  
c o n t r a d i  c t o r y  , f o r  I  ( e x c l u s i v e l y ) ,  o r  I ,  S m i th ,  and some 
o t h e r s ,  c o u ld  ado pt  i t .  But i t  i s  r a t i o n a l l y  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  
when we a t t e m p t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  f o r  a l l  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
p r im a  f a c i e  l i k e  c as es .  For  i f  t h i s  judgem ent  were t o  be 
a p p l i e d  u n i v e r s a l l y  th en  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
would  f r u s t r a t e  what  i s  o b v i o u s l y  th e  p o i n t  o f  t h e  second  
h a l f ,  namely t o  g e t  t h e  h e lp  o f  o t h e r s  when we need i t .
Perhaps a more i n t e r e s t i n g  t y p e  o f  judgem ent  t h a t  i s  
f r u s t r a t e d  when we a t t e m p t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  o v e r  a l l  p r im a  
f a c i e  l i k e  cas es ,  i s  o f  t h e  form ' I  w i l l  p l a y  o n l y  i f  I  can 
w i n ’ . Most c o m p e t i t i v e  games a r e  such t h a t  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  
i m p o s s i b le  f o r  eve ryone  t o  w in .  In  o r d e r  f o r  Sm ith  t o  be 
s a i d  t o  have won a game o f  chess,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  he must have  
an opponent  who has l o s t .  S ince  n e c e s s a r i l y  n o t  e v e r y  
c o m p e t i t o r  can w in ,  th e  judgement  ' I  w i l l  p l a y  o n l y  i f  I  can 
w i n ’ i s  i m p o s s ib le  when a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  p r im a  f a c i e  l i k e  
c a s e s .  The p o i n t  o f  such a judgem ent  would be f r u s t r a t e d  i f  
i t  were adopted  u n i v e r s a l l y .
A n o th e r  t y p e  o f  judgem ent ,  w h i l e  n o t  s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g , i s  
s e n s e l e s s  when we a t t e m p t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  o v e r  a l l  
r e l e v a n t  cas es .  C o n s id e r  an example borrowed f ro m  K . B a i e r  
( 1 9 5 8 : 1 9 7 ) :
Always a s s e r t  what you t h i n k  no t  t o  be t h e  cas e .
No m a t t e r  what  t h e  reason i s  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  ju d g e m e n t ,  i f  
t h i s  i s  supposed t o  be a d i r e c t i v e  f o r  a l l  persons  i t  would  
e v e n t u a l l y  l ead  t o  a breakdown o f  a l l  com m unica t ion .  As we 
s h a l l  s ee ,  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between t r u e  and f a l s e  s t a t e m e n t s
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-  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  a s t a t e m e n t  s i m p ! i c i t e r  -  
depends upon t h e  p resu m p t ion  o f  a g e n e r a l  ad h e re n c e  t o  t h e  
norm o f  making t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  ( s e e  p p . 2 9 0 -2 9 5  a h e a d ) .  I  
w i l l  a r g u e ,  however,  t h a t  such a s t a t e m e n t  i s  n o t  s e l f -  
c o n t r a d i  c t o r y , o r  s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g , as a r e s u l t  o f  a p p l y i n g  
U .R .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  does n o t  make any sense when t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  i t s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  a r e  s p e l l e d  o u t .
To say t h a t  a moral judgem ent  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  t h e n ,  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  f o r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  
a g e n ts  t o  do t h e  a c t  in  q u e s t i o n ,  ( i n  t h e  r a t h e r  p a l l i d  
senses o f  ' l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ’ a b o v e ) .  But t h e r e  i s  more 
t o  t h e  m a t t e r  th an  t h i s .  When we say t h a t  someone X ought  
t o  do F, in  a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  sense o f  ' o u g h t ’ , we im p ly  
t h a t  he i s  no t  c o n s t r a i n e d  o r  impeded in  any p h y s i c a l  o r  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e s p e c t ,  so t h a t  X can weigh our  judgem ent  and 
t h e n ,  i f  he chooses,  he can a c t  upon i t .  T h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  we 
im p ly  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  o n l y  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  b u t  m a t e r i a l l y  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  him t o  do F. The judgem ent  i s  u n d ers to o d  t o  be 
a r e a l i s t i c  g u id e  t o  h i s  a c t i o n s .  I n  a s i m i l a r  way, i t  i s  
p o i n t l e s s  t o  t e l l  X t h a t  a c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t  F i s  
good, o r  m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e d ,  i f  i t  i s  n o t  a t r a i t  t h a t  a human 
b e in g  can ,  as an e m p i r i c a l  f a c t ,  possess .  F must be
a p p l i c a b l e  in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  does j u s t i c e  t o  what  persons  
a r e ,  o r  have i t  in  them t o  be.
T h e re  i s  a p o i n t  t h a t  i s  o f t e n  o v e r lo o k e d  h e r e .  A
p a r a l l e l  argument  t o  th e  one above a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  judgem e n ts .  I n  a m o r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
sense o f  ' c a n ’ o r  ' c o u l d ’ , which goes beyond l o g i c a l
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  f o r  a s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
i t  must be m a t e r i a l l y  p o s s i b l e  no t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
t h e  ju dgem en t  t o  do ( o r  t o  have d o n e ) ,  b u t  f o r  a l l  p r im a  
f a c i e  l i k e  cases t o  do th e  a c t  in  q u e s t i o n .  T h is  i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o r t a n t  f o r  judgem ents  where t h e  reasons  a r e  
c la im e d  t o  be u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e .  I t  must n o t  o n l y  be 
l o g i c a l  p o s s i b l e  f o r  eve ryone  t o  do what  t h e  judgem ent  
r e q u i r e s ,  i t  to o  must be m a t e r i a l l y  p o s s i b l e  f o r  them t o  do
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i t .  I t  must be t h e  t y p e  o f  a c t i o n  t h a t  anyone can p e r f o r m ,  
o r  t h e  k in d  o f  m o t iv e  any moral  a g e n t  can have .
L e t  me p u t  t h i s  p o i n t  in  a d i f f e r e n t  way. I n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  which f o l l o w s  I  hope t o  show t h a t  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  U .R .  can p r o v i d e  an answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'Which moral  
ju dgem en ts  ought  anyone t o  make?’ , where t h e  answer g iv e n  
w i l l  a p p ly  t o  eve ryo n e  a l i k e .  And, c l e a r l y ,  we c a n n o t  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  judgem ents  c o n t a i n i n g  reasons  which i t  would  be 
m a t e r i a l l y  im p o s s ib le  f o r  a l l  human b e in g s  t o  choose t o  do,  
o r  t o  choose t o  a v o id  d o in g .  And t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  a c t -  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  w h ich ,  when u n i v e r s a l i z e d ,  a l l  moral a g e n ts  
c o u ld  n o t  p h y s i c a l l y  o r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  do. So when we a r e  
u n i v e r s a l i z i n g ,  we need t o  r e c o g n is e  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a 
s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  in  te rm s o f  what i t  i m p l i e s  human 
b e in g s  a r e  l i k e ,  o r  co u ld  be l i k e .  Such judgem en ts  a r e
r a t i o n a l l y  f o r f e i t  where t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  d e s c r i b e s  a 
manner o f  e x i s t e n c e  t o  which i t  would be m a t e r i a l l y
im p o s s i b le  f o r  a l l  human be ings  t o  d e g e n e r a t e  o r  which would  
be m a t e r i a l l y  i m p o s s ib le  f o r  them a l l  t o  a t t a i n .
We need t o  m ent ion  a l s o  o t h e r  t y p e s  o f  judgem en t  which  
a r e  i m p o s s i b le  i f  we assume, q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l y ,  t h e  r u l e  
'o u g h t  i m p l i e s  c a n ’ . F i r s t  o f  a l l  t h e r e  a r e  th o s e  which a r e  
i n c o h e r e n t ,  s im p ly  because t h e y  e x p re s s  m u t u a l l y  
i n c o m p a t i b l e  o b j e c t i v e s .  A judgem ent  m ig h t  be s a i d  t o  do 
t h i s  i f  t h e  reason e x p re s s e s ,  say ,  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  both t o  be 
g r e g a r i o u s  and a f f e c t i o n a t e  and t o  have coo l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  a l l  o f  o n e ’ s a c q u a i n t a n c e s , o r  t o  be both  p o p u la r  and 
r e c l u s i v e ,  and so on. A n o th er  t y p e  o f  judgem ent  t h a t  i s  
i n c o h e r e n t  i s  one where i t s  p o i n t  i s  d e f e a t e d  as soon as t h e
j u d g e r  l e t s  i t  be known t h a t  he has adopted  i t ,  ( f o r  a c t u a l
o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c a s e s ) .  For  exam ple ,  i f  Sm ith  l e t s  Brown 
know t h a t  he does no t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  one m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  keep  
p rom ises  t o  repay borrowed money, a t  t h e  t im e  when he 
p rom ises  t o  repay Brown, then  h i s  p rom ise  t o  rep ay  i s  
s e l f - d e f e a t i n g .  As K . B a i e r  ( i b i d ) suggests;
. . . a n y  remark t h a t  throws doubt  on t h e  s i n c e r i t y
o f  th e  p ro m is e r  w i l l  d e f e a t  t h e  purpose o f  making
39
a p ro m is e .
The t y p e  o f  cases t h a t  can be shown t o  be c o n c e p t u a l l y  
i n c o h e r e n t  o r  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g  a r e  a f o r t i o r i  non-  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .
We w i l l  co n c lu d e  our  d i s c u s s io n  o f  u n a c c e p t a b l e  and 
i m p o s s i b le  t y p e  ( i )  and ( i i )  cases  h e r e .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  in  
t h e  e s s a y ,  l e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  say t h a t  s i n g u l a r  judgem en ts  
which  t h e  j u d g e r  i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  o r  t h a t  become 
l o g i c a l l y  o r  m a t e r i a l l y  i m p o s s ib le  when he t r i e s  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  them, can not  be long t o  t h e  m o r a l i t y  o f  a 
r a t i o n a l  p e rs o n .  I  want  t o  c o n s id e r  now h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases  
o f  t y p e  ( i i i ) .
A f u r t h e r  t e s t  t h a t  th e  moral j u d g e r  must p e r f o r m ,  t o  see  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  a p a r t i c u l a r  judgem ent  he i s  making i s  r e a l l y  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  i s  t o  im ag ine  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case  in
which h i s  own judgem ent  i s  a d i r e c t i v e  g u i d i n g  t h e  a c t i o n s  
o f  o t h e r s  tow ards  h i m s e l f .  I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  j u d g e r  must p u t  
h i m s e l f  in  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a l l  o t h e r  persons  who a r e  
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  judg em en t .  Thus i f  I  j u d g e  t h a t  i t  i s  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t  f o r  me t o  do F t o  you t h e n ,  t o  be
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e , in  a r e a l  o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  t a b l e s - t u r n e d
c a s e ,  I  must a c c e p t  t h a t  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  f o r  you t o  do
F t o  me. T h i s  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  a v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  Golden R u le .  
We can show t h a t  i t  l o g i c a l l y  f o l l o w s  f rom  U .R .  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o o f :
( i )  I  j u d g e  t h a t  I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  H y p o t h e s is
do F t o  you, f o r  t h e  reason R.
( i i )  I  j u d g e  t h a t  someone m o r a l l y  ought  ( i ) ,  by U .R .  
t o  do any a c t  which i s  t h e  same in  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  as my do ing  F t o  you 
( i i i )  Your  do ing  F t o  me in  a t a b l e s -  A n a l y t i c
tu r n e d  s i t u a t i o n  i s  th e  same in  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  as my do ing  
F t o  you.
( i v )  You m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F t o  me ( i i ) ,  ( i i i )
in  a t a b l e s - t u r n e d  s i t u a t i o n
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The v a l u e  o f  t h e  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n  i s  o b v io u s .  For  
what  a person c l a i m s  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  happen when he i s  a 
j u d g e r  i s  o f t e n  no t  what  he c l a i m s  oug ht  t o  happen when he 
i n  t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s shoes.  Thus,  once a g a i n ,  t h e  use o f  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  can expose an 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y ;  t h a t  o f  a p p l y i n g  one s t a n d a r d  o f  r i g h t  o r  
wrong t o  o n e s e l f  and a n o t h e r  s t a n d a r d  t o  judgem en ts  d i r e c t e d  
a g a i n s t  o n e s e l f .
However i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  know what  e x a c t l y  we a r e  t o  
make o f  t h e  demand t h a t ,  when making a moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  we 
must p u t  o u r s e l v e s  in  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  o t h e r  persons  who a r e  
a f f e c t e d  by i t .  S u r e l y  o n e ’ s own and a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w i l l  i n c l u d e  our  d i f f e r e n t  d e s i r e s  and 
i n t e r e s t s ;  we w i l l  have d i f f e r e n t  m enta l  and p h y s i c a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , d i f f e r e n t  a b i l i t i e s ,  r e s o u r c e s ,  s o c i a l  
p o s i t i o n s ,  l i f e  h i s t o r i e s  and even d i f f e r e n t  a n c e s t r i e s .  So 
how e x a c t l y  i s  t h i s  t o  be done?
5.  To u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  p r o p r i a  persona
How a r e  we t o  c o n s t r u c t  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases in  which we
can p u t  o u r s e l v e s  in  our  r e c i p i e n t ’ s shoes? One p o s s i b l e
answer h e re  i s  t o  use what ,  f o l l o w i n g  R .M .H a r e ,  we w i l l  c a l l
( i )  ' t h e  uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  j_n p r o p r i  a persona  t e s t ’ . Hare
( 1 9 6 3 : 1 0 8 )  w r i t e s  o f  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t :
. . . w h e n  we a r e  a s k in g  B t o  im ag in e  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  h i s  v i c t i m ,  we phras e  o u r  q u e s t i o n  . . .  
'What do you say ( i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a ) abo u t  a 
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in  which you a r e  in  your  v i c t i m ’ s 
posi t i o n ? ’
I n  o t h e r  words,  we ask th e  j u d g e r  s im p ly  t o  c o n s i d e r  th e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in  which he i s  on t h e  r e c e i v i n g  end o f  h i s  
own ju d g e m e n t ,  s t i l l  w i t h  h i s  own p r e f e r e n c e s ,  v a l u e s ,  l i f e  
h i s t o r y ,  and so on. I n  t h i s  way t h e r e  i s  a sense in  which  
h i s  own and t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s p o s i t i o n s  a r e  r e v e r s e d  y e t  t h e  
j u d g e r ’ s p e rs o n a l  i d e n t i t y  i s  p r e s e r v e d .  T h is  i s  a common 
use o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case argum ents;  and a common example  
used t o  i l l u s t r a t e  i t ,  i s  t h e  case o f  t h e  r a c i s t  in  South  
A f r i  c a .
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L e t  us suppose t h a t  Smith  i s  a w h i t e  South A f r i c a n  
em p lo y e r  who r e f u s e s  t o  h i r e  Jones because Jones i s  a b l a c k  
man. Us ing  t h e  i n  p r o p r i a  persona  s t r a t e g y  we m ig h t  ask  
Sm ith  t o  im ag ine  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  which b l a c k  
p e o p le  c o n t r o l  most o f  t h e  w e a l t h  and t h e  power i n  t h a t  
c o u n t r y .  I n  th e s e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  would  Sm ith  
a c c e p t  t h a t  a b la c k  e m p lo y e r ,  now Jones,  oug ht  t o  r e f u s e  t o  
h i r e  a w h i t e  person s o l e l y  on t h e  grounds o f  h i s  c o l o u r ?  
I f  Sm ith  r e f u s e s  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  Jones m o r a l l y  o ug ht  t o  
behave in  t h i s  way, we can c o n v i c t  Smith  o f  v i o l a t i n g  U .R .  
Sm ith  i s  r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  th e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  ju d g e m e n t .  Of course  he may r e f u s e  t o  employ Jones  
and n o t  b o t h e r  t h a t  h i s  a c t  can not  be r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  
However i f  he i s  concerned w i t h  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  h i s  
judgem en t  and he f i n d s  h i m s e l f  u n w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  i d e a  
o f  Jones do ing  t h e  same t h i n g  t o  him in  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  then  Smith  r a t i o n a l l y  c an n o t  a c c e p t  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  judg em en t .
To u n i v e r s a l i z e  f o r  a l l  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases i n  p r o p r i a  
p ers o n a  we m ig h t  a l l o w  n o t  o n l y  f o r  changes which may as a 
m a t t e r  o f  cau sa l  p o s s i b i l i t y  come abo ut  bu t  a l s o  f o r  c e r t a i n  
d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  and r e v e r s a l  o f  r o l e s  which  
e m p i r i c a l l y  c o u ld  n o t  o c c u r ,  so t h a t  i t  t a k e s  e f f o r t  t o  
im a g in e  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  cas e .  For exam ple ,  we m ig h t  ask  
Sm ith  t o  c o n s id e r  th e  t a b l e s - t u r n e d  case in  which he,  S m i th ,  
i s  a b l a c k  man and Jones i s  w h i t e .  Would he, S m i th ,  s t i l l  
a c c e p t  t h e  judgem ent  i f  Jones r e f u s e d  t o  h i r e  him because o f  
h i s  c o l o u r ?  I f  Smith  r e f u s e s  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
c a s e ,  we can c o n v i c t  him o f  d o u b le  s t a n d a r d s .  He i s  
r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  th e  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  h i s  o r i g i n a l  
j u d g e m e n t .
We need t o  e x te n d  t h e  i_n p r o p r i a  perso na  s t r a t e g y  t o  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  cas es .  In  th e  r a c i s t  exam ple ,  where t h e r e  a r e  
a number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a f f e c t e d  by h i s  ju d g e m e n t ,  we must  
ask Smith  t o  t e s t  i t  by im a g in in g  h i m s e l f  in  t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  each person a f f e c t e d  by w h a te v e r  a c t i o n  he
42
proposes  t o  p e r f o r m .  I n  t h i s  way, Sm ith  can d e t e r m in e  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  he would c o n sen t  t o  t h e  judgem en t  i f  he knew 
t h a t  in  each case c o n s id e r e d  he would be on t h e  r e c e i v i n g  
end o f  t h e  a c t i o n .  Only  i f  he would so c o n s e n t ,  i n  each  
c a s e ,  can he c l a i m  t h a t  h i s  i n i t i a l  judgem en t  i s  r e a l l y  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .  And, as Hare  ( 1 9 7 8 : 7 7 - 7 8 )  n o te s  i n  t h e  
r a c i s t  cas e ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  Smith  would j u d g e  in  t h e  
way he p ro p o ses ,  i f  t o  do so would mean t h a t  he would  be so 
d i  s a d v a n t a g e d .
I t  seems, t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  U .R .  t o  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases i n  p r o p r i a  perso na  can be an i m p o r t a n t  
d i a l e c t i c a l  t o o l  in  moral r e a s o n in g .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t a t u s  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  t h e s i s  can s t i l l  be 
answered as b e f o r e .  Our b a s ic  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  U .R .  
has been shown t o  be a s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  we 
have c a l l e d  c o n s is t e n c y  A, a m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  and n e c e s s a ry  
p r i n c i p l e .  And t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  U .R .  t o  cases j_n p r o p r i a  
p erso na  r e t a i n s  t h e  h a l l m a r k s  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  and n e u t r a l i t y .  
I t  i s  n e u t r a l ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c o n t e s t a b l e  
moral  commitments.
We can see t h i s  more c l e a r l y  perhaps  -  v i z .  t h a t  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  i_n p r o p r i a  persona  r e t a i n s  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  
U .R .  -  by c o n s i d e r i n g  two a l t e r n a t i v e  acc o u n ts  t h a t  Hare  
g i v e s  o f  t h e  r e v e r s i b i  1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  both o f  which  Hare  
seems t o  t h i n k  a r e  p a r t  and p a r c e l  o f  t h e  j_n p r o p r i  a perso na  
t e s t ,  y e t  which go w e l l  beyond c o n s is t e n c y  A.
H a r e ’ s second v e r s i o n  o f  th e  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  we
w i l l  c a l l  ( i i )  ' t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  t e s t ’ . When f o r m u l a t i n g
a moral  judg em en t ,  Hare  ( i b i d : 9 4 )  t e l l s  us t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r
. . . m u s t  be p re p a re d  t o  g i v e  w e ig h t  t o  ( a n o t h e r  
pers o n )  A ’ s i n c l i n a t i o n s  and i n t e r e s t s  as i f  t h e y  
were h i s  own.
On t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  l o g i c ,  t h e  j u d g e r  must no t  
s im p ly  im ag in e  h i m s e l f  in  t h e  o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s shoes w h i l e  
r e t a i n i n g  h i s  ( t h e  j u d g e r ’ s )  own p r e f e r e n c e s ,  v a l u e s  e t c . ,  
r a t h e r ,  he must c o n s id e r  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in  which -  so 
t o  speak -  he i s  in  th e  o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s mind,  w i t h  t h a t
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p e r s o n ’ s p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  and v a l u e s .  He must th e n  
f o r m u l a t e  ju d g e m e n ts ,  Hare  s u g g e s ts ,  f rom  both  h i s  own and 
t h e  o t h e r ’ s v i e w p o i n t .
In  s im p le  b i l a t e r a l  cases t h i s  r e s u l t  ap p e a rs  t o  be 
a c h ie v e d  when one asks o n e s e l f  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  one would  
a s s e n t  t o  a c o n d i t i o n a l  o f  t h e  form:  ' I f  I  were in  t h e  o t h e r  
p e r s o n ’ s p o s i t i o n ,  h a v in g  h i s  d e s i r e s ,  v a l u e s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  
e t c . ,  how would I  r e a c t  t o  t h e  t h o u g h t  o f  someone do in g  what  
I  am p ro p o s in g  t o  do, t o  me?’ . I n  many e v e ry d a y  cases  t h e  
j u d g e r  would n o t  need t o  know a l l  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h e  
o t h e r  person possesses and th en  im a g in e  h i m s e l f  h a v in g  a l l  
o f  t h e s e .  C l e a r l y ,  t h i s  would be an i m p o s s i b le  r e q u i r e m e n t .  
Pres um ab ly ,  in  many cases one would n o t  need t o  know v e r y  
much abo ut  t h e  o t h e r  p e rso n .  For exam ple ,  t o  d e c id e  t o  be 
p o l i t e  t o  a shop a s s i s t a n t ,  i t  s u f f i c e s  t o  r e c o g n is e  t h a t  
he,  l i k e  a lm o s t  e v e ry b o d y ,  p r e f e r s  p o l i t e n e s s  t o  ru d en ess .
Ha re  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 1 )  g i v e s  us a c l e a r  example  o f  t h e  k i n d  o f
t h i n g  he has in  mind.  The case he c i t e s  i s  one where Hare
wants  t o  le a v e  h i s  b i c y c l e  in  a p l a c e  where a n o t h e r  man
wants t o  p a rk  h i s  c a r .  Both p a r t i e s  d e s i r e  t o  l e a v e  t h e i r
v e h i c l e s  where t h e y  a r e ,  b u t  H a r e ’ s d e s i r e  t o  l e a v e  t h e
b i c y c l e  i s  l e s s  than  t h e  d r i v e r ’ s d e s i r e  t o  p a rk  h i s  c a r .
Hare  co n c lu d es  t h a t  u s ing  t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  s t r a t e g y ,  he
w i l l  j u d g e  t h a t  h i s  b i c y c l e  ought  t o  be moved. T h i s  i s
because he has two d e s i r e s ,  ( i b i d )
. . . t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e s i r e  t o  l e a v e  my b i c y c l e  where i t  
i s ,  and my a c q u i r e d  d e s i r e  t h a t  were I  t h e  o t h e r  
p a r t y  I  shou ld  be a b l e  t o  park  my c a r  and t h e  l a t t e r  
w i l l  be s t r o n g e r .
I n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  cas es ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  c o n s i d e r a b l y  more 
knowledge o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  i n v o l v e d  would be needed.  
Somehow I  must im agine  m y s e l f  pos sess in g  a l l  o f  t h e  i n c l i n a ­
t i o n s  and i n t e r e s t s  o f  th o s e  a f f e c t e d  by my ju d g em en t ,  as i f  
t h e y  were my own. T h is  b r i n g s  us t o  a n o t h e r  fo rm  in  which  
Hare  su g g es ts  t h e  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  t e s t  o c c u r s .
L e t  us c a l l  t h e  t h i r d  t e s t  ( i i i )  ' t h e  i d e a l  o b s e r v e r  
t e s t ’ . ( I t  i s  th e  one w h ich ,  Hare  ( 1 9 6 3 : 9 4 )  t e l l s  us,  has
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a f f i n i t i e s  w i t h  I d e a l  O b s e rv e r  t h e o r i e s . )  He ( i b i d : 117)  
w r i t e s :
. . . i n  th e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  a g e n t  has t o  
c o n s id e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  e v e r y  person who i s  
a f f e c t e d .
Where t h e r e  i s  n o t  one o t h e r  person b u t  i n d e f i n i t e l y  many,  
i n  making a moral  judgem ent  I  must im ag in e  m y s e l f  p o s s e s s in g  
t h e  d e s i r e s ,  ( p r e f e r e n c e s , i n t e r e s t s ,  v a l u e s )  o f  a l l  th o s e
a f f e c t e d  by my ju dgem en t ,  as w e l l  as my own. I  must th e n
g i v e  equ a l  w e ig h t  t o  a l l  o f  th e s e  d e s i r e s  ( e t c . ) .  But how 
does t h i s  le a d  t o  a d e t e r m i n a t e  moral  c o n c lu s io n ?  How i s
my t a k i n g  i n t o  a cc ount  th e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  d e s i r e s  supposed  
t o  is s u e  i n t o  a moral judgement? H a r e ’ s answer i s  t h a t  by 
a d o p t i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i d e a l  o b s e r v e r ,  I  w i l l  t a k e  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  my own o r i g i n a l  d e s i r e  and t h e  p o s i t i v e  and n e g a t i v e  
d e s i r e s  o f  a l l  o f  th o s e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  a c t  as i f  t h e y  were  
a l s o  my own, I  w i l l  then  r a t i o n a l l y  s a t i s f y  my s t r o n g e s t
d e s i r e s  o r  i n t e r e s t s .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  an a c t i o n  I  p la n
t o  do w i l l  have ad v e rs e  e f f e c t s  on S m i th ,  Jones and Brown.
What I  must do i s  im agine  m y s e l f  in  t h e  p l a c e  o f  S m i th ,
Jones and Brown, w i t h  t h e i r  d e s i r e s ,  e t c . ,  as w e l l  as my 
own. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  I  must im agine  m y s e l f  h a v in g  t h e i r  
d e s i r e s  a g a i n s t  my p lanned  a c t i o n .  And when im a g in in g  a l l  
o f  t h i s  -  my own o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i v e  d e s i r e  as w e l l  as th o s e  
o f  S m i th ,  Jones and Brown -  I  w i l l  choose t o  f o r e g o  th e  
p lan n e d  a c t  because do ing  so i s  now in  accord  w i t h  my
s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e .  In  t h i s  way, I  t a k e  up t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e
i d e a l  o b s e r v e r .
Hare  ( i bi  d : 11 7)  g iv e s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  example  which  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between r o l e - r e v e r s a l  and 
m u l t i l a t e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  in  h i s  a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  j u d g e  who 
d e c id e s  t h a t  he ought  t o  send a man t o  j a i l  f o r  t h e f t .  On 
t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  account  ( i i ) ,  t h e  ju d g e  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
im a g in e  what  i t  would be l i k e  in  t h e  t h i e f ’ s s i t u a t i o n ;  
s i n c e  t h e  t h i e f  has a v e r y  s t r o n g  d e s i r e  n o t  t o  be s e n t  t o  
j a i l ,  t h e  ju d g e  would p r o b a b ly  n o t  im p r is o n  him. However ,  
as Hare  n o t e s ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  t h i r d - p a r t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t
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have t o  be in c l u d e d  in  h i s  d e c i s i o n .  The ju d g e  has t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  e v e r y  person who m ig h t  r e a s o n a b ly  
be t h o u g h t  t o  be a f f e c t e d  by h i s  ju d g e m e n t .  T a k in g  a l l  o f  
t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  t o g e t h e r ,  h i s  judgem ent  t h a t  t h e  man must go 
t o  p r i s o n  would g i v e  more p e o p le  more o f  what  t h e y  d e s i r e  
th a n  would any o t h e r .
We s h o u ld  n o te  he re  t h a t  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  t e s t
( i i i ) ,  ( t h e  i d e a l  o b s e r v e r  t e s t ) ,  i s  n o t  an in d e p e n d e n t  t e s t  
b u t  i t  i s  an e x t e n s io n  o f  ( i i ) ,  ( t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  t e s t ) .  
Both ( i i )  and ( i i i )  r e q u i r e  t h a t  in  o n e ’ s moral  judgem en t  
one must g i v e  equal  w e ig h t  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  o f  th o s e  
a f f e c t e d  by th e  proposed a c t i o n .  I n  both t e s t s ,  I  can do 
t h i s  by im a g in in g  t h a t  a l l  o f  t h e  d e s i r e s  i n v o l v e d  a r e  my 
own. Thus t h e  judgem ent  I  a c c e p t  w i l l  be in  acc ordance  w i t h  
my r e s u l t i n g  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e .
Ha re  app ears  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  'e q u a l  w e i g h t ’ r e q u i r e m e n t
f o l l o w s  f rom  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  Of t h e  f o r m e r  he
( i b i d : 118)  w r i t e s :
I t  must be emphasized t h a t  i t ,  l i k e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i t s e l f ,  i s  a p u r e l y  fo rm a l  
p r i n c i p l e ,  f o l l o w i n g  f rom  t h e  l o g i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
moral w o rd s ; . . .
As a m a t t e r  o f  l o g i c ,  I  must im ag ine  m y s e l f  p o s s e s s in g  a l l  
o f  t h e  d e s i r e s  ( e t c . )  o f  each and a l l  o f  th o s e  a f f e c t e d  by 
my j u d g e m e n t . 25 The demand t h a t  equa l  w e ig h t  s h o u ld  th en  
be g i v e n  t o  t h e i r  d e s i r e s  i s  a c o r o l l a r y  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .
Can t e s t s  ( i i )  and ( i i i )  be e s t a b l i s h e d  as fun d am en ta l  
and in e s c a p a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l o g ic ?  I  w i l l  answer  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n  f u l l y  l a t e r  ( p p . 1 1 7 - 1 2 4 ) .  For t h e  moment we need 
o n l y  n o te  t h a t ,  u n l i k e  t h e  t e s t  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a , t o  say  
t h a t  'one  shou ld  g i v e  equa l  w e ig h t  t o  th e  d e s i r e s  o f  
e v e ry o n e  a f f e c t e d  by th e  ju d g e m e n t ’ i s  n o t  a n e u t r a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t .  The is s u e  between someone who a s s e r t e d  i t  and 
someone who d e n ie d  i t  would be a moral i s s u e .  Anyone who 
a s s e r t s  i t  i s  t a k i n g  a moral s ta n d  which someone e l s e ,  q u i t e  
r e a s o n a b l y ,  m ig h t  no t  a c c e p t .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  where t h e r e  is
a c o n f l i c t  o f  d e s i r e s ,  someone m ig h t  t h i n k ,  q u i t e  
r e a s o n a b l y ,  t h a t  t h e  moral  t h i n g  t o  do i s  t o  g i v e  more 
w e i g h t  t o  t h e  d e s i r e s  o f  members o f  h i s  own f a m i l y  o r ,  
p e r h a p s ,  t o  th o s e  d e s i r e s  t h a t  d e s e rv e  t o  be s a t i s f i e d .  He 
m ig h t  a r g u e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  p e o p le  a r e  so d i f f e r e n t  in  
c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  -  some a r e  k in d  o t h e r s  a r e  c r u e l ,  some work  
h ard  o t h e r s  a r e  l a z y ,  some a r e  generous o t h e r s  a r e  
a v a r i c i o u s ,  some have i n t e g r i t y  o t h e r s  do n o t  -  - t h a t  we do 
n o t  have an equal  r i g h t  t o  our  d e s i r e s  and i n t e r e s t s  b e in g  
t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  Now such a c l a i m  m ig h t  be th o u g h t  t o  be 
a moral  anathema y e t  i t  i s  n o t  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  o r  
r a t i o n a l l y  i n c o h e r e n t ,  n e i t h e r  would such a c l a i m  v i o l a t e  
t h e  o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by U.R .  The p o i n t  i s ,  t h e  
d e n i a l  o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t y p e s  ( i i )  and
( i i i )  seems t o  be p e r f e c t l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  moral  
di  s c o u r s e .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  d e n i a l  o f  i_n p r o p r i a  perso na  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  would n o t  be in  o r d e r .  G iven i t s  e x te n d e d  
i n t e r p r e t a t i  on j_n p r o p r  i a p e r s o n a , U .R .  commits us t o  
n o t h i n g  more th an  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  ( a c t u a l  o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l )  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  jud g em en ts ,  l o g i c a l l y  o r  m a t e r i a l l y  i m p o s s i b le  
judgem en ts  e t c .  I t  does n o t  commit us t o  any c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  d e s i r e s ,  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r  p e rs o n s ,  
when making a judg em en t .  Far  l e s s  does i t  commit us t o  
p u t t i n g  th o s e  d e s i r e s  ( e t c . )  on equa l  f o o t i n g  w i t h  o u r  own. 
Thus w h i l e  i_n p r o p r i  a persona  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  may be a 
n e u t r a l  e x t e n s io n  o f  our  U.R .  p r i n c i p l e  -  n e u t r a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  
t o  a l l  moral  t h e o r i e s  -  th e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  and i d e a l  o b s e r v e r  
r e v e r s i  bi  1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  do n o t  a p p ear  t o  be. We w i l l  
r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  in  C h a p te r  T h r e e .
I  want  now t o  compare, b r i e f l y ,  U .R .  w i t h  o t h e r  
approaches  t o  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s .
U .R .  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  o t h e r  accounts  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y
What has been e s t a b l i s h e d  so f a r ?  I  have c la im e d  t h a t  t o  
pass r a t i o n a l  m uster  we must be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  U.R.
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u n i v e r s a l i z e  our  s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  I  have  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  show how t h e  U .R .  r u l e  i s  based upon a 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A. S in c e  i t  i s  j u s t  t h e  t e r m  we 
a r e  u s in g  f o r  d e o n t i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y  A, U .R .  
e n j o y s  t h e  a d v an tag es  and p l a c e s  t h e  same c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
judgem en ts  as c o n s is t e n c y  A. I f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  th e n  so i s  U . R . ,  
(s e e  p p . 5 5 - 5 9  a h e a d ) .
I  have i n d i c a t e d  how U .R .  works and we have n o ted  i t s  
e x t e n s i o n  t o  h y p o t h e t i c a l  ca s e s ,  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . We 
have seen t h a t  re g a rd e d  in  t h i s  way U .R .  i s  c a p a b le  o f  
p o w e r f u l  employment in  moral a rgum ent .  Someone who w i l l  n o t  
o r  can n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  s i n g u l a r  ju dgem en t  f o r  a l l  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases i n  p r o p r i a  perso na  c o n t r a v e n e s  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A. H is  r e f u s a l  u s u a l l y  i n d i c a t e s  h i s  
i n s i n c e r i t y  o r  h i s  use o f  d o u b le  s t a n d a r d s .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  he i s  u n a b le  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  a s i n g u l a r  judgem en t  when 
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  i s  l o g i c a l l y  o r  m a t e r i a l l y  
i m p o s s i b l e .  I f  a j u d g e r  w i l l  n o t  o r  can n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  he 
s h o u ld  w i t h d r a w  h i s  o r i g i n a l  ju d g em en t .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  p o i n t s  above,  I  hope t o  show t h a t  an 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  U .R .  imposes o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
ju d g e m e n ts ,  ( c o n c e r n in g  c h o ic e s  o f  a c t i o n ,  d e f e n s i b l e  
c o n d u c t ,  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s ,  e t c . ) .  I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f  i s  a l o g i c a l  t h e s i s ,  an 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  U .R .  has d e f i n i t e  moral  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  When i t  
i s  a p p l i e d  t o  c e r t a i n  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  p r e m is e s ,  moral  
c o n c lu s io n s  can be o b t a i n e d  f rom t h i s  r u l e .  Hence U .R .  i s  
n o t  m e r e ly  a l o g i c a l  t h e s i s .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  a n o th e r  adv a n ta g e  t h a t  d e s e rv e s  t o  be 
em phas ized;  U.R .  i s  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  r u l e ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  
i t  does n o t  commit us t o  any c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  ass u m p t io n s .  
I t  m ig h t  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  a cc o u n t  so f a r  i n v o l v e s  a 
p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  c o n s is t e n c y  as opposed t o  i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,  o r  
r a t i o n a l i t y  as a g a i n s t  i r r a t  i o n a l  i t y  and so U.R .  i s  n o t  
v a l u e - n e u t r a l .  As f a r  as I  can see t h i s  i s  n o t  a d e f e c t .
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Any a t t e m p t  t o  g i v e  an a cc o u n t  o f  any r u l e  w i l l  i n v o l v e  some 
such n o r m a t iv e  e v a l u a t i o n s .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  
e v a l u a t i o n s  we make and t h e  k in d  o f  r e a s o n in g  by which t h e y  
a r e  s u p p o r te d ,  must n o t  depend upon c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  
a s s u m p t io n s .  T h i s  i s  what  we w i l l  mean by ' a  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  
r u l e ’ .
I t  i s  w o r th  e m p h a s iz in g  t h a t  U .R .  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  has
been shown n o t  t o  be based upon c o n t e s t a b l e  v a l u e
as s u m p t io n s .  I f ,  as we add t o  t h e  a c c o u n t ,  we c o n t i n u e  t o
a c h ie v e  t h i s  s o r t  o f  n e u t r a l i t y ,  our  f i n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f
U.R .  w i l l  be m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l .  T h i s  i s  a p r i z e  w o r th  h a v in g .
For  we a r e  prone t o  c h a l l e n g e  moral  judgem en ts  o r
p r i n c i p l e s ,  i f  f o r  no o t h e r  reason s im p ly  because moral
ju dgem en ts  o r  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  c o n s id e r e d  t o  be t h e  k in d  o f
s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  and sho u ld  be c h a l l e n g e d .
U s u a l l y  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  concerns  th e  moral  r i g h t s  o r  wrongs
o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  in  q u e s t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  we a r e
more l i k e l y  t o  a c c e p t  a p r i n c i p l e  i f  i t  can be shown t o  be
n e u t r a l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  any moral  t h e o r y .  For  when i t  i s  so
r e g a r d e d ,  i t  i s  no l o n g e r  s u b j e c t  t o  a t t a c k  on moral
grounds .  I f  i t  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  be c o n t r o v e r s i a l , i t  must be
shown t h a t  i t  i s  no t  a l o g i c a l  o r  r a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  in  th e
senses t h a t  i t  i s  c la im e d  t o  be. For t h i s  reason i t  i s
i m p o r t a n t  t o  make c l e a r  t h a t  U . R . ,  and t h e  ex te n d e d
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  i t  which f o l l o w ,  do n o t  i n v o l v e
c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  assum pt ions .  O t h e r w i s e ,  as Hare  ( i b i d : 3 1 )
su g g es ts  in  h i s  d is c u s s io n  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y :
. . . t h e  o b j e c t i o n  w i l l  be made t h a t  a moral  p r i n c i p l e  
has been smuggled in  d i s g u i s e d  as a l o g i c a l  
d o c t r i  n e .
I  hope t o  show t h a t  a n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e  expanded v e r s i o n  o f  
U .R .  i s  p o s s i b l e  f rom w h ich ,  n o n e t h e le s s ,  moral  c o n c lu s io n s  
can be d e r i v e d .
The argument f o r  bas ing  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  on c o n s is t e n c y  
i s  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  when we c o n s id e r  some o f  th e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h i s .  E a r l i e r  in  t h i s  essay ( p p . 3 - 4 ) ,  we 
noted  o t h e r  r e n d e r i n g s  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s ,
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e . g .  ' t h e  C a t e g o r i c a l  I m p e r a t i v e ’ , ' t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
i m p a r t i a l i t y ’ and ' f a i r n e s s ’ , a fo rm  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'What  
i f  e v e r y o n e  d id  t h a t ? ’ and so on. L e t  us see i f  any o f  
t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  p r o v i d e s  a more r i g o r o u s  o r  p e r s p ic u o u s  
a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s .
K a n t ’ s (o £  c i  t : 6 7 )  f i r s t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  C a t e g o r i c a l
I m p e r a t i v e ,  i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  s t a t e s :
. . . I  ought  n ev er  t o  a c t  e x c e p t  in  such a way t h a t  
I  can a l s o  w i l l  t h a t  my maxim sho u ld  become a 
u n i v e r s a l  law
A c c o rd in g  t o  K a n t ,  in  our  moral  re a s o n in g  we b eg in  w i t h  a 
maxim -  what  he c a l l s  ' a  s u b j e c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a c t i o n ’ -  
t h e  scope o f  which i s  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  a g e n t  h i m s e l f ;  e . g .  ' I  
w i l l  do F in  su c h -a n d -s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ’ . The C a t e g o r i c a l  
I m p e r a t i v e  th en  d i r e c t s  us, sub s p e c ie  l o g i c a e . t o  r e p l a c e  
t h e  c o n s t a n t  * I *  w i t h  a u n i v e r s a l  q u a n t i f i e r ;  th u s  'E v e ry o n e  
w i l l  do F in  s u c h -a n d -s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ’ . The new 
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ent  i s  t h e  one upon which f u r t h e r  t e s t s  
o f  c o n s is t e n c y  a r e  th en  p e r fo rm ed ;  v i z .  I s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  
jud g em en t  one t h a t  I  would be p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  w i l l i n g  t o  
a c c e p t?  I s  i t  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  o r ,  in  some o t h e r  way,  
s e l f - d e f e a t i n g ?  and so on. ( F o r t u n a t e l y  t h i s  i s  n o t  an 
essay  in  K a n t ia n  e x e g e s i s ,  so I  do n o t  f e e l  o b l i g e d  t o  
de fen d  my s t a r k  o u t l i n e  o f  K a n t ’ s famous t h e s i s  in  any  
d e t a i 1. )
L i k e  K a n t ,  I  to o  have f o r m u l a t e d  t h e  t h e s i s  in  te rm s  o f  
n o r m a t iv e  judgem ents  addressed  t o  t h e  a g e n t  h i m s e l f ,  o r  t o  
o t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  L ik e  t h e  C a t e g o r i c a l  
I m p e r a t i v e ,  U .R .  th en  d i r e c t s  us ,  in  t h e  name o f  
c o n s i s t e n c y ,  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  s i n g u l a r  t e rm  ' I ’ w i t h  a 
u n i v e r s a l  q u a n t i f i e r  and,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t o  check t h e  
j u d g e r ’ s w i l l i n g n e s s  and a b i l i t y  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  
ju d g e m e n t .  I  m a i n t a i n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  U .R .  r u l e  i s  
r o u g h ly  in  l i n e  w i t h  K a n t ’ s f i r s t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  C a t e g o r i c a l  
I m p e r a t i v e ,  ( though  some m a jo r  d i f f e r e n c e s  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  
in  C h a p te r  S e v e n ) .  A t  any r a t e ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y
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d i f f e r e n t  o r  p e r s p ic u o u s  a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y
t h e s i s  t h a t  we seek .
Could  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  be b e t t e r  s t a t e d  in
te rm s  o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y  o r  as a p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e ?  I  t h i n k
n o t .  We saw e a r l i e r  t h a t  we can n o t  r e t a i n  t h e  goa l  o f
n e c e s s i t y  and t h e o r y - n e u t r a l i t y  i f  we t r y  t o  d e r i v e  i t  f rom
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y , f o r  so i n t e r p r e t e d ,
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  c l a i m .  We saw
t h i s  when d i s c u s s in g  H a r e ’ s v iew  t h a t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  one g i v e s  equal  w e ig h t  t o  t h e  d e s i r e s  and
i n t e r e s t s  o f  eve ryo n e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  ju d g e m e n t .  As we
n o t e d ,  anyone who a s s e r t s  t h i s  i s  t a k i n g  a moral  s ta n d  which
someone e l s e ,  q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l y ,  m ig h t  n o t  a c c e p t .  The same
prob lem  a p p l i e s  t o  D .H .M o n r o ’ s ( 1 9 6 1 : 1 6 3 )  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e
i m p a r t i a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e :
One ought  n o t  t o  make e x c e p t io n s  in  o n e ’ s own 
f a v o u r .
As Monro p o i n t s  o u t ,  t h i s  to o  i s  a moral  c l a i m ,  ( t h a t  i s  
o f t e n  smuggled i n t o  a t h e o r y  under  t h e  g u is e  o f  a m o r a l l y  
n e u t r a l  p r i n c i p l e ) .  The f a c t  t h a t  c o n t r o v e r s y  i s  p o s s i b l e  
i s  an embarrassment  when th e  d e s id e r a tu m  i s  t o  f o r m u l a t e  an 
ac c o u n t  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  i s  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  c o n t r o ­
v e r s i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  U .R .  app ears  t o  be a 
n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l  r e n d e r i n g .
A s i m i l a r  prob lem  a p p l i e s  i f  we t r y  t o  d e r i v e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  f rom th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e .  A t  f i r s t  b lu s h ,  
t h e y  a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  p r i n c i p l e s .  A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  
l a t t e r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  two cases c o u ld  be ju d g ed  t o  be t h e  
same though t h e y  may be d i f f e r e n t  in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s .  
C o n s id e r  th e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  s t a t e m e n t s :
( 1 )  Two i n d i v i d u a l s  should  be ju d g ed  t o  be t h e  same o r  
t o  be r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  i f  t h e i r  needs a r e  t h e  
same, o t h e r w is e  th e y  sho u ld  be ju d g ed  d i f f e r e n t l y .
( 2 a )  S m i t h ’ s and J o n e s ’ needs a r e  t h e  same so t h e y  shou ld  
be judged  t o  be th e  same o r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r .
( 2 b )  S m i t h ’ s g r e a t e r  need i s  c o u n t e r b a la n c e d  by Jones
g r e a t e r  a b i l i t y  such t h a t  when c o n s id e r e d  f rom  th e
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c r i t e r i a  o f  needs and a b i l i t y  Sm ith  and Jones sh o u ld
be ju d g ed  t o  be t h e  same o r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r .
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  j u s t i c e  would lead  many p e o p le  t o  a c c e p t
( 2 b )  even though in  te rm s o f  t h e  c r i t e r i a  by which we assess
them ( v i z .  needs and a b i l i t y ) ,  Smith  and Jones a r e  q u i t e
d i f f e r e n t .  For when t h e y  a r e  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  needs and a b i l i t y  m ig h t  be t h o u g h t ,  f ro m  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  j u s t i c e ,  t o  can ce l  each o t h e r  o u t  and so 
r e q u i r e  t h a t  Smith  and Jones be judged  in  t h e  same way. On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, U .R .  (as  our  a cc ount  o f  i t  so f a r  s t a n d s ) ,
would  a l l o w  ( 1 )  and ( 2 a )  b u t ,  i f  i t  does n o t  r u l e  i t  o u t
a l t o g e t h e r ,  ten d s  t o  obscure  t h e  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  
( 2 b ) .  T h is  a rgum ent ,  I  hope, i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  show t h a t  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  and u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  a r e
di  f f e r e n t .
Some p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  f o l l o w i n g  M .S in g e r  ( 1 9 6 1 / 1 9 8 5 ) ,  c l a i m  
t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  'An a c t i o n  i s  wrong i f  t h e  consequences  
o f  e v e ry o n e  do ing  i t  a r e  u n d e s i r a b l e  o r  d i s a s t r o u s ’ i s  a 
s e l f - e v i d e n t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  m o r a l i t y .  Could  we f i n d  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  s u p p o r t  we seek f o r  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y
t h e s i s  in  te rm s o f  t h e  a p r i o r i  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  an a c t  i s  
m o r a l l y  wrong when t h e  consequences o f  eve rybody  do in g  i t  i s  
d i s a s t r o u s ?  We s h a l l  see in  C h a p te r  T hree  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
many reasons f o r  n o t  t r y i n g  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  t h e s i s  in  t h i s  way. I  w i l l  m ent ion  one o f  them 
h e r e .  As we have seen,  our  a cc ount  o f  U .R .  y i e l d s  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on l o g i c a l  and m a t e r i a l  ( p h y s i c a l  and 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l )  i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  These c an n o t  be d is m is s e d  
as i r r e l e v a n t  by someone whose u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ent  would  
l e a d  t o  such consequences.  However t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  q u e s t i o n  
f o r  a t h e s i s  which i s  based upon th e  u n d e s i r a b l e  o r  
d i s a s t r o u s  consequences o f  e v e ryo n e  d o ing  what  a judgem ent  
r e q u i r e s ,  would be ' u n d e s i r a b l e ’ o r  ' d i s a s t r o u s ’ f o r  whom? 
T h i s  i s  an em b a r ra s s in g  q u e s t i o n  i f  t h e  i d e a  i s  t o  p u t  
f o r w a r d  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  m o r a l i t y  t h a t  i s  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  assum pt ions .  F o r ,  in  S i n g e r ’ s sense,
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som eth ing  w i l l  o n l y  cou n t  as a d i s a s t e r  i f  i t  does n o t  
depend on someone’ s p a r t i c u l a r  t h e o r y  o f  v a l u e ,  o r  
i n t e r e s t s .  And i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  we a l l  s h a r e  t h e  
same v iew  ab o u t  what  i s  o r  i s  n o t  a d i s a s t e r .  ( S i n c e  t h e  
t h e s i s  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  in  d e t a i l  be low,  we w i l l  l e a v e  t h e  
c r i t i c i s m  a t  t h a t  f o r  th e  moment.)
I t  does n o t  seem th en  t h a t  we w i l l  f i n d  a non-  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  r a t i o n a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
t h e s i s  by t r y i n g  t o  d e r i v e  i t  f rom p r i n c i p l e s  l i k e  t h o s e  o f  
i m p a r t i a l i t y  and f a i r n e s s .  N e i t h e r  w i l l  we f i n d  t h e
f o u n d a t i o n  we seek by bas ing  i t  upon a s o - c a l l e d  s e l f -  
e v i d e n t  moral  p r i n c i p l e s  c o n c e rn in g  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences .
What o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  t h e r e  t o  b as in g  t h e  r u l e  on 
c o n s is t e n c y ?  Perh aps ,  f o l l o w i n g  H. S id g w ic k  ( 1 9 0 7 : 3 8 0 ) ,  we 
can u n d e rs ta n d  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i t s e l f  t o  be a s e l f -  
e v i d e n t  p r i n c i p l e .  I f  we were t o  assume t h i s ,  v i z .  t h a t  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  an a p r i o r i  p r i n c i p l e  o f  reason -  by 
which  I  t a k e  i t  we mean t h a t  i t s  c o r r e c t n e s s  can n o t  be 
d e n ie d  by any c l e a r  t h i n k i n g  person -  we would have t o  
o v e r l o o k  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  some, presum ably  c l e a r  t h i n k i n g ,  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  do deny i t .  A . M a c I n t y r e  and P .W inch ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  o f f e r  o s t e n s i b l y  moral  judgem ents  which t h e y  c l a i m  
do n o t  r e q u i r e  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g .  ( I  w i l l  assume t h a t  t h e  
c l a i m s  made thus  f a r  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  n o n - c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  o f  
U.R .  w i l l  be a cc ep ted  by t h e  uncommitted r e a d e r . )  L a t e r  I  
w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  both M a c I n t y r e  and Winch a r e  m is t a k e n .  The  
p o i n t  t o  n o te  here  i s  t h a t  we can not  m e re ly  i n s i s t  t h a t  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  i s  an i n t u i t i v e l y  c o r r e c t  p r i n c i p l e ,  when 
t h i s  v e r y  s e l f - e v i d e n c e  i s  d e n ie d .  The a f f i r m a t i o n  o f  a 
c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t u i t i o n  d i r e c t e d  a t  an argument  based on 
i n t u i t i o n ,  t a k e s  away th e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a t t e r .  The 
n e c e s s i t y  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  must be defended  in  s u b s t a n c e . 26
L e t  us t r y  one l a s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  our  a c c o u n t .  Could  we 
base t h e  n e c e s s i t y  and n e u t r a l i t y  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  on 
what Hare  c a l l s  ' d e s c r i p t i v e  m e a n i n g - r u l e s * ?27 For  H a re ,  any
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ju d g e m e n t  which has d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning must be
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  because (og  c i t : 3 9 ) :
. . . t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  m e a n i n g - r u l e s  which d e t e r m in e  
t h i s  meaning a r e  u n i v e r s a l  r u l e s .
The exam ple  which Hare  chooses t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  c l a i m  i s
' T h i s  i s  r e d ’ . Hare  c a l l s  ' T h i s  i s  r e d ’ a s im p le
d e s c r i p t i v e  ju d g em en t .  A p p ly in g  t h e  uni  v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e
t o  i t ,  he ( i b i d : 1 1 )  w r i t e s :
' T h i s  i s  r e d ’ e n t a i l s  ' E v e r y t h i n g  l i k e  t h i s  i n  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  i s  r e d ' . . .
Thus i f  I  say X i s  red t h e n ,  on H a r e ’ s v e r s i o n  o f  t h e
m a t t e r ,  i t  i s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s ,  ( n o t
c o n s i s t e n c y  A ) ,  which commits me t o  s a y in g  t h a t  a n y t h i n g
l i k e  X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  i s  a l s o  r e d .
He goes on t o  c l a i m  t h a t  moral  judgem ents  a r e  a l s o
d e s c r i p t i v e ,  v i z .  t h e y  c o n t a i n  te rm s s u b j e c t  t o  d e s c r i p t i v e  
meaning r u l e s .  However moral judgem ents  a r e  a l s o
p r e s c r i p t i v e . When we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  d e c id e  what  we m o r a l l y  
oug ht  t o  do,  we a r e  lo o k in g  f o r  an a c t i o n  t o  which we can  
commit  o u r s e l v e s  y e t  w h ic h ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  we a r e  
p r e p a re d  t o  a c c e p t  as e x e m p l i f y i n g  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  a c t i o n  
t h a t  can be p r e s c r i b e d  f o r  anyone e l s e .
I t  i s  a p e c u l i a r i t y  o f  moral te rm s  in  judgem ents  th e n
t h a t  t h e y  have both a d e s c r i p t i v e  and a p r e s c r i p t i v e
m eaning .  However,  t h e  p o i n t  must be s t r e s s e d ,  i t  i s  because
moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  l i k e  o t h e r  v a l u e  ju d g em en ts ,  c o n t a i n  te rm s
s u b j e c t  t o  d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning r u l e s  t h a t  t h e y ,  moral
ju d g e m e n ts ,  a r e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . Hare  ( i b i d : 1 5 )  w r i t e s :
. . . t h e  f e a t u r e  o f  v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s  which I  c a l l  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  s im p ly  t h a t  which t h e y  s h a re  
w i t h  d e s c r i p t i v e  judgem en ts ;  namely t h a t  t h e y  both  
c a r r y  a d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning.
L e t  me p o i n t  o u t  j u s t  one reason why I  t h i n k  h i s  a cc ount
h e re  i s  d e f e c t i v e .
Ha re  i n s i s t s  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s , 28 d e s i r e s 29 and w an ts30 a r e  
n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . At  f i r s t  b lu s h ,  t h i s  i s  odd. We were
t o l d  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  i s  due t o  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e
meaning o f  te rm s ;  thus  ' T h i s  i s  r e d ’ i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e
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because o f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  m e a n i n g - r u l e s  which a p p ly  t o  t h e  
te rm s  i n v o l v e d .  Why t h e n ,  f o r  t h e  same r e a s o n ,  i s n ’ t  e . g .  
' T h i s  i s  w a n t e d ’ . The terms t h a t  we use in  s t a t i n g  w a n ts ,  
( d e c i s i o n s ,  e t c . ) ,  a l s o  have d e s c r i p t i v e  m eaning ,  o r ,  
r a t h e r ,  such s t a t e m e n t s  c o n t a i n  words s u b j e c t  t o  d e s c r i p t i v e  
m e a n i n g - r u l e s . So d e s p i t e  H a r e ’ s d i s c l a i m e r  ( i b i d : 1 5 7 ) .  on 
h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  r u l e ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  would seem t o  
commit t h e  w a n te r  t o  w a n t in g  w h a te v e r  i s  wanted f o r  a n y t h i n g  
e x a c t l y  o r  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r .
However we a r e  t o l d  t h a t  ' w a n t s ’ a r e  n o t  uni  v e r s a l  i z a b l e .  
P res u m ab ly ,  t h i s  i s  because Hare  w ishes  t o  say t h a t  a person  
does n o t  have t o  have reasons f o r  w a n t in g  som eth ing  which  
th e n  a p p ly  t o  a n y t h i n g  s i m i l a r ;  and i f  t h e r e  need n o t  be 
reasons  why som eth ing  i s  w anted ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  does n o t  
a p p l y .  But t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  n o t  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  H a r e ’ s 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  above o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  I f  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  bears  t h e  same r e l a t i o n  t o  ' t h i s  i s  r e d ’ 
as i t  does t o  ' o u g h t - s t a t e m e n t s ’ , (by  v i r t u e  o f  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  m e a n i n g - r u l e s  i n v o l v e d ) ,  i t  would seem a l s o  t o  
a p p ly  t o  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e rn in g  som eth ing  t h a t  i s  w an ted .  I f  
one f e e l s  t h a t  a l l  o f  t h i s  d o e s n ’ t  q u i t e  make sense t h i s  i s  
because t h e r e  i s  someth ing d e f e c t i v e  w i t h  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  
H a r e ’ s a cc o u n t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y .
I n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  H a re ,  in  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r  I  w i l l  a rg u e  
t h a t  c o n s is t e n c y  A, n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y , s e r v e s  w a n ts ,  
d e s i r e s , ( e t c . )  in  t h e  way Hare  d e s c r i b e s .  W h i le  s t a t e m e n t s  
c o n c e r n in g  wants must be used c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e . For as we have n o te d ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  need n o t  
be reasons  why som eth ing  i s  w anted ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  (even  
i n  t h i s  l i m i t e d  fo rm )  g e ts  no purchase  on w an ts .
U n l i k e  Hare  and t h e  r e s t ,  I  have t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  a 
v e r s i o n  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  U .R .  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A. T h is  l a t t e r  p r i n c i p l e  i s ,  in  
some sen se ,  beyond d i s p u t e .  However ,  in  an essay  o f  t h i s  
s o r t ,  one ought  t o  be a b l e  t o  make a t  l e a s t  some s u g g e s t io n s  
in  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  c o n s is t e n c y  A i s  n e c e s s a ry .
The n e c e s s i t y  o f  c o n s is t e n c y
On my a c c o u n t  ( t h u s  f a r )  U .R .  i s  n e c e s s a ry  because i t  
i s ,  so t o  sp eak ,  a f a n c y - d r e s s  v e r s i o n  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y  A . 31 
I f  t h i s  i s  so ,  we need t o  say someth ing a b o u t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
o f  t h e  l a t t e r .  E a r l i e r  we saw t h a t  s i n g u l a r  e m p i r i c a l  
ju d g e m e n ts  can be s u b s t i t u t e d  i n t o  c o n s is t e n c y  A. So we 
m ig h t  be a b l e  t o  see more c l e a r l y  why c o n s i s t e n c y  A i s  
n e c e s s a r y ,  by c o n s i d e r i n g  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  in  e m p i r i c a l  
c o n t e x t s . 32
We no ted  t h a t  in  an e m p i r i c a l  i n q u i r y  when a person  
ju d g e s  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  X i s  F because i t  has a p r o p e r t y  R, 
th e n  R w i l l  s t a t e  o r  imp ly  th e  reason why t h e  p r e d i c a t e  F 
a p p l i e s  t o  X. The p r e d i c a t e  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  because  
o f  t h e  reason  g i v e n .  We noted  a l s o  t h a t  a l th o u g h  R i s  t h e  
reason  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  e m p i r i c a l  judg em en t ,  in  most cases  
a g e n e r a l  reason o r  r u l e  i s  g iv e n  o r  i m p l i e d  where 'b e c a u s e '  
-  and r e l a t e d  i n f e r e n t i a l  terms ( v i z .  ' t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f ’ , 
' e v i d e n c e  f o r ’ , ' a  s u f f i c i e n t  reason f o r ’ , ' a  p r im a  f a c i e  
sound reason f o r ’ ) -  i n d i c a t e  th e  reason f o r  t h e  ju d g e m e n t .  
Thus we e x p e c t  and presume t h a t  when a person ju d g e s  t h a t  X 
i s  F because o f  th e  reason R, he w i l l  ju d g e  t h a t  a l l  o t h e r  
p a r t i c u l a r s  X ’ , X ’ ’ , . . .  which have been, a r e ,  o r  w i l l  be 
found t o  have R, a r e  a l s o  F. T h is  i s  t o  s ay ,  in  e f f e c t ,  
t h a t  we e x p e c t  and presume th e  person t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  A in  
h i s  e m p i r i c a l  judgem en ts .  He would be s a i d  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  
A, ( o r  may be s a i d  t o  be 'b e i n g  c o n s i s t e n t  A ’ ) ,  when t h e  
su b seq u e n t  s ta t e m e n t s  he makes can be seen t o  be in  
a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h e  g e n e ra l  e m p i r i c a l  reason t h a t  he h o ld s  
t o  be t r u e  in  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  judgem ent .
The assum ption  o f  c o n s is te n c y  A in  e m p i r i c a l  c o n t e x t s  
a p p e a rs  t o  be th e  v e r y  parad igm o f  i n q u i r i n g  r a t i o n a l i t y .  
We assume t h a t  in  e m p i r i c a l  c o n t e x t s ,  t h e  j u d g e r  would be 
p r e p a r e d  and a b l e  t o  go beyond what i s  g iv e n  in  h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  ju d g em en t ,  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  cases which  
have n o t  been o r  cannot  be examined.  I f  an e x p e r im e n t  
c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  t h i s  r u l e ,  we would q u e s t i o n  t h e  a c c u ra c y  o f
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t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  e x p e r im e n t ,  o r  we m ig h t  q u e s t i o n  
t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  w i t h  which  we 
a r e  w o r k in g ;  i . e .  we would say t h a t  R i s  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  someth ing be ing  an F, a f t e r  a l l .  What we 
would  n o t  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  b a s ic  r u l e .  I n  o t h e r  words,  w h i l e  
we may q u e s t i o n  w h e th er  o r  n o t  any o r  a l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  t h a t  we a r e  w ork in g  w i t h  a r e  a d e q u a t e ,  ( a n d ,  
as a r e s u l t ,  th e y  a r e  sometimes r e v i s e d ) ,  we assume t h a t  t h e  
r u l e  -  we a r e  c a l l i n g  i t  c o n s is t e n c y  A -  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  
t r u t h .
How a r e  we t o  j u s t i f y  th e  assum ption  o f  n e c e s s i t y  here?  
One p o s s i b l e  answer i s  a long  t h e  l i n e s  Hume ( 1 7 3 9 : 3 4 3 / 4 )  
g i v e s . 33 I t  i s  j u s t  a f a c t  o f  human n a t u r e  t h a t  we do reason  
i n  t h i s  way. The r a t i o n a l  person bases h i s  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  
t h e  e m p i r i c a l  w o r ld  upon e v id e n c e  which in  p r a c t i c e  
c r u c i a l l y  depends on th e  outcome o f  p r o c e d u re s  l i k e  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A. I t  i s  n o t  t h a t  we must reason in  t h i s  way,  
r a t h e r ,  i t  i s  j u s t  a f a c t  t h a t  we do.
When i t  comes t o  moral c o n t e x t s ,  t h i s  ( p u t a t i v e )  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  human n a t u r e  m ig h t  be e x p l a i n e d  as  
f o l l o w s :  we a r e  so used t o  m ee t in g  t h e  demands o f
c o n s i s t e n c y  A when making e m p i r i c a l  judgem ents  t h a t  we f e e l  
t h a t  i t  has some v a l u e  in  i t s e l f  and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  i t  
r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  be pursued in  moral c o n t e x t s .  Thus 
where t h e r e  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  good reasons f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  same judgem en t  has 
been,  i s ,  and w i l l  be e n t a i l e d  in  th o se  cases where t h e  same 
reason  a p p l i e s .
A weakness in  t h i s  a t te m p te d  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h a t  when i t  
i s  a p p l i e d  t o  moral judgem en ts ,  i t  t a k e s  some o f  t h e  f o r c e  
o u t  o f  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  U .R.  i s  a nec essa ry  r u l e .  S in c e  i t  i s  
j u s t  t h e  way we happen t o  reason about  e m p i r i c a l  phenomena 
and s i n c e ,  ex h v p o t h e s i , our  U .R .  re a s o n in g  in  moral  
c o n t e x t s  i s  a n a l o g i c a l  t o  t h i s  f e a t u r e  o f  e m p i r i c a l  
r e a s o n in g ,  t h e r e  need be no n e c e s s i t y  t o  e t h i c a l
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c o n s i s t e n c y .  U .R .  m e r e ly  happens t o  be a r u l e  we use in  
moral  c o n t e x t s .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  a second p o s s i b l e  way -  and I  t h i n k  t h e
c o r r e c t  way -  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  demand f o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  A in
e m p i r i c a l  ju d g e m e n ts ,  and t h i s  i s  a lo n g  K a n t i a n  l i n e s .  Ve ry  
r o u g h l y ,  a K a n t ia n  would say t h a t  we r e g a r d  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  t h e  w o r ld  as p ossess ing  some k in d  o f  c o h eren ce  o r  u n i t y .  
I f  we d i d  n o t ,  we would be fa c e d  by an i n d e f i n i t e  s u c c e s s io n
o f  d i v e r s e  and unconnected p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e r i e n c e s .  I f  t h i s
was t h e  ca s e ,  t h e  r e s u l t  would n o t  be e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  k in d  b u t  s im p ly  no e x p e r ie n c e s  a t  a l l .  Thus 
we may say a p r i o r i  t h a t  coherence  o r  u n i t y  o f  some k i n d  i s  
a fu n d a m e n ta l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .
Now t h i s  u n i t y  i s  bound up w i t h  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
c o n s i s t e n c y .  For when we speak o f  t h e  u n i t y  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  
i n  w hat  does t h i s  c o n s i s t ?  The u n i t y  in  q u e s t i o n  i s  j u s t  
what  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  in  t h e  process  o f  r e a s o n in g  we a c t u a l l y  
do em ploy .  And, in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  i s  t o  be found in  o u r  
p re s u m p t io n  t h a t  in  o r d i n a r y  d e s c r i p t i v e  ju d g e m e n ts ,  
c o n c e r n in g  what  we s ee ,  h e a r ,  f e e l ,  e t c . ,  we a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  
A. W i t h o u t  a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  k i n d ,  t h e  p roce ss  o f  
e m p i r i c a l  r e a s o n in g  would la c k  a k in d  o f  c o h e re n c e .  For  i t  
would seem t o  amount t o  a p rocess  in  which one would ju d g e  
t h a t  X i s  o f  a c e r t a i n  k in d  F, o r  w i l l  behave in  a c e r t a i n  
way F, because o f  a p r o p e r t y  R t h a t  X has ,  and th e n  one 
would have t o  make t h e  same judgem ent  abo u t  t h e  same t h i n g  -  
o r  a b o u t  o t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r s  X ’ , X ’ ’ t h a t  possess t h e  same 
p r o p e r t y  R -  i n d e f i n i t e l y  many t im e s ,  as i f  t h e y  were a l l  
d i v e r s e  o r  unconnected t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  ju d g e m e n t .  An 
e x a m in a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  p rocess  o f  r e a s o n in g ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  w i l l  show t h a t  f rom what we o b s e rv e  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e ,  we assume (w h e th e r  j u s t i f i a b l y  o r  n o t )  t h a t  t h i s  
o b s e r v a t i o n  w a r r a n t s  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  ju d g e m e n t ,  b u t  a l s o  we 
presuppose  t h a t  n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  same judgem ent  w i l l  a p p ly  t o  
a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  cases whose t r u t h  we have n o t  
d i  r e c t 1y c o n f  i rrned.
A K a n t i a n  would  a r g u e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  we 
f i n d  h e r e  i s  l o c a t e d ,  n o t  in  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  
t h e m s e l v e s ,  b u t  in  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  w o rk in g s  o f  t h e  human 
mind.  I t  i s  ( p a r t l y  a t  l e a s t )  due t o  t h e  r a t i o n a l  a p p a r a t u s  
w i t h i n  t h e  human mind t h a t  i f  we ju d g e  som eth ing  t o  be t r u e  
o f  a c e r t a i n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  we e x p e c t  and presume i t  w i l l  be 
t r u e  o f  o t h e r  e x p e r ie n c e s  which a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h a t  in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  judg em en t .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A i s  p a r t  o f  our  r a t i o n a l  a p p a r a t u s ;  m e e t in g  
t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  h e lp s  t o  g i v e  coherence  t o  o u r  p a r t i c u l a r  
ju d g em en ts  o f  p r e s e n t  and p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  and i t  i s  by 
v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  our  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ab o u t  f u t u r e  
e v e n t s  and s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s  in  t h e  w o r ld  w i l l  be c o n f i r m e d .  
Thus t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A may be t h o u g h t  t o  be due 
t o  i t s  b e in g  an a p r i o r i  c o n d i t i o n  o f  human reas o n .
By a na log ous  arguments t o  t h e  above,  o r d e r  o f  some k in d  
i s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  i f  we a r e  t o  r e n d e r  c o h e r e n t  t h e  
d i v e r s e  s u c c e s s io n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r ie n c e s  which c a l l  f o r  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  I f  we d i d  n o t  assume t h a t  t h e y  possess  
some k in d  o f  o r d e r ,  we would have t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  d i v e r s e  and 
unconnected  p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e r ie n c e s  upon w h ic h ,  f o r  no 
a p p a r e n t  reas o n ,  we happen t o  pass t h e  same o r  d i f f e r e n t  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  When we speak o f  o r d e r  h e r e ,  in  what  does 
t h i s  c o n s i s t ?  The o r d e r  in  q u e s t i o n  i s  j u s t  what  i s  
e x e m p l i f i e d  in  t h e  c o n s is t e n c y  we e x p e c t  and presume in  t h e  
judgem en ts  we make c o n c e r n in g  what  i s  good, r i g h t  o r  wrong,  
oug ht  o r  ought  n o t  t o  be done.  To s a t i s f y  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  
i f  we ju d g e  t h a t  someone ought  t o  do s o - a n d - s o  f o r  s u c h -a n d -  
such re a s o n ,  we presuppose t h a t  t h e  same o r  a s i m i l a r  moral  
ju d g em en t  a p p l i e s  when t h e  same reason a p p l i e s .  T h i s  h e lp s  
t o  g i v e  u n i t y  t o  our  moral judgem ents  ab o u t  t h e  p r e s e n t  and 
p a s t ,  and i t  i s  by v i r t u e  o f  such a r u l e  t h a t  o u r  judgem ents  
ab o u t  h y p o t h e t i c a l  f u t u r e  s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s  a r e  r a t i o n a l l y  
c o h e r e n t .
A g a in ,  by p a r i t y  o f  r e a s o n in g  t o  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c a s e ,  a 
K a n t i a n  would  o f f e r  a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  argum ent  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  
t h a t  we can n o t  h e l p  our  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  a t  t h i s  l e v e l .  Our  
reason demands c o n s is t e n c y  A in  o u r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts  as a 
c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y .  To p u t  t h e  p o i n t  i n  a  
d i f f e r e n t  way: i t  i s  an a p r i o r i  c o n d i t i o n  o f  human t h o u g h t  
t h a t  demands t h a t  i f  we ju d g e  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  X o u g h t  t o  
do F f o r  t h e  reason R t h e n ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  we presuppose  
a n y t h i n g  which i s  th e  same as X in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  R, 
a l s o  ought  t o  do F. There  i s  no need t o  be t r o u b l e d  by t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  we can not  h e lp  o u r s e l v e s  a t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  we a r e  c on v in ced  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  i s  r e a l l y  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  our  th o u g h t  r a t h e r  t h a n ,  s ay ,  a c o n t i n g e n t  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  te n d e n c y .
I  am m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  we must be 
w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  U .R .  u n i v e r s a l i z e  our  s i n g u l a r  moral  
judgem en ts  i s  ana logous  t o  t h e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  we make 
c o n c e r n in g  s i n g u l a r  e m p i r i c a l  ju d g e m e n ts ,  and t h a t  bo th  can 
be u n d e rs to o d  as b e ing  i n s t a n c e s  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A, which I  
am p r o p o s in g  -  and t h i s  i s  no more th a n  a p ro p o sa l  -  i s  an 
a p r i  o r i  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n .  A c l o s e r  i n s p e c t i o n ,  
u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  r e v e a l s  many grounds f o r  d o u b t in g  t h e  
e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e  proposed a n a lo g y .  T h i s  i s  one o f  many 
prob lem s c o n f r o n t i n g  U .R .  L e t  us c o n s id e r  some o f  t h e  more 
t r o u b le s o m e  ones.
Some prob lem s f o r  U .R .
F i r s t l y ,  judgem ents  t h a t  a r e  p l a i n l y  non -m ora l  ap p e a r  t o  
pass t h e  t e s t s  imposed by U .R .  As we have d e f i n e d  i t  so 
f a r ,  t h i s  r u l e  p la c e s  few r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  To c l a i m  t h a t  'X and Y a r e  a l i k e  i n  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s ’ i s  s im p ly  t o  say t h a t  t h e y  possess a 
f e a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  re g a r d s  as r e l e v a n t .  Anybody c o u ld  
be d e s c r ib e d  as b e ing  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  anyone e l s e  and 
anybody c o u ld  be made t o  possess d i f f e r e n t  q u a l i t i e s  f rom  
anybody e l s e  depending on which d e s c r i p t i o n  t h e  j u d g e r
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d e c id e s  i s  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  As a r e s u l t  t h e  number and  
v a r i e t y  o f  judgem ents  which may be l e g i t i m a t e l y  U .R .  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  as 'm o r a l *  judgem ents  c o u ld  be i n d e f i n i t e l y  
l a r g e .  T h e re  i s  a p r i c e  t o  be p a id  f o r  t h i s .  U .R .  does n o t  
h e l p  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  moral f rom  t h e  n o n -m o r a l .  T h e re  i s  
n o t h i n g  m o r a l l y  d i s t i n c t i v e  abo ut  b e ing  w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  o n e ’ s judgem ents  in  accordance  w i t h  U .R .
T h in g s  a r e  even more gloomy i f  we c o n s i d e r ,  s e c o n d l y ,  U.R 
in  te rm s  o f  a c r i t e r i o n  w i t h  which we c o u ld  i d e n t i f y  moral  
f ro m  immoral ju d g em en ts ,  v i z .  as an answer t o  t h e  'w h ic h  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n .  Someone can c o n s i s t e n t l y  make 
immoral judgem ents  o r  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a i l  t o  make m o r a l l y  
r e q u i r e d  ju d g e m e n ts .  Such an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  a b o u t  as immoral  
as one can be. H is  c o n s is t e n c y  o n l y  makes t h i n g s  w orse .  I f  
he c o n s i s t e n t l y  does p r o h i b i t e d  t h i n g s  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  
r e f u s e s  t o  do what he ought  t o  do, he i s  a moral  
a b o m i n a t i o n .  N o n e th e le s s  h i s  judgem ents  w i l l  s a t i s f y  U .R .
Suppose th e n  t h a t  we t r y  t o  overcome t h e s e  prob lem s by 
s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  ' m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  r e a s o n s ’ in  
U .R .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  in  th e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  n o t h in g  f o r m a l  o r  
d e f i n i t i o n a l ,  e x c e p t  a r b i t r a r i l y  by way o f  s t i p u l a t i o n ,  
would seem t o  e s t a b l i s h  such c r i t e r i a .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see how f a c t u a l  c o n d i t i o n s  c o u ld  s e r v e  
as c r i t e r i a  f o r  r e l e v a n t  s i m i l a r i t i e s  in  moral  c o n t e x t s .  
And we do n o t  seem t o  be a b l e  t o  propose n o n - f  a c t u a l  
( e v a l u a t i v e  o r  n o r m a t iv e )  c r i t e r i a ,  w i t h o u t  f o r f e i t i n g  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  our  U .R .  r u l e .  We may co n c lu d e  t h a t  we a r e  
n o t  a b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  moral f rom  t h e  n o n -m o r a l ,  and 
c e r t a i n l y  n o t  moral  w o r th  f rom  t h e  im m ora l ,  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
U .R .
A t h i r d  prob lem  concerns t h e  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  many moral  
ju d g e m e n ts .  I  have ment ioned a l r e a d y  t h a t  an argument  i s  
needed t o  show t h a t  m e re ly  n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between one 
case and a n o t h e r  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t  in  moral  ju d g em en ts .  Even 
i f  we p r o v i d e  such an argum ent ,  s u r e l y  t h e r e  w i l l  a lw ays  be 
some n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  f e a t u r e  among t h e  more s p e c i f i c
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reas ons  by which a person s u p p o r ts  h i s  ju d g e m e n t .  When he 
i s  making h i s  w i l l ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  Sm ith  t h i n k s  t h a t  i t  i s  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t  t o  l e a v e  a p a r t i c u l a r  i te m  t o  one o f  h i s  
c h i l d r e n ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  one such i t e m ,  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  how 
such a judgem en t  can be s a i d  t o  be U .R .  uni  v e r s a l  i z a b l e .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e r e  co u ld  a lways  be some p r im a  f a c i e  moral  
f e a t u r e  i n  a non-m ora l  o r  immoral judgem ent  which a j u d g e r  
i s  w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e .  C o n s id e r  t h e  c a s e ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  o f  some Nazi  war c r i m i n a l s  who, when on t r i a l  f o r  
t h e i r  h e in o u s  c r im e s ,  c la im e d  t h a t  t h e y  were ' o n l y  d o in g  
t h e i r  j o b ’ o r  'o b e y in g  o r d e r s ’ which a r e ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  a c t i o n s  
o f  p r im a  f a c i  e moral w o r th .  I t  seems easy enough t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  some m o r a l l y  w o r th y  a s p e c t  -  p o s s i b l y  a reason  
t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  some o f  t h e  j u d g e r ’ s i n t e n t i o n s  -  o f  
a lm o s t  any p r im a  f a c i e  w icked  ju d g em en t .  Such c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n s  le a d  n o t  so much t o  a d e n i a l  o f  U .R .  as t o  dou bt  
a b o u t  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  d e f i n i n g  m o r a l i t y  in  te rm s  o f  i t .
A f o u r t h  p rob lem ,  which f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  one above,
c o n cern s  t h e  hope m ent ioned e a r l i e r  t h a t  f rom  t h e
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  p r i n c i p l e  we c o u ld  a r r i v e  a t  u n i v e r s a l
moral  judgem en ts  t h a t  a p p ly  t o  eve ryo n e  a l i k e .  T h i s  seems
t o  be f o i l e d  by t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  scope o f  some reasons  t h a t
o c c u r  i n  p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  moral judgem ents  t h a t  a r e  meant
t o  a p p ly  t o  s p e c i f i c  groups ,  such th o s e  which a p p ly  t o
p a r e n t s ,  d o c t o r s ,  o r  t o  C a t h o l i c  p r i e s t s .  The d u t i e s  o f
p a r e n t s  t o  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  t h e  d o c t o r ’ s H i p p o c r a t i c  o a t h ,
t h e  moral  p r i n c i p l e  e n j o i n i n g  p r i e s t s  n o t  t o  d i v u l g e  what  i s
t o l d  them in  t h e  c o n f e s s i o n a l ,  a r e  p r e c i s e  and s i t u a t i o n a l .
C l e a r l y  we a r e  a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  them in  t h e  sense o f
a p p l y i n g  them t o  eve ryone  who f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h e  range o f
t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n .  But e q u a l l y  o b v i o u s l y  t h e y  a r e  n o t
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  in  t h e  sense t h a t  t h e y  a p p ly  t o  e v e ry b o d y .
As D .Loc ke  ( 1 9 6 8 : 4 2 )  says:
Moral  p r i n c i p l e s  (such as th o s e  which a p p ly  above)  
may be u n i v e r s a l  in  t h e  sense o f  a p p l y i n g  t o  
e v e r y t h i n g  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  s o r t . . . T h e y  a r e  n o t  
u n i v e r s a l  in  th e  sense o f  b e ing  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
e v e r y o n e .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  do app ear  t o  be numerous q u i t e  
fu n d a m e n ta l  moral  jud g em en ts ,  t h a t  a r e  u n r e s t r i c t e d  i n  t h e i r  
s co pe .  P r o h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  k i l l i n g  o t h e r  human b e in g s  o r  
a g a i n s t  t o r t u r i n g  them o r ,  on a h a p p i e r  n o t e ,  reas ons  in  
f a v o u r  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ,  f a i r n e s s ,  
seem t o  be u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e .  I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  a l l  human be ings  t o  p e r fo r m  ( o r  n o t  t o  p e r f o r m )  
t h e  a c t s  in  q u e s t i o n .  (Or  perh a p s ,  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  o u r  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  we shou ld  say t h e y  may be p e r fo rm ed  by a l l  
' p e r s o n s ’ t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some human 
b e in g s  can n o t  be s a i d  t o  choose t o  do a n y t h i n g  p r o p e r l y  
d e s c r i b e d  as m urder ,  l y i n g  and t h e  l i k e . )  The p o i n t  i s :  
g iv e n  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  scope o f  some re a s o n s ,  i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  
o b v io u s  how by U .R .  we cou ld  g e t  f rom  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i s m  o f  t h i s  k i n d .
A f i f t h  d i f f i c u l t y  concerns  t h e  a n a lo g y  between t h e  
g e n e r a l i z i n g  r u l e  in  e m p i r i c a l  c o n t e x t s  and U .R .  f o r  moral  
j u d g e m e n ts .  I f  t h e  a n a lo g y  i s  sound,  U .R .  would have t o  
d e s c r i b e  how we do reason in  moral judgem ents  r a t h e r  th a n  be 
a r u l e  w h ic h ,  say ,  s t i p u l a t e s  how we r a t i o n a l l y  s h o u ld .  
However some p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  as we n o te d ,  deny t h a t  moral  
r e a s o n in g  i s  l i k e  t h i s .  They deny,  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  t h a t  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts .  A . M a c I n t y r e  c l a i m s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  n o t  a l l  
moral  judgem ents  have t o  be s u p p o r te d  by reasons  and f rom  
t h i s  he c on c lu des  t h a t  n o t  a l l  moral  judgem en ts  a r e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . On t h e  o t h e r  hand P.Winch argues  t h a t ,  in  
c e r t a i n  c o n t e x t s ,  where a p a r t i c u l a r  judgem ent  i s  based upon 
re a s o n s ,  t h i s  does n o t  a lw ays  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  same 
ju dgem en t  a p p l i e s ,  even though t h e  same reasons  a p p l y .  L i k e  
M a c I n t y r e ,  Winch co n c lu des  t h a t  n o t  a l l  moral  judgem ents  a r e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . 34 M o reover ,  on t h i s  v ie w ,  by making  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  p a r t  o f  my d e f i n i t i o n  o f  m o r a l i t y ,  I  am 
n o t  n e u t r a l .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  I  am b ia s e d  in  f a v o u r  o f  one 
t y p e  o f  t h e o r y  a g a i n s t  o t h e r s .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  in  my a c c o u n t ,
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t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  I  c o u ld  say t o  f a u l t  t h e  k i n d  o f  a rgum ents  
M a c I n t y r e  and Winch produce t o  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  c l a i m s .
A s i x t h  p rob lem  -  t h a t  a g a in  g i v e s  us grounds f o r
d o u b t i n g  t h e  a n a lo g y  between c o n s i s t e n t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n
i m p l i e d  by s i n g u l a r  e m p i r i c a l  judgem ents  and u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i 1 i t y  in  moral judgements  -  i s  t h a t  v e r y  o f t e n ,  when t h e  
moral  judgem ents  o f  two o r  more i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n f l i c t ,  we do 
n o t  seem t o  need t o  say t h a t  e i t h e r  one o f  t h e  j u d g e r s  has  
v iew ed  t h e  e v id e n c e  i n c o r r e c t l y  o r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  som eth ing  
wrong w i t h  one o r  o t h e r  o f  t h e i r  re a s o n s ,  ( a s  we do when 
e m p i r i c a l  judgem ents  c o n f l i c t ) .  R a th e r  we e n t e r t a i n  t h e  
f u r t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgem en ts  
r e a l l y  do c o n f l i c t  and,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h a t  such c o n f l i c t s  a r e  
n o t  o b j e c t i v e l y  d e c i d a b l e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, we would n o t  
t h i n k  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l  d is a g re e m e n ts  a r e  i n c a p a b l e  o f  b e in g  
s e t t l e d .  We would n o t  need t o  c o n s id e r  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e
c o n f l i c t  t o  know t h a t  one o f  them i s  r i g h t  and t h e  o t h e r
wrong; o r  t h a t  th e y  a r e  both wrong. I t  does n o t  seem t o  
make sense t o  say t h a t  t h e i r  c o n f l i c t  has no o b j e c t i v e  
s o l u t i o n .
To d ea l  w i t h  th e s e  and o t h e r  p rob lem s,  we need t o  d e v e lo p  
many more re s o u rc e s  than  we have so f a r .  Among o t h e r  
t h i n g s ,  we w i l l  need t o  have a c l e a r e r  i d e a  o f  j u s t  what  can  
and c a n n o t  be reg ard e d  as a r e l e v a n t  moral  b e l i e f ,  reason o r  
ju d g e m e n t .  So f a r  we have c e n t r e d  upon reasons  t h a t  t h e  
j u d g e r  re g a r d s  as r e l e v a n t ;  reasons t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  and 
a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e .  We may have t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between  
t h i s  k in d  o f  reason and reasons t h a t  a r e  g e n u i n e l y  r e l e v a n t  
i n  moral  c o n t e x t s .  To f i n d  a b a s is  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r ,  we may 
need t o  look a t  some o f  our  t r a d i t i o n a l  moral  b e l i e f s  and 
t r y  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  purposes f o r  which such b e l i e f s  e x i s t .  
For  t h e  moment, we a r e  f o r c e d  t o  con c lu d e  t h a t  w h i l e  a 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  r u l e  based upon c o n s is t e n c y  A m ig h t  be 
i m p l i e d  and nec essa ry  f o r  our  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  e m p i r i c a l  
ju dgem en ts  and even though U .R .  may i t s e l f  be n e c e s s a ry  and
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s i m i l a r l y  d e r i v e d ,  i t  has n o t  been shown t h a t  i t s  n e c e s s i t y  
can be u n d e rs to o d  by d i r e c t  a n a lo g y  w i t h  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c a s e .
T h e re  i s  a more p r e s s i n g  prob lem :  as I  have i n t e r p r e t e d  
i t ,  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  n o t h i n g  more th a n  
an e x t e n s i o n  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A i n  d e o n t i c  c o n t e x t s .  I f  t h i s  
i s  c o r r e c t ,  n o t h i n g  i s  added by t h i s  r u l e  t h a t  would  n o t  
f o l l o w  j u s t  as w e l l ,  f rom  c o n s i s t e n c y  A. What e x a c t l y  i s  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two supposed t o  be? Do we need  
a u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ?
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CHAPTER TWO
UNIVERSAL!ZABILITY AND IMPERSONAL REASONS
As I  have i n t e r p r e t e d  i t  so f a r ,  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
r u l e  U .R .  amounts t o  n o t h i n g  more th a n  a t e s t  f o r  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  ju d g e m e n ts .  As 
long  as t h e  j u d g e r  i s  w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  U .R .  u n i v e r s a l i z e  
t h e  ju d g em en t  in  which i t  o c c u r s ,  any reason t h a t  he r e g a r d s  
as m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  w i l l  do. However as t h e y  a r e  u s u a l l y  
u n d e r s to o d ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and c o n s is t e n c y  A a r e  
d i f f e r e n t  r e q u i r e m e n t s . One i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h i s .  
U n l i k e  c o n s i s t e n c y  A, t h e  c o n t e x t  in  which t h e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  r u l e  i s  a p p l i e d ,  v i z .  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  c e r t a i n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  be p la c e d  on t h e  k in d  o f  reasons  
t h a t  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  in  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e  ju d g e m e n ts .  Some 
reasons  a r e  r e l e v a n t  and o t h e r s  a r e  n o t .  As a r e s u l t  we 
f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a w ide  range o f  reasons  t h a t  can o c c u r  in  
a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  judgem en ts  t h a t  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  A, y e t  t h e y  
a r e  n o t  u s u a l l y  t h o u g h t  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .  We need t o  
t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  in  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  U .R .
I  w i l l  b e g in ,  in  ( 1 ) ,  by i d e n t i f y i n g  some d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e  l a r g e  c l a s s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  judgem ents  -  some o f  
them e r s a t z  moral  judgem en ts  -  t h a t  demand c o n s is t e n c y  A b u t  
w h ic h ,  u n l i k e  gen u in e  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  do n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  I  w i l l  a rgue  in  ( 2 )  t h a t  
one d i f f e r e n c e  between g en u ine  and e r s a t z  moral  judgem en ts  
i s  t h a t  a reason in  t h e  fo r m e r  must be im p e r s o n a l ;  by which  
we w i l l  mean t h a t  reasons  in  s i n g u l a r  judgem en ts  t o  which  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  a p p l i e s  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem ents  t h e y  s u p p o r t .  I  w i 11 
show, in  ( 3 ) ,  how t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
we p l a c e  on p r o p e r  names and o t h e r  u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  te rm s  
f rom  o c c u r r i n g  in  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  ju d g e m e n ts .  I n  ( 4 )  I  wi 11 
arg u e  t h a t  t h e  d e s i d e r a t a  o f  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  and c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  reasons  can be met by our  e a r l i e r  d e f i n i t i o n ,  i f
U .R .  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  ju d g em en ts  c o n t a i n i n g  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  
r e a s o n ,  v i z .  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  and j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  r e a s o n s .  I  
w i l l  t h e n ,  i n  ( 5 ) ,  c o n t r a s t  t h e  amended a c c o u n t  o f  U .R .  w i t h  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A and show a sense in  which ju d g e m e n ts  which  
s a t i s f y  t h e  f o r m e r  a r e  o b j e c t i v e .  I n  t h e  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  ( 6 )  
we w i l l  n o t e  a w o r r y i n g  weakness in  t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i  ve  
v e r s i o n  o f  U .R .
D i f f e r e n c e s  between c o n s i s t e n c y  A and u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y .
C o n s i s t e n c y  A a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  k in d s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  
ju d g em en ts  which  n o r m a l ly  we would want  t o  say have n o t h i n g  
t o  do w i t h  m o r a l i t y .  C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  exa m ple ,  a ju d g em en t  o f  
t a s t e .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  I  am o f f e r e d  s p in a c h  a t  d i n n e r  
which  I  d e c l i n e  and t h a t  somebody asked me "Why?". I  m ig h t  
r e p l y  "Because i t  i s  b i t t e r " .  O b v io u s ly  I  c a n n o t  th e n  s a y ,  
on t h e  same grounds ,  t h a t  I  l i k e  k a l e  and t h a t  i t  i s  b i t t e r .  
A l th o u g h  I  can s a y ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h a t  I  l i k e  k a l e  because i t  
has a d i f f e r e n t  t y p e  o f  b i t t e r n e s s ;  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  o f f e r  
t h e  same ground as t h e  one g iv e n  f o r  my d i s l i k i n g  s p i n a c h .  
Now l e t  us suppose t h a t  h a v in g  g iv e n  t h e  b i t t e r n e s s  o f  
s p in a c h  as my reason f o r  r e j e c t i n g  i t  a t  d i n n e r  y e s t e r d a y ,  
I  am o f f e r e d  k a l e  a t  d i n n e r  t o d a y .  I  m ig h t  reason t h u s :  
s i n c e  i t s  b i t t e r n e s s  was my reason f o r  r e j e c t i n g  s p in a c h  
y e s t e r d a y  and I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  v e g e t a b l e  I  am o f f e r e d  
t o d a y ,  k a l e ,  i s  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  s p in a c h  i n  t h e  way 
t h a t  i t  t a s t e s  -  and s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  no o t h e r  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  s u r r o u n d in g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  ( e . g .  my h o s t  
d i d  n o t  grow t h e  k a l e  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  me t o  e a t  t o d a y )  -  I  
s h a l l  r e f u s e  t h e  k a l e .  We would a g r e e ,  I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A i s  an ad e q u a te  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  my u n a d ven tu ro u s  
d e c i s i o n .  To p u t  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y :  i f  R i s  t h e  reason  
f o r  t h e  judgem en t  S, in  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  T,  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  A, 
i t  must be t h e  reason  f o r  my judgem ent  S ’ i n  T ’ .
Mora l  m a t t e r s  a r e  n o t  m a t t e r s  o f  t a s t e .  However a 
p a r a l l e l  a rgument  seems t o  a p p ly  t o  examples  which we would  
a d m i t  t o  b e in g  s u b j e c t  t o  moral  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  C o n s id e r
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a g a in  K a n t ’ s exam ple  o f  f a l s e  p r o m i s in g ;  v i z .  Sm ith  i s  i n  
d e s p e r a t e  need o f  money and borrows f ro m  Jon es ,  p r o m is in g  
t h a t  he w i l l  repay  t h e  money, b u t  knowing t h a t  he w i l l  n o t  
keep t h e  p r o m is e .  I f  Sm ith  wants  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a 
r a t i o n a l ,  moral  ju dgem en t  th e n  he i s  com m it ted  by U .R .  t o  
( t h e  r a t h e r  c o n v o l u t e d ) :  ' I f  I  j u d g e  t h a t  I  o ug h t  t o  make
t h e  f a l s e  p rom ise  t o  Jones,  because I  am in  d e s p e r a t e  need 
o f  money and w i t h o u t  a f a l s e  prom ise  Jones w i l l  n o t  l e n d  me 
i t ,  th e n  whenever  I  o r  anyone e l s e  d e s p e r a t e l y  needs money 
and we b e l i e v e  t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  i t  w i l l  n o t  be l e n t ,  t h e  same 
j u d g em en t  a p p l i e s ’ . I f  Sm ith  can n o t  a c c e p t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  
case i_n p r o p r i a  p e rso n a  th e n  he can n o t  r e g a r d  h i m s e l f  as  
r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  in  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  cas e .
A q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i s :  do we need a 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  o v e r  and above c o n s i s t e n c y  A? 
R a th e r  th a n  r e q u i r e  t h a t  S m i t h ’ s judgem en t  be t e s t e d  by 
U . R . ,  why n o t  s a y ,  more s i m p ly :  i f  R i s  t h e  reason f o r  h i s
ju dgem en t  S in  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  T,  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  A, i t  must  
be t h e  reason  f o r  h i s  judgem ent  S ’ in  T ’ . I n  s h o r t ,  i s n ’ t  
t a l k  o f  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  h e re  redundant?
The redundancy argument  a p p l i e s  t o  more th a n  s i m p le  
b i l a t e r a l  c a s e s .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  S m i th ,  Jones and Brown 
a r e  b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  a m a g i s t r a t e ,  who f i n d s  them a l l  g u i l t y  
o f  d r i v i n g  t h e i r  c a r s  in  an u n roa dw or thy  c o n d i t i o n ;  (and  
t h a t  none o f  them have m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  f o r  t h e  
o f f e n c e ,  o r  p r e v i o u s  c o n v i c t i o n s ,  and so f o r t h ) .  Assuming 
t h a t  m a g i s t r a t e s ’ c o u r t s  a f f o r d e d  scope f o r  i n f o r m a l  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  r e a s o n in g ,  we m ig h t  say t h a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l  
m a g i s t r a t e  must reason th u s :  ' I f  t h e  o f f e n c e  i s  t h e  reason  
f o r  f i n i n g  Smith  one hundred pounds t h e n ,  by U . R . ,  i t  must  
be t h e  reason f o r  f i n i n g  anyone r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r ,  e . g .  
Jones and Brown, t h e  same amount o f  money’ . What e x a c t l y  i s  
added h e re  by s a y in g  t h a t  h i s  ju dgem en t  must be U .R .  
uni  v e r s a l  i z a b l e  t h a t  does n o t  f o l l o w ,  j u s t  as w e l l ,  by 
s a y in g  t h a t  i t  must be c o n s i s t e n t  A?
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We can a d m i t  exam ples  l i k e  t h o s e  above as cases  t o  which  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A a p p l i e s  and f o r  which t a l k  o f  a u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  r u l e  i s  s u p e r f l u o u s .  N o n e t h e le s s  I  want  t o  a rg u e  
t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and c o n s i s t e n c y  A p l a y  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  r o l e s  in  o u r  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n in g  and t h a t ,  as  a 
r e s u l t ,  we w i l l  need t o  amend o u r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  when a p p l y i n g  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  I  must be p r e p a r e d  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
t h e  onus o f  g i v i n g  re a s o n s .  We have ta k e n  c a r e  o f  t h i s  
p o i n t  a l r e a d y .  U .R .  a p p l i e s  o n l y  t o  s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju d g em en ts  whereas c o n s i s t e n c y  A a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  s t a t e m e n t s  
o f  o p i n i o n ,  t a s t e ,  p r e f e r e n c e ,  e t c .  ( s e e  p . 14 a b o v e ) .  One 
does n o t  need t o  have a reason f o r  o n e ’ s s t a t e m e n t  o f  t a s t e ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  conform  w i t h  c o n s i s t e n c y  A. I f  I  say  " I  
l i k e  k a l e  and I  d i s l i k e  s p in a c h "  and somebody asks me why,  
I  can c o n s i s t e n t l y  and i n t e l l i g i b l y  r e p l y  " I  r e a l l y  do n o t  
know why; I  j u s t  happen t o  l i k e  one and d i s l i k e  t h e  o t h e r " .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  t o  which  U .R .  
a p p l i e s ,  has t o  be s u p p o r te d  by a re a s o n .
Perhaps t h e  p o i n t  w i l l  be p ressed  t h a t  I  am b u i l d i n g  t o o  
much on t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  ' a  ju d g e m e n t ’ h e r e .  C o u ld n ’ t  i t  be 
c o u n te re d  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  t a s t e  a r e  judgem ents  f o r  which  
reasons  o r  grounds need n o t  be g iven ?  C o u ld n ’ t  you s a y ,  f o r  
exam ple ,  t h a t  I  do n o t  need t o  have reasons  f o r  my judgem en t  
c o n c e r n in g  sp in ac h ?  Even i f  I  a l l o w  t h i s ,  v i z .  t h a t  t h e r e  
can be judgem ents  o f  t a s t e  f o r  which reasons  a r e  n o t  needed,  
t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  deny t h a t  t o  j u d g e  t h a t  an a c t i o n  i s  m o r a l l y  
r i g h t  o r  wrong,  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  one has reasons  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  
i t ,  (w h ich  i s  t h e  p o i n t  I  want  t o  m ake) .
To see t h a t  t h i s  i s  so,  l e t  us suppose t h a t  t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e  in  o u r  example  does n o t  have a reason f o r  h i s  
ju d g e m e n t .  He f i n e s  Jones e t  a l  and l e t s  Sm ith  o f f  s c o t -  
f r e e .  Now i f  he had made a ju d g e m e n t ,  we assume t h a t  i t  
w i l l  a lw a ys  be p o s s i b l e  f o r  someone t o  ask him why t h e  
reasons  in  J o n e s ’ case  t i l t  t h e  b a l a n c e .  I f  we ask t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e  "Why?" and he says t h a t  he d o e s n ’ t  know why -
t h a t  he has no reason f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  he has drawn  
between them -  we would f i n d  h i s  " ju dgem ent"  ( s i c )  
i n c o m p r e h e n s i b le .  For  i f  he does n o t  have a reason f o r  i t ,  
n o t h i n g  would c o u n t  as making i t  t h e  c o r r e c t  ju d g e m e n t ,  
s i n c e  t h e r e  would be no reason why i t ,  r a t h e r  th a n  i t s  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y , i s  c o r r e c t .  And, m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s . n o t h i n g  
would  co u n t  as i t  f a i l i n g  t o  be c o r r e c t .  But i f  n o t h i n g  
c o u n ts  e i t h e r  way (as  b e ing  o r  f a i l i n g  t o  be c o r r e c t ) ,  
a n y t h i n g  he s a i d  would be th e  r i g h t  ju d g e m e n t .  Why, t h e n ,  
s h o u ld  we c a l l  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  ' a  ju d g e m e n t ’ ? In  a s i m i l a r  
way, i f  he r e p l i e s  " I t  i s  j u s t  a f e e l i n g  I  have"  o r  " I n  t h e  
absence o f  a s t r o n g  reason e i t h e r  way, I  t o s s e d  a m enta l  
c o in "  n o r m a l ly  we would sa y ,  t o  p a r a p h r a s e  J . S . M i  11 
( 1 8 5 9 :1 3 1  ) ,  t h a t  such a s t a t e m e n t  can o n l y  c o u n t  as t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e ’ s p r e f e r e n c e  o r  i n c l i n a t i o n .  I f  t h e r e  i s  t o  be 
any p o i n t  in  c a l l i n g  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  ca j u d g e m e n t ’ i t  must be 
based upon r e l e v a n t  re a s o n s .
My a d v e r s a r y  m ig h t  r e p l y  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  my response  
p o i n t s  t o  i s  between a r b i t r a r y  and d e l i b e r a t e  ju d g e m e n t .  
Why n o t  say t h a t  th e  m a g i s t r a t e  has made an a r b i t r a r y  
judgem ent?  But t h i s  misses t h e  p o i n t .  Such an a r b i t r a r y  
ju dgem en t  ( i f  we m u s t ) ,  can be c o n s i s t e n t l y  a p p l i e d .
C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  case  in  which t h e  m a g i s t r a t e  
m e r e ly  in  a f i t  o f  t e m p e r ,  f i n e s  Jones one hundred pounds  
and th e n  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  f i n e s  Brown t h e  same amount o f  
money. T h i s  s o r t  o f  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  i s  r u l e d  o u t  by U .R .  
When a p p l y i n g  t h i s  r u l e ,  h i s  judgem ent  must be based upon 
re a s o n s .  We have seen why t h i s  i s  so.  To j u d g e  t h a t  a 
g i v e n  a c t i o n  F m o r a l l y  o u g h t / o u g h t  n o t  t o  be done by X i s  t o  
c o n s i d e r  reasons f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  do in g  i t .  To c l a i m  th e n  
t h a t  o n e ’ s s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , i s
t o  s a y ,  in  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  o n e ’ s judgem ent  has t h e  w e ig h t  o f
reasons  beh ind  i t ;  t h e  j u d g e r  i s  w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  
h i s  judgem en t  f o r  a l l  a c t u a l  and h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases  i n
p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . I n  judgem ents  t o  which we would say t h a t  
U.R.  a p p l i e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we must know what  i t  i s  a b o u t  cases
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t h a t  l e a d s  us t o  say e . g .  t h a t  bo th  Sm ith  and Jones o u g h t  t o  
be p u n is h e d ,  o r  t h a t  one case i s  p u n is h a b le  b u t  n o t  t h e  
o t h e r .  T h i s  need n o t  be so when we a p p ly  c o n s i s t e n c y  A.
T h e re  i s ,  however,  a more i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between  
t h e  r o l e s  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A and uni  v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t y , t h a t  U .R .  
as I  have d e f i n e d  i t  e a r l i e r ,  does n o t  c a p t u r e .  L e t  us 
suppose t h a t  I  g i v e  one o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  as my reason  f o r  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  in  my judgem ent  o f  t a s t e :  ( a )  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e y  s im p ly  happen t o  be l i k e s  and d i s l i k e s  o f  K e i t h  
D o w l in g ;  o r  ( b )  l i k e s  and d i s l i k e s  o f  mine;  o r  ( c )  l i k e s  and 
d i s l i k e s  o f  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  Uni v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t v . Needs,  and 
Moral  Judgem ent . There  i s  n o t h i n g  wrong,  f ro m  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A, w i t h  my re a s o n s .  Or suppose  
t h a t  I  say ( d )  " I  d i s l i k e d  s p in a c h  l a s t  y e a r ,  when I  t r i e d  
i t  i n  Glasgow, bu t  I  l i k e d  i t  to d a y  when I  t r i e d  i t  i n  
U m t a t a " . Some odd d i f f e r e n t i a l  reasons  can be g i v e n  f o r  
judgem en ts  o f  t a s t e .  The p o i n t  i s ,  though odd, t h e r e  i s  no 
p r im a  f a c i e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  h e r e .  Now suppose t h a t  o u r  
m a g i s t r a t e  g i v e s  any one o f  ( a ) - ( d )  as t h e  reason f o r  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  in  h i s  judgem ent  between Smith  and Jones .  He 
m ig h t  reason th u s :  one s h o u ld  ju d g e  s i m i l a r  road o f f e n d e r s  
in  t h e  same way, u n le s s  ( a )  t h e y  a r e  c a l l e d  Tom S m i th ,  o r  
( b )  t h e y  a r e  c l o s e  f r i e n d s  o f  m ine ,  o r  ( c )  t h e y  a r e  t h e  
a u t h o r  o f  s u c h -a n d - s u c h ,  in  which case d r i v i n g  an unroad ­
w o r th y  v e h i c l e  i s  p e r m i s s i b l e .  Or suppose t h a t  t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e  g i v e s  as h i s  reason t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ( d )  S m i t h ’ s 
o f f e n c e  o c c u r r e d  y e s t e r d a y ,  whereas J o n e s ’ happened t o d a y ,  
o r  t h a t  S m i t h ’ s happened in  one p l a c e ,  J o n e s ’ in  a n o t h e r ,  
and t h a t  m e r e ly  t h e  s p a t i a l  o r  t h e  te m p o ra l  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
h i s  reason f o r  f i n i n g  Jones and l e t t i n g  Sm ith  o f f .  We may 
v iew  h i s  reasons  w i t h  l e s s  th a n  a p p r o v a l ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e  has g iv e n  what  app ear  t o  be reasons  t h a t  can be 
a p p l i e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y .  Each o f  ( a ) - ( d )  i s  a reason f o r  S in  
T and c o u ld  be a reason f o r  S ’ ( e . g .  a l l  Tom S m i th s )  in  
s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  T ’ . B u t ,  we want  t o  respond ,  what  i s
71
r i g h t  f o r  Sm ith  can n o t  be wrong f o r  Jones m e r e ly  because  
Sm ith  i s  Sm ith  and Jones i s  Jones .
The cause o f  o u r  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  easy  t o  i d e n t i f y .
W h i le  judgem en ts  such as ( a ) - ( d )  may be c o n s i s t e n t  A,
n o r m a l l y  we would say t h a t  we can n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z e  them. For
o u r  usua l  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  r u l e  i n c l u d e s  a
r e s t r i c t i o n  upon r e f e r e n c e s  t o  p u r e l y  i n d i v i d u a l  o r
n u m e r ic a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  t h i n g  t o  which t h e  jud g em en t
a p p l i e s .  As J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 8 3 )  n o te s :
. . .  we want  t o  r u l e  o u t  as i r r e l e v a n t  mere n u m e r ic a l  
as opposed t o  g e n e r i c  d i f f e r e n c e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between one i n d i v i d u a l  and a n o t h e r  as such .
I t  may be t h a t  what  i s  wrong f o r  Jones i s  r i g h t  f o r  Smith
b u t ,  i f  i t  i s ,  t h i s  must be on t h e  b a s is  o f  reasons  which
d i s t i n g u i s h  some q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  between them and
t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n s .  T h is  p o i n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  and i s  w o r th
s t r e s s i n g .  P a r t  o f  t h e  usual  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e
uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e  i s  t h a t  we can n o t  a p p ly  i t  t o  a
s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n t ,  i f  t h e  judgem ent  c o n t a i n s  an
i r r e p l a c e a b l e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  , 35 On t h e  o t h e r
hand,  a s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  i s  uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e  i f  one i s  a b l e
t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  s i n g u l a r  te rm  w i t h  g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f
t h e  p e rs o n ,  t h e i r  a c t i o n ,  o r  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e r e b y
make t h e  c o r r e s p o n d in g  judgem ent  ab o u t  any o t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r
case  which s a t i s f i e s  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n .
The r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  w e l l  known. We noted  e a r l i e r  t h a t
S id g w ic k  r e c o g n is e s  i t .  However in d e p e n d e n t  argum ents  a r e
r e q u i r e d  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  use o f  i t .  W i t h o u t  them, i t  amounts
t o  no more th a n  ad hoc r e s t r i c t i o n .  Hare  r e c o g n is e s  t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n  t o o .  He says t h a t  p a r t  o f  h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  t h a t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  must be p la c e d  on
s i n g u l a r  t e r m s .  He t e l l s  us ( 1 9 6 3 : 2 1 9 )  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two
s t a g e s  in  t h e  p rocess  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n :
The f i r s t  i s  passed when we have a p r i n c i p l e  n o t  
c o n t a i n i n g  p r o p e r  names o r  o t h e r  s i n g u l a r  te rm s  f rom  
which t h e  moral  judgem ent  we want  t o  make f o l l o w s ,  
g iv e n  t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n .
As we saw, H a r e ’ s u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  p r i n c i p l e  i s  based on 
t h e  m e a n i n g - r u l e s  which a p p ly  t o  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  f e a t u r e  o f  
t e r m s ;  i t  c o n c e rn s ,  t h a t  i s  t o  s ay ,  t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  usage o f  
d e s c r i p t i v e  te r m s .  We m ig h t  o v e r l o o k  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m ean ing -  
r u l e s  a r e  n o t o r i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  n o t  i m p o s s i b l e ,  t o  
s t a t e .  We m ig h t  a c c e p t ,  a l s o ,  t h a t  most o c c u r r e n c e s  o f  
p r o p e r  names a r e  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  r u l e s  o f  t h i s  k i n d .  However  
t h i s  would n o t  j u s t i f y  p l a c i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon d e f i n i t e  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  and o t h e r  u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g ,  y e t  g e n e r a l  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  (s e e  examples ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  b e l o w ) . 36 I f  t h e s e  
c a n n o t  occ u r  in  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  ju dgem en t  t h e n ,  a g a i n ,  
in d e p e n d e n t  arguments  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  show t h i s .
How a r e  we t o  j u s t i f y  r e s t r i c t i n g  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  p u r e l y  
i n d i v i d u a l  o r  n u m e r ic a l  a s p e c ts  o f  a person f ro m  t h e  
re a s o n s ,  in  s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  t o  which t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  can be a p p l i e d ?  I  t h i n k  t h e  answer  
i s  t h a t  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgem ent  needs,  in  some se n s e ,  t o  
be i m p a r t i a l  and t h a t  g iv e n  t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  a c e r t a i n  s o r t  
o f  p a r t i a l i t y  i s  a v o id e d .  Now I  need t o  be c a r e f u l  h e r e .  
We must p r e s e r v e  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  ( n o n - c o n t e s t a b i l i t y )  o f  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  t h a t  we a c h ie v e d  in  o u r  a c c o u n t  o f  
U .R .  However many w r i t e r s  i n s i s t  t h a t  by a d m i t t i n g
i m p a r t i a l i t y  as p a r t  o f  o u r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i 1 i t y ,  we f o r f e i t  n e u t r a l i t y .  T h i s  seems t o  me t o  be 
t r u e  o f  t h e  k in d s  o f  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y  t h a t  we a r e  
u s u a l l y  g iv e n  (s e e  e . g .  p . 5 0 ) .  The q u e s t i o n  t h a t  we need t o  
ask i s :  i s  a n e u t r a l  a cc o u n t  o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y  p o s s i b l e ?
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  can such an a cc ount  e x p l a i n  why s i n g u l a r  
ju dgem en ts  can n o t  be l e g i t i m a t e l y  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  when t h e y  
c o n t a i n  a te rm  which co u ld  o n l y  a p p ly  t o  one i n d i v i d u a l ?  To 
answer t h i s ,  we need t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  an 
im p ersona l  reas o n .
I m p a r t i a l i t y  as im p ersona l  reasons
As a f i r s t  pass a t  d e f i n i n g  ' i m p a r t i a l i t y ’ l e t  us say
t h a t
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D e f . A  A reason R i s  i m p a r t i a l ,  i n  t h e  r e q u i r e d  s e n s e ,  i f  
R i s  a reason f o r  anyone,  i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
c o n t e x t ,  t o  make t h e  same ju d g e m e n t .
We sh o u ld  n o t i c e ,  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c o n t r o ­
v e r s i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  'One oug ht  n o t  t o  make e x c e p t i o n s  in  
o n e ’ s own f a v o u r ’ . T h is  and o t h e r  s i m i l a r  v e r s i o n s  o f  
i m p a r t i a l i t y ,  as we have m e n t io n e d ,  a r e  moral  c l a i m s  t h a t  
someone m ig h t  n o t  a c c e p t .  D e f i n i t i o n  A i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  
demand t h a t  in  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  s i n g u l a r  ju d g e m e n t ,  t h e  
reason  must be im p e r s o n a l .  The j u d g e r ’ s reason must be a 
reason  f o r  anyone making t h e  same judgem ent  in  s i m i l a r  
c i  r c u m s t a n c e s .
As i t  s t a n d s ,  however,  D e f .A  i s  e q u i v o c a l .  A reason  R 
c o u ld  be im persona l  in  t h e  sense ( a )  t h a t  R i s  m e r e ly  
s t a t i n g  t h e  j u d g e r ’ s own p r e f e r e n c e .  Thus a s u b s t i t u t i o n  
f o r  R c o u ld  be a s t a t e m e n t  o f  any d e s i r e  o r  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  
t h e  j u d g e r  t h a t  he would be w i l l i n g  t o  p r e s c r i b e  f o r  h i m s e l f  
and t h a t  he would be w i l l i n g  t o  countenance  anyone e l s e ,  in  
a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  g i v i n g  as t h e i r  reason f o r  t h e  same 
ju d g e m e n t .  L e t  us c a l l  a reason t h a t  conforms t o  t h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  v e r s i o n  o f  D e f . A ,  a j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  
r e a s o n .  A 1 t e r n a t i v e l y  R c o u ld  be im persona l  in  t h e  sense  
( b )  o f  b e in g  a reason f o r  anyone,  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  t h e  
person  who so r e g a r d s  i t ,  s i n c e  R i s  based upon grounds t h a t  
any r a t i o n a l  person would g i v e  as t h e i r  reason f o r  t h e  same 
ju d g e m e n t .  L e t  us c a l l  such reasons  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l . A 
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason i s  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  an a g e n t ,  h i s  a c t  
o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h ic h ,  when i t  i s  f o r m u l a t e d  c l e a r l y ,  
p r o v i d e s  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h e  purposes  o f  moral  
e v a l u a t i o n .
I t  m ig h t  be observed  t h a t ,  as i t  s t a n d s ,  t h e  j u d g e r -  
r e l a t i v e  r e n d e r i n g  o f  D e f .A  would n o t  impose t h e  d e s i r e d  
r e s t r i c t i o n  on u n i q u e l y  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  te rm s  ( f r o m  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  s i n g u l a r  moral  j u d g e m e n t s ) .  For  R c o u ld  be 
im p ersona l  and s t i l l  c o n t a i n  a p r o p e r  name, i n d e x i c a l ,  o r  a 
d e f i n i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  j u s t  so long as i t  i s  a reason t h a t  a
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ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r  would  a c c e p t  anyone g i v i n g .  The m a g i s t r a t e  
c o u ld  c l a i m  t h a t  h i s  reason in
( 1 )  A l l  Tom Sm iths  sho u ld  be ju d g e d  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  way
t o  o t h e r  o f f e n d e r s ,  because t h e y  a r e  c a l l e d  Tom 
S m i t h ,
i s  i m p e r s o n a l ( a ) , f o r  he a c c e p ts  t h a t  anyone s e r v i n g  as a 
m a g i s t r a t e  would  be e q u a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  i n  g i v i n g  t h e  same 
r e a s o n .  Or he c o u ld  a rgue
( 2 )  A l l  m a g i s t e r i a l  judgem ents  o f  s i m i l a r  cases  o u g h t  t o
be t h e  same u n le s s  t h e y  a r e  m ine .
Someone who i s  p a r t i a l  i n  t h i s  sen se ,  comes i n t o  c o n f l i c t
w i t h  U .R .  o n l y  i f  he r e c o g n is e s  t h a t  o t h e r  p e o p le  t o o  a r e  
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  h i m s e l f  bu t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  e q u a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d  in  making t h e  same ju d g e m e n t .  He m ig h t  r e c o g n i s e ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  anyone s e r v i n g  as a m a g i s t r a t e  would  be 
j u s t i f i e d  in  g i v i n g  t h e  same reas o n .
From what  we have s a i d  in  C h a p te r  One, i t  m ig h t  be 
th o u g h t  t h a t  ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  a r e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  s i n c e  a 
' because * - r e a s o n  in  a moral judgem en t  has t o  d e s c r i b e  a 
g e n e r a l  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  a g e n t ,  t h e  a c t  o r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  
i s  u n c l e a r  which g e n e r a l  p r o p e r t y ,  i f  any ,  a name l i k e  'Tom 
S m i t h ’ c o u ld  be s a i d  t o  d e s c r i b e .  Even i f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
a reason which conforms w i t h  th e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  a c c o u n t  ( a s  
i t  s t a n d s ) ,  c o u ld  be e m b a r r a s s in g ly  i n d i v i d u a t i n g .  For  t h e  
g e n e r a l  p r o p e r t y  c o u ld  be a un ique  f a c t o r ,  which i s  s a i d  t o  
make t h e  case d i f f e r e n t  f rom  o t h e r s  and which t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  j u d g e r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e .  For  
i n s t a n c e ,  D .Locke  m a i n t a i n s  ( 1 9 6 8 : 3 8 )  t h a t  any i d i o s y n c r a t i c  
o r  a r b i t r a r y  reason i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  i n  k e e p in g  w i t h  ( a ) .  
He t h i n k s  t h a t  he can c o g e n t l y  a rgue  t h a t  he has s p e c i a l  
r i g h t s  because
( 3 )  I  am t h e  a u t h o r  o f  ( t h e  a r t i c l e )  'The  T r i v i a l -  
i z a b i l i t y  o f  U n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y ’
f ro m  w h ic h ,  Locke say s ,  ( i b i d : 3 9 )  i t  f o l l o w s :
Everyone l i k e  me in  b e in g  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  t h i s  
a r t i c l e  has . . .  s p e c i a l  r i g h t s .
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Though o t h e r s  w i t h  t h e  same name may w r i t e  s i m i l a r  a r t i c l e s ,  
o n l y  one a u t h o r ,  Don Locke,  c o u ld  have w r i t t e n  t h i s  a r t i c l e .  
I f  an im p erso n a l  reason i s  one t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  would  a c c e p t  
t h a t  o t h e r s  s h o u ld  g i v e ,  th e n  u n i q u e l y  d e s c r i p t i v e  f e a t u r e s  
l i k e  ' b e i n g  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  The T r i v i a l i z a b i 1 i t y  o f  U n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i  1 i t y ’ would be i m p e r s o n a l .  So long as we keep t h e  
f e a t u r e s  t h e  same, we p r e s e r v e  t h e  i m p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  
re a s o n .  P r e s e r v e  t h e  reason and we can u n i v e r s a l i z e  t h e  
s i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g em en t ,  th u s  s a t i s f y i n g  U .R .
We s h o u ld  n o t e ,  a l s o ,  t h a t  t h e  reason f o r  any b i z a r r e  
s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  j u d g e r  i s  
w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  c o u ld  be im p ersona l  in  k e e p in g  w i t h  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n .  L e t  us borrow an example  o f  a b i z a r r e  
ju dgem en t  t h a t  P . F o o t  ( 1 9 5 8 : 5 1 2 )  g i v e s ,
( 4 )  One ought  n o t  look  a t  hedgehogs in  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
moon.
So long  as t h e  reason (w h a te v e r  i t  i s )  g iv e n  i n  s u p p o r t  o f
( 4 )  i s  based upon d e s c r i p t i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  case t h a t  t h e
j u d g e r  would be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  p r e s c r i b e  u n i v e r s a l l y ,  
i t  c o u ld  be i m p e r s o n a l ( a )  in  kee p in g  w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  judgem ent  c o u ld  be d e s c r i p t i v e l y  u n iq u e  in  
a n o t h e r  way. R c o u ld  be a s e t  o f  g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  
d e s c r i b e  an i n d i v i d u a l  in  such a way t h a t  o n l y  t h i s  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o u ld  p o s s i b l y  s a t i s f y  t h e  s e t .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  I  
m ig h t  ju d g e
( 5 )  You ought  t o  keep your  p rom ise  t o  rep ay  d e b t s ,  
u n le s s  you a r e  m a le ,  5 f e e t  11 in c h e s  t a l l ,  were
born in  London in  1938,  a r e  m a r r ie d  t o  a l e c t u r e r  i n
P h i lo s o p h y  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T r a n s k e i ,  and so on,
l i s t i n g  so many, u n d e n ia b ly  g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  y e t  such 
t h a t  o n l y  one i n d i v i d u a l  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  by t h e  s e t .  Even i f  
we i n s i s t  t h a t  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , reasons  in  judgem ents  
must be g e n e r a l ,  we c o u ld ,  in  t h i s  way, a lw ays  escape th e  
p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  D e f .A  t o  U .R .  For  t h e  
j u d g e r  c o u ld  a lw a ys  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a u n ique  s e t  o f  
g e n e r a l  f a c t o r s  abo ut  t h e  case t h a t  he i s  j u d g i n g  which
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makes i t  r e l e v a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  o t h e r s  y e t  w h ich  he would  
be w i l l i n g  t o  countenance  anyone,  i n  a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  
g i v i n g  as t h e i r  reason f o r  t h e  same ju d g e m e n t .
Now t h e r e  a r e  a number o f  t h i n g s  wrong w i t h  t h e  c l a i m s  
abo ve .  Most  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  a w r i t t e n  o r  spoken u t t e r a n c e  i s  
n o t  a reason s im p ly  because I  happen t o  r e g a r d  i t  as one .  
Any p u t a t i v e  reason must be, a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l l y ,  ( f o r  want  
o f  a b e t t e r  p h r a s e )  'open t o  p u b l i c  i n s p e c t i o n ’ . T h i s  i s  t o  
s a y ,  o t h e r s  must be a b l e  t o  see t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between t h e  
p r o f f e r e d  reason and t h e  k in d s  o f  reasons  t h a t  a r e  u s u a l l y  
r e g a r d e d  as r e l e v a n t  in  t h e  c o n t e x t .  We w i l l  c a l l  t h i s  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e .  And s e c o n d l y ,  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  f e a t u r e  g iv e n  in  t h e  reason must be s u f f i c i e n t l y  
s p e c i f i c  f o r  o t h e r s  t o  r e l a t e  t h e  reason c a u s a l l y ,  
l o g i c a l l y ,  o r  in  some o t h e r  r a t i o n a l  way, t o  t h e  
accompanying ju d g em en t .  In  o t h e r  words,  t h e  reason  must  
e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem ent  f o r  th o s e  t o  whom i t  i s  o f f e r e d .  
T h i s  we w i l l  c a l l  t h e  e l u c i d a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n .  I n  t h e s e  
se n s e s ,  my reason must make a c l a i m  t o  b e ing  a reas o n ;  t h a t  
i s  t o  sa y ,  a reason in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I  so 
r e g a r d  i t .
L e t  me i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  p o i n t s  h e re  w i t h  two exa m ples .  
Suppose t h a t  someone asks me "Why d i d  you go t o  t h e  t h e a t r e  
l a s t  n i g h t ? "  I  m ig h t  r e p l y  " I t  was my w i f e ’ s b i r t h d a y  and 
I  wanted t o  g i v e  her  a t r e a t "  o r  " I  wanted t o  see t h e  p l a y  
because I  have read so many f a v o u r a b l e  r e v ie w s  o f  i t " .  Many 
d i f f e r e n t  answers can be g iv e n  w h ic h ,  w h i l e  t h e y  d i f f e r  in  
c o n t e n t ,  a r e  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  asked and 
e l u c i d a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  go t o  t h e  t h e a t r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  suppose t h a t  I  were t o  r e p l y  "Because Glasgow b e g in s  
w i t h  ' G ’ " .  I  t h i n k  t h a t  we would say t h a t  f rom  o u r  
knowledge o f  p e o p l e ’ s reasons f o r  t h e a t r e - g o i n g ,  i t  i s  
h i g h l y  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  anyone a c t u a l l y  would have t h i s  as  
t h e i r  re a s o n .  U s u a l l y  when someone g i v e s  a reason we 
r e c o g n is e  i t  as r e l e v a n t  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n .  Here  
we do n o t .  E i t h e r  I  must e x p l a i n  how my r e p l y  i s  a r e l e v a n t
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answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  o r  what  I  have s a i d  j u s t  does n o t  
c o u n t  as a gen u in e  re a s o n .  The n o t i o n  o f  a c o m p l e t e l y  
a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen reason i s  nonsense;  i f  a n y t h i n g  c o u ld  
c o u n t  as a re a s o n ,  th en  t h e r e  would be no p o i n t  i n  o f f e r i n g  
a n y t h i n g  as a reas o n .  I  t h i n k  t h a t  we would  s a y ,  a l s o ,  o f  
"Because Glasgow b eg in s  w i t h  a ' G ’ " , t h a t  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  
which a s p e c t  o f  t h e  " reason"  ( s i c )  c o u ld  be s a i d  t o  
e l u c i d a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  -  v i z .  t o  go t o  t h e  t h e a t r e  -  i n  t h e  
minds o f  th o s e  t o  whom t h e  reason i s  g i v e n .
L e t  me p u t  t h e  p o i n t s  I  am making h e re  d i f f e r e n t l y .  
Suppose t h a t  you ask me: "Why does t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Glasgow
b e g in s  w i t h  ' G ’ have any r e l e v a n c e  t o  your  d e c i s i o n  t o  go t o  
t h e  t h e a t r e ? " .  What you a r e  a s k in g  f o r  i s  e i t h e r  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between my reason and t h e  usual  
corpu s  o f  reasons  f o r  t h e a t r e - g o i n g ,  o r  f o r  an e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  which a s p e c t  o f  t h e  reason g iv e n  i s  supposed t o  be 
r e l e v a n t  t o  my d e c i s i o n  t o  go t o  t h e  t h e a t r e ;  ( o r ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  you a r e  p r o b a b ly  a s k in g  f o r  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  b o t h ) .  
These a r e  f a m i l i a r  f e a t u r e s  o f  r e a s o n - g i v i n g  whenever  a 
reason  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  be i r r e l e v a n t ,  o r  i t s  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  
t h e  judgem ent  t o  be in  need o f  f u r t h e r  e l u c i d a t i o n .  My 
response  must be based upon a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  case i n  q u e s t i o n  
t h a t  a r e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  o t h e r s .
To see t h a t  t h i s  i s  so ,  c o n s id e r  a second exam ple .  
Suppose t h a t  a s c i e n t i s t  c l a i m s  t h a t  h i s  e x p e r im e n t  i s  
r e l e v a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom a l l  o t h e r  e x p e r im e n t s  i n  i t s  
f i e l d ,  'becau se  he -  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t e r  -  i s  m a le ,  i s  5 f e e t  
11 in c h e s  t a l l ,  was born in  London in  1938 ,  e t c . ’. Why would  
we demur? Because t h e  reasons he g i v e s  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  c l a i m  
a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  i r r e l e v a n t .  We do n o t  see t h e  c o n n e c t io n  
between t h e  p r o f f e r e d  reason and t h e  accompanying judgem ent  
ab o u t  e x p e r im e n t s ;  i . e .  how t h e  f o r m e r  i s  supposed t o  
e l u c i d a t e  t h e  l a t t e r .  And we do n o t  see t h e  c o n n e c t io n  
between t h e  p r o f f e r e d  reason and t h e  k in d s  o f  reasons  t h a t  
a r e  u s u a l l y  reg ard e d  as r e l e v a n t  in  s c i e n c e .  We have no 
id e a  what  e l s e  he would re g a r d  as r e l e v a n t ,  o r  what  he would
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r e g a r d  as i r r e l e v a n t .  N e i t h e r  does i t  make a d i f f e r e n c e  i f  
t h e  s c i e n t i s t  t e l l s  us t h a t  he has a lw a y s  g i v e n  t h i s  as  a 
r e a s o n .  A l th o u g h  i t  would make a d i f f e r e n c e  i f  he was a b l e  
t o  show t h a t  such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  ( b e i n g  m a le ,  5 f e e t  11 
in c h e s  t a l l ,  e t c . ) ,  a r e  con nected  w i t h  t h e  k i n d s  o f  reasons  
t h a t  o t h e r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  in  t h i s  f i e l d ,  u s u a l l y  a c c e p t .  We 
would  be more l i k e l y  t o  a d m i t  t h a t  g iv e n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  h i s  s u p p o r t i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  were im p erso n a l  
r e a s o n s .
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t o  co u n t  as an im p ersona l  reason f o r  a 
ju d g e m e n t ,  a d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t e m e n t  must meet  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e  and judgem ent  e l u c i d a t i o n .  So we 
need t o  amend our  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  1 im p ersona l  r e a s o n s ’ i n  t h e  
l i g h t  o f  t h i s :
D e f . A ’ R i s  an im p ersona l  reason i f  R i s  a c o n t e x t u a l l y
r e l e v a n t  and a j u d g e m e n t - e l u c i d a t i n g  reason meaning  
by t h i s  t h a t  anyone u n d e rs ta n d s  R as b e in g  a reason  
o f  a c e r t a i n  t y p e  and t h a t  R e l u c i d a t e s  t h e  
ju d g e m e n t .
B e f o r e  we can make t h e  n e c e s s a ry  amendment t o  U . R . ,  we need 
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e  i n  more 
d e t a i 1.
The t a s k  o f  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  reasons  which can be t h o u g h t  
o f  as r e l e v a n t  in  any c o n t e x t  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  e x t r e m e l y  
p r o b l e m a t i c .  However i t  i s  n o t  o f  im m ed ia te  c o n c e r n .  For  
t h e  moment, I  hope t h a t  i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  
' r e l e v a n c e ’ i s  a r e l a t i o n a l  n o t i o n ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  a 
t h i n g  can n o t  be r e l e v a n t  s i m p ! i c i t e r  b u t  must be r e l e v a n t  t o  
so m e th in g .  I t  i s  o n l y  when we know what  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t h a t  
we can b eg in  t o  i d e n t i f y  ways in  which reasons  may be 
re g a r d e d  as r e l e v a n t .  A l l  t h a t  we can say o f  a g e n e r a l  
n a t u r e  i s  t h a t  R must be commensurate w i t h  reasons  w h ic h ,  as 
a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  do have a p a r t  t o  p l a y  in  e n a b l i n g  us t o  
r e c o g n is e  som eth ing  as a judgem ent  b e lo n g in g  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
t y p e  o f  d i s c o u r s e .
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We need t o  r e c o g n is e ,  in  t h e  case o f  moral  re a s o n s ,  t h a t  
a p a r t i c u l a r  re a s o n ,  d i r e c t i n g  b e h a v i o u r  o r  g u i d i n g  
a t t i t u d e s ,  i s  con nected  w i t h  a t  l e a s t  some o f  t h e  more usua l  
moral  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  l i k e ,  as Hume ( 1 8 8 9 : 2 9 7 )  s a y s ,  t h o s e  in  
f a v o u r  o f
. . . h u m a n i t y ,  f i d e l i t y ,  t r u t h ,  j u s t i c e ,  cou rage
te m p e ra n c e ,  c o n s ta n c y ,  d i g n i t y  o f  m i n d ; . . .
A l s o ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  ou r  e v e r y d a y  moral  reasons  a r e  
con cerned  w i t h  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  a c t i o n ,  l i k e  p ro m o t in g  o n e ’ s 
own and o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s w e l l - b e i n g ,  k ee p in g  p r o m is e s ,  b e in g  
l o y a l ,  h a v in g  i n t e g r i t y ,  f e e l i n g  and showing g r a t i t u d e ,  
e t c . ,  t h e y  i n c l u d e ,  in  a d d i t i o n ,  p r o h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
k i l l i n g ,  harm ing  o t h e r  p e o p le ,  d i s h o n e s t y ,  g r e e d ,  and so 
f o r t h . 37 When i t  can be r e l a t e d  t o  co n c e p ts  such as th o s e  
above ,  we a r e  a b l e  t o  r e c o g n is e  som eth ing  as a moral  re a s o n .  
N o t i c e  t h a t  I  am n o t  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  c o n c e p ts  o r  
r easons  upon which a c r i t e r i o n  o f  moral  r e l e v a n c e  s h o u ld  be 
based.  I  am c l a i m i n g  o n l y  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  t h e  t y p e  o f  
c o n c e p ts  on which m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reasons  a r e  based.  I n  
o u r  e v e r y d a y  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  such m a t t e r s ,  we do r e c o g n iz e  
e . g .  ' . . . b e c a u s e  Sm ith  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  k i l l e d  J o n e s ’ ' . . . h e  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  caused h i s  c h i l d  f u r t h e r  s u f f e r i n g ’ , ' . . . h e  
made a f a l s e  prom ise  t o  repay  J o n e s ’ ; o r ,  (on a h a p p i e r  
n o t e )  ' . . . b e c a u s e  he i s  an h o n e s t ,  s y m p a t h e t i c  p e r s o n ’ , t o  
be p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reas o n s .
To c l a i m  a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  n o t ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t o  say why i tem s  
in  such a l i s t  a r e  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  N e i t h e r  i s  i t  t o  
say what  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  r e l e v a n c e  a r e .  And i t  c e r t a i n l y  
i s  n o t  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  a judgem ent  in  which reasons  o f  t h i s  
s o r t  o c c u r  oug ht  m o r a l l y  t o  be a c t e d  upon o r  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t .  By s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  s i n g u l a r  judgem ents  
c o n t a i n i n g  c e r t a i n  ty p e s  o f  reason a r e  n o t  moral  judgem ents  
(and  t h e r e f o r e  a r e  n o t  g e n u in e ly  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ) , I  am n o t  
t r y i n g  t o  condemn them as im m ora l .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  s a y in g  
t h a t  a reason in  a s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  i s  r e l e v a n t  and 
e l u c i d a t i n g  and t h e r e f o r e  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y , 
we do n o t  have t o  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  judgem ent  e x p re s s e d .  We
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a r e  r e f e r r i n g ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t o  'm o r a l *  in  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  
sense i n  which t h e  word i s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  n o n - m o r a l .  I t  i s  
p e r f e c t l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  r e c o g n iz e  som eth ing  as a moral  re a s o n ,  
t o  r e c o r d  t h i s  in  a s e c o n d - o r d e r  d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t e m e n t ,  and 
y e t  t o  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  i t  r a d i c a l l y  o r  t o  condemn i t  as  
m o r a l l y  w r o n g . 38 In  t h i s  sense o f  'm o r a l *  we can h o ld  on t o  
o u r  p ro p o s a l  t h a t  im persona l  reasons  can be j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  
r e a s o n s .  Both m o r a l l y  r i g h t  and immoral p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  
ju d g e m e n ts  can be und ers to o d  t o  be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and 
e l u c i d a t i n g .
I t  i s  t h e  p rese n ce  o f  a t  l e a s t  some o f  t h e s e  c o n c e p ts  i n  
o t h e r  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  m oreover ,  which e n a b le s  us t o  p i c k  
c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e i r  conduct  as b e in g  t h e i r  moral  
p r a c t i c e  o r  o u t l o o k  and,  o f t e n ,  t o  r e c o g n is e  t h e  t y p e  o f  
moral  o u t l o o k  i t  i s . 39 O b v io u s ly  moral  id e a s  v a r y  f ro m  one  
s o c i e t y  t o  a n o t h e r ;  p r a c t i c e s  such as a b o r t i o n  o r  i n f a n t ­
i c i d e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a r e  approved o f  in  one s o c i e t y  and n o t  
a n o t h e r .  Y e t  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  t o  such v a r i a t i o n .  Members 
o f  t h e  Xhosa t r i b e  in  T r a n s k e i ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  have a number  
o f  d i s t i n c t i v e  moral r u l e s  which r e f e r  t o  t h e  b e h a v io u r  o f  
Xhosa p e o p le .  These do n o t ,  however,  m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e  them  
t o  do t h i n g s  l i k e  l o o k i n g  a t  hedgehogs in  m o o n l ig h t ,  r a t h e r ,  
t h e y  concern  such t h i n g s  as o b e d ie n c e  t o  p a r e n t s ,  l o y a l t y  t o  
t h e  g roup ,  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e i r  e l d e r s .  The p o i n t  i s ,  one  
c o u ld  n o t  say t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  moral  b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s  
o f  t h e  Xhosa p e o p le  u n le s s  one has a l r e a d y  formed some 
c o n c e p t io n  o f  m o r a l i t y .  L e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  s a y ,  f o r  t h e  
moment,  t h a t  we u n h e s i t a t i n g l y  r e f e r  t o  t h e i r  r u l e s  as moral  
r u l e s  because t h e y  a r e  connected  t o  what  I  am c a l l i n g  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  c o n c e p ts .  A l t h o u g h ,  i t  needs t o  be 
s t r e s s e d  a g a i n ,  none o f  t h i s  e x p l a i n s  why such c o n c e p ts  a r e  
t o  be r e g a rd e d  as r e l e v a n t .
P h i l o s o p h e r s ,  l i k e  H a re ,  who su g g e s t  t h a t  a lm o s t  a n y t h i n g  
can c o u n t  as a moral reason a r e  n e g l e c t i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  
c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e  t h a t  o r d i n a r y  moral  r e a s o n in g  a c t u a l l y  
r e q u i r e s .  We would be s u r p r i s e d  i f ,  as we n o te d ,  a person
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c l a i m s  t o  a c c e p t ,  s a y ,  ( 4 )  v i z .  'One o ug ht  n o t  lo o k  a t  
hedgehogs in  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  moon’ as a moral  p r i n c i p l e .  
T h i s  would  n o t  be m e r e ly  a s u r p r i s e ,  as Hare  ( 1 9 7 8 : 7 4 )  s ay s :
. . . o c c a s i o n e d  by an i n a b i l i t y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d ,  n o t
what  t h e  v iew  i s ,  b u t  why anybody s h o u ld  t h i n k  t h a t .
We would  s a y ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  f rom  our  knowledge o f  moral  
p r i n c i p l e s  and how t h e y  d e v e lo p ,  we c an n o t  u n d e r s ta n d  how 
anyone would come t o  re g a rd  ( 4 )  t o  be one,  l e t  a l o n e  a d o p t  
i t .  Fo r  we would n o t  see how ( 4 )  meshes w i t h  o t h e r  c o n c e p ts  
t h a t  a r e  th o u g h t  t o  r e f e r  t o  m o r a l l y  wrong c o n d u c t ,  o r  how
( 4 )  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  moral  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I t  w i l l  n o t  do f o r  
t h e  s p e a k e r  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h i s  happens t o  be one o f  h i s  
fu n d a m e n ta l  moral  p r i n c i p l e s ;  o r  t h a t  he a lw a ys  a c c e p t s  t h i s  
as a moral  reas o n .  W i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h i s  c l a i m  
would be as u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  as h i s  p r e v i o u s  rem ark .
L e t  us suppose,  however,  t h a t  we a r e  p ressed  t o  c o n s i d e r  
w hat  i s  a t  l e a s t  a l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  t h a t  someone d i d  
a c t u a l l y  a c c e p t  ( 4 )  as a g u id e  t o  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  and t h i n k  
th e m s e lv e s  bound t o  urge  i t  on o t h e r s ,  t h a t  t h e y  f e l t  g u i l t  
and remorse i f  ( 4 )  was b roken ,  and so o n . 40 The p o i n t  m ig h t  
be t h a t  i f  ou r  moral judgem ents  were v e r y  d i f f e r e n t ,  o r  i f  
t h e y  were made in  a n o t h e r  u n i v e r s e ,  o r  in  v e r y  unusual  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  our  w o r ld ,  then  p r i  ma f a c i  e b i z a r r e  
judgem en ts  would have t h e  same k in d  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  
o u r  moral  judgem ents  in  f a c t  have .  My response t o  t h i s  i s  
t h a t  we would say t h a t  th e  burden o f  p r o o f  i s  on th e  
ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r  t o  show i t s  r e l e v a n c e .  We would  need a 
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  reason R, which would  
e n a b l e  us t o  u n d ers ta n d  why any person m o r a l l y  o u g h t  n o t  
lo o k  a t  hedgehogs in  m o o n l ig h t .  We s h o u ld  n o t  e x p e c t  him t o  
say in  r e p l y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  " A n y th in g  can c o u n t  as a reason  
f o r  s a y in g  ( 4 ) " .  The f a c t  t h a t  he i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  g i v e  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  i t  shows t h a t  t h e  case i s  e x c e p t i o n a l  and 
t h a t  t h e  burden o f  p r o o f  i s  f o r  him t o  show t h e  reason i s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  moral  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  What one would be a s k in g  
f o r  h e r e  i s  a c o n c e p tu a l  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  T h i s  means, among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h a t  t h e  p o i n t s  he r a i s e s  must be i n t e l l i g i b l e
t o  o t h e r s .  The p o i n t  I  am t r y i n g  t o  make i s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  e x c lu d e  a p r i o r i  any reas on  as a 
p o s s i b l e  moral  re a s o n ,  i t  must in  p r i n c i p l e  be p o s s i b l e  t o  
see t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i t  and o t h e r  moral  r e a s o n s . 41
Im p e rs o n a l  reasons  and t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on names
Why sh o u ld  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n c e  r e s u l t  in  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p r o p e r  names and o t h e r  s i n g u l a r  te rm s  f ro m  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  reasons? I n  t h e  case o f  p r o p e r  names, ( i n  
t h e  c l e a r e s t  s o r t  o f  cases an yw ay ) ,  t h e r e  i s  no o b v io u s  
c o n n e c t io n  between a reason t h a t  depends upon t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a p r o p e r  name and t h e  k in d s  o f  reasons  
n o r m a l l y  r e c o g n is e d  as r e l e v a n t  t o  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  When 
o u r  m a g i s t r a t e  in  ( 1 )  g iv e s  "Because he i s  c a l l e d  Tom Smith"  
as h i s  reason f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  we 
would  say t h a t  we j u s t  do n o t  see how t h e  f a c t  t h a t  someone 
i s  c a l l e d  by a c e r t a i n  name can be r e l a t e d  t o  any o t h e r  
r e c o g n i z a b l e  moral  re a s o n .  We can n o t  see how b e in g  c a l l e d  
by a c e r t a i n  p r o p e r  name can have a b e a r i n g  on such t h i n g s  
as o b l i g a t i o n s ,  r i g h t s ,  v a l u e s ,  i d e a l s ,  o r ,  i n  t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e ’ s case ,  r e l i e f  f rom blame and pun ishm ent .  Even 
i f  he were t o  c l a i m  t h a t  he i s  p r e s e n t i n g  a new moral  
p r i n c i p l e  which can n o t  be d e f i n e d  in  te rm s  o f  a n y t h i n g  more 
f u n d a m e n t a l ,  o r d i n a r i l y  we would s t i l l  i n s i s t  t h a t  t o  be 
i n t e l l i g i b l e  t h e  reason must con nec t  w i t h  o t h e r  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  r e a s o n s ,  (and t h a t  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between t h e  
reason and t h e  judgem ent  must meet t h e  e l u c i d a t i n g  
c o n d i t i o n ) .  H is  u t t e r a n c e  can have t h e  ap p e a ra n c e  o f  a 
r e a s o n ,  o f  c o u rs e .  I t  can be couched in  t h e  same fo rm  o f  
w ords ,  o r  be g iv e n  in  t h e  to n e  o f  v o i c e ,  in  which reasons  
a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l 1y e x p re s s e d .  However,  a doubt  would  
a r i s e  a b o u t  what  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e  means by ' a  r e a s o n ’ i f ,  when 
c a l l e d  upon t o  show how what  he i s  s a y in g  co n n e c ts  w i t h  t h e  
usual  k in d s  o f  reasons in  t h e  c o n t e x t  -  o r  how i t  e l u c i d a t e s  
t h e  judgem en t  -  he d i d  n o t  see t h e  need t o  s a t i s f y  th e s e  
c r i t e r i a .  The p o i n t  i s  n o t ,  pace H a re ,  t h a t  we would wonder
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why anybody sh o u ld  t h i n k  t h a t .  N e i t h e r  i s  i t  t h a t  i f  t h e  
s p e a k e r  f a i l s  t o  meet our  c r i t e r i a ,  dou b ts  would  a r i s e  a b o u t  
w hat  he meant .  R a t h e r ,  i f  he f a i l s  t o  see t h a t  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  meet our  c r i t e r i a ,  we would be a t  a l o s s  t o  
u n d e r s ta n d  why he c a l l s  h i s  u t t e r a n c e  ' a  r e a s o n ’ . I t  f a i l s  
as a reason f o r  anyone e l s e .  S o - c a l l e d  re a s o n s ,  c o n t a i n i n g  
p r o p e r  names t h a t  f u n c t i o n  as t e r m s ,  f a i l  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  as  
r e a s o n s .
L e t  us see i f  t h e  same e x p l a n a t i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon p o s s e s s iv e  pronouns in  s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts .  C o n s id e r  a g a in  t h e  example  ( 2 )  ' A l l  m a g i s t e r i a l  
ju d g em en ts  o f  s i m i l a r  cases oug ht  t o  be t h e  same u n le s s  t h e y  
a r e  m in e ’ . L e t  us suppose, f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  t h e  reason  
o f f e r e d  in  ( 2 )  i s  s im p ly  based upon a f e e l i n g ,  o r  some o t h e r  
n o n - r a t i o n a l , i d i o s y n c r a t i c  f a c t o r  o f  t h e  person who g i v e s  
i t ;  i . e .  'b e cau se  t h i s  i s  how I  f e e l  ab o u t  i t ’ . I n  moral  
c o n t e x t s ,  t h i s  i s  t o  t u r n  reason g i v i n g  i n t o  a p u r e l y  
p r i v a t e  a f f a i r  and hence t o  s u r r e n d e r  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  one i s  
g i v i n g  a reason t h a t  i s  d e t e r m i n a b l e  by o t h e r  p e r s o n s ,  i . e .  
t h a t  i t  can be c o n s id e r e d  t o  be r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g .
We need t o  be c a r e f u l  h e r e .  I  do n o t  want  t o  say t h a t  
a l l  fo rm s  o f  p ronominal  r e f e r e n c e  make t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  in  
which t h e y  ap p ear  f o r f e i t  as m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  re a s o n s .  I t  
c o u ld  be, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  s o r t  o f  reason t h a t  a j u d g e r  
p r o v i d e s  by t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e ,  i t  
i s  in  h i s  i n t e r e s t s ,  o r  t h a t  i t  i s  t o  h i s  a d v a n ta g e .  I f  t h e  
j u d g e r  i s  p r e p a re d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  ju d g e m e n t ,  t h e s e  can 
be p e r f e c t l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  and,  in  our  sense ,  im p ersona l  
re a s o n s .  Though we may no t  l i k e  i t ,  ( 2 )  i s  t h e  k in d  o f  
reason  t h a t  some i n d i v i d u a l s  do g i v e  f o r  t h e i r  moral  
j u d g e m e n t s .
N o n e t h e le s s  a reason i s  a moral  reason o n l y  i f  i t  i s  
p r im a  f a c i e  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g .  How i s  a judgem ent  
l i k e  ( 2 )  t o  be u n d e rs to o d ,  i f  t h e  reason i s  supposed t o  be 
u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  j u s t  one i n d i v i d u a l ’ s i n t e r e s t s  o r
p r e f e r e n c e s ?  O b v io u s ly  i t  w i l l  n o t  do f o r  t h e  s p e a k e r  t o
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c i t e  i n  response  t o  o u r  q u e s t i o n  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  he 
s h a r e s  w i t h  o t h e r  p e o p le ,  l i k e  ' . . . b e c a u s e  I  am v e r y  w i s e ’ .
Even i f  we a l l o w  t h a t  ' b e i n g  v e r y  w i s e ’ i s  r e l e v a n t  and
e l u c i d a t i n g  in  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i t  c o u ld  be a reas on  f o r
f a v o u r i n g  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  o t h e r  m a g i s t r a t e ’ s t o o ,  so 
' . . . u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  m in e ’ would n o t  be a  p u r e l y
i n d i v i d u a t i n g  r e f e r e n c e .  N e i t h e r  w i l l  i t  do f o r  t h e  j u d g e r  
t o  c i t e ,  as t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  r e l e v a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  h i s  reason  in
( 2 ) ,  a d e s c r i p t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  o n l y  he happens t o  
have l i k e  ' b e i n g  t h e  o n l y  m a g i s t r a t e  in  T r a n s k e i  who i s  
f u l l y  c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  e v e r y  a s p e c t  o f  c r i m i n a l  l a w ’ . Once 
a g a in  i f  we a l l o w  t h a t  t h i s  i s  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  such a 
reason  i n v i t e s  a c o m p a ra t i v e  e le m e n t ,  i f  n o t  in  t h e  a c t u a l  
w o r l d ,  in  h y p o t h e t i c a l  ca s e s .  O th e rs  w i t h  a s i m i l a r  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  l i k e  'b e i n g  c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  most a s p e c t s  o f  
c r i m i n a l  l a w ’ would s t i l l  have some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  ( th o u g h ,  
p e r h a p s ,  a p r o p o r t i o n a l  1y l e s s e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) ,  f o r  h a v in g  
t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  s i m i l a r l y  f a v o u r e d  in  such c o n t e x t s .  The 
reason  in  ( 2 )  would n o t ,  t h e n ,  u n i q u e l y  i n d i v i d u a t e  o u r  
m a g i s t r a t e .  A s i m i l a r  o b j e c t i o n  co u ld  be r a i s e d  i f  a s e t  o f  
g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  a r e  su g gested ;  such as 'b ecau se  I  am 
t h e  o n l y  m a g i s t r a t e  in  T r a n s k e i  who was born in  London, i s  
5 f e e t  11 in c h e s  t a l l ,  e t c ,  and who i s  f u l l y  c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  
e v e r y  a s p e c t  o f  c r i m i n a l  l a w ’ . I t  i s  f a r  f rom  c l e a r  how t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  can be r e g a rd e d  as c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
and e l u c i d a t i n g .  However i f  p e r  absurdum we suppose t h e y  
a r e ,  s i n c e  o t h e r  persons have s i m i l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  a 
s i m i l a r  reason would ho ld  f o r  them.
L e t  us suppose then  t h a t  t h e  r e c o u rs e  t o  u n iq u e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  dropped and he c l a i m s  t h a t  by g i v i n g  th e  
reason ' . . . u n l e s s  t h e y  ( t h e  m a g i s t e r i a l  j u d g e m e n ts )  a r e  
m i n e ’ he means t h a t  'he  i s  h i m s e l f  and wants  t o  f u r t h e r  h i s  
own i n t e r e s t s  o r  r e p u t a t i o n ’ , (w h ich  seems t o  be t h e  p o i n t  
o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  e x a m p le ) .  The sense o f  t h e  reason  
' . . . u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  m in e ’ , in  ( 2 ) ,  i s  ' I  d e s i r e  my 
p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  be met above a l l  e l s e ’ . I f  t h i s  i s  so,  e v e r y
85
o t h e r  person  c o u ld  make much t h e  same c l a i m .  S in c e  i t  i s  
t r u e  t h a t  each person  i s  h i m s e l f  and, p r e s u m a b ly ,  w ants  t o  
f u r t h e r  h i s  own i n t e r e s t s ,  i f  one person can ju d g e  t h a t  he 
m o r a l l y  o ug ht  t o  do su c h -a n d -s u c h  on t h e  b a s is  o f  t h i s  
reas on  t h e n ,  by U . R . ,  we a l l  ought  t o  do i t .  W i t h o u t  a 
g e n e r a l  t h e o r y  o f  moral  r e l e v a n c e ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  o f  our  
a c c o u n t  we w i l l  have t o  say t h a t  egoism o f  t h i s  s o r t  i s  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  (however  see p p . 4 0 6 -4 1 2  a h e a d ) .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand,  i f  he were t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  same reason does 
n o t  h o ld  f o r  o t h e r  p e rso n s ,  th e n  t h e  j u d g e r  must p r o v i d e  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  how t h i s  s e r v e s  as a reason in  h i s  case  b u t  
n o t  f o r  t h a t  o f  o t h e r s .  And h i s  answer  must n o t  run i n t o  
t h e  t y p e  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  no ted  above.  I f  an e x p l a n a t i o n  
c a n n o t  be p r o v i d e d ,  then  t h e  proposed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  s e r v e s  
as a reason in  a l l  cases  o r ,  what  i s  more l i k e l y ,  i t  does  
n o t  s e r v e  as a r e l e v a n t  reason a t  a l l .
The arguments  above a p p ly  a l s o  t o  d e f i n i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n s .  
Where t h e s e  behave as s i n g u l a r  t e r m s ,  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  where  
a l l  t h a t  i s  germane abo ut  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  
u n i q u e l y  r e f e r s  t o  one i n d i v i d u a l , 42 ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  where in  
( 3 )  ' b e i n g  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  ' T r i v i a l i z a b i 1 i t y  o f  U n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b i l i t y ’ i s  used s im p ly  t o  d e s i g n a t e  Don L o c k e ) ,  l i k e  
p r o p e r  names, such uses v i o l a t e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  r e l e v a n c e  
and e l u c i d a t i o n .  To meet th e s e  l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e  
reason  must have a d e s c r i p t i v e  c o n t e n t ;  i t  must be based  
upon one o r  more q u a l i t a t i v e  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  case in  q u e s t i o n .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  c o n t e n t  i s  in te n d e d  
t h e r e  must be a d i s c e r n i b l e  c o n n e c t io n  between t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
reason  and t h e  k in d s  o f  reasons u s u a l l y  r e g a rd e d  as r e l e v a n t  
t o  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  And t h e r e  must be a c l e a r  c o n n e c t io n  
between t h e  reason and t h e  judgem ent  which c o u ld  be s a i d  t o  
e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem ent  f o r  o t h e r s .  Regarded in  t h i s  l i g h t ,  
I  t h i n k  we would say t h a t  L o c k e ’ s reason i s  n o t  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t ,  n e i t h e r  does i t  e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem ent  'E v e ry o n e  
l i k e  me in  b e ing  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e  has . . .  s p e c i a l  
r i g h t s ’ . So, in  t h e  absence o f  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h e
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reason  i n  ( 3 )  i s  n o t  r e l e v a n t  o r  e l u c i d a t i n g  and ,  t h e r e b y ,
( 3 )  i s  n o t  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  moral  ju d g e m e n t .  I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  
we need t o  p re s s  t h i s  p o i n t  any f u r t h e r .
Locke a l s o  c o n s id e r s  a case  where a d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  be g e n e r a l ,  y e t  i t  u n i q u e l y  d e s c r i b e s  one 
i n d i v i d u a l .  H is  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  such a d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a n u m e r i c a l l y  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  r e f e r e n c e .  Locke 
( op c i t : 3 8 )  g i v e s  as an example:
( 6 )  'E v e ry o n e  who i s  t h e  Son o f  God has t h i s  d u t y ’ may 
be u n i v e r s a l  in  fo rm ,  bu t  ( s t i l l  a p p l i e s )  t o  o n l y  
one p erso n .
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  our  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n  I  w i 11 c l a i m ,  b u t  n o t  
a r g u e ,  t h a t  w h i l e  a s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ent  c o n t a i n i n g  a 
g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  such as 'b e i n g  t h e  Son o f  God’ may as a 
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  r e f e r  t o  o n l y  one o b j e c t ,  o t h e r  o b j e c t s  m ig h t  
possess i d e n t i c a l  o r  com parab le  p r o p e r t i e s ,  o r  t h e  same 
p r o p e r t y  w i l l  be possessed by o t h e r s  in  a g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  
d e g r e e ,  i f  n o t  in  t h e  a c t u a l  w o r ld ,  th e n  in  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
c a s e s .  So, a g a i n ,  l a c k i n g  a d e t a i l e d  t h e o r y  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  
r e l e v a n c e  we have t o  say ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  t h a t  ( 6 )  i s  
r e l e v a n t  and t h a t  i t  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .
B e f o r e  p a s s in g  t o  our  n e x t  p o i n t ,  i t  i s  w o r th  s t r e s s i n g  
some o f  t h e  consequences o f  t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n .  I  c a n n o t  
j u d g e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  f u l f i l l i n g  my ( o r  Tom S m i t h ’ s )  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  c a r e e r ,  when t h i s  i s  a t  t h e  expense o f  o t h e r s ,  
i s  a m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  a c t  f o r  me, y e t  n o t  f o r  o t h e r s  l i k e  
me; u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  can be j u s t i f i e d  by 
r e l e v a n t  q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between m y s e l f  and o t h e r s  
o r  between t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which I  and t h e y  a r e  p l a c e d .  
More i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  i t  would p r e v e n t  a t y p e  o f  i n v e r t e d  
egoism ado pted  by some a s c e t i c s ,  and i t  would r u l e  o u t  
s u p e r e r o g a t o r y  a c t s  where t h e s e  depend f o r  t h e i r  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  upon a un ique  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  a g e n t .  I  
c a n n o t  make judgem ents  o f  t h e  form ' I  m o r a l l y  o ug ht  n o t  t o  
a c t  in  s u c h -a n d -s u c h  a way b u t  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  f o r  
o t h e r s  t o  do s o ’ ; o r  o f  t h e  form  ' I  m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  a c t  
h e r o i c a l l y  b u t ,  in  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  o t h e r s  m o r a l l y
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need n o t ’ . I  can n o t  make such ju d g em en ts ,  i f  I  c a n n o t  show
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any r e l e v a n t  q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  between
m y s e l f  and o t h e r s .  T h i s  a d d i t i o n  t o  our  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  r u l e  p r e c l u d e s ,  a l s o ,  t h e  k i n d  o f
j i n g o i s m  which demands t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  one p a r t i c u l a r
group o r  c o u n t r y  a lo n e  shou ld  c o u n t .  As J . L . M a c k i e  (op
c i t : 8 4 )  s u g g e s ts ,
. . . i t  r u l e s  o u t  t h e  k in d  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  which demands 
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  some one c o u n t r y  a r e  supreme,  
o r  which says i t  i s  r i g h t  t o  s e r v e ,  say I r e l a n d  by 
methods which would be wrong i f  used t o  s e r v e ,  s a y ,  
F r a n c e . . .
Such ju dgem en ts  a r e  r a t i o n a l l y  f o r f e i t ;  u n l e s s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  can be j u s t i f i e d  by c i t i n g  r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between I r e l a n d  and F ra n c e ,  o r  between t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  
which  t h e y  a r e  p l a c e d .  And t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on names a l s o  
r u l e s  o u t  t h e  k in d  o f  i n v e r t e d  p a t r i o t i s m  which r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  I  s h o u ld  n o t  l o v e ,  say ,  S c o t la n d  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  a l l  
r i g h t  f o r  anyone e l s e  t o  lo ve  any o t h e r  c o u n t r y .  Any 
ju d g em en t  which depends s im p ly  upon t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  an 
i r r e p l a c e a b l e  p r o p e r  name, i n d e x i c a l ,  o r  m e r e ly  on a 
n u m e r ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i s  f o r f e i t  under  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The argument  c o n c e rn in g  r e l e v a n c e  and e l u c i d a t i o n  has  
been d i r e c t e d  a t  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  ( p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g )  
re a s o n s .  A j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  reason must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t e  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n .  However t h e
d e f i n i t i o n  A o f  im persona l  reas o n s ,  we n o te d ,  a p p l i e s  t o  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  as w e l l  as j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  re a s o n s .  C l e a r l y ,  
a reason may be a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  c o n t e x t  and e l u c i d a t e  t h e  
c o n c lu s io n  y e t  f a i l  t o  be j u d g e r - n e u t r a l . For  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  
m ig h t  depend upon a t h e o r e t i c a l  b i a s  o f  t h e  j u d g e r ,  e . g .  he 
c o u ld  be a com m itted  u t i l i t a r i a n ,  K a n t i a n ,  e g o i s t ,  e t c .  I t  
co u ld  be s im p ly  t h a t  th e  j u d g e r ’ s reason i s  b ia s e d  i n  f a v o u r  
o f  h i s  own f a m i l y  o r  group .  As we have s a i d ,  though we 
m ig h t  n o t  a g re e  w i t h  such reas o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  pr im a  
f a c i e  non -m ora l  about  making e x c e p t io n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  c o n d i t i o n  r e q u i r e s  -  some 
how -  t h a t  R can be seen t o  be th e  c o r r e c t  reason f o r  t h e
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a s s o c i a t e d  moral  ju d g em en t .  So t h e  argum ents  c o n c e r n in g  
r e l e v a n c e  and e l u c i d a t i o n  a p p ly  a f o r t i o r i  t o  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
re a s o n s ,  as does t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f
s i n g u l a r  te rm s  in  R.
We can r e t u r n  t o  t h e  f i r s t  m a jo r  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  I
m en t io n ed  a t  t h e  end o f  C h a p te r  One. We n o ted  t h a t ,  as i t  
s t a n d s  so f a r ,  U .R .  w i l l  n o t  s e r v e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts  f rom  non-m ora l  jud g em en ts .  However f ro m  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  above,  we can say t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  j u s t  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  two o r  more t h i n g s  can be th o u g h t  t o  be s i m i l a r  which  
j u s t i f i e s  t h e  demand t h a t  th e  same moral  judgem en t  a p p l i e s  
t o  b o t h .  The s i m i l a r i t i e s  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  
T h i s  p o i n t  needs s t r e s s i n g .  To a p p ly  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
r u l e ,  t h e  reason g iv e n  in  a s i n g u l a r  judgem en t  must be
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  So we need t o  amend t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  U .R .  by i n t r o d u c i n g  i n t o  i t  a c o n d i t i o n ( s )  which w i l l  
a l l o w  us t o  p i c k  o u t  th o s e  f a c t s  we can appea l  t o  as
c o n s t i t u t i n g  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reasons  and which r u l e s  
o u t  t h e  r e s t .
We can narrow  t h e  f i e l d  he re  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  As w e l l  as  
m e e t in g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e ,  we a r e  
l o o k i n g  f o r  a c r i t e r i o n / c r i t e r i a  f o r  reasons  which does n o t  
i m p o r t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral assum pt ions  i n t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  U .R .  How a r e  we t o  do t h i s ?  One way would be t o  
r e s t r i c t  t h e  c l a s s  o f  r e l e v a n t  reasons t o  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
f a c t u a l  reasons  ( t h o s e  f rom which a l l  c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  
ass um pt ions  a r e  e x c lu d e d )  y e t  w h ic h ,  when t h e y  a r e  
f o r m u l a t e d  c l e a r l y ,  p r o v i d e  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h e  
purposes  o f  moral e v a l u a t i o n .  A n o th e r  way would be t o  
d e f i n e  ' c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e ’ w i d e l y  enough t o  c o v e r  a l l  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  e t h i c a l  v iew s t o  which a j u d g e r  m ig h t  be 
co m m it ted ;  so t h a t  t h e  amended d e f i n i t i o n  c a tc h e s  
u t i l i t a r i a n  j u d g e r s ,  K a n t i a n s ,  th o se  whose judgem en ts  a r e  
i n s p i r e d  by a love  o f  mankind,  o r  by s e l f - l o v e ,  by 
a e s t h e t i c i s m ,  f o r  sad ism,  o r  masochism, e t c . , ( o r  a 
c o m b in a t io n  o f  any o f  th e s e  v i e w s ) .  W ith  t h i s  in  mind,  I
w ant  now t o  i n t r o d u c e  i n t o  U .R .  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between  
ju d g e t  n e u t r a l  and j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  re a s o n s .
J u d g e r - n e u t r a l  and j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  U .R .
I  am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reasons  can be 
o f  two k i n d s ,  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  o r  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e .  A j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  reason i s  a f a c t u a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  an a g e n t ,  h i s  a c t  
o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h ich ,  when i t  i s  f o r m u l a t e d  c l e a r l y ,  
p r o v i d e s  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h e  purposes  o f  moral  
e v a l u a t i o n .  So i f  R i s  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  r e a s o n ,  a 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  R w i l l  be a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a c e r t a i n  f a c t  
o r  p r o p e r t y  ( o r  c e r t a i n  consequences which must f o l l o w  i f  
t h e  a c t i o n  i s  p e r fo rm e d )  which e n t a i l s ,  o r  i s  in  some o t h e r  
way a s u f f i c i e n t  o r  good reason f o r ,  an a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  
j u d g e m e n t .  One obv io u s  adv an tage  o f  t h i s  o p t i o n  i s  t h a t  
a l t h o u g h  i t  i n v o l v e s  s u p p le m e n t in g  U .R .  w i t h  an a d d i t i o n a l  
s o u rc e  o f  moral  e v a l u a t i o n ,  t h e  l a t t e r  would n o t  be a 
c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  p r i n c i p l e  bu t  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t .  Thus i t  
would  n o t  r e q u i r e  a d i s p u t a b l e  moral assum pt ion  t o  j u s t i f y  
r e l e v a n t  r e a s o n s ,  when u s ing  U.R.
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  we t h i n k  o f  R as j u d g e r - r e l a t i  ve  
th e n  a r e l e v a n t  reason w i l l  r e f l e c t  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e  o r  
o v e r a l l  moral  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  th e  j u d g e r ,  r a t h e r  th a n  any  
i n t r i n s i c  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  a g e n t ,  o r  h i s  a c t i o n  ( o r  fo r m a l  
f e a t u r e s  o f  h i s  j u d g e m e n t ) .  Beyond t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
c h o i c e  w i l l  be governed by th e  fo rm a l  and c o n t e x t u a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  we have d is c u s s e d  a l r e a d y ,  t h e r e  would n o t  need  
t o  be l i m i t s  on what can cou nt  as a r e l e v a n t  reas on ;  t h e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  R co u ld  be any r e l e v a n t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e  t h a t  th e  j u d g e r  would be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  a c t  
upon h i m s e l f  and p r e s c r i b e  f o r  o t h e r s  in  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  he may p r e f e r  a moral p o l i c y  
o f  a lw a ys  s e e k in g  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  h i s  own i n t e r e s t s .  I f  
he does,  h i s  answer t o  t h e  'w h ich  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n ,  as we have n o te d ,  appears  t o  be r e l e v a n t  and i t  
seems t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y  he m ig h t  p r e f e r
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a p o l i c y  which emphasizes  t h e  g e n e r a l  h a p p in e s s ,  s o c i a l  
u t i l i t y ,  o r  d u t i e s  t o  o t h e r s .  These t o o  a l l  seem t o  be 
r e l e v a n t  reasons  and co u ld  occur  in  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  moral  
j u d g e m e n t s .
The j u d g e r - r e l a t i  ve o p t i o n ,  as we can se e ,  a l s o  i n v o l v e s  
s u p p le m e n t in g  U .R .  w i t h  an a d d i t i o n a l  so u rc e  o f  moral  
e v a l u a t i o n .  The a d d i t i o n  o f  th e  c o n d i t i o n  ' t h e  o v e r a l l  
p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  reasons o f  t h e  j u d g e r ’ ( w h a te v e r  t h e s e  
may b e ) ,  would n o t  t u r n  U.R.  i n t o  a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  r u l e .  We 
a r e  n o t  s p e c i f y i n g  what  th e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  sh o u ld  be.  T h a t  
i s  a m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  j u d g e r  t o  d e c id e .  A l l  t h a t  we r e q u i r e  
i s  t h a t  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  reasons  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  
most r e c e n t  d is c u s s io n s  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  a r e  
j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e .  They a r e  concerned  w i t h  what  somebody -  
u s u a l l y  t h e  a g e n t ,  though sometimes an anonymous s p e c t a t o r  -  
s t r o n g l y  wants done,  e i t h e r  by o r  t o  e v e r y b o d y ,  o r  by o r  t o  
t h o s e  who a r e  s p e c i f i e d  in  th e  j u d g e m e n t . 43
The d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  and j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  R i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  our  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  U .R .  and i t  needs t o  be s t r e s s e d .  I f  we 
g i v e  R t h e  fo r m e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e  j u d g e r  d e c id e s  f o r  
h i m s e l f  h i s  answer t o  t h e  'w h ich  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n .  Moral  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  i s  c o n t i n g e n t  upon what  t h e  
a g e n t  wants  o r  p r e f e r s .  We need t o  check o n l y  t h a t  t h e  
reason  i s  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and t h a t  t h e  s i n g u l a r  moral  
ju dgem en t  in  which i t  occurs  i s  g e n u in e ly  and u n i v e r s a l l y  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  ju d g e m e n t - m a k e r ’ s own o v e r a l l  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  i f  R r e p r e s e n t s  a c l a i m  a b o u t  a 
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e  because i t  in  
f a c t  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  a g e n t s ,  o r  because i t  
g i v e s  r i s e  t o  consequences t h a t  a r e  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l y  good o r  
bad. J u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reas ons ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  any ,  a r e  q u i t e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  p e rs o n a l  c h o ic e ;  in d e p e n d e n t ,  t h a t  i s ,  o f  
what  one would ,  o n e s e l f ,  be w i l l i n g  t o  p r e s c r i b e  
u n i v e r s a l l y .  Judger  n e u t r a l - r e a s o n s  w i l l  r e s t  on
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s i m i l a r i t i e s  which a r e  seen t o  be m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  by e v e r y  
r a t i o n a l  j u d g e r .
We can now i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l / j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  i n t o  t h e  U.R .  d e f i n i t i o n .  L e t  us c a l l  t h e  
judger  r e l a t i v e  v e r s i o n  o f  our  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  
U . R . I .  T h i s  v e r s i o n  o f  th e  r u l e  s t a t e s :
I f  A ju d g e s  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F because o f  
t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i  ve reason R (where  R can be any 
s t a t e m e n t  o f  a c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  p r e f e r e n c e  t h a t  
t h e  j u d g e r  would be w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l l y  
p r e s c r i b e )  th en  A must be judged  t h a t  anyone t o  whom 
R a p p l i e s  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F.
I n  a p p l y i n g  U . R . I ,  t h e  j u d g e r  may s p e c i f y  what  c o n s t i t u t e s  
a m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  judgem en t .  A l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  i s  t h a t  
h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  s e t  by t h e  broad and 
vague n o t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i f  
we c o u ld  r e p l a c e  R by a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a p r o p e r t y  which i s  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , we have
U . R . I I .  I f  A ju d g e s  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  do F f o r  t h e
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason R, (where  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  
R i s  a c e r t a i n  f a c t  o r  p r o p e r t y ,  o r  a consequence,  
which e n t a i l s  o r  i s  r a t i o n a l l y  ad e q u a te  f o r  X ’ s 
o b l i g a t i o n  t o  do F) then  any r a t i o n a l  person must  
j u d g e  t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  m o r a l l y  oug ht  
t o  do F.
D i f f i c u l t i e s  i m m e d ia te ly  a r i s e  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  p i c t u r e  o f  
moral  r e l e v a n c e .
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  w h i l e  moral judgem ents  may be based  
on m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t ,  many p h i lo s o p h e r s  would deny t h a t  t h e  
f o r m e r  a r e  e n t a i l e d  by th e  l a t t e r ,  o r  t h a t  in  some o t h e r  way 
f a c t u a l  reasons  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  o r  r a t i o n a l l y  ad e q u a te  f o r  
t h e  moral  judgem ents  th e y  s u p p o r t .  The r e l a t i o n  between  
reasons  and moral judgem en ts ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  n o t  u s u a l l y  
e x p re s s e d  in  te rm s o f  a n a l y t i c i t y ;  v i z .  t r u e  by v i r t u e  o f  
t h e  meanings o f  th e  words t h e y  c o n t a i n .  The c o n n e c t io n  
betw een ,  s ay ,  'X i s  c o u ra g e o u s ’ o r  'X i s  t e m p e r a t e ’ and 'X
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i s  a good man’ does n o t  appear  t o  be one o f  d e f i n i t i o n  o r  
l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t .  F u r t h e r ,  i f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between  
reas ons  and judgem ent  i s  supposed t o  be a n a l y t i c  th e n  t h e  
i d e a  o f  o n e ’ s j u d g i n g ,  in  U . R . I I ,  seems t o  be r e d u n d a n t  
anyway. For  t h e  t r u t h  o f  moral c l a i m s  w i l l  be known a 
p r i o r i  when t h e  reason i s  g i v e n .  I n  which c a s e ,  we would  
n o t  a p p e a r  t o  need a u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  r u l e ;  r a t h e r  we would  
have t o  g i v e  th e  same e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between f a c t s  and v a lu e s  -  and f a c e  t h e  same k in d  o f
d i f f i c u l t i e s  -  as anyone who t r i e s  t o  j u s t i f y  a n a l y t i c i t y .  
(The  c l a i m  t h a t  some f a c t s  e n t a i l  moral  judgem ents  i s  one
t h a t  I  w i l l  c h a l l e n g e  in  th e  pages a h e a d . )
A second prob lem  i s  t h a t  I  seem t o  have a d i f f i c u l t y  in  
o f f e r i n g  examples o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reas o n s .  We m ig h t  t r y  
t o  i d e n t i f y  them in  moral  d is c o u r s e  by a n a lo g y  w i t h  t h o s e  in  
e m p i r i c a l  d i s c o u r s e ,  where t h e  n o t i o n  o f  ' a  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
r e a s o n ’ seems t o  be m e a n i n g f u l .  Can we sa y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  j u s t  as in  t h e  s e a rch  f o r  e m p i r i c a l  t r u t h ,  t o  be
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  one must no t  be p r e j u d i c e d  in  f a v o u r  o f  o n e ’ s 
own e x p e r im e n t s  m e re ly  because t h e y  a r e  o n e ’ s own so ,  by 
a n a lo g y ,  in  moral judgem ents  one must n o t  f a v o u r  o n e ’ s own 
p r e f e r e n c e s  ( o r  i n t e r e s t s )  m e re ly  because t h e y  a r e  o n e ’ s 
own? The a n a lo g y  here  would be between t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  
' r e s p e c t  f o r  e v i d e n c e ’ as th e  b a s is  o f  i m p e r s o n a l ,  e m p i r i c a l  
reasons  and, say ,  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  o t h e r s ’ as 
t h e  b a s is  o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  moral re a s o n s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  we 
c o u ld  n o t  p u t  any c o n f id e n c e  in  t h i s  a n a lo g y .  I n  t h e  
e m p i r i c a l  c o n t e x t ,  t o  be p a r t i a l  in  t h e  reasons  t h a t  one 
g i v e s ,  i s  t o  be i r r a t i o n a l ;  someone engaged in  a s c i e n c e  who 
r e f u s e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  e v id e n c e  o f  a n o t h e r  due t o  h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  h i s  own r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s ,  m e r e ly  because  
t h e y  a r e  h i s  own, has g iven  up t h e  se a rc h  f o r  e m p i r i c a l  
t r u t h s .  But we have seen a l r e a d y  t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  i n  moral  
c o n t e x t s ,  does n o t  seem t o  commit us t o  i m p a r t i a l i t y  o f  t h i s  
s o r t .  F u r th e rm o re  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  e v i d e n c e ’ , in  t h e  case o f  
e m p i r i c a l  reasons r e q u i r e s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  o t h e r  persons  a r e
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a c c e p t e d  as l e g i t i m a t e  so u rc es  o f  e v i d e n c e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
o n e ’ s f e e l i n g s  tow ards  them, whereas  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w hat  
t h e  a n a l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  
o t h e r s ’ would i n v o l v e .  Does t h i s  mean t h a t  one s h o u ld  
l i s t e n  t o  t h e i r  arguments? Should  one t a k e  heed o f  w hat  
t h e y  say? Should  one a c c e p t  o n l y  t h o s e  re as o n s  w h ich  can  
be w h o l e h e a r t e d l y  endorsed from t h e i r  p o i n t  o f  v iew ?
T h e re  a r e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  o t h e r  ways o f  t r y i n g  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
t h a t  R i s  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , p r im a  f a c i e  good reason  f o r  a  
moral  ju d g e m e n t .  We m ig h t  r e q u i r e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  
c h o ic e  o f  reasons  has t o  be made in  ig n o r a n c e  o f  o n e ’ s own 
t a l e n t s ,  q u a l i t i e s ,  o r  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e  one o c c u p ie d  
i n  s o c i e t y  a l a  R a w l s . 44 We have t o  commit o u r s e l v e s ,  t h a t  
i s  t o  s a y ,  in  advance and f rom beh ind  a v e i l  o f  ig n o r a n c e ,  
t o  t h e  reasons  which we t h i n k  sh o u ld  a p p ly  i n  c e r t a i n  
t y p i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .  I f  
e v e ry o n e  were t o  ju d g e  in  th e  same way t h e n ,  t h i s  m ig h t  show 
t h a t  R i s  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason f o r  a g iv e n  moral  
j u d g e m e n t .
N e i t h e r  o f  t h e  approaches above f u r n i s h  us w i t h  any  
o b v io u s  examples o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  r e a s o n s .  U n les s  we had 
a c l e a r  a cc ount  o f  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  re a s o n s ,  we c a n n o t  
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p a r a l l e l i s m  between t h e  i m p e r s o n a l i t y  
o f  reasons  which seems t o  ho ld  in  e m p i r i c a l  e n q u i r y  and t h e  
k in d  o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons t h a t  we m ig h t  hope t o  f i n d  i n  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgem en ts .  The a l t e r n a t i v e  n o t i o n ,  o f  
making judgem ents  f rom beh ind  a v e i l  o f  i g n o r a n c e ,  
p i c t u r e s q u e  and s t r i k i n g  though i t  i s ,  does n o t  im m e d ia t e l y  
s u g g e s t  any reasons t h a t  have t o  be endorsed  f rom  e v e r y  
p o i n t  o f  v ie w .  So what a r e  th e s e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons?  
They can n o t  j u s t  be p ic k e d  f rom o u t  o f  t h e  a i r .
T h e re  a r e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  a c c o u n ts .  I  w i l l  
o f f e r  one l a t e r  in  t h i s  e s s a y .  But t h i s  t a k e s  us t o o  f a r ,  
t o o  q u i c k l y .  For th e  moment we may n o te  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
n o t h i n g  in  U . R . ,  o r  a n y th i n g  e l s e  t h a t  we have s a i d  so f a r ,  
which i n d i c a t e s  t h e  m a t e r i a l  r e s p e c t s  t h a t  c o u n t  as
u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  grounds f o r  c l a i m i n g  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l i t y . 
However f o r  o u r  purpo ses ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  i t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  
t o  assume t h a t  a r i c h  and w ide  range o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
reas ons  e v e n t u a l l y  can be g i v e n .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  p ro c e d u re  in  U . R . I  d i f f e r s  
f ro m  U . R . I I  in  a t  l e a s t  one p r a c t i c a l  r e s p e c t ,  and we need 
t o  n o t i c e  t h i s .  I n  both cases we need t o  ask t h e  j u d g e r  
w h e th e r  he w i l l  a c c e p t  th e  same judgem ent  n o t  o n l y  f o r  
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  a c t u a l  cases b u t  a l s o  f o r  a l l
h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases where h i s  judgem ent  c o u ld  a p p l y .  I f  t h e  
j u d g e r  f i n d s  t h a t  he runs up a g a i n s t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l
c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  he would be u n w i l l i n g  t o  e n d o r s e ,  o r  i f  he 
c a n n o t ,  i . e .  i f  h i s  judgem ent  runs up a g a i n s t  l o g i c a l  o r  
r a t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  then  th e  s i n g u l a r  ju dgem en t  i s  n o t  
uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e . On t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  r e n d e r i n g  o f  
r e l e v a n t  reasons  t h i s  i s  a l l  t h e r e  i s  t o  i t .  On t h e  o t h e r
hand,  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reas o n s ,  as we have s a i d ,  d e s c r i b e
f e a t u r e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  o r  t h e i r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  which a r e  
i n  f a c t  t h e  same. To check t h a t  we a r e  a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  
a s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  h e re  we would need t o  c o n f i r m  t h a t  t h e  
reason  R i s  in  f a c t  s a t i s f i e d  in  e v e r y  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c a s e .  
I f  i t  i s ,  th e n  any in fo rm e d ,  c a r e f u l  and r e f l e c t i v e  p e rs o n ,  
i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  R as 
t h e  reason f o r  making t h e  same judg em en t .
B e a r in g  in  mind t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  above ,  l e t  us now r e t u r n  
t o  t h e  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between c o n s is t e n c y  A 
and U .R .
U . R . . c o n s is t e n c y  and o b j e c t i v i t y
Both t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  and j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  v e r s i o n s  o f  
U.R .  e n j o y  t h e  adv an tages  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  A. They both  r u l e  
o u t  th o s e  judgem ents  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  w i l l  n o t ,  o r  c a n n o t ,  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  a p p ly  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . We have seen t h a t  
u n l i k e  c o n s is t e n c y  A, however,  a s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t o  which  
e i t h e r  o f  t h e  expanded i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  U .R .  can be 
a p p l i e d ,  can not  be based upon m e r e ly  n u m e r ic a l  p a r t i c u l a r s .
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T h i s  i s  because t o  be uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e  t h e  reason  R, i n  'X 
o u g h t  t o  do F because o f  R ’ , must be i m p e r s o n a l ,  i n  t h e  
sense t h a t  i t  must be r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem en t  
f o r  o t h e r s .  S i n g u l a r  judgem ents  based on reas ons  which  
c o n t a i n  i r r e p l a c e a b l e  p ro p e r  names, i n d e x i c a l s ,  and d e f i n i t e  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  which f u n c t i o n  as names, a r e  n o t  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e .  And a l th o u g h  as i t  s ta n d s  i t  i s  a b l u r r y
r e q u i r e m e n t ,  ' c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e ’ s u g g es ts  a l s o  why 
b i z a r r e  reasons  sho u ld  be r u l e d  o u t  as uni v e r s a ! i z a b l e  
re a s o n s .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  th e  demand t h a t  o u r  s i n g u l a r
ju d g e m e n ts  be c o n s i s t e n t  does n o t  p l a c e  such r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
t h e i r  c o n t e n t .  We have gone beyond t h e  mere c a l l  f o r  
c o n s i s t e n c y  A.
C o n s i s t e n t  reasons do n o t  need t o  be c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  re a s o n s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  I  s t i l l  want  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
t h e  expanded i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  U .R .  a r e  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l , i n  
t h e  sense t h a t  t h e y  do n o t  depend upon c o n t e s t a b l e  v a l u e  
a s s u m p t io n s .  L e t  me show t h i s ,  b r i e f l y ,  f o r  t h e  j u d g e r -
r e l a t i v e  U . R . I .  Any s t a t e m e n t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  which t a k e s  a 
s t a n d  on what we ought  m o r a l l y  t o  do, where t h e  reason i s  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  w i l l  be a l e g i t i m a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  
t h e  a n t e c e d e n t  in  U . R . I .  Now t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  such a reason  
must be r e l e v a n t  i s  n o t  t o  make a s u b s t a n t i v e  moral c l a i m .  
I f  someone were t o  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  me, t h e  is s u e  between us 
would  n o t  be a moral one.  For a l th o u g h  i t  i s  ab o u t  
m o r a l i t y ,  t h e  d is a g r e e m e n t  would n o t  be an is s u e  w i t h i n
m o r a l i t y .  We would n o t  argue  as i f  t h e  demand f o r  r e l e v a n c e  
and e l u c i d a t i o n  a r e  is s u e s  which co u ld  be s e t t l e d  by a 
p r i n c i p l e  p r o v id e d  by m o r a l i t y ;  t h e y  c an n o t  be re g a rd e d  as 
w i t h i n  m o r a l i t y  in  t h e  same sense as ,  say ,  'You sh o u ld  keep 
p r o m i s e s ’ i s  w i t h i n  i t .
We can c o n t r a s t  c o n s is t e n c y  A w i t h  U . R . I  and U . R . I I  in  
a n o t h e r  way. U n l i k e  c o n s is t e n c y  A, t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  t h e
c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e  t o  U . R . ,  marks o f f  moral  judgem ents  
f rom  o t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  non-mora l  ju d g e m e n ts .  The re  a r e  many 
p r a c t i c a l  judgem ents  t h a t  we a r e  a b l e  t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y
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p r e s c r i b e  f o r  a l l  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  cases  b u t  w h ich  i t
would  be s i l l y  t o  sug ges t  have a n y t h i n g  t o  do w i t h  m o r a l i t y .
Suppose t h a t  I  say t o  someone who i s  ab o u t  t o  go f o r  a w a lk :
( 7 )  You ought  t o  t a k e  your  u m b r e l l a  because i t  i s
r a i n i n g  and you w i l l  g e t  w e t .
I n  ( 7 ) ,  I  t a k e  t h e  reason 'A person who wants  t o  go f o r  a
w a lk  and n o t  t o  g e t  w e t ’ t o  a p p ly  t o  th e  w a l k e r  and i t  i s
t r u e  t h a t  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  eve ryone  o f  whom t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s
t r u e  sh o u ld  t a k e  t h e i r  u m b r e l l a .  ( I  know f rom  e x p e r i e n c e
t h a t  t h i s  i s  a f a i r l y  r e l i a b l e  g u a r a n te e  a g a i n s t  g e t t i n g
w e t . ) 45 I  may add t h a t  I  would w i l l i n g l y  and c o n s i s t e n t l y
p r e s c r i b e  t h a t  'Anyone who i s  th e  same in  t h e  r e l e v a n t
r e s p e c t s  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  u m b r e l l a  e t c ’ . However t h e
reason  'b ecau se  i t  i s  r a i n i n g  and you w i l l  g e t  w e t ’ f a i l s
t o  c a p t u r e  our  p r e - a n a l y t i c a l  n o t i o n  o f  a c o n t e x t u a l l y
r e l e v a n t  moral  reason and so,  on my a c c o u n t ,  ( 7 )  i s  n o t
uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e  by U.R.  I .  To p u t  t h e  p o i n t  h e re  in  a n o t h e r
way, by U .R .  I ,  I  must r e g a r d  my s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t o  be
m o r a l l y  b i n d i n g  on eve ryo n e  t o  whom t h e  reason does o r  c o u ld
a p p l y .  I t  i s ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , how we a l l  m o r a l l y  o u g h t  t o
behave in  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  But t o  re g a r d  ( 7 )  as m o r a l l y
b i n d i n g  app ears  t o  be nonsense.
I n  h i s  e a r l i e r  work,  however,  R .M .H a re  ( 1 9 5 2 / 1 9 6 3 )  seemed
f o r c e d  t o  say t h a t  ( 7 )  i s  a moral  ju d g em en t ,  i f  t h e  j u d g e r
so r e g a r d s  i t .  For  my s i n g u l a r  judgem ent  t o  be a moral
jud g em en t  a l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  i s  t h a t  I  must be w i l l i n g  and
a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  and i t  must be p r e s c r i p t i v e . Hare
t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no o t h e r  r a t i o n a l  l i m i t  on t h e
s i n g u l a r  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  t h a t  a person may be w i l l i n g  t o  U . R . I
u n i v e r s a l i z e .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 9 5 )
On my v ie w ,  t h e r e  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  no c o n t e n t  f o r  a 
moral  p r e s c r i p t i o n  t h a t  i s  r u l e d  o u t  by l o g i c  o r  by 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  te rm s .
He c l a i m s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  a g e n ts  c r e a t e  t h e i r  own 
moral  v a l u e s .  Thus by u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  i t ,  I  m ig h t  e l e v a t e
( 7 )  -  o r  any o t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  ju dgem en t ,  t h a t  I  am w i l l i n g  t o  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  p r e s c r i b e  f o r  a l l  cas es ,  i_n p r o p r i a  p e r son a ,
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b u t  w h ich  i t  would  be s i l l y  t o  s u g g es t  have a n y t h i n g  t o  do 
w i t h  m o r a l i t y  -  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .
Ha re  i s  n o t  unaware o f  t h e  p rob lem  h e r e .  I n  o r d e r  t o
escape  i t ,  i n  h i s  e a r l i e r  work ( 1 9 5 2 ) ,  he i n t r o d u c e s  a
r e f e r e n c e  t o  ' s t a n d a r d s ’ . We a r e  t o l d  t h a t  by r e s o l v i n g  t o
a c c e p t  o n l y  c e r t a i n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as r e l e v a n t ,  t h e  j u d g e r
c r e a t e s  h i s  own s t a n d a rd s  o f  moral r e l e v a n c e .  What i f  t h e
j u d g e r  i s  asked t o  j u s t i f y  th e s e  s ta n d a rd s ?  Hare  says t h a t
t h i s  can be done w i t h i n  an account  o f  a 'way o f  l i f e ’ . I t
i s  up t o  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  w he ther  o r  n o t  he a c c e p t s  a g iv e n
'way o f  l i f e ’ . He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 5 2 : 6 9 )
. . . i f  p ressed  t o  j u s t i f y  a d e c i s i o n  c o m p l e t e l y  we 
have t o  g i v e  a com ple te  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  way o f  
l i f e  o f  which i t  i s  p a r t . . .  I f  t h e  i n q u i r e r  s t i l l  
goes on t o  ask 'B u t  why shou ld  I  l i v e  l i k e  t h a t ? ’ 
th en  t h e r e  i s  no f u r t h e r  answer t o  g i v e  h i m . . . f o r  in  
t h e  end e v e r y t h i n g  r e s t s  upon such a d e c i s i o n  in  
p r i n c i p l e .  He has t o  d e c id e  w h e th e r  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  
way o f  l i f e  o r  n o t ; . . .
Ha re  would n o t  deny,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h a t  many p e o p le  a c q u ie s c e
in  t h e  v a l u e s  and moral  p r a c t i c e s  o f  th e  s o c i e t y  i n  which
t h e y  were r a i s e d .  H is  p o i n t  i s  t h a t ,  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  any
p e r s o n ’ s moral  o u t l o o k  u l t i m a t e l y  r e s t s  on t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  t o
a c c e p t  such a way o f  l i f e .  I t  i s  a lw ays  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a
person  t o  r e j e c t  th e  p r a c t i c e s  in  which he was r a i s e d .
I t  i s  n o t  obv ious  t o  me t h a t  we e v e r  a c t u a l l y  do o r  c o u ld  
make d e c i s i o n s  in  t h i s  a b s o l u t e  way. W h i le  i t  makes 
p e r f e c t l y  good sense t o  t a l k  o f  someone h a v in g  d e c id e d  t h a t  
he o ug ht  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because she i s  s i c k ,  
I  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  we can d e c id e  t o  a d o p t  a 
way o f  l i f e  in  w h ich ,  say ,  k i l l i n g  o t h e r  human b e in g s  i s  n o t  
r e g a r d e d  as an e v i l ,  o r  one in  which making f a l s e  prom ises  
i s  re g a r d e d  as t h e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  s t a n d a r d ,  and so on.  A t  
l e a s t  I  would n o t  know what  t o  make o f  someone who t a l k e d  as  
i f  t h e  e n t i r e  c o n t e n t  o f  a l l  such judgem ents  i s  dependent  on 
h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  c h o ic e .  (We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  l a t e r . )
T h e re  can be no doubt  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  t o  what  we 
o r d i n a r i l y  do count  as a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason;  ( l i m i t s  
s e t ,  I  w i l l  a rgue  l a t e r ,  by c e r t a i n  needs o f  persons  and by
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p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  a r e  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a human s o c i e t y ) .  A l l  we 
r e q u i r e  t o  r e c o g n iz e  f o r  t h e  moment i s  t h a t  some such 
c r i t e r i a  do govern  t h e  moral reasons we g i v e .  I n  o r d i n a r y  
moral  d i s c o u r s e ,  anyone w i l l  n o r m a l ly  e x p e c t  t o  see  t h e  
r e l e v a n c e  o f  a j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  reason and t h a t  t h e  reason  
e l u c i d a t e s  th e  ju dgem en t .  W i t h o u t  such c o n d i t i o n s ,  any 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  a p p l i e d  p r e s c r i p t i v e  ju d g em en t ,  no m a t t e r  how 
unconnec ted  i t  m ig h t  be t o  a moral p o i n t  o f  v ie w ,  c o u ld  be 
r e g a r d e d  as a moral ju dgem en t .  I n  which c a s e ,  u n i v e r s a l  
p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  would be (and i s )  bought  a t  t h e  p r i c e  o f  
making t h e  c o n cep t  o f  ' a  moral  ju d g e m e n t ’ vacuous.
I  want  t o  n o t i c e  one f i n a l  c o n t r a s t  between c o n s i s t e n c y  
A and t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s . I t  co n cerns  t h e  
a l l e g e d  c o n f l i c t  between autonomy and o b j e c t i v i t y  in  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts .  I  have c la im e d  a l r e a d y  t h a t  a person who makes 
a moral  judgem ent  must be t h o u g h t  t o  be autonomous.  We a r e  
r e q u i r e d  in  c o n t e x t s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral judgem ent  t o  choose  
f o r  o u r s e l v e s  what  we w i l l  d o . 46 T h is  may seem t o  c o n f l i c t  
w i t h  t h e  v iew  t h a t  moral judgem ents  can be o b j e c t i v e l y  
c o r r e c t ,  o r  t h a t  t h e i r  c o r r e c t n e s s  i s  p u b l i c l y  d e t e r m i n a b l e .
We have seen ,  however,  t h a t  w h a te v e r  th e  c o n t e n t  o f  our  
ju d g e m e n t ,  i t  must be o b j e c t i v e  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  m in im al  
sense o f  s a t i s f y i n g  c o n s is t e n c y  A. Thus i f  I  m a i n t a i n  'X 
o ug ht  t o  do F because o f  R ’ I  can be c h a l l e n g e d  by showing  
t h a t  I  do n o t  a lw ays  a c c e p t  t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  
o ug ht  t o  do F, o r  t h a t  I  can not  l o g i c a l l y  a c c e p t  t h i s .  By 
c o n s i s t e n c y  A, a judgem ent  can be re g a rd e d  as o b j e c t i v e  in  
t h e  sense t h a t  i t  i s  open t o  t h i s  form o f  l o g i c a l / r a t i o n a l  
a p p r a i s a l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
U . R . I ,  marks a f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th o s e  judgem ents  
which  a r e  m i n i m a l l y  o b j e c t i v e  ( i n  t h i s  sense o f  c o n s i s t e n c y )  
and t h o s e  which a r e  o b j e c t i v e  in  t h a t  t h e y  do n o t  r e l y  on 
h i s  name, o r  any o t h e r  un ique  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  j u d g e r ’ s 
m ake-up ,  o r  on t h e  un ique  p o s i t i o n  in  t h e  w o r ld  t h a t  o n l y  he 
c o u ld  occupy .  They a r e  o b j e c t i v e  a l s o  in  b e ing  in d e p e n d e n t  
o f  t h e  a r b i t r a r y  whims o r  i d i o s y n c r a s i e s  o f  t h e  j u d g e r . 47
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J u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  reasons  a r e  s u b j e c t i v e ,  however ,  i n  t h e  
sense t h a t  once t h e  above c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  m et ,  any v ie w  i s  as  
good as any o t h e r .  For  t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v i s t ,  i n d i v i d u a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  t h e  u l t i m a t e  source  o f  moral  v a l u e .  Hence  
a j u d g e r  m ig h t  p r e f e r  a p o l i c y ,  we s a i d ,  t h a t  em phas izes  t h e  
g e n e r a l  ha p p in e s s  o r  d u t i e s  t o  o t h e r s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i t  
can be p r e j u d i c e d  in  h i s  own f a v o u r ,  o r  in  f a v o u r  o f  h i s  own 
k i t h  and k i n ,  o r  h i s  own r a c e ,  e t c .  A l l  ap p ear  t o  pass t h e  
r e l e v a n c e  and e l u c i d a t i n g  c r i t e r i a  and a r e ,  t h e r e b y ,  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  under  U . R . I .  T h is  sug ges ts  a way in  which  
o n e ’ s autonomous commitment t o  any s e t  o f  U . R . I  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e  moral  b e l i e f s  i s  s u b j e c t i v e .
We can see t h i s  b e t t e r ,  p e rh a p s ,  by s k e t c h i n g  two o t h e r  
ways in  which c e r t a i n  judgem ents  a r e  t h o u g h t  t o  be 
o b j e c t i v e .  These a r e  ( i )  th e  sense e x e m p l i f i e d  by t h e  te rm  
' o b j e c t i v e ’ when i t  i s  used in  d e d u c t i v e  c o n t e x t s .  A 
l e c t u r e r  m ark ing  a t e s t  in  L o g ic ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  can 
o b j e c t i v e l y  say t h a t  a s t u d e n t  has sco red  57%. T h e re  i s  no 
need,  o r  scope,  in  such a g r a d in g  f o r  a judgem ent  by t h e  
e x a m in e r .  C l e a r l y ,  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  t h i s  k in d  has a c u t t i n g -  
edge which e n a b le s  us t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t r u e  f rom  f a l s e ,  
c o r r e c t  f rom  th e  i n c o r r e c t  answers .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  m arker  
o f  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  essay must say t h a t  he ju d g e s  t h a t  i t  i s  
w o r th  57%. T h is  b r i n g s  us t o  a sense ( i i )  i n  which a 
ju dgem en t  can be ' o b j e c t i v e 5 . There  a r e  s ta n d a r d s  e . g .  o f  
r e l e v a n c e ,  knowledge o f  th e  t o p i c ,  e v id e n c e  o f  w ide  and 
s e l e c t i v e  r e a d i n g ,  o r i g i n a l i t y ,  t h a t  a r e  a p p l i e d  when 
m ark in g  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  essays and w i t h  which t h e  l e c t u r e r  
would  j u s t i f y  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  mark.  An essay m arker  -  on a 
good day and in  t h e  c l e a r e s t  cases -  i s  a b l e  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
h i s  mark i s  o b j e c t i v e l y  j u s t i f i e d  by a p p e a l i n g  t o  such  
s t a n d a r d s .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see how U . R . I  judgem ents  
c o u ld  be t h o u g h t  t o  be o b j e c t i v e  in  senses ( i )  and ( i i ) .
Some moral  p h i lo s o p h e r s  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  moral  
t r u t h s  t h a t  have t h e  h a l l m a r k  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  s i m i l a r  t o
( i ) . 48 They c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  judgem ents  t h a t  would
rem a in  t r u e  w h a te v e r  anyone o r  ev e ry o n e  p r e f e r s ,  d e s i r e s ,  
t h i n k s ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
( 8 )  No on s h o u ld  e v e r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  cause a c h i l d  t o  
s u f f e r  e x c e s s i v e  and unnecessary  p a i n .
Even i n  a w o r ld  o f  s a d i s t s ,  who a l l  r e j e c t e d  i t ,  t h e  
ju d g em en t  ( 8 )  rem ains  c o r r e c t ,  j u s t  as * 2 6 / 5 0  + 3 1 / 5 0  = 57%’ 
rem a in s  t r u e ,  even in  a w o r ld  in  which no one t a k e s  L o g ic  
t e s t s  o r  where t h e r e  i s  no one in  t h e  u n i v e r s e  who can  
c o u n t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  c o u ld  be argued  t h a t  ( 8 )  i s  
t r u e  in  t h e  sense o f  ( i i ) ;  t h e r e  a r e  p u b l i c l y  d e t e r m i n a b l e  
c r i t e r i a  t h a t  a p p ly  t o  i t  and w i t h  which we can j u s t i f y  ( 8 )  
as a p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t  moral ju d g em en t .  The prob lem  f o r  
t h e  o b j e c t i v i s t  o f  e i t h e r  s o r t  i s  t o  show how t h e  
o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  such judgem ents  can be e s t a b l i s h e d  and 
j u s t i f i e d .  Once th e  d u s t  has c l e a r e d ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  I  hope 
t o  e s t a b l i s h  how most o f  our  fundam en ta l  moral  b e l i e f s  a r e  
and autonomous s i n g u l a r  judgem ents  must be o b j e c t i v e  in  t h e  
sense o f  ( i i ) .
B e f o r e  a l l  o f  t h i s ,  however,  we need t o  c o n s i d e r  what  
w i l l  t u r n  o u t  t o  be an i r r e m e d i a b l e  f l a w  i n  o u r  j u d g e r -  
r e l a t i v e  r u l e  U . R . I .
A weakness in  U . R . I
I  have n o t  s a i d  what t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  c o n t e x t u a l  
r e l e v a n c e  a r e ,  I  have a s s e r t e d  m e r e ly  t h a t  we r e c o g n is e  them  
i n  e v e r y d a y  moral  judgem en ts .  S in c e  we la c k  them, we can n o t  
say why any o f  o u r  commonsense moral  b e l i e f s  a r e  t o  be 
re g a r d e d  as r e l e v a n t .  A s i m i l a r  prob lem  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  
e l u c i d a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n .  I  have c la im e d  t h a t  f o r  a s i n g u l a r  
ju dgem en t  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , i t s  reason must is s u e  a 
r e c o g n i z a b l y  m o r a l ,  as opposed t o  n o n - m o r a l , c o n c l u s i o n .  I  
have n o t  s a i d  what  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f o r  r e c o g n i z i n g  such 
a c o n n e c t io n ;  j u s t  t h a t  we do r e c o g n is e  t h e  need f o r  such a 
c o n n e c t io n  in  e v e ry d a y  d i s c o u r s e .  A l l  o f  t h i s  w i l l  be 
d e a l t  w i t h  in  t h e  c h a p t e r s  ahead.
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We a r e  f a c e d  by a more immediate  p ro b lem .  The f a c t  t h a t  
we can e l i m i n a t e  c e r t a i n  reasons as non-m ora l  does n o t  seem 
t o  g e t  us v e r y  f a r  when i t  comes t o  a n s w e r in g  t h e  ’ which  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n .  A person c o u ld  c i t e  
p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  reasons -  t h a t  a r e  r e c o g n is e d  t o  be 
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  in  judgem ents  t h a t  he would  be 
w i l l i n g  t o  U . R . I  u n i v e r s a l i z e  -  which most o f  us t h i n k  a r e  
u t t e r l y  im m ora l .  Reasons which a f f i r m  t h e  d o m i n a t io n ,  
p e r s e c u t i o n ,  o r  e x t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  one group by a n o t h e r ,  o r  
w hich  p r o f e s s  such t h i n g s  as r a c i a l  o r  se x u a l  d i s c r i m i ­
n a t i o n ,  r e l i g i o u s  i n t o l e r a n c e ,  and so on, pass t h e  r e l e v a n t  
and e l u c i d a t i n g  c r i t e r i a .  Most o f  us want  t o  r e j e c t ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  reasons  based on a r a c i s t  t h e o r y  l i k e  a p a r t h e i d  
b u t  we can n o t  deny t h a t  t h e  r a c i s t ’ s reasons  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  
moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  How do we r e j e c t  such reasons  m e r e ly  w i t h  
t h e  r e s o u rc e s  o f  U . R . I  a t  our  d i s p o s a l?  What i s  more t o  t h e  
p o i n t :  how a r e  we t o  r e j e c t  them w i t h o u t  a p p e a l i n g  t o  v a l u e  
c r i t e r i a  o f  our  own?
Most  w r i t e r s  o f  m e t a - e t h i c s  h o ld  t h a t  we c a n n o t .  They  
arg u e  t h a t  t h i s  shows t h a t  uni  v e r s a l  i zab i  1 i t y  i s  a p u r e l y  
fo r m a l  moral  p r i n c i p l e .  What seems t o  be meant by t h i s  i s  
t h a t ,  by i t s e l f ,  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  empty as a 
p o s i t i v e  g u id e  t o  answ er ing  t h e  'w h ich  moral  j u d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n .  Beyond a h igh  l e v e l  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  ( i n c o n s i s t ­
e n c i e s ,  s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g  d i r e c t i v e s ,  e t c . ) ,  U . R . I  seems t o  
be w o e f u l l y  in a d e q u a te  when i t  comes t o  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  judgem en ts ,  in  te rm s  o f  t h e i r  b e in g  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t  o r  wrong. As J . G i l b e r t  ( 1 9 7 2 : 4 4 1 )  a r g u e s ,  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t
. . . n e i t h e r  e n j o i n s  nor  f o r b i d s  any c o n s i s t e n t  cou rs e  
o f  c o n d u c t .
The s i n  co m m it ted ,  however,  i s  f a r  g r e a t e r  th a n  t h i s .
G i l b e r t  and o t h e r  w r i t e r s  go on t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  n o t  m e r e ly  f o r m a l , b u t  t r i v i a l .
As D .Locke  (ofi c i t :  2 5 ) ,  w r i t e s ;
. . . a s  soon as any w e ig h t  i s  p u t  on t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i t  
seems t o  c o l l a p s e  i n t o  s h a t t e r i n g  t r i v i a l i t y .
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The t r i v i a l i t y  in  q u e s t i o n  seems t o  stem f ro m  t h e  r o l e  i t  
p l a y s ,  o r  r a t h e r  f a i l s  t o  p l a y ,  when i t  comes t o
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  moral  f rom immoral ju d g em en ts .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, some w r i t e r s  c l a i m  t h a t  U . R . I  i s  
a n y t h i n g  b u t  t r i v i a l .  The p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  v e r s i o n  o f  
U . R . ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c e r t a i n  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  ( u n c o n t r o -  
v e r s i a l )  a ss u m p t io n s ,  t h e y  s ay ,  does t e l l  us what  anyone  
m o r a l l y  o u g h t / o u g h t  n o t  t o  do. I n  o t h e r  words,  U . R . I  i s  a 
m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  I f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  i s  j u s t  w hat  we 
a r e  l o o k i n g  f o r :  a n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e  c r i t e r i o n  w i t h  which  we 
can d e t e r m in e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  and wrong ju d g e m e n ts .  So l e t  us 
c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  c l a i m s  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l .
CHAPTER THREE
UNIVERSALIZABIL ITY AS A FORMAL AND A MATERIAL PRINCIPLE
Most  moral  p h i lo s o p h e r s  ho ld  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  m e re ly  a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e .  Some 
add t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  t r i v i a l .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a few  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  suggest  t h a t  U . R . I ,  w i t h o u t  any a d d i t i o n a l  
moral  a ss u m p t io n s ,  does y i e l d  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  ju d g e m e n ts .  
They r e g a r d  U . R . I  as a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  and a n y t h i n g  b u t  
t r i v i a l .  So I  need t o  say what I  u n d e rs ta n d  by t h e  f o r m a l /  
m a t e r i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  and then  say how i t  a p p l i e s  t o  our  
v e r s i o n s  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s .  Has U . R . I  g o t  t o  
be r e g a r d e d  as a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e ?  I f  so,  i s  i t  t r i v i a l ?  
Or i s  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U . R . I  p o s s ib le ?  We f a c e  
a d i f f e r e n t  prob lem  w i t h  th e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . ,  
v i z .  U . R . I I .  I f  we cou ld  i d e n t i f y  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s e t  o f  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons t h i s  would g i v e  us a m a t e r i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U .R .  However t h e  q u e s t i o n  rem a in s :  Can 
t h e r e  be any j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons a t  a l l ?
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  in  s e c t i o n  ( 1 ) ,  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  a 
f o r m a l  moral  p r i n c i p l e  i s  one w h ich ,  by i t s e l f ,  i s  
i n a p p l i c a b l e  -  whereas a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  -  
t o  p a r t i c u l a r  ca s e s .  I  w i l l  show a number o f  ways in  which  
any p r i n c i p l e ,  fo rm a l  o r  m a t e r i a l ,  can be i n a p p l i c a b l e .  I n
( 2 ) ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  f o r m a l / m a t e r i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
more p r e c i s e l y  and i n d i c a t e  how t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  
t h e  U .R .  t h e s i s .  In  ( 3 )  I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  in  te rm s  o f  
i d e n t i f y i n g  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  and wrong ju d g e m e n ts ,  any fo r m a l  
v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . I  i s  t r i v i a l .  However we m ig h t  t r y  t o  show 
t h a t  U . R . I  can be g iv e n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . We w i l l  
c o n s i d e r ,  in  ( 4 ) ,  R . M . H a r e ’ s ( 1 9 8 1 )  c l a i m  t o  a c c o m p l is h  t h i s  
by showing t h a t  h i s  v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . I  g e n e r a t e s  u t i l i t a r ­
i a n i s m .  And in  ( 5 )  we w i l l  c o n s id e r  M . S i n g e r ’ s ( 1 9 6 1 )  c l a i m  
t h a t  he can o b t a i n  m a t e r i a l  moral c o n c lu s io n s  w i t h  h i s  
v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . I ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  an a p r i o r i  p r i n c i p l e
c o n c e r n i n g  u n d e s i r a b l e  consequences.  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  both  
a c c o u n ts  a r e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  I n  ( 6 )  I  w i l l  s u g g e s t  two ways 
in  w h ich  U . R . I I  can be g iv e n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . One 
o f  t h e s e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  p o i n t s  t o  a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  
c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e  and a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  b a s i s  f o r  moral  
r e a s o n s .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  ( 7 ) ,  I  w i l l  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  some o f  t h e  
i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  we have d iscu s sed  in  P a r t  One.
The i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e s
As a f i r s t  pass a t  d e f i n i n g  t h e  f o r m a l / m a t e r i a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  l e t  us say t h a t :
D e f . B  By a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  we mean a p r i n c i p l e  which must
be supplemented w i t h  moral assum pt ions  s i n c e  i t  does
n o t  a p p ly  d i r e c t l y  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .  By a
m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, we mean a
p r i n c i p l e  w h ic h ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  a i d  o f  any o t h e r  moral
ass u m p t io n s ,  can be used t o  d e r i v e  o r  t o  j u s t i f y
moral  c o n c lu s io n s .
The d i f f e r e n c e  suggested  h e re  between a fo rm a l  and m a t e r i a l
p r i n c i p l e  i s ,  in  a n u t s h e l l ,  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  l a t t e r
and t h e  i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  th e  fo r m e r  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .
T h e re  i s  an a m b i g u i t y ,  however,  in  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  a
f o r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  ' i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ’ .
F i r s t l y ,  and a t  i t s  most e x t r e m e ,  we m ig h t  u n d e rs ta n d  t h i s
t o  mean t h a t  such a p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  any
p a r t i c u l a r  p r a c t i c a l  ju dgem en t .  I t  has no b e a r i n g  on human
a c t i o n  a t  a l l .  E v i d e n t l y  t h e r e  a r e  such p r i n c i p l e s .  As
J .Benson  ( 1 9 8 1 : 2 2 9 )  w r i t e s :
'One ought  t o  t e l l  th e  t r u t h  o r  n o t  t o  t e l l  t h e  
t r u t h ’ i s  o b v io u s ly  t r i v i a l  s i n c e  i t  can n o t  be 
v i o l a t e d .
A p r i n c i p l e  which can not  be v i o l a t e d  o r  w i t h  w h ic h ,  w h a te v e r  
one does,  one must comply,  w i l l  n o t  have any s i g n i f i c a n t  
b e a r i n g  on any judgem ent  concerned w i t h  human a c t i o n s .  I t  
seems q u i t e  r e a s o n a b le  t o  say t h a t  such a p r i n c i p l e  i s  
t r i v i a l .  However our  U . R . I  i s  n o t  l i k e  t h i s .  A j u d g e r  can  
choose w h e th e r  o r  no t  t o  comply w i t h  i t .
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A second l e s s  ex t re m e  way in  which a p r i n c i p l e  may n o t  be 
d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  cases i s  where t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  m e r e ly  p la c e s  l o g i c a l  o r  r a t i o n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
t h e  t y p e  o f  judgem ents  t h a t  we m ig h t  o t h e r w i s e  make. U .R .  I  
s e t s  such l i m i t s .  I t  r u l e s  o u t  judgem ents  which t h e  j u d g e r  
i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  o r  which le a d  t o  i n c o n s i s t ­
e n c i e s  ( e t c . )  when t h e  r u l e  i s  a p p l i e d .  I t  e x c lu d e s  t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  p u r e l y  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  te r m s ,  a r b i t r a r y  o r  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  reas ons ,  and so on. Thus,  as we 
saw, we can not  a p p ly  U . R . I  t o  a v a r i e t y  o f  e g o i s t i c  
j u d g e m e n ts ,  where th e s e  a r e  based m e r e ly  on a n u m e r ic a l  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  one i n d i v i d u a l  o r  one group o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .
T h i s  i s  t o  t e l l  us some o f  t h e  judgem ents  t h a t  we c a n n o t  
make. I t  i s  a n e g a t i v e  t e s t .  Those judgem ents  which do n o t  
acc o rd  w i t h  U . R . I  do n o t  pass t h e  r a t i o n a l  m u s te r .  We c o u ld  
go a b i t  f u r t h e r .  I f  a judgem ent  can n o t  be r a t i o n a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d  th e n  i t  can not  be m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  and we have  
a ( n e g a t i v e )  d u ty  n o t  t o  p e r fo rm  such a c t s .  I n  a l l  o f  t h e s e  
ways,  we m ig h t  n o t e ,  U . R . I  i s  n o n - t r i v i a l .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  what  I  t h i n k  i s  one o f  two i m p o r t a n t  
reas o n s  why a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e  m ig h t  be s a i d  n o t  t o  a p p ly  t o  
p a r t i c u l a r  ca s e s .  The p r i n c i p l e ,  by i t s e l f ,  can n o t  s p e c i f y  
which  judgem ent  m o r a l l y  should  be made in  a p a r t i c u l a r  cas e .  
Taken on i t s  own, a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g .  
T h i s  s t r i k e s  me as c o r r e c t ,  though n o t  v e r y  i l l u m i n a t i n g .  
For  no p r a c t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  fo rm a l  o r  m a t e r i a l ,  by i t s e l f  
can p r o v i d e  a com ple te  d i r e c t i v e  abo ut  what  ought  t o  be 
done.  A l l  p r a c t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  have t o  be a p p l i e d  and,  in  
a p p l y i n g  one,  we have t o  t a k e  i n t o  acc o u n t  f a c t s  a b o u t  th e
w o r ld  in  which i t  i s  a p p l i e d .  So any p r a c t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e ,
v iew ed  s im p ly  in  i s o l a t i o n ,  i s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  in  t h i s  sense .
When t h e  f a c t s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  case a r e  known, however,
t h e r e  i s  one k in d  o f  p r i n c i p l e ,  a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h a t
can be d i r e c t l y  a p p l i e d  t o  them t o  produce a moral  
c o n c l u s i o n .  We w i l l  un d ers ta n d  a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h i s  
i s  t o  say ,  t o  be one t h a t  we can a p p ly  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  f a c t s
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o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  ca s e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  
t y p e  o f  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  can be a p p l i e d  t o  them o n l y  
m e d i a t e l y .  I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  b e s t  way t o  u n d e r s ta n d  
t h e  i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  v i z .  t h e y  do n o t  
a p p ly  d i r e c t l y ,  b u t  o n ly  m e d i a t e l y ,  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .  
What e x a c t l y  does t h i s  l a t t e r  n o t i o n  i n v o l v e ?
B e fo re  I  answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  we need t o  c o n s i d e r  some 
o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  ways in  which a j u d g e r  m ig h t  f a i l  t o  a p p ly  
any p r i n c i p l e ,  m a t e r i a l  o r  f o r m a l ,  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .  As 
a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  a j u d g e r  can f a i l  t o  d i r e c t l y  a p p ly  a 
p r i n c i p l e  ( i )  because i t  i s  u n c l e a r l y  f o r m u l a t e d .  E i t h e r  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  o r  one o r  more o f  i t s  key te r m s ,  c o u ld  be so  
vague o r  ambiguous t h a t  th e  j u d g e r  can not  u n d e rs ta n d  i t .  He
may n o t  be a b l e  t o  a p p ly  i t  ( i i )  because t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e
p a r t i c u l a r  case a r e  u n c e r t a i n  o r  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  He may 
have d i f f i c u l t y  in  a p p ly i n g  i t  ( i i i )  because o f  t h e  
c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  in  which a judgem ent  i s  c a l l e d
f o r .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  say t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f  i s  to o
complex o r  t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  case a r e  n o t  known b u t ,  
r a t h e r ,  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  i s  s im p ly  i n c a p a b le  o f  making a l l  o f  
t h e  c o m p u ta t io n s  n e c essa ry  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  because o f  
t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  L e t  me i l l u s t r a t e  
( i ) - ( i i i ) above.
C o n s id e r  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e :  'A lw ays  a c t  so as t o  
promote  t h e  g r e a t e s t  good f o r  th e  g r e a t e s t  number’ . So 
s t a t e d ,  what  seems t o  be a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  m ig h t  be 
t h o u g h t  t o  be vague,  due t o  la c k  o f  c l a r i t y  o f  t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n  ' t h e  g r e a t e s t  good’ . The j u d g e r  m ig h t  be u n c l e a r  
a b o u t  what  th e  phrase  r e f e r s  t o ,  o r  how t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  good. I f  he can not  u n d ers ta n d  one o r  more o f  i t s  
c e n t r a l  c o n c e p ts ,  o b v io u s ly  he w i l l  f a i l  t o  see how t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  d i r e c t l y .  L e t  us m in im iz e  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  
by suppos ing  t h a t  Bentham’ s a cc ount  o f  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  
t h e s i s  can be c l e a r l y  un d ers to o d :  'A c t  a lw a ys  so as t o
promote t h e  g r e a t e s t  b a la n c e  o f  p l e a s u r e  o v e r  p a i n ’ . 49
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N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  j u d g e r  may n o t  be a b l e  t o  a p p ly  t h e  
u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e  because t h e  f a c t s  a r e  n o t  c l e a r .  
A c c o r d in g  t o  Bentham, th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  f a c t s  in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  case  i s  a q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  e m p i r i c a l  m a t t e r .  To 
c a l c u l a t e  t h e  f a c t s ,  one must compare t h e  ' u t i l e s ’ ( u n i t s  o f  
p l e a s u r e  and p a i n )  t h a t  w i l l  r e s u l t  f rom t h e  v a r i o u s  co u rs e s  
o f  a c t i o n  open t o  one, and then  f o l l o w  th e  c o u rs e  t h a t  w i l l  
produce  t h e  g r e a t e s t  ba la n c e  o f  p l e a s u r e  o v e r  p a i n .  
However ,  even a id e d  by th e  hedonic  c a l c u l u s ,  our  j u d g e r  may 
s t i l l  be u n a b le  t o  a p p ly  i t .  T h is  i s  n o t  because t h e  f a c t s  
a r e  u n a v a i l a b l e  b u t  because t h e  f a c t s  t o  be ta k e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  a r e  so c o m p l ic a t e d  o r  numerous t h a t  he can n o t  make 
an e f f e c t i v e  c o m p u ta t io n  o f  them. These a r e  some o f  t h e  
o b v io u s  problems we may have in  a p p l y i n g  any p r i n c i p l e ,  
m a t e r i a l  o r  f o r m a l .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us back t o  our  d i s c u s s io n  o f  a t h i r d  way in  
which  a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e  may f a i l  t o  a p p l y .  When t h e  f a c t s  
o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  case a r e  known, we n o te d ,  a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  
can be a p p l i e d  t o  them o n ly  m e d i a t e l y .  The p r i n c i p l e ,  by 
i t s e l f ,  i s  i n c o m p le t e .  I t  i s  in c o m p le te  as an answer t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  'Which moral judgements  ought  anyone t o  make?’ . I n  
o r d e r  t o  produce a moral c o n c lu s io n ,  i t  needs t o  be 
supp lem ented  by a d d i t i o n a l  moral ( o r  o t h e r  e v a l u a t i v e )  
a s s u m p t io n s .  To many o f  us ,  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  seems t o  a p p ly  
t o  Bentham’ s u t i l i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  which e v i d e n t l y  he t h o u g h t  
t o  be a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  We want t o  ask Bentham, " S u r e l y  
t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  needs t o  i n c l u d e  n o t  o n l y  q u a n t i t a t i v e  b u t  
q u a l i t a t i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as w e l l? " ,  For exa m p le ,  in  te rm s  
o f  u t i l e s ,  a broken arm may be s a i d  t o  be t w i c e  as p a i n f u l  
as a broken  f i n g e r .  The p a in  t h a t  one f e e l s  a t  t h e  d e a th  o f  
a lo v e d  one,  however,  i s  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r  t o  p h y s ic a l  
p a in  and can not  be measured on th e  same s c a l e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
many o f  us would want t o  argue t h a t  t h e  p l e a s u r e  t h a t  one  
g e t s  f ro m  r e a d in g  a g r e a t  work l i k e  The H i  ad i s  o f  a 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r  f rom t h a t  which r e s u l t s  f rom  
p l a y i n g  p u s h p in .  They cannot  be measured one a g a i n s t  th e
o t h e r .  We would  a r g u e ,  in  o t h e r  words,  t h a t  f o r  t h e  u t i l i t y  
p r i n c i p l e  t o  g e n e r a t e  a v a l u e  ju d g e m e n t ,  a d d i t i o n a l  
n o r m a t iv e  c o n t e n t  needs t o  be b ro u g h t  i n t o  t h e  a c c o u n t .  
T h i s  i s  j u s t  as M i l l  m a in ta in e d  a l l  a l o n g . 50 However ,  so  
i n t e r p r e t e d ,  s i n c e  a d d i t i o n a l  n o r m a t iv e  assu m p t io n s  a r e  
needed in  o r d e r  t o  a p p ly  i t ,  th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e  
c ea ses  t o  be a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .
A t  f i r s t  b lu s h ,  i t  seems t h a t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  
p r i n c i p l e  f a i l s  t o  be d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  
cases  in  t h e  same way as t h e  s k e tc h  g iv e n  o f  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  
p r i n c i p l e .  As we noted e a r l i e r ,  t h e r e  i s  no s t a n d a r d  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  i t  and i t  i s  o f t e n  u n c i e a r l y  f o r m u l a t e d .  
T h i s  I  t r i e d  t o  overcome in  th e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  by d e f i n i n g  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  in  terms o f  U .R .  and,  in  C h a p te r  Two, by 
a d d in g  U . R . I  and U . R . I I  t o  se c u re  some l e v e l  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  
r e l e v a n c e  in  t h e  reasons t h a t  we g i v e .  N o n e th e le s s  we can  
f a i l  t o  a p p ly  U . R . I  o r  U . R . I I  because we a r e  unaware o f  t h e  
f a c t s .  Or t h e  f a c t s  i n v o l v e d  may be t o o  complex f o r  us t o  
see how t o  a p p ly  t h e  r u l e  t o  them. A ls o  U . R . I ,  l i k e  t h e  
f o r m a l  r e n d e r i n g  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  above,  i s  u s u a l l y  
i n t e r p r e t e d  as be ing  in c o m p le te  as an answer  t o  t h e  'w h ich  
moral  j u d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n .  What I  mean by t h i s  i s  t h a t  
g i v e n  a fo rm a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , U . R . I  does n o t  y i e l d ,  e i t h e r  
a l o n e  o r  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  non-m ora l  p r e m is e s ,  any moral  
c o n c l u s i o n s .  A d d i t i o n a l  n o r m a t iv e  assum ptions  a r e  needed in  
o r d e r  t o  a p p ly  i t .
L e t  me now t r y  t o  make th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between a fo r m a l  
and a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  more p r e c i s e ,  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  above.
The f o r m a l / m a t e r i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n
As a second pass a t  d e f i n i n g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between a 
f o r m a l  and m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  c o n s id e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
D e f . C .  A f o r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  c o n t a i n s  c e n t r a l l y  w i t h i n  i t  a  
n e u t r a l ,  y e t  u n s p e c i f i e d  v a r i a b l e ,  (w h e re  by an 
' u n s p e c i f i e d  v a r i a b l e ’ we mean a v a r i a b l e  which
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f a i l s  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  t y p e  o f  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  i s  
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ) ;  whereas a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  
one which c o n t a i n s  c e n t r a l l y  w i t h i n  i t  a v a r i a b l e  
t h a t  can be r e p la c e d  by a d e s c r i p t i v e  reason  which  
s p e c i f i e s  a n e u t r a l  y e t  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  p r o p e r t y . 51 
I n  te rm s  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  above,  we m ig h t  u n d e r s ta n d  U . R . I  
t o  be an example  o f  a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e ;  v i z .
I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F because o f  
t h e  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  reason R th en  I  must ju d g e  t h a t  
anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F.
U . R . I  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  in  
c o m p l ia n c e  w i t h  D e f . C . ,  s i n c e  i t  c o n t a i n s  t h e  u n s p e c i f i e d  
v a r i a b l e  * j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  r e a s o n ’ . ( O t h e r  te rm s  in  U . R . I ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  can be regarded  as u n s p e c i f i e d  v a r i a b l e s  b u t  f o r  
o u r  purposes  t h i s  can be i g n o r e d . )  L e t  me make t h e  p o i n t  
h e r e  in  a n o t h e r  way. I  argued e a r l i e r  t h a t  t o  a p p ly  U . R . I ,  
t h e  j u d g e r ’ s p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  reason in  h i s  s i n g u l a r  
jud g em en t  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t ;  b u t  t h e r e  i s  
n o t h i n g  in  U . R . I  t h a t  t e l l s  us which p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  t o  be 
so r e g a r d e d .  Hence i t  can be m a in ta in e d  t h a t  by i t s e l f ,  
U . R . I  a p p l i e s  o n ly  m e d i a t e l y  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  ca s e s .  I t  i s  
in c o m p le t e  as an answer t o  t h e  'w h ich  moral  j u d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  we were t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  v a r i a b l e  by 
a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a p r o p e r t y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  ' t h i n g s  w i t h  t h e  
same n e e d s ’ , t h e  s i t u a t i o n  appears  t o  be q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  
For  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  U.R.  I ,  we now have a v e r s i o n  o f  U .R .  
which  does i n d i c a t e  th e  t y p e  o f  t h i n g  which i s  c o n s id e r e d  t o  
be m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  v i z .  ' t h i n g s  w i t h  t h e  same n e e d s ’ . 
A ls o  t h i s  appears  t o  y i e l d  a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  v e r s i o n  o f  U .R,  v i z .  U . R . I I .  We m ig h t  s t a t e  U . R . I I  
i n  te rm s  o f  D e f . C .  thus
I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F f o r  t h e  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason R, where R r e f e r s  t o  c e r t a i n  
needs,  then  any r a t i o n a l  person must j u d g e  t h a t  
someone w i t h  th e  same needs m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F.
C l e a r l y ,  one way in  which t h e  sug gested  v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . I I  
d i f f e r s  f ro m  U . R . I  i s  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  can be u n d e rs to o d  as  
o f f e r i n g  a p o s i t i v e  answer t o  t h e  'w h ich  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ 
q u e s t i o n .  I  shou ld  make th o se  judgem ents  which  a r e  
s u p p o r te d  by reasons concerned w i t h  c e r t a i n  needs o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s  and in  which t h i n g s  w i t h  t h e  same needs a r e  
j u d g e d  t o  be a l i k e .  Of course  I  would have t o  show, by 
f o r c e  o f  a rgum ent ,  t h a t  ' t h i n g s  w i t h  t h e  same n e e d s ’ i s  a 
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  ground f o r  c l a i m i n g  t h e  l i k e n e s s  o f  cases  
and t h a t  i t  i s  a c t u a l l y  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l . ( T h i s  I  hope t o  do 
i n  t h e  c h a p t e r s  a h e a d . )  I n  t h e  absence o f  such an a c c o u n t ,  
we w i l l  c o n c e n t r a t e  on U . R . I .
We a r e  i n t e r p r e t i n g  U.R.  I  -  in  t h e  way i t  i s  u s u a l l y  
u n d e rs to o d  -  as a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e .  ( I  sh o u ld  add,  
p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  we m ig h t  n o t  have t o  i n t e r p r e t  U . R . I  
as a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ;  as we s h a l l  see ,  we m ig h t  t r y  t o  show 
how p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  reasons in  U . R . I  le a d  i n e l u c t a b l y  t o  
m a t e r i a l  c o n c l u s i o n s . )  For t h e  p r e s e n t  we w i l l  u n d e r s ta n d  
U .R .  I  t o  be a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  meaning by t h i s  t h a t  by 
i t s e l f  U . R . I  i s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  as a moral  answer  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e s .  We have seen what t h i s  i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  i n v o l v e s .  
But  why does i t  make U . R . I  t r i v i a l ?
The t r i v i a l i t y  o f  fo rm a l  v e r s i o n s  o f  U . R . I
Th e re  i s  a f o u r t h  sense in  which a moral  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c as es ,  namely ,  when t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
a l l o w s  a lm o s t  a n y th i n g  t o  cou n t  as a r e l e v a n t  r e a s o n ,  so 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  v e r y  few a c t s  o r  p o l i c i e s  t o  which th e
p r i n c i p l e  c o u ld  n o t  be a p p l i e d .  And t h i s  seems t o  le a d  t o
t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  judgem ents  which a r e  p a t e n t l y  
u n j u s t i  f i  a b l e .
S in c e  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  c o n t e x t u a l  l i m i t s  on t h e  p r e f e r e n c e -  
s t a t i n g  reasons  a person may be w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  we 
can s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  R in  U . R . I  reasons  in  f a v o u r  o f
s e l f i s h n e s s ,  o f  be ing  o v e r b e a r in g  o r  a g g r e s s i v e ,  o r  which
a d v o c a te  r a c i a l ,  sexua l  o r  r e l i g i o u s  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  e t c .
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Even a f t e r  f u l l y  and kno w ledgeab ly  s u b j e c t i n g  th e m s e lv e s  t o  
t h e  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  t e s t ,  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a , u n y i e l d i n g  
e g o i s t s ,  r a c i s t s ,  s e x i s t s ,  e t .  a j .  may be w i l l i n g  t o  
u n i v e r s a l l y  p r e s c r i b e  th e  judgem ents  in  q u e s t i o n .  And h e r e  
i s  one reason why v e r s io n s  o f  U . R . I  a r e  s a i d  t o  be t r i v i a l .
I  may j u d g e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  I  ought  m o r a l l y  t o  pursue  
my c a r e e r  in  an uncompromising way and do so a t  t h e  expense  
o f  o t h e r s .  Assuming t h a t  th e  judgem ent  i s  one t h a t  I  am 
w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  I  am committed  t o  p r e s c r i b i n g  i t  
f o r  anyone who i s  in  th e  p o s i t i o n  t o  c o n f e r  such a b e n e f i t  
on h i m s e l f .  And so long as I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  reason  
i s  c o n c l u s i v e  -  i f  I  p la c e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h ig h  v a l u e  on a 
reg im e  under  which i n d i v i d u a l s  s t r i v e  c o m p e t i t i v e l y  t o  
promote t h e i r  c a r e e r s  -  I  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  
reason  i s  c o n c l u s i v e ,  even when my c o l l e a g u e s  promote t h e i r  
c a r e e r s  a t  my expense.  S i m i l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a p p ly  t o  
r a c is m .  Advocates  o f  a p a r t h e i d ,  who r e f e r  w i t h  en th u s ia s m  
t o  t h e  most t r i v i a l  f e a t u r e s ,  such as t h e  c o l o u r  o f  a 
p e r s o n ’ s s k i n ,  o r  ( i f  t h a t  i s  u n c e r t a i n )  t o  t h e  shape o f  h i s  
nose,  o r  t h e  f r i z z  in  h i s  h a i r ,  as grounds by which t h e y  a r e  
p r e p a r e d  t o  m o r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  -  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
p e o p le  in  South A f r i c a  i n t o  r a c i a l  g roups ,  o f t e n  b o i l s  down 
t o  reasons  o f  t h i s  s o r t  -  may kn o w in g ly  and w i l l i n g l y  
s u b j e c t  th e m s e lv e s  t o  th e  r e v e r s i  bi  1 i t y  t e s t  i_n p r o p r i a
p e r s o n a . And l e t  us no t  f o r g e t ,  t h e  r a c i s t  r e g a r d s  such  
p r o p e r t i e s  as r e l e v a n t  reasons in  judgem ents  c o n c e r n in g  such 
t h i n g s  as employment,  hou s ing ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  p o l i t i c s  and f o r  
r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in  th e  use o f  most s o c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s .
T h e re  a r e  many more d i f f e r e n c e s  between p e o p le  upon which  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  which a r e  a l lo w e d  by U .R .  I ,  can be made y e t  
which in  p r a c t i c e  most o f  us would ju d g e  t o  be m o r a l l y
wrong.  For  exam ple ,  as J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 8 9 )  n o t e s ,  n o r m a l ly  
we would  ju d g e :
. . . i t  i s  u n f a i r  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  in  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  
e d u c a t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  on grounds o f  sex;  i t  i s
u n f a i r  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  in  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c o u n c i l
housing  on grounds o f  r e l i g i o u s  a f f i l i a t i o n . 52
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None o f  t h e  above a r e  e x c lu d e d  by U . R . I .  O n ly  i f  we had a 
r e s t r i c t i v e  a c c o u n t  o f  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  p r o p e r t i e s  c o u ld  we 
f a u l t  such re a s o n s .
T h i s  i s  why, in  h i s  e a r l i e r  w orks ,  R .M .H a r e  found  he
c o u ld  n o t  r u l e  o u t ,  by h i s  a cc o u n t  o f  uni v e r s a l  i z a b i  1 i t y ,
t h e  N az i  i d e a l  which e n j o i n s  t h e  s y s t e m a t i c  e x t e r m i n a t i o n  o f
t h e  Jews.  He a t t e m p t e d  t o  u n d e r c u t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  by a r g u i n g
t h a t  most f a n a t i c s  a r e  n o t  c l e a r - h e a d e d ,  f u l l y  in fo rm e d  o r
f a c t u a l l y  c o r r e c t .  However Hare  r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  a c o n v in c e d
and in fo rm e d  Naz i  may be q u i t e  p r e p a r e d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s
m onstrous  ju d g e m e n t .  He m ig h t  be c o n s i s t e n t  enough t o  s a y ,
even i n s i s t ,  t h a t  i f  he o r  h i s  c h i l d r e n  t u r n  o u t  t o  be
J e w is h ,  t h e y  t o o  s h o u ld  be e x t e r m i n a t e d ;  he m ig h t  be
i m a g i n a t i v e  enough t o  r e a l i s e  what  i t  would be l i k e  t o  be in
t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  p r o p r  i a pe rso na  o f  t h e  p e o p le  he i s
p r o p o s in g  t o  s l a u g h t e r .  Y e t  no m a t t e r  how o u t r a g e o u s  t h e
Naz i  p o l i c y  may seem t o  us ,  Hare  would n o t  be a b l e  t o  show
him t h a t  he i s  m o r a l l y  wrong.  I n  a n o t o r i o u s  p assage ,  Hare
( 1 9 6 3 : 1 8 4 )  w r i  t e s :
I f  t h e r e  a r e  p e o p le  so wedded t o  some f a n a t i c a l  
i d e a l  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a b l e  t o  im a g in e ,  in  t h e i r  f u l l  
v i v i d n e s s ,  t h e  s u f f e r i n g s  o f  t h e  p e r s e c u t e d ,  and who 
can s t i l l  p r e s c r i b e  u n i v e r s a l l y  t h a t  t h i s  
p e r s e c u t i o n  s ho u ld  go on in  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e i r  
i d e a l s ,  even i f  i t  were t h e y  th e m s e lv e s  who had t o  
s u f f e r  t h u s ,  th e n  t h e y  w i l l  rem ain  unshaken by any  
argument  t h a t  I  have been a b l e  t o  d i s c o v e r .
Hare  c l a i m s  t h a t  such f a n a t i c i s m  i s  r a r e .  ( I t  c e r t a i n l y
i s n ’ t  r a r e  in  So u th ern  A f r i c a . )  Anyway, t h i s  i s  sm a l l
c o m f o r t  t o  a moral  p h i l o s o p h e r .
The c r i t i c i s m  made a g a i n s t  Hare  h e re  i s  t h a t  h i s
u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  can n o t  d e t e r m in e  which a c t s  a r e
r i g h t  o r  wrong,  p r e c i s e l y  because he i s  u n a b le  t o  d e t e r m in e
which d e s c r i p t i v e  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  As
0 . O ’ N e i l l  ( 1 9 7 5 : 1 8 )  o b s e r v e s :
Of t h e  many p a r t i c u l a r  ju dgem en ts  which may be made 
ab o u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t  we need t o  know which sh o u ld  
be u n i v e r s a l l y  p r e s c r i b e d . . . o t h e r w i s e  u n i v e r s a l
p r e s c r i p t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be a c t i o n - g u i d i n g .
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A t  one t i m e ,  Ha re  ( 1 9 5 2 / 1 9 6 3 )  would  have d is m is s e d  t h i s  
c r i t i c i s m  as based on a m is c o n s t r u a l  o f  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t -  
i v i s m  as a n o r m a t iv e  sys tem .  B u t ,  as we s h a l l  see  s h o r t l y ,  
he does n o t  any more.
We m ig h t  t r y  t o  d e fe n d  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  U .R .  I  by 
r e m in d in g  o u r s e l v e s  t h a t  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  
p r o p r i a  pe rso na  i s  a t  l e a s t  a t e s t  o f  t h e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  t h e  
f a n a t i c ’ s ju d g e m e n t .  T h i s  I  have argued i s  c o r r e c t .  
However i t  d o e s n ’ t  g e t  us t o  g r i p s  i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  w i t h  h i s  
arg u m en t .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Naz i  s i n c e r e l y  h o ld s  h i s  v iew s  
t o  be m o r a l l y  r i g h t  means, p resu m a b ly ,  t h a t  he t h i n k s  them  
t o  be t r u e ,  ( r a t h e r  th a n  an a r b i t r a r y  c h o ic e  he has m ade) .  
The Naz i  can n o t  say "These a r e  my moral  p r i n c i p l e s  th o u g h ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  I  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  f a l s e " .  T h i s  would  be 
nonsense in  m o r a l ,  j u s t  as i t  i s  in  any o t h e r  a r e a  o f  
d i s c o u r s e .  I f  t h e  s i n c e r e  Naz i  does b e l i e v e  h i s  t h e o r y  i s  
t r u e ,  w i t h  o n l y  U . R . I  t o  hand,  i t  d o e s n ’ t  look  as though we 
c o u ld  f a u l t  him, l e t  a l o n e  r e f u t e  him.
I  s a i d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  t h i s  i s  one reason why, i n t e r p r e t e d  
as a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  U . R . I  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  be t r i v i a l .  I t  
m e r e ly  s e t s  c e r t a i n  r a t i o n a l  l i m i t s  -  v i z .  i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,  
i n s i n c e r i t y  and t h e  l i k e  -  t o  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  judgem en ts  and 
p o l i c i e s .  We can n o t  th e n  a r g u e ,  as Hare  seemed t o ,  t h a t  
th o s e  ju dgem en ts  t h a t  do conform  t o  i t  a r e  r a t i o n a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d . 53 I t  goes w i t h o u t  s a y in g  t h a t  we c a n n o t  e s t a b l i s h  
t h a t  a judgem ent  i s  r a t i o n a l  on t h e  b a s is  t h a t  i t  has n o t  
been proven i r r a t i o n a l .  U . R . I  would have t o  be shown t o  be 
a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts .  I t  seems odd, however,  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  
be.  I t  seems odd t o  say t o  t h e  Nazi  t h a t  t h e  v ie w s  he 
p r e s c r i b e s  a r e  r a t i o n a l l y  w a r r a n t e d ,  o r  t o  say t o  a 
co n v in c e d  r a c i s t  t h a t  though your  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  n o t  mine,  
I  can see t h a t  t h e y  a r e  r a t i o n a l .  What seems much more 
l i k e l y  i s  t h a t  in  a d d i t i o n  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y , t h e r e  a r e  
o t h e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h a t  a moral  judgem en t  needs t o  s a t i s f y
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t o  c o u n t  as r a t i o n a l l y  w a r r a n t e d  and t h a t  t h e  N a z i ’ s and 
r a c i s t ’ s v ie w s  f a i l  t o  meet t h e s e  o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s .
Even l e s s  would  we be p r e p a re d  t o  say t h a t  any p r a c t i c a l  
jud g em en t  which s a t i s f i e s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i n  p r o p r i  a 
pe rs o n a  i s  t h e r e b y  m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e .  A ju d g em en t  i s  
m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e ,  we n o t e d ,  i f  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  f o r  
someone t o  do what  i t  p r e s c r i b e s  o r  n o t  as he chooses .  
U . R . I  does n o t  r u l e  o u t  t h e  s y s t e m a t i c  e x t e r m i n a t i o n  o r  t h e  
c o n s i s t e n t  m i s t r e a t m e n t  o f  p e o p le .  F a r  f rom  b e in g  m o r a l l y  
p e r m i s s i b l e ,  o r d i n a r i l y  we would say t h a t  judgem en ts  l i k e  
t h e s e  a r e  m ons trous .  We would f a u l t  them, t o  say t h e  l e a s t ,  
f o r  l a c k i n g  r e s p e c t  o r  sympathy f o r  t h e  v i c t i m s .  As t h i n g s  
s t a n d ,  however ,  we have no grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  an 
a p p e a l ,  s a y ,  t o  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  p e r s o n s ’ has a n e u t r a l ,  
r a t i o n a l  i m p o r t ,  t h a t  i t  would  need t o  have t o  sup p lem ent  
U . R . I .  R a t h e r ,  i t  seems t o  be an ad hominem o r  p e r s u a s i v e  
d e v i c e  t o  g e t  t h e  Nazi  o r  r a c i s t  u n i v e r s a l i z e r  t o  be moved 
by t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  t h e  p e o p le  t h a t  he p e r s e c u t e s .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  some such e x t r a  p r o v i s i o n  i s  
needed t o  s a t i s f y  our  o r d i n a r y  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  what  i s  
m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e .
I t  f o l l o w s  a f o r t i o r i  t h a t  we can n o t  c l a i m  t h a t  e v e r y  
ju dgem en t  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  U . R . I  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t ,  o r  t h a t  we 
oug ht  t o  p e r f o r m  a c t i o n s ,  o r  s u p p o r t  p o l i c i e s ,  m e r e ly  
because t h e y  can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d  in  t h i s  way. I f  we c a n n o t  
d i s t i n g u i s h  p e r m i s s i b l e  a c t i o n s  f rom  t h e  r e s t  by U . R . I ,  i t  
w i l l  n o t  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  moral  d u t i e s  o r  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a c t i o n .
/
T h e re  i s  a f u r t h e r  and more i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  
t r i v i a l i t y  t h a t  must be m e n t io n e d .  A w ide  range o f  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  i n c l u d i n g  opposed and i r r e c o n c i 1 a b l e  ones ,  seem 
t o  be c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  U .R .  I .  J u s t  as t h e  s i n c e r e  Naz i  o r  
r a c i s t  c o u ld  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i_n p erso na  p r o p r i a , so can t h e  
com m it ted  a n t i - N a z i  and a n t i - r a c i s t .  The c o n f l i c t  h e re  need 
n o t  be t h e  r e s u l t  o f  one o r  o t h e r  o f  t h e  a d v e r s a r i e s  
m is u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  o r  due
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t o  t h e i r  ig n o r a n c e  o f  some r e l e v a n t  f a c t s ,  o r  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  j u d g e r  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  compute t h e  f a c t s .  The 
com m it ted  Naz i  and a n t i - N a z i ,  r a c i s t  and a n t i - r a c i s t ,  s e x i s t  
and f e m i n i s t ,  e t c . ,  a l l  can u n i v e r s a l i z e  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . 
The f a c t  t h a t  such d i a m e t r i c a l l y  opposed and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  
o u t l o o k s  s a t i s f y  U . R . I  su g g e s ts  t h a t  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  moral  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  f a l l s  e n t i r e l y  upon t h e  e x t r a  e v a l u a t i v e  
a s s u m p t io n s ,  which a r e  r e q u i r e d  in  a d d i t i o n  t o  U . R . I  i n  
o r d e r  t o  produce  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .  The s i g n i f i c a n t  moral  
c o n t e n t  o f  ju dgem en ts  i s  t o  be found in  t h e s e  f u r t h e r  
a s s u m p t io n s .  They a r e  t h e  s o u rc e  o f  t h e  w ide  and 
i n t r a c t a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  moral  o u t l o o k .  I t  i s  l i t t l e  
wonder t h a t  D .Locke  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  J . G i l b e r t  ( 1 9 7 2 )  and o t h e r s  
s u g g e s t  t h a t ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  as a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  a U . R . I -  
t y p e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  t r i v i a l .
B e fo r e  c o n c lu d in g  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  we sh o u ld  
n o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  t r i v i a l i t y  h e re  i s  n o t  due t o  t h e  way in  
which I  have d e f i n e d  ' a  fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ’ . I f  t h i s  were  so ,  
any fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e  would  be t r i v i a l .  However we have seen  
t h a t  on my d e f i n i t i o n ,  J . S . M i l l ’ s m o d i f i c a t i o n  t o  Bentham’ s 
p r i n c i p l e  makes h i s  v e r s i o n  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  a fo r m a l  
p r i n c i p l e .  M i l l  ( 1 8 6 1 : 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 )  a rgued t h a t  p l e a s u r e s  d i f f e r  
i n  q u a l i t y  and we oug ht  t o  p r e f e r  a s m a l l e r  q u a n t i t y  o f  
h i g h e r  p l e a s u r e  t o  a l a r g e r  q u a n t i t y  o f  t h e  lo w e r  s o r t .  The 
s m a l l e r  q u a n t i t y ,  we n o te d ,  must c o n t a i n  some e le m e n t  o f  
v a l u e  which makes i t  more d e s i r a b l e  th a n  t h e  l a r g e r  q u a n t i t y  
o f  t h e  low e r  s o r t .  T h i s  e le m e n t  can n o t  i t s e l f  be p l e a s u r e  
s i n c e ,  i f  i t  w e re ,  t h e  s m a l l e r  q u a n t i t y  o f  h i g h e r  p l e a s u r e  
would j u s t  be more p l e a s u r e .  Hence M i l l  has t o  a d m i t  
e le m e n ts  o f  v a l u e  which a r e  n o t  p l e a s u r e .  Regarded in  t h i s  
l i g h t ,  I  c o n te n d ,  M i l l ’ s v e r s i o n  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  a p p l i e s  
o n l y  m e d i a t e l y  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .  I t  i s  a fo rm a l  
p r i n c i p l e .
U n l i k e  U . R . I  however ,  t h e  fo r m a l  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  
u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e  would n o t  p e r m i t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  o r  
c o n t r a r y  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  By t h i s  r u l e ,  a p a r t i c u l a r
j u d g em en t  and i t s  c o n t r a r y  c a n n o t  bo th  be t h o u g h t  t o  promote  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  p l e a s u r e .  ( A t  l e a s t  I  c a n n o t  t h i n k  what  a s e t  
o f  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  would  be l i k e  such t h a t  c o n f o r m i t y  both  
w i t h  i t ,  and w i t h  i t s  c o n t r a r y  s e t ,  would prom ote  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  h a p p in e s s  f o r  t h e  g r e a t e s t  n u m b e r . )  I n t e r p r e t e d  
as a f o r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  m oreo ve r ,  moral  d i s t i n c t i o n s  do n o t  
f a l l  e n t i r e l y  upon t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  e v a l u a t i v e  assum pt ions  
which have t o  be added t o  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e  i n  o r d e r  
t o  produce  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .  Even as a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  has a p o s i t i v e  moral  c o n t e n t .  I f  i t  i s  t r u e  
t h a t  d o in g  a c e r t a i n  t h i n g  F w i l l  r e s u l t  in  more q u a l i t a t i v e  
p l e a s u r e  th a n  a n o t h e r  t h i n g  G, th e n  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  m o r a l l y  
b e t t e r  t h a t  I  can do th a n  F. The r e s u l t  o f  any a c t i o n  
which d e v i a t e d  f ro m  F would be l e s s  good. U n l i k e  U . R . I ,  
t h e n ,  what  I  am c a l l i n g  M i l l ’ s u t i l i t a r i a n  r u l e  does 
c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  judgem en ts  t h a t  can be t h o u g h t  
t o  be m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  The g e n e r a l  p o i n t  h e r e  i s  t h a t  a 
p r i n c i p l e  such as t h i s  may be fo r m a l  y e t  n o t  t r i v i a l  i n  t h e  
two senses  we have d is c u s s e d .
The n e x t  q u e s t i o n  we must ask i s :  do we have t o  i n t e r p r e t  
U . R . I  as a fo r m a l  p r i n c i p l e ?  I t  seems n o t .  I f  i t  i s  t o  be 
re g a rd e d  as a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  we n o te d ,  t h i s  must be 
because i t  combines w i t h  some o t h e r  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  
c o n d i t i o n  and, as a r e s u l t ,  has a d i r e c t  b e a r i n g  on 
s i t u a t i o n s  which r e q u i r e  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .  Some
p h i l o s o p h e r s  u n d e rs ta n d  U . R . I  in  t h i s  way. They c l a i m ,  t h i s  
i s  t o  sa y ,  t h a t  th e  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i  ng v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  f u r t h e r  u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  as s u m p t io n s ,  does t e l l  
us what  m o r a l l y  we sh o u ld  do. What i s  s u r p r i s i n g  i s  t h a t  
R .M .H a r e ,  in  h i s  most r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  
makes such a c l a i m .
Hare  and p r e f e r e n c e - u t i 1 i t a r i a n i s m
I n  s e v e r a l  o f  h i s  r e c e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  Hare  has c la im e d  
t h a t  t h e  l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  ( o u r
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U . R . I )  g e n e r a t e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  moral  v i e w ,  namely a fo rm  o f
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 1 )
. . . t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  o u r  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  
g e n e r a t e s  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .
A l th o u g h  he does n o t  e x p l a i n  h i s  use o f  ' g e n e r a t e s * ,  t h e
c l e a r  s u g g e s t io n  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n o n - c o n t i n g e n t
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between U . R . I  and p r e f e r e n c e - u t i 1 i t a r i a n i s m .
Now i f  t h i s  i s  so ,  i t  i s  j u s t  t h e  r e s u l t  we a r e  l o o k i n g  f o r ;
a n e u t r a l  r u l e  t h a t ,  i n  some way o r  a n o t h e r ,  g i v e s  r i s e  t o
s u b s t a n t i v e  moral  r e s u l t s .
A t  f i r s t  b lu s h  i t  does seem an odd c l a i m  f o r  Ha re  t o
make. A f t e r  a l l ,  o r i g i n a l l y  H a r e ’ s v ie w  was t h a t  p r o v i d e d
t h a t  he i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  a u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i  b e r  m ig h t  choose
any n o r m a t iv e  p r i n c i p l e  a t  a l l .  He c e r t a i n l y  d i d  n o t  need
t o  choose u t i l i t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e s .  The e a r l i e r  Hare
( 1 9 6 3 : 3 2 )  says  e x p l i c i t l y ;
. . . n o  moral  judgem en t  o r  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s u b s ta n c e  
f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  ( u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s t )  t h e s i s  
a l o n e .
And we a r e  t o l d  ( i b i d : 8 9 ) :
E t h i c a l  t h e o r y . . . p r o v i d e s  o n l y  a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  c o n c e p tu a l  f ram ework  w i t h i n  which moral  
r e a s o n in g  t a k e s  p l a c e ;  i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  in  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  sen se ,  n e u t r a l  as between d i f f e r e n t  moral
o p i n i o n s . .  .
As long as he h o ld s  them c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  even t h e  Naz i  
u n i v e r s a l i z e r  can r a t i o n a l l y  p r e s c r i b e  h i s  v ie w s .  The b e s t  
c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  Hare  co u ld  o f f e r ,  as I  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  i s  
t h a t  such a person i s  a ' f a n a t i c ’ . 54 On t h e  r e c e n t  
u t i l i t a r i a n  a c c o u n t ,  however,  f a n a t i c i s m  o f  t h i s  s o r t  i s  no 
lo n g e r  an e m b a r ra s s m e n t . The f a n a t i c ’ s m is ta k e  now i s  t h a t  
he t a k e s  no a cc o u n t  o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  d e s i r e s ,  v a l u e s ,  
i d e a l s ,  o f  t h e  p e o p le  he p e r s e c u t e s .  The p u z z l i n g  q u e s t i o n  
i s  how Hare  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f ro m  t h e  moral  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  U . R . I  t o  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . 55
I  t h i n k  t h e  answer i s  t h a t  i t  r e s u l t s  f rom  a c o n fu s io n  
between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  acc o u n ts  Hare  g i v e s  o f  t h e
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r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  ( i )  i n  p r o p r i a  pe rs o n a  ( i i )  r o l e  
r e v e r s a l  and ( i i i )  t h e  i d e a l  o b s e r v e r . 56 H i s  o r i g i n a l  
p o s i t i o n ,  as we saw, was t h a t  i n  p r o p r i  a p e rso n a  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  a l e g i t i m a t e  and t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  e x t e n s i o n  
o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s . On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  in  h i s  
l a t e r  w r i t i n g  we a r e  t o l d  t h a t  when someone u n i v e r s a l i z e s ,  
he i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  m e r e ly  t o  im ag in e  h i m s e l f  in  t h e  o t h e r  
p e r s o n ’ s p l a c e ,  y e t  s t i l l  w i t h  h i s  own p r e f e r e n c e s ,  e t c .  
R a t h e r ,  he has t o  im ag in e  what  i t  would  be l i k e  t o  be i n  t h e  
o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s shoes h a v in g  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s .  He has t o  
t a k e  on b o a rd ,  so t o  sp eak ,  t h e  o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s d e s i r e s ,  
v a l u e s ,  i d e a l s ,  q u a l i t i e s  and a b i l i t i e s ,  as w e l l  as h i s  own.
The r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  p u t a t i v e  l o g i c a l  e x t e n s i o n  t o  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  a l l o w s  Hare  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a d v a n ta g e s .  The  
N a z i ’ s m is ta k e  i s  t h a t  he t a k e s  no a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  person he p e r s e c u t e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  when 
we a p p ly  t h i s  f o r m u l a  in  t h e  r a c i s t  exam ple ,  Sm ith  sh o u ld  
n o t  ask h i m s e l f  i_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a : 'How do I  r e a c t  t o  t h e  
t h o u g h t  o f  someone n o t  h i r i n g  me, a w h i t e  man, s t i l l  w i t h  my 
own r a c i s t  v a l u e s  and i d e a l s ,  i f  I  were b l a c k ? ’. R a t h e r ,  he 
s h o u ld  ask t h e  much more i m a g i n a t i v e l y  demanding  
q u e s t i o n : 'How do I  r e a c t  in  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case where I  
have J o n e s ’ q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  d e s i r e s ,  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i n t e r e s t s  
and v a l u e s  i n c l u d i n g ,  p e rh a p s ,  a n t i - r a c i s m ? ’ .
However t h e  argument  h e re  seems le s s  c o n g e n ia l  t o  a n t i ­
ra c is m  th a n  Hare  (and t h e  r e s t  o f  us)  would  w an t .  The 
r a c i s t  c o u ld  a rgue  t h a t  i f  i t  i s  a r a t i o n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  
he has t o  im ag in e  h i m s e l f  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s d e s i r e s ,  
t h e n ,  m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s , when making a moral ju d g e m e n t ,  t h e  
b l a c k  man must im ag in e  h i m s e l f  t o  have t h e  r a c i s t ’ s d e s i r e s ,  
e t c .  I f  t h e  r o l e s  were r e v e r s e d  and t h e  b l a c k  man was t o  
e m p a th is e  in  t h i s  way w i t h  t h e  r a c i s t ,  p re s u m a b ly ,  t h e  b l a c k  
man m ig h t  r e c o g n is e  s k i n  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  be m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  
Perhaps he would n o t  th e n  t h i n k  t h a t  j o b  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
a g a i n s t  someone on t h e  b a s is  o f  t h e i r  c o l o u r  i s  im m ora l .  A t
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l e a s t  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  i n  H a r e ’ s a c c o u n t ,  th u s  f a r ,  t h a t  
t e l l s  us why he s h o u ld .
A second d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  w i t h  o n l y  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
t e s t s  ( i )  and ( i i )  t o  hand, o u r  j u d g e r  does n o t  have a  
s i n g l e  u n i f i e d  s t a n d p o i n t  f rom  which t o  e s t a b l i s h  a 
p r e f e r e n c e - o r d e r i n g . I t  seems t o  make i t  i m p o s s i b le  f o r  us 
t o  do a n y t h i n g  t o  a n o t h e r  person which t h e y  would  s t r o n g l y  
p r e f e r  us n o t  t o  do. I f  my youngest  d a u g h t e r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
s e t s  f i r e  t o  a t e n  pound n o t e ,  I  m ig h t  t h i n k  I  o u g h t  t o  
p u n ish  h e r  in  t h e  hope t h a t  i t  w i l l  d is c o u r a g e  h e r  f rom
b u r n in g  money in  t h e  f u t u r e .  She, o f  c o u r s e ,  w i l l  be
t o t a l l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  p un ishm e nt .  By t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  t e s t ,  
I  t o o  would s t r o n g l y  p r e f e r  n o t  t o  be p u n is h e d .  So r o l e -  
r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  a p p ears  t o  d i r e c t  us n e v e r  t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  
a n y o n e ’ s e a r n e s t l y  h e ld  oppos ing  d e s i r e s .  For  o t h e r w i s e  i t  
would mean t h a t  we were d o ing  t o  them what  we would n o t  want  
done t o  us i f  we were them.
A t h i r d  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  even i f  we g r a n t  t h e  d ub ious  
c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  a s u f f i c i e n t  amount o f  i m a g i n a t i o n  c o u ld  
e n a b le  two p e o p le ,  w i t h  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t o
em p a th is e  t h e i r  way i n t o  each o t h e r s  shoes,  n o t h i n g  
g u a r a n te e s  t h e  moral  j u s t i f i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
t h e m s e lv e s  o r  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  which r e s u l t s  f rom  them. Even 
when a p p e a le d  t o  by two p e o p le  who g e n u i n e l y  d e s i r e  t o
b a la n c e  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f f  a g a i n s t  each o t h e r ,  t h e r e  a r e  
no grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  i d e n t i f y ,  t h e r e b y ,  
what t h e y  m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  do.
A f o u r t h  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  a d h e r in g  t o  t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  
t e s t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  o f  one person may r e q u i r e  t h a t  we b reak  
t h e  r u l e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  o f  o t h e r s .  I f  my d a u g h t e r  burns  you r  
te n  pound n o t e ,  do in g  t o  h e r  w ha t ,  no d o u b t ,  you would  
d e s i r e  me t o  do t o  h e r ,  would i n v o l v e  do in g  som eth ing  t h a t  
she would  n o t  d e s i r e .  I n  t h i s  way t h e  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  t e s t  
i n e v i t a b l y  b reak s  down when i t  i s  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  many 
s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s
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c o n f l i c t  w i t h  each o t h e r .  I n  f a c t  i t  w i l l  b r e a k  down in  
t h o s e  s i t u a t i o n s  where moral  prob lem s t y p i c a l l y  a r i s e .
So t h e  r e a s o n a b l e  t h i n g  t o  do, i t  seems, i s  t o  d i s c o v e r  
a c o u rs e  o f  a c t i o n  which w ou ld ,  i f  f o l l o w e d ,  a p p ly  t h e  
r e v e r s a l  t e s t  t o  a l l  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s .  The  
c a l c u l a t i o n  has t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  d e s i r e s  o f  a l l  o f  t h o s e  who 
w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by t h e  a c t i o n .  And I  oug h t  th e n  t o  s a t i s f y  
t h e  s t r o n g e s t  n e t  d e s i r e .  T h i s  i s  H a r e ’ s s o l u t i o n .  For  
i n s t a n c e ,  in  a p p l y i n g  t h e  t h i r d  t e s t  t o  my d a u g h t e r ’ s n o te  
b u r n i n g ,  I  must be p r e p a re d  t o  f r u s t r a t e  h e r  d e s i r e s  in  
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  s t r o n g e r  f e l t  and more numerous d e s i r e s  o f  
t h o s e  who w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by h e r  a c t i o n .  The r a c i s t  Sm ith  
must weigh h i s  d e s i r e  f o r  r a c i a l  ad v a n ta g e  a g a i n s t  a l l  o f  
t h e  d e s i r e s  o f  t h e  t h r e a t e n e d  and s u b ju g a te d  n o n - w h i t e s .  
The Naz i  f a n a t i c ’ s m is ta k e  i s  t h a t  he t a k e s  no a c c o u n t  o f  
t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  Jewish p e o p le  he p e r s e c u t e s .  
When he does,  he w i l l  f o r e g o  t h e  p lanne d  a c t  because t o  do 
so w i l l  now acc o rd  w i t h  h i s  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e .
We can see now where a k in d  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 57 f i t s  i n t o  
t h e  p i c t u r e .  A c c o rd in g  t o  H a re ,  t h e  ' i d e a l  o b s e r v e r  t e s t ’ 
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a moral  judgem en t  s h o u ld  r e s u l t  f rom  w h a t ,  on 
b a la n c e  and a f t e r  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s ,  each  
i n d i v i d u a l  d e s i r e s .  For  a m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  judgem en t  we must  
t r y  t o  d i s c o v e r  which co u rs e  o f  a c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  more 
d e s i r e s  o f  more p e o p le ,  o r  s a t i s f i e s  them t o  a g r e a t e r  
d e g r e e .  Thus i t  seems t h a t  Hare  t h i n k s  t h a t  f ro m  t h e  moral  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  he can g e n e r a t e  a 
form  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  I t  a l l  seems d e c e p t i v e l y  s i m p l e .
N e e d le s s  t o  say t h e r e  a r e  many prob lem s w i t h  H a r e ’ s 
p r o p o s a l .  I n  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  in  many cases  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  see how one c o u ld  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  
must g i v e  w e ig h t  t o  a l l  d i v e r g e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s .  We have seen  
t h a t ,  i n  t h e  s i m p l e s t  o f  c a s e s ,  we m ig h t  be a b l e  t o  
f o r m u l a t e  uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e  judgem en ts  which can be endorsed  
f rom  e v e r y  p o i n t  o f  v ie w ;  o r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  we may be a b l e  t o  
i d e n t i f y  some judgem ents  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  an a c c e p t a b l e
121
compromise between d i f f e r e n t  v ie w s .  But  how a r e  we t o  
a r r i v e  a t  such ju dgem en ts  where t h e r e  a r e  r a d i c a l l y  
d i v e r g e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  as i t  i s  w i t h  most o f  o u r  more 
o b s t i n a t e  moral  d is a g re e m e n ts ?
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  a more i m p o r t a n t  reason  why H a r e ’ s 
p ro p o s a l  f a i l s .  Even i f  Hare  succeeds i n  showing t h a t  t h e  
maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  t h e  same as  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  i d e a l  o b s e r v e r  ( i n  h i s  
sense o f  t h e  l a t t e r  n o t i o n ) ,  we s t i l l  need t o  be c o n v in c e d  
t h a t  t h e  maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  o v e r a l l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  one  
and t h e  same as t h e  moral  p o i n t  o f  v ie w .  Why sh o u ld  t h e  
l a t t e r  be t h e  same as t h e  maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e s ?  Why n o t  t h e  minimum; o r  some o t h e r  p o i n t ?  Why 
sh o u ld  t h e  moral  p o i n t  o f  v iew  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  a t  a l l ?  C e r t a i n l y  H a r e ’ s 
'maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s ’ does n o t  seem t o  
p r o v i d e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some o f  o u r  
u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  b e l i e f s .
L e t  us c o n s id e r  one such b e l i e f :  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t o  k i l l  
a n o t h e r  human b e in g  a g a i n s t  h i s  w i l l  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong.  
Presum ably  Hare  would say t h a t  k i l l i n g  a person who p r e f e r s  
t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  l i v e  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong because i t  i s  c o n t r a r y  
t o  t h e  v i c t i m ’ s v e r y  s t r o n g l y  f e l t  o v e r a l l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  One 
prob lem  h ere  i s  t h a t  i f  I  k i l l  someone f rom  w h a t e v e r  m o t iv e ,  
I  am n o t  d o ing  a n y t h i n g  which can th e n  a f f e c t  h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  Dead men d o n ’ t  have p r e f e r e n c e s .  T h e re  i s  no 
v i c t i m  around t o  lam ent  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  have  
been d i s r e g a r d e d .  ( P r o v i d e d  t h a t  I  k i l l  him q u i c k l y  and 
p a i n l e s s l y ,  no unhapp iness  i s  caused t o  h i m . )
Hare  m ig h t  t r y  t o  g i v e  t h e  dead i n d i v i d u a l  a ' p r e f e r e n c e  
r a t i n g ’ , t r e a t i n g  t h e  v i c t i m ’ s u n t i m e l y  d e a th  as som eth ing  
l i k e  a v e r y  g r e a t  p a in  t h a t  he has s u f f e r e d  and t h a t  most  
i n d i v i d u a l s  would  p r e f e r  n o t  t o  s u f f e r . 58 But t h i s  c a n ’ t  be 
r i g h t .  As we noted  e a r l i e r ,  we m ig h t  c o n c e i v a b l y  measure  
t h e  p a in  o f  a broken arm w i t h  t h a t  o f  a broken f i n g e r ,  b u t  
we can not  e q u a te  our  own o r  a n o t h e r ’ s d e a th  w i t h  som eth ing
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l i k e  a broken  arm. They a r e  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  
o r d e r .  N e i t h e r  i s  my p r e f e r r i n g  n o t  t o  be k i l l e d  a w o r ry  
a b o u t  t h e  g r e a t  p a in  I  f e a r  i n  t h e  a c t  o f  d y i n g .  R a t h e r ,  i f  
i t  can be c o r r e c t l y  d e s c r ib e d  as a p r e f e r e n c e  a t  a l l ,  i t  i s  
a p r e f e r e n c e  n o t  t o  cease  t o  e x i s t .  I t  i s ,  f i r s t  and 
f o r e m o s t ,  a w o r ry  a b o u t  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  my p e r s o n a l i t y .  
T h i s  can h a r d l y  be r e g a rd e d  as ana log ous  t o  s u f f e r i n g  a 
g r e a t  p a i n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  my g r i e f  a t  a r e l a t i v e  o r  f r i e n d  
b e in g  k i l l e d  w i l l  n o t  s im p ly  be a m a t t e r  o f  a w o r ry  a b o u t  
h i s  o r  h e r  s u f f e r i n g ,  which I  would p r e f e r  them n o t  t o  have  
had.  Nor w i l l  i t  o n l y  be a f e e l i n g  o f  p e r s o n a l  lo s s  I  would  
p r e f e r  n o t  t o  have .  My g r i e f  i s  p r i m a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  h i s
o r  h e r  c e a s in g  t o  be a p e rs o n .
However,  l e t  us assume f o r  t h e  sake o f  a rgum ent  t h a t  t h e  
person who i s  k i l l e d  can be s a i d  t o  have p r e f e r e n c e s .  Ha re  
i s  th e n  f a c e d  by a n o t h e r  o b j e c t i o n .  U n d o u b ted ly  t h e  k i l l e r  
t o o  has p r e f e r e n c e s  and i t  seems t o  be a n a l y t i c a l l y  t r u e  
t h a t ,  in  cases o f  w i l f u l  h o m ic id e ,  one o f  t h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
i s  t o  see t h e  w o u ld -b e  v i c t i m  dead.  How, t h e n ,  a r e  we t o  
a r r i v e  a t  a t r a d e - o f f  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  t h a t  w i l l ,  a t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  show us why t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  v i c t i m  s h o u ld  
p r e v a i 1?
H a r e ’ s p o i n t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  we s h o u ld  choose th o s e  
judgem en ts  which c o v e r  t h e  maximum number o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d .  Even i f  t h e  v i c t i m  no l o n g e r  has 
any p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  k i l l e r ’ s p r e f e r e n c e s  would  be 
o u tw e ig h ed  by t h e  s t r o n g l y  f e l t  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  
d e c e a s e d ’ s own f a m i l y  and f r i e n d s ,  who would p r e f e r  t h a t  he 
had c o n t in u e d  t o  l i v e .  I s  t h i s  what  makes murder  m o r a l l y  
wrong? C o n s id e r  t h e  case o f  S m i th ,  whom a gang,  i n c l u d i n g
members o f  S m i t h ’ s own f a m i l y ,  murder w i t h  a ' n e c k l a c e ’ in
a South A f r i c a n  t o w n s h ip .  We may s a f e l y  assume t h a t  by f a r  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th o s e  p r e s e n t  ( s t r o n g l y )  p r e f e r  t o  see  Smith  
dead.  S in c e  t h e  gang members a r e  in  t h e  m a j o r i t y ,  m e r e ly  on 
a c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  u t i l i t a r i a n  
a l s o  would seem t o  be com m it ted  t o  s a y in g  t h a t  t h e y  a r e
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d o in g  t h e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  t h i n g  by m u r d e r in g  t h e i r  v i c t i m .  
The b a la n c e  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  in  t h e  g a n g ’ s f a v o u r .  Y e t  i t  
would  be nonsense t o  su g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  makes t h e i r  p r im a  
f a c i e  w ick ed  a c t  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .
I f  we t u r n  f rom  murder  t o  t o r t u r e  and o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  
c r u e l t y ,  a r e  we t o  say t h a t  any person who i s  b e in g  b a d ly  
m i s t r e a t e d  s h o u ld  s u b o r d i n a t e  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  perhaps  
c o m p l e t e l y ,  t o  compromise w i t h  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h o s e  who 
a r e  m i s t r e a t i n g  him? No doubt  we oug ht  t o  be t o l e r a n t  o f  
t h e  v iew s  o f  o t h e r s .  But must t h e  Jew compromise w i t h  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  c o n v in c e d  N a z i?  S u r e l y  t h e  bounds o f  
t o l e r a n c e  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  s u i c i d a l  a c c ep tan ce ?
To a v o id  t h i s ,  ( a  s t a n d a r d  c r i t i c i s m ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e - u t i 1 i t a r i a n i s m ) , Hare  m ig h t  t r y  t o  r e f o r m u l a t e  
t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  t o  som eth ing  l i k e :  'O n e ’ s
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgem ents  s h o u ld  max im ise  p r e f e r e n c e s  
e x c e p t  when t h i s  i n v o l v e s  m u r d e r in g ,  t o r t u r i n g ,  o r  i n  some 
o t h e r  way p e r s e c u t i n g ,  someone’ . However t h i s  would  seem t o  
reduce  p r e f e r e n c e - u t i 1 i t a r i a n i s m  t o  an ad hoc p r o c e d u r e  and,  
a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  i t  would rob t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  i t s  
s i m p l i c i t y  which was i t s  i n i t i a l  a t t r a c t i o n .
The re  i s  one o t h e r  f l a w  t h a t  I  want  t o  m e n t io n .  H a r e ’ s 
t r a n s i t i o n  f rom  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  t o  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
depends upon what  I  have c a l l e d  t e s t  ( i i i )  v i z .  t h e  ' i d e a l  
o b s e r v e r ’ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n  in  
U . R . I .  He c l a i m s  t h a t  t e s t  ( i i i )  can be e s t a b l i s h e d  as a 
fu n d am en ta l  and in e s c a p a b l e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  l o g i c .  I t  i s  a 
consequence o f  t h e  l o g i c  o f  moral  d i s c o u r s e .  However,  
u n l i k e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  j n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a , t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
'One s h o u ld  g i v e  equa l  w e ig h t  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  ev e ry o n e  
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  ju d g e m e n t ’ i s  n o t  a n e u t r a l  r u l e .  Anyone  
who a s s e r t s  i t ,  I  m a i n t a i n e d ,  i s  t a k i n g  a moral  s ta n d  which  
someone e l s e ,  q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l y ,  m ig h t  n o t  a c c e p t .  Someone 
m ig h t  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  moral t h i n g  t o  do i s  t o  g i v e  more 
w e ig h t  t o  th o s e  who d e s e r v e  t o  have t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  
s a t i s f i e d .  Thus i f  U . R . I  i s  a n e u t r a l  p r i n c i p a l
n e u t r a l ,  t h a t  i s  t o  a l l  moral  t h e o r i e s  -  t h e  ' i d e a l  
o b s e r v e r ’ r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  c o n d i t i o n  i s  n o t  m e r e ly  an e x t e n s i o n  
o f  U .R .  as Hare  c l a i m s  i t  t o  be.
S i n g e r ’ s u l t i m a t e  moral  c o n t e n t
M . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 6 1 / 1 9 8 5 )  a l s o  t h i n k s  t h a t  h i s  v e r s i o n  o f
U . R . I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  a m a t e r i a l  moral  p r i n c i p l e .
T o g e t h e r  w i t h  one o t h e r  u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  as s u m p t io n ,  i t  g i v e s
r i s e  t o  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  S i n g e r  c a l l s  h i s  v e r s i o n  o f  U . R . I
' t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e ’ ( G . P . ) . 59 T h i s  s t a t e s
( 1 9 6 1 : 5  ) t h a t
. . . w h a t  i s  r i g h t  ( o r  wrong)  f o r  one person  i s  r i g h t
( o r  wrong)  f o r  any s i m i l a r  person in  s i m i l a r
c i  r c u m s t a n c e s .
G . P . ,  l i k e  U . R . , a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  whole  f a m i l y  o f  n o r m a t iv e
t e r m s ,  'g o o d ’ , ' o u g h t ’ , e t c .  (w h ich  can be s u b s t i t u t e d ,
m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s . f o r  ' r i g h t ’ i n  G . P . ) .
S i n g u l a r  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ,  in  S i n g e r ’ s t h e o r y ,  a l s o  have
t o  s a t i s f y  what  he c a l l s  ' t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  co n s e q u e n c e s ’ ,
( P . C . ) .  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  ( i bi  d : 6 3 )  s t a t e s :
I f  t h e  consequences o f  A ’ s do ing  X would  be 
u n d e s i r a b l e ,  th e n  A oug ht  n o t  t o  do X.
S i n g e r  c l a i m s  t h a t  P .C .  i s  a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  o f  moral
r e a s o n in g  and he c l a i m s  t h a t  i t s  d e n i a l  i s  s e l f -
c o n t r a d i  c t o r y . From G .P .  and P .C .  we may d e r i v e  a t h i r d
p r i n c i p l e ,  ' t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  a r g u m e n t ’ ( G . A . ) which i s ,
in  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c o re  o f  S i n g e r ’ s t h e s i s .  We a r e  t o l d  t h a t
t o g e t h e r ,  G .P .  and P .C .  ( i bi  d : 6 5 )  g i v e  us:
I f  t h e  consequences o f  eve ry o n e  d o ing  X would  be 
u n d e s i r a b l e ,  th e n  n o t  e ve ry o n e  oug ht  t o  do X
f rom  which we o b t a i n  G.A .  t h a t ,  a t  i t s  c l e a r e s t ,  i s  s t a t e d
( i b i d :4  ) th u s :
I f  ev e ry o n e  were t o  do t h a t ,  t h e  consequences would  
be d i s a s t r o u s  ( o r  u n d e s i r a b l e ) ;  t h e r e f o r e  no one 
ought  t o  do t h a t .
To c l a i m  t h a t  a judgem ent  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , i n  o t h e r
words,  means t h a t  i t  does n o t  p r e v e n t  som eth ing  which i s ,
o r  sho u ld  be, a f u r t h e r  i n c o n t r o v e r t i  b l e  end o f  human
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a c t i o n ,  namely t h e  a v o id a n c e  o f  d i s a s t r o u s  o r  u n d e s i r a b l e  
co n s e q u e n c e s .
T h e re  a r e  s e v e r a l  prob lem s w i t h  t h e  l i n e  o f  r e a s o n in g  
above b u t  we w i l l  c o n f i n e  o u r s e l v e s  h e re  t o  some o b v io u s  
weaknesses o f  P .C .  and G. A . 60 F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  i s  n o t  a t  
a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  P .C .  i s  t h e  l o g i c a l  t r u t h  i t  i s  c l a i m e d  t o  
be.  To e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  t h e  consequences o f  a s i n g u l a r  
judgem en t  would  be d i s a s t r o u s ,  i s  n o t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a fo r m a l  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  I t  m ig h t  be som eth ing  t h a t ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  
we would  a l l  be u n w i l l i n g  t o  e n d o rs e .  But t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  
h a l l m a r k  o f  a l o g i c a l  t r u t h .  S e c o n d ly ,  even i f  f o r  t h e  sake  
o f  a rgument  we a l l o w  t h a t  P .C .  i s  a l o g i c a l  t r u t h  ( i . e .  
' d i s a s t r o u s  c o n seq u e n ces ’ i s  u n d ers to o d  t o  be l o g i c a l l y  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  ' m o r a l l y  w ro n g ’ ) ,  we a r e  s t i l l  e n t i t l e d  t o  ask  
"what  k in d s  o f  consequences a r e  d i s a s t r o u s ? "  As we s h a l l  
s e e ,  once any w e ig h t  o f  t h i s  k in d  i s  p u t  on P .C .  i t  does n o t  
y i e l d  many u n c o n t e n t io u s  answ ers .  I f  we c o n s i d e r  G .A .  th e n  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n c r e a s e .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  n o t  o b v io u s  t h a t  
an a c t i o n  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong j u s t  because t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
e v e ry o n e  do ing  i t  would be d i s a s t r o u s .  The a c t i o n  may be 
wrong in  i t s e l f .  I n  which c a s e ,  t h e  d i s a s t e r  which r e s u l t s  
in  ev e ry o n e  do ing  i t  would s im p ly  be t h e  sum t o t a l  o f  each  
i n d i v i d u a l  m isdeed.  Second,  and more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  i s  n o t  
c l e a r  t h a t  S i n g e r ’ s G.A .  can p r o v i d e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some o f  our  u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  b e l i e f s .
C o n s id e r  a g a in  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  ' k i l l i n g  a n o t h e r  human 
bei  ng aga i  n s t  hi  s wi 11 i s moral  1 y wrong ’ . I t  i s  p r im a  f a c i e  
wrong, S i n g e r  would say ,  because o f  t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  
consequences -  t o  say th e  l e a s t  -  t h a t  r e s u l t  f rom  
u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  a murderous a c t .  Our q u e s t i o n ,  f o r  S i n g e r ,  
i s :  u n d e s i r a b l e  f o r  whom? Suppose t h a t  we say t h a t  t h e
u n d e s i r a b l e  consequences a r e  t o  ev e ry o n e  in  s o c i e t y .  We 
m ig h t  e x p l a i n  t h i s  by p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  t h e  k i l l i n g  o f  t h e  
person may become known t o  o t h e r  p e rs o n s ,  who due t o  t h i s  
knowledge,  have a more gloomy e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e i r  own chances  
o f  l i v i n g  t o  a r i p e  o l d  a g e . 61 Are we t o  sa y ,  in  o t h e r
126
w ords ,  t h a t  t h e  m a jo r  moral  o b j e c t i o n  t o  k i l l i n g  i s  n o t  t o  
t h e  wrong done t o  t h e  v i c t i m ,  b u t  t o  t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  
consequences t h a t  would  r e s u l t  f o r  th o s e  l e f t  a l i v e ?  I f  so,  
one o f  t h e  many o d d i t i e s  o f  s a y in g  t h i s  would  be t h a t  t h e r e  
seems t o  be n o t h i n g  m o r a l l y  wrong w i t h  k i l l i n g  a n o t h e r  human 
b e in g  i f  i t  i s  done in  c o m p le te  s e c r e c y ,  o r  i f  t h o s e  l e f t  
a l i v e  do n o t  l e a r n  ab o u t  i t .  T h e i r  s t a t e  o f  mind would  be 
e x a c t l y  t h e  same as i f  t h e  k i l l i n g  had n o t  t a k e n  p l a c e .  
C l e a r l y ,  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  do. When a murder  has been com m it ted  
t h e r e  i s  a moral  wrong done w h ic h ,  by no s t r e t c h  o f  t h e  
i m a g i n a t i o n ,  can be eq u a te d  m e r e ly  w i t h  t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y ,  
o r  sense o f  impending d i s a s t e r ,  f e l t  by h i s  f a m i l y  o r  by t h e  
r e s t  o f  s o c i e t y .
T h e re  i s  a n o t h e r  way we can show t h a t  t h e  p r im a  f a c i e  
wrongness o f  k i l l i n g  can n o t  be e x p l a i n e d  as p r i m a r i l y  a  
m a t t e r  o f  u n d e s i r a b l e  o r  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences f o r  th o s e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who s u r v i v e  i t .  I f  we were a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  
a s i n g u l a r  judgem en t  in  which F i s  an a c t  o f  k i l l i n g ,  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  we m ig h t  be d e s c r i b i n g  c o u ld  be l i k e  t h e
d i s a s t r o u s  consequences o f  a t o t a l  n u c l e a r  w ar ,  in  which t h e  
e n t i r e  human race  i s  w iped o u t .  I f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
r e g a rd e d  as m o r a l l y  re p u g n a n t ,  i t  can n o t  be in  te rm s  o f  our  
concern  f o r  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences f o r  t h e  poor  s o u ls  
who s u r v i v e  i t .  For  ex h y p o th e s i  t h e r e  i s  no one l e f t  t o  
s u f f e r  th e  consequences.  S u r e l y ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  no one i s  l e f t  t o  s u f f e r ,  we would r e g a r d  t h e  
e x t i n c t i o n  o f  our  own s p e c ie s  -  as we do, perhaps  t o  a
l e s s e r  d e g re e ,  t h a t  o f  any o t h e r  s p e c ie s  -  as som eth ing
which would be a g r e a t  t r a g e d y  in  i t s  own r i g h t .
Should  we say t h a t  u n n ecessary  k i l l i n g  i s  wrong because  
o f  t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  consequences t h a t  r e s u l t  f o r  t h e  v i c t i m ?  
I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  so.  Suppose t h a t  Jones commits a d u l t e r y  w i t h  
Mary Smith  w i t h o u t  Tom S m i t h ’ s knowing i t .  I f  he -  and 
ev e ry o n e  e l s e  -  i s  i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  a c t ,  i t  would be
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  consequences which Sm ith  o r  
o t h e r s  m ig h t  be s a i d  t o  s u f f e r .  Even though i t  may be
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argue d  t h a t  he w i l l  s u f f e r  in  a sm a l l  way, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  by 
a n o t i c e a b l e  d e c re a s e  in  h i s  w i f e ’ s a t t e n t i o n s  t o  h im,  t h e  
wrong t h a t  i s  b e in g  done t o  Sm ith  c an n o t  be e q u a te d  w i t h  t h e  
u n d e s i r a b l e  e f f e c t  on him. S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  wrong done t o  t h e  
v i c t i m  o f  an a c t  o f  m urder ,  when he i s  dead and i s  eo ip s o  
i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he has been m urdered ,  does n o t  
seem t o  g e t  t o  th e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  i m m o r a l i t y  o f  t h e  m a t t e r .
I f  t h e  arguments above a r e  c o r r e c t ,  t h e  wrongness o f  
k i l l i n g  a person i s  n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  e x p l a i n e d  in  te rm s  o f  t h e  
d i s a s t r o u s  consequences f o r  t h e  v i c t i m  o r  t h e  s u r v i v o r s .  
Can we say t h a t  th e  consequences o f  some t h i n g s  a r e  t h o u g h t  
t o  be d i s a s t r o u s  s i m p l i c i t e r ? S i n g e r  seems t o  t h i n k  so.  
T h e re  a r e  many c l e a r  ca s e s ,  he t e l l s  us ,  where t h e r e  i s  no 
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  d i s a s t r o u s .  He g i v e s  as examples  
(op  c i t : 9 4 ) :
An e a r t h q u a k e  i s  a d i s a s t e r ,  so i s  a t o r n a d o ,  a 
s h ip w r e c k ,  o r  a p la n e  c r a s h ,  and so would  be a 
n u c l e a r  war;  and t h i s  does n o t  depend upon a n y o n e ’ s 
t h e o r y  o f  v a l u e ,  o r  on a n y o n e ’ s i n t e r e s t  o r  p o i n t  o f  
v i e w . . .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e s e  examples o n l y  co u n t  as d i s a s t e r s  in  
S i n g e r ’ s sense -  and t h e r e b y ,  work as u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
( n e u t r a l )  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  reasons  -  i f  we 
a l l  s h a re  t h e  same v iew  abo ut  t h e  u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
consequences.  And we do n o t .
Take S i n g e r ’ s example  o f  n u c l e a r  w ar .  Most  p e o p le  would  
a g r e e  w i t h  him t h a t  n u c l e a r  war would be a d i s a s t e r .  
However some p e o p le  manage t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  t h i s  v iew  t o  an 
i d e a l  t h e y  c o n s id e r  t o  be o f  more im p o r ta n c e .  They say i t  
would be b e t t e r  t h a t  we a l l  p e r i s h  in  a n u c l e a r  war th a n  t o  
be made t o  l i v e  in  a communist s t a t e .  ( ' I t ’ s b e t t e r  t o  be 
dead th a n  r e d ’ . )  I s  such a judgem ent  immoral? I  would say  
so.  But i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  show t h i s  in  a rgum ent ,  
h a v in g  o n l y  P .C .  and G.A. a t  o n e ’ s d i s p o s a l .
T h i s  i s  n o t  an e x c e p t i o n a l  exam ple ,  which m ig h t  s u g g es t  
t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  t h e r e  i s  g e n e r a l  agreem ent  abo u t  which  
d i s a s t r o u s  consequences a r e  m o r a l l y  wrong.  We would a l l  
a c c e p t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d ro u g h t
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s u f f e r e d  by p e o p le  i n  t h e  Horn o f  A f r i c a  f o r  t h e  l a s t  
dec ade ,  i s  a d i s a s t e r .  Such c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  t h e  cause o f  
m i s e r y ,  f a m in e ,  d i s e a s e  and, f o r  many p e o p le ,  an e a r l y  
d e a t h .  A l l  o f  t h i s  c o u ld  be a g r e e d .  But  t h e  moral  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  d i s a s t e r  can be q u e r i e d .  I t  i s  
s u g g es ted  by some, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i f  a f f l u e n t  F i r s t  
W orld  c o u n t r i e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  h e lp  th e s e  poor p e o p le ,  one day  
t h e  a f f l u e n t  n a t i o n s  w i l l  be u n a b le  t o  look  a f t e r  
t h e m s e l v e s . 62 I n  50 y e a r s  t i m e ,  when t h e  w o r l d ’ s p o p u l a t i o n  
c o u ld  be t h r e e  t im e s  i t s  p r e s e n t  l e v e l ,  t h e  number who w i l l  
th e n  d i e  f rom  fa m in e  and d i s e a s e ,  o r  who w i l l  s t r u g g l e  on in  
a b s o l u t e  p o v e r t y ,  w i l l  be much g r e a t e r .  The c a p a c i t y  o f  
a f f l u e n t  n a t i o n s  t o  h e lp  c o u ld  be exh a u s te d  and t h e y  w i l l  
have j e o p a r d i z e d  t h e i r  own w e l l - b e i n g .  Thus,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  
t h e  E t h i o p i a n s  sho u ld  be l e f t  t o  s t a r v e  to d a y  f o r  o t h e r w i s e  
t h e y  w i l l  d rag  th e  r i c h  n a t i o n s  down w i t h  them tom orrow,  
which  i s  seen as an even g r e a t e r  d i s a s t e r .  The p o i n t  i s ,  
u s in g  S i n g e r ’ s c r i t e r i a ,  we can not  f a u l t  t h e  person who i s  
p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences o f  a p r e s e n t  
p o l i c y  o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  where t h i s  i s  done in  t h e  name 
o f  a p u t a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  d i s a s t e r .
The cases above,  no d o u b t ,  a r e  ones where a l l  t h e  
d i s p u t a n t s  a g r e e  abo ut  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences,  b u t  
d i s a g r e e  abo ut  w h e th er  o r  n o t  t h i s  s h o u ld  be t o l e r a t e d  f o r  
f e a r  o f  even worse r e s u l t s .  T h is  i s  n o t  a lw ays  t h e  cas e .  
Many o f  our  more s e r i o u s  moral  d is a g r e e m e n ts  a r e  concerned  
w i t h  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  consequence would be a 
d i s a s t e r .  For  t h e  m i l i t a r y - m i n d e d  man, i f  ev e ry o n e  were  t o  
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  o b j e c t  a t  a t im e  o f  w ar ,  t h e r e  would be no 
one t o  f i g h t  t h e  war and t h a t  would be d i s a s t e r .  For  t h e  
p a c i f i s t ,  t h i s  i s  j u s t  what  s h o u ld  happen.  For  a C a t h o l i c  
woman, whose l i f e  i s  p u t  a t  r i s k  i f  she becomes p r e g n a n t ,  
t h e  i d e a  o f  c o n t r a c e p t i o n  i s  n o n e t h e le s s  h i g h l y  u n d e s i r a b l e ,  
i f  n o t  a d i s a s t e r .  For  t h e  n o n - C a t h o l i c ,  i t  i s  t h e  woman’ s 
r e l i g i o u s  commitment t h a t  i s  d i s a s t r o u s .
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F i n a l l y ,  even i f  i t  i s  a g ree d  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  outcome o f  
a ju d g em en t  i s  d i s a s t r o u s ,  i t  can s t i l l  be d i s p u t e d  w h e th e r  
o r  n o t  t h i s  makes i t  m o r a l l y  wrong. C o n s id e r  S a r t r e ’ s 
famous example  o f  one o f  h i s  s t u d e n t s ,  a young man, t o r n  
between j o i n i n g  t h e  R e s is t a n c e  and c a r i n g  f o r  h i s  e l d e r l y  
m o th e r .  The main p o i n t  o f  t h i s  exam ple ,  f o r  S a r t r e ,  i s  t o  
show t h a t  p r e v i o u s l y  acc e p te d  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  o f  no h e l p  in  
t h i s  t y p e  o f  s i t u a t i o n ;  i . e .  a moral d i lemm a.  The s t u d e n t  
a c c e p t s  both  t h a t  one ought  t o  s e r v e  o n e ’ s c o u n t r y  and t h a t  
one oug ht  t o  p r o t e c t  o n e ’ s p a r e n t s .  But t h i s  t e l l s  him 
n o t h i n g  when, as h e r e ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  p o i n t  in  o p p o s i t e  
d i r e c t i o n s .  Which a l t e r n a t i v e  s h o u ld  he ta k e ?  L e t  us 
suppose t h a t ,  f o r c e d  by th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  make a c h o i c e ,  
t h e  young man d e c id e s  t o  j o i n  t h e  R e s i s t a n c e .  L e t  us 
suppose a l s o  t h a t  as a r e s u l t  h i s  m other  d i e s  o f  a broken  
h e a r t  w h i l e  he spends t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  war p e r f o r m in g  a 
u s e le s s  c l e r i c a l  t a s k ,  in  an o f f i c e  w e l l  away f ro m  t h e  
f r o n t .  No doubt  we would r e g a r d  th e  consequences as  
u n d e s i r a b l e ,  i f  n o t  d i s a s t r o u s ,  f o r  ev e ry o n e  co n cern ed .  
However i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t ,  g iv e n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  
which he made i t ,  we would say t h a t  t h e  young man made a 
m o r a l l y  wrong ju d g e m e n t .  We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  
l a t e r .  I  hope t h a t  I  have s a i d  enough in  t h e  d i s c u s s io n  so  
f a r  t o  show t h a t  when we probe some o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  S i n g e r ’ s G.A. we a r e  n o t ,  in  f a c t ,  p r o v id e d  
w i t h  u n c o n t e n t io u s  moral  judgem ents  as answers .
We have now c o n s id e r e d  -  though n o t  w i t h  t h e  d e t a i l s  i t  
r e q u i r e s 63 -  what we a r e  c a l l i n g  j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  m a t e r i a l  
a c c o u n ts  o f  U . R . ,  v i z .  th o se  found in  t h e  r e c e n t  w r i t i n g  o f  
R .M .H a r e  and M . S i n g e r .  The r e s p e c t i v e  a p p e a ls  t o
f p r e f e r e n c e - u t i 1 i t y ’ and ' d i s a s t r o u s  con seque nces ’ l e t  
i m p o r t a n t  i n d e t e r m i n a c i e s  i n t o  t h e i r  sys tem s .  As a r e s u l t ,  
each has t o  im p o r t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  assum pt ions  i n t o  h i s  
a c c o u n t  and so f o r f e i t s  t h e  c l a i m  t o  moral  n e u t r a l i t y .  So 
o u r  p rob lem  i s  s t i l l  t o  f i n d  a t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  
c o n t e x t u a l  r e l e v a n c e . I n  o t h e r  words,  we a r e  l o o k i n g  f o r  a
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  c o n t e n t  o f  reasons  w h ic h ,  
w h i l e  n o t  i m p o r t i n g  moral  assum pt ions  i n t o  o u r  a c c o u n t ,  
p i c k s  o u t  th o s e  f e a t u r e s  we can appea l  t o  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  
r e l e v a n t  reasons  and r u l e s  o u t  t h e  r e s t ;  and w h ic h ,  a t  t h e  
same t i m e ,  p r o v i d e s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  o u r  o r d i n a r y  moral  
b e l i e f s  and w i t h  which anyone can d e t e r m in e  r i g h t  f ro m  wrong  
a c t i o n s .
The t im e  has come f o r  us t o  c o n s id e r  i f  t h e r e  a r e  any  
reasons  w h ic h ,  f o r  t h e  purposes o f  moral  e v a l u a t i o n ,  a lw a ys  
c o u n t  as t h e  c o r r e c t  reasons  f o r  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  moral  
j u d g e m e n ts .  T h i s  i s  t o  say ,  we need t o  c o n s i d e r  p o s s i b l e  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  c a n d id a t e s  f o r  R, in  U . R . I I .
Towards a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  m a t e r i a l  a cc ount
T h e re  a r e  a t  l e a s t  two ways in  which we m ig h t  t r y  t o  g i v e  
a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  R.
( a )  We m ig h t  ask i f  t h e r e  a r e  any p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  a r e  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  a l l  human b e in g s .  They must n o t  c o n t a i n  any  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  assum pt ions  y e t  t h e y  must be r e l e v a n t  
t o  moral  judgem en ts  so t h a t  we may use them t o  j u d g e  
d i f f e r e n t  cases  t o  be a l i k e .  The p ro p o sa l  i s  o t i o s e ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  u n le s s  we can say what  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
a r e , 64 why d e s c r i p t i o n s  c o n t a i n i n g  them a r e  m o r a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  and,  th en  i f  we can say ,  what  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i s  between t h e  e s s e n t i a l i s t  d e s c r i p t i o n  and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
moral  ju d g e m e n t .
( b )  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  we m ig h t  a rgue  t h a t  in  o u r  moral  
judgem en ts  i t  i s  r a t i o n a l  t o  presume t h a t  a l l  cases  a r e  
a l i k e  -  we assume a l l  p e o p le  t o  be a l i k e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a l l  
o f  t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  in  a g iv e n  s i t u a t i o n  -  and th e n  p l a c e  th e  
burden o f  p r o o f  on anyone who wants  t o  j u d g e  i n d i v i d u a l  
cases d i f f e r e n t l y .  The j u d g e r  would be r e q u i r e d  t o  make t h e  
same judgem en t  f o r  a l l  p r im a f a c i e  l i k e  cases  and show t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  between a p a r t i c u l a r  case and a l l  th e  
r e s t ,  which w a r r a n t s  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  ju d g e m e n t .  A s i m i l a r  
s t r a t e g y  i s  proposed by S.Benn and R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 1 1 )  in
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t h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y .  They  
w r i t e  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e :
. . . i t  i s  a p resu m p t io n  a g a i n s t  t r e a t i n g  them (human 
b e in g s )  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  in  any r e s p e c t  u n t i l  grounds  
f o r  d i s t i n c t i o n  have been s h o w n . . . T h e  onus o f  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  r e s t s  on whoever would make 
d i s t i  n o t i o n s .
I f  we exchange t h e  r e f e r e n c e  h e re  f rom  ' t r e a t i n g ’ t o  
' j u d g i n g ’ , we have th e  f o l l o w i n g  p re s u m p t iv e  ac c o u n t  o f  U .R .
I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F because o f  
t h e  reason R, th en  I  may presume t h a t  R a p p l i e s  t o  
a l l  p r im a  f a c i e  l i k e  i n d i v i d u a l s  Y, Z . . . a n d  t h a t  Y,  
Z . . . o u g h t  t o  do F; and t h e  burden o f  p r o o f  i s  on 
anyone who wants t o  ju d g e  some i n d i v i d u a l  W 
d i f f e r e n t l y .
The p r e s u m p t iv e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  app ears  t o  have a l l  o f  U . R . ’ s 
f e a t u r e s .  A ls o  i t  app ears  t o  be a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  A t  
l e a s t ,  we can see how t o  ju d g e  in  th o s e  cases where t h e r e  i s  
no c l e a r  e v id e n c e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  between i n d i v i d u a l s .  O nly  
where t h e r e  i s  e v i d e n c e ,  i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  judgem en t  
w a r r a n t e d .
L e a v in g  a s i d e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  e i t h e r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r  t h e  moment, t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between ( a )  
and ( b )  i s  o f  consequence and i s  w o r th  s t r e s s i n g .  One 
a d v a n ta g e  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  i s  t h a t  i t  would s e r v e  as a 
g u id e  in  th o s e  cases where we can not  d e c id e  in  what  ways, o r  
t o  what  e x t e n t ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  s i m i l a r  o r  d i f f e r e n t .  For
( b )  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  we ju d g e  t h i n g s  t o  be a l i k e  where  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  can not  be shown, o r  u n t i l  grounds f o r  a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  can be shown. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  ( a )  i s  no h e l p  in  
such c as es ;  f o r ,  ex h y p o t h e s i , no judgem ent  i s  w a r r a n t e d  in  
cases  where we can not  d e c id e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
s h a re  t h e  same, m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y .
L e t  me i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  h e r e .  C o n s id e r  a g a in  
t h e  case  in  which Smith  and Jones a r e  b ro u g h t  b e f o r e  a 
m a g i s t r a t e  f o r  t h e  same o f f e n c e .  (They a r e  both  found  
g u i l t y  o f  d r i v i n g  t h e i r  c a r s  in  an unroa dw or thy  c o n d i t i o n . )  
L e t  us suppose t h a t  Smith  g iv e s  m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in
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an a t t e m p t  t o  show why he sh o u ld  n o t  be p un ishe d  f o r  t h e  
o f f e n c e .  Now i f  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e ’ s judgem ent  i s  based on t h e  
p r e s u m p t iv e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b ) ,  he m ig h t  d e c id e  t h a t  s i n c e  
Sm ith  has p u t  f o r w a r d  grounds which show t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  h i s  ca s e ,  he i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  a more l e n i e n t  
ju d g e m e n t ,  ( i . e .  t h a t  Smith  s h o u ld  n o t  be pun ish e d  l i k e  
J o n e s ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  th e  m a g i s t r a t e  bases h i s  
judgem en t  on t h e  e s s e n t i a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( a ) ,  he m ig h t  
n o t  come t o  t h i s  d e c i s i o n .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a p p ly  ( a )  t h e  
m a g i s t r a t e  must d e t e r m in e  w h e th er  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  d r i v i n g  
o f f e n d e r s  w i t h  ' s i m i l a r  m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ’ (assum ing  
o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  ' s i m i 1a r i t y - o f - m i t i g a t i n g - c i r c u m s t a n c e ’ i s  
an e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y ) ,  who were n e v e r t h e l e s s  p u n is h e d .  
Thus on t h e  one hand,  ( a ) ,  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e  must d e t e r m in e  
w h e th e r  S m i t h ’ s case be longs  t o  an e s t a b l i s h e d  c a t e g o r y  o f  
cases  which a r e  deemed t o  m e r i t  a d i f f e r e n c e  o f  ju d g em en t ;  
on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  ( b ) ,  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  
S m i t h ’ s case  a lo n e  c o u ld  j u s t i f y  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e ’ s d i f f e r e n c e  
o f  ju d g e m e n t .
I t  seems, t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e  p re s u m p t iv e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  
m ig h t  s e r v e  as an a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e .  W hatever  
jud g em en t  one makes in  a p a r t i c u l a r  ca s e ,  t h e  same judgem en t  
would a p p ly  in  a l l  cases where t h e  j u d g e r  i s  i g n o r a n t  o f  
r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  grounds f o r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
c a n n o t  be shown. Whereas t h e  e s s e n t i a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
( a )  would  s e r v e  as a g u ide  o n l y  in  th o s e  cases where we know 
t h a t  t h e  t h i n g s  in  q u e s t i o n  s h a re  t h e  same e s s e n t i a l  
p r o p e r t y .  So U . R . I I ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  as ( b ) ,  seems t o  s e r v e  as  
a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  w i t h o u t  many f u r t h e r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  
However i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  p l a u s i b l e ?
Are  we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  in  any judgem ent  we presume t h a t  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  l i k e  cases u n t i l  e v id e n c e  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e  
i s  p r e s e n te d ?  C l e a r l y ,  we a r e  n o t .  I n  f a c t ,  v e r y  o f t e n  i t  
i s  r a t i o n a l  t o  presume d i f f e r e n c e ,  n o t  l i k e n e s s ,  between t h e  
two o r  more p a r t i e s  i n v o l v e d ,  and t h e  burden o f  p r o o f  i s  on 
anyone who f a v o u r s  sameness o f  ju d g e m e n t .  To see t h a t  t h i s
133
i s  so ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  i n  which  each o f  
t h e  ju d g e m e n t -m a k e rs  i s  d raw ing  up h i s  w i l l : 65
( 1 )  Sm ith  has two c h i l d r e n  and d e c id e s  t o  g i v e  one h a l f  
o f  h i s  p o s sess io n s  t o  each o f  them.
( 2 )  Jones has two c h i l d r e n  and d e c id e s  t o  g i v e  one o f  
them 90% o f  h i s  p o s sess io n s  and t h e  o t h e r  10%.
( 3 )  Brown has one c h i l d  and d e c id e s  t o  g i v e  one h a l f  o f  
h i s  p o s sess io n s  t o  t h i s  c h i l d  and t h e  o t h e r  h a l f  t o  
someone he has randomly s e l e c t e d  f rom  t h e  names in  
t h e  t e l e p h o n e  d i r e c t o r y .
Shou ld  we ask Sm ith  how he j u s t i f i e s  h i s  ju d g e m e n t ,  ( t o
d i v i d e  h i s  e s t a t e  e q u a l l y  between h i s  c h i l d r e n ) ,  no dou bt  he 
would  g i v e  as t h e  reason t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  both  h i s  
c h i l d r e n  and t h a t  he has a p a r e n t a l  d u ty  t o  t r e a t  them in  
t h e  same way. W h i le  Smith  i s  no t  t r e a t i n g  a l l  p e o p le  a l i k e ,  
he i s  t r e a t i n g  a l l  o f  th o s e  i n v o l v e d  a l i k e .  O b v io u s ly  t h i s  
r e p l y  w i l l  n o t  do when we ask Jones why he d i v i d e d  h i s  
w e a l t h  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  between h i s  c h i l d r e n .  I n  o r d e r  
t o  s a t i s f y  our  i n t u i t i o n s  on t h i s  m a t t e r ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  Jones  
would  need t o  say som eth ing  l i k e  "One o f  my c h i l d r e n  i s  a 
l a w y e r  w i t h  a l a r g e  p r a c t i c e  and t h e  o t h e r  has been an
i n v a l i d  s i n c e  b i r t h  and t h i s  j u s t i f i e s  g i v i n g  t h e  f o r m e r  10% 
and t h e  l a t t e r  90% o f  my e s t a t e " .  I n  o t h e r  words,  Jones  
w i l l  need t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  
t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  h i s  c h i l d r e n  which j u s t i f i e s  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  in  h i s  ju d g e m e n t .  The responses we m ig h t  e x p e c t  
f ro m  Sm ith  and Jones a r e  d i f f e r e n t  bu t  -  assuming t h a t  
J o n e s ’ e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  a lo n g  th e  l i n e s  suggested  -  both  can  
be u n d ers to o d  as bas in g  t h e i r  judgem ents  on th e  p resu m p t io n  
t h a t  in  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  d i s p o s in g  o f  o n e ’ s p r o p e r t y ,  o n e ’ s 
c h i l d r e n  sh o u ld  be judged  t o  be l i k e  ca s e s .  I n  such c a s e s ,  
ad h e re n c e  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  m ig h t  seem t o  be usual  and 
an a p p a r e n t  d e v i a t i o n  f rom  t h i s  norm would r e q u i r e  
a d d i t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n .  However when we ask Brown ab o u t  h i s
ju d g e m e n t ,  we would want  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  j u d g i n g  t h e  two
cases t o  be a l i k e .  Our p resu m p t ion  would be, I  t h i n k ,  t h a t
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t h e  p e o p le  i n v o l v e d  a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  and t h a t  t h e y  sh o u ld  
be ju d g e d  t o  be so.  I t  would f a l l  upon Brown t o  show t h a t  
though t h e r e  i s  a p resu m p t io n  a g a i n s t  i t ,  t h e r e  i s  some 
o v e r r i d i n g  reason f o r  ju d g i n g  t h e s e  cases  t o  be a l i k e .  So 
i t  i s  i n c o r r e c t  t o  sug ges t  t h a t  o r d i n a r i l y  we would a lw a y s  
make t h e  p re s u m p t io n  in  f a v o u r  o f  l i k e  c a s e s ,  as r e q u i r e d  by 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b ) .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in  examples l i k e  (1 ) — ( 3 )  above,  what  in  f a c t  
we would  presume t u r n s  on th e  s o c i a l  norms t h a t  a p p ly  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t .  I n  t h e  norms o f  most Western  s o c i e t i e s ,  a l l  
c h i l d r e n  a r e  c o n s id e r e d  t o  s tan d  in  t h e  same r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  
t h e i r  f a t h e r  and so p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  tow a rd s  one o f  
them must be j u s t i f i e d ;  whereas in  many n on -W es te rn  
s o c i e t i e s ,  l i k e  Xhosa s o c i e t y ,  an e l d e s t  son i s  b e l i e v e d  t o  
s t a n d  in  a s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  h i s  f a t h e r ,  ( p r i m o ­
g e n i t u r e ) ,  and t h e  norm i s  t o  g i v e  f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  t o  
t h e  e l d e s t  son.  An equal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  f a t h e r ’ s 
e s t a t e  among h i s  c h i l d r e n  would be a d e v i a t i o n  f rom  t h e  norm 
and would  need t o  be j u s t i f i e d .  So t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  
red u c es  t o  t h e  c l a i m :  o n l y  in  th o se  c o n t e x t s  where one i s  
i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  mores, ( o r  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h a t  
a p p ly  in  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ) ,  sho u ld  one presume t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  
i n v o l v e d  a r e  s i m i l a r  in  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t s  and ju d g e  
a c c o r d i  n g l y .
The case  f o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  i s  f u r t h e r  weakened s i n c e  
t h e  p r e s u m p t iv e  c l a i m  i s  e i t h e r  based upon t h e  f o o l i s h  
assum pt ion  t h a t  a l l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  t o  
be presumed t o  be m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ,  o r  t h e  even more 
f o o l i s h l y  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g  assum ption  t h a t  any m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  s i m i l a r i t y  between i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  t o  be presumed 
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  But we have been a s k in g  a l l  a lo n g :  what  
e x a c t l y  co u n ts  as a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  s i m i l a r i t y ?
One p o s s i b l e  answer m ig h t  be t h a t  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  
r e g a r d e d  as e s s e n t i a l  o t h e r s  a c c i d e n t a l ,  w i t h i n  a g iv e n  
moral  p r a c t i c e .  Where a l l  o f  t h e  norms and s p e c i a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r e  known t o  t h e  person making t h e  ju d g em en t ,
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some p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d  a r e  b e l i e v e d  t o  
be e s s e n t i a l  f o r  them, w h i l e  t h e y  possess o t h e r s  
a c c i d e n t a l l y .  C o n s id e r  a g a in  t h e  case  o f  Sm ith  in  example
( 1 ) .  Why s h o u l d n ’ t  we say t h a t  S m i t h ’ s ju d g e m e n t ,  i n  which  
he d is p o s e d  o f  h i s  e s t a t e  e q u a l l y  between h i s  c h i l d r e n ,  i s  
due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he i s  aware t h a t  i n  W estern  c u l t u r e ,  
each b e n e f i c i a r y  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  possess an e s s e n t i a l  
p r o p e r t y ?  The p r o p e r t y  in  q u e s t i o n ,  l e t  us s a y ,  i s  
' ch i  1d r e n - o f - t h e - s a m e - p a r e n t ’ . Thus Smith  ju d g e s  t h a t  he 
sh o u ld  d i s t r i b u t e  h i s  e s t a t e  e q u a l l y  between th o s e  who s h a re  
t h i s  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y ,  ( a l l  and o n l y  th o s e  cases who a r e  
c h i l d r e n  o f  S m i t h ) .  I n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  d i s p o s i n g  o f  an 
e s t a t e ,  ' c h i  1d r e n - o f - t h e - s a m e - p a r e n t ’ i s  an e s s e n t i a l  
p r o p e r t y  f o r  j u d g e r s  in  a W estern  c u l t u r e .  I f  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  
one e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y  t o  which c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  g i v e n ,  
t h e r e  a p p ears  t o  be som eth ing  t o  recommend i n  t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ( a ) .
Such o p t im is m ,  however ,  i s  s h o r t - l i v e d .  I n  more complex  
e xa m p les ,  t h e  ac c o u n t  f a l t e r s .  C o n s id e r  a g a in  J o n e s ’ case  
in  example  ( 2 ) .  Here  t h e r e  app ears  t o  be a t  l e a s t  two  
s o - c a l l e d  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  be ta k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  
For w h i l e  both i n d i v i d u a l s  s a t i s f y  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  
' ch i  1d r e n - o f - t h e - s a m e - p a r e n t ’ , (nam ely  J o n e s ) ,  t h e  i n v a l i d  
c h i l d  has an a d d i t i o n a l  p r o p e r t y  ' n e e d - d u e - t o - d i s a b i 1 i t y ’ 
which t h e  o t h e r  l a c k s .  On i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( a ) ,  t h e  prob lem  
f a c i n g  Jones i s  t o  d e c id e  which p r o p e r t y  i s  g e n u i n e l y  
e s s e n t i a l  in  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  d i s p o s in g  o f  h i s  p o s s e s s io n s .  I f  
i t  i s  ' c h i 1d r e n - o f - t h e - s a m e - p a r e n t ’ th e n  h i s  progeny a r e  
l i k e  cases whereas  i f  i t  i s  ' n e e d - d u e - t o - d i s a b i 1i t y ’ th en  
one o f  t h e  two does n o t  have t h e  p r o p e r t y  and so a 
d i f f e r e n c e  in  ju dgem en t  i s  j u s t i f i e d .  The p o i n t  i s ,  i n  h i s  
judgem ent  w h a t e v e r  Jones chooses he i s  bound t o  m in im iz e  o r  
n e g l e c t  t h e  o t h e r  and,  in  do ing  so,  he w i l l  f a i l  t o  t r e a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  s h a r i n g  t h e  same e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y  in  t h e  same 
w ay .
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I n  t h e  exam ple  above ,  an e s s e n t i a l i s t  m ig h t  a t t e m p t  t o  
d e fe n d  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( a )  in  one o f  two ways.  
On t h e  one hand,  he may t r y  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a more complex t y p e  
o f  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y .  I n s t e a d  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  two  
p r o p e r t i e s  i n  exam ple  ( 2 ) ,  he m ig h t  t r y  t o  in v o k e  a new 
essence  by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  them i n t o  a s i n g l e  p r o p e r t y .  
However i t  seems odd t h a t  he can r e v i s e  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
i n  t h i s  way. I t  would sap our  c o n f i d e n c e  in  what  he c a l l s  
e s s e n t i a l  ism. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  t o  me how t h i s  new 
p r o p e r t y  m ig h t  be d e s c r i b e d .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l i s t  m ig h t  a t t e m p t  t o  d e fend  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( a )  by 
r u l i n g  o u t  one o r  both o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  as b e in g  g e n u i n e l y  
e s s e n t i a l .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  g iv e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s o c i a l  
norms in  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  a p a r e n t ’ s e s t a t e ,  
t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  t o  commend ' ch i  1d r e n - o f - t h e - s a m e - p a r e n t ’ 
as a g e n u i n e l y  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y .  So what  i s  a ' g e n u i n e l y  
e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y ’ ? T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  t h e  nub o f  my 
t h e s i  s .
7.  C o n c lu s io n  o f  P a r t  One
We have a r r i v e d  a t  t h e  end o f  P a r t  One. We have seen  
t h a t  t o  be r a t i o n a l ,  any s i n g u l a r  moral  judgem ent  must be 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  in  t h e  sense t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  must be w i l l i n g  
and be a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  i t  f o r  a l l  l i k e  cases i_n p r o p r i a  
p e r s o n a . T h i s  gave us a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  answers t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  'Which moral  judgem ents  oug ht  anyone t o  make?’ 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  we found t h a t  t o  be g e n u in e ly  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
r a t h e r  th a n  m e r e ly  c o n s i s t e n t ,  t h e  reason g iv e n  in  t h e  
judgem en t  must be c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g .  We 
have noted  t h a t  both j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  and j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
reasons  can meet  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s . G iven  a fo r m a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  however ,  t h e  fo r m e r  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  
v e r s i o n  o f  U. R.  ( U . R . I )  i s  t r i v i a l  s i n c e  in  answer t o  t h e  
'w h ic h  moral  ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ q u e s t i o n ,  i t  a l l o w s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
judgem en ts  and p u ts  a l l  o f  t h e  w e ig h t  on t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
moral  a s s u m p t io n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a m a t e r i a l  v e r s i o n  o f
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U . R . I  runs i n t o  a l l  s o r t s  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The a c c o u n ts  we 
c o n s id e r e d  f a i l  as e x p l i c a t i o n s  o f  some o f  o u r  o r d i n a r y  
moral  b e l i e f s  and t h e y  depend upon c o n t e s t a b l e  v a l u e  
a s s u m p t io n s .  However ,  we have seen t h a t  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U . R . I I  does seem t o  be p o s s i b l e .  
We can f i n d  a v a l i d ,  m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U . R . I I ,  i f  
we can say what  c o u n ts  as a g e n u i n e l y  e s s e n t i a l ,  m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  p r o p e r t y .
I n  t h e  c h a p t e r s  ahead ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show what  t h i s  m ig h t  
be. I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  c a p a c i t i e s ,
a b i l i t i e s ,  d r i v e s  o f  p e rs o n s ,  c o n c e r n in g  which t h e r e  i s  no 
d i f f e r e n c e  between one i n d i v i d u a l  and a n o t h e r .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
I  hope t o  show how each o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  i d e n t i f i e d  i s  a 
need f o r  a l l  p e rs o n s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  s o c i a l  norms, e t c .  I f  
t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h e n ,  where a reason in  a s i n g u l a r  
jud g em en t  i s  based upon such a p r o p e r t y ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  can be no g en u ine  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  judgem en t  and o t h e r  human b e in g s .
I  w i l l  a rg u e  a l s o  t h a t  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  any o f  t h e  needs  
in  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  by i t s e l f ,  n e u t r a l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  moral  
t h e o r i e s ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  i t  does n o t  depend upon 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  a s s u m p t io n s .  However I  w i l l  show t h a t  
we can and do r e f e r  t o  such needs as c r i t e r i a  f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  
what o r d i n a r i l y  pass as moral  b e l i e f s .
I  w i l l  go on t o  show t h a t  where a re a s o n ,  in  a s i n g u l a r  
ju d g e m e n t ,  d e s c r i b e s  such a need th e n  t h i s  i s  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t ,  e l u c i d a t i n g  and a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  t h e  
accompanying ju d g e m e n t .  Then I  w i l l  make use o f  our  
d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h e  p r e s u m p t iv e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( b )  above .  I  
w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  by v i r t u e  o f  c e r t a i n  o f  t h e i r  u n d e r l y i n g  
needs,  i t  i s  r a t i o n a l  t o  presume t h a t  a l l  human b e in g s  a r e  
a l i k e  f o r  t h e  purposes  o f  moral  judgem en t  and t h a t  t h e  
burden o f  p r o o f  i s  on anyone who seeks t o  ju d g e  a p a r t i c u l a r  
case d i f f e r e n t l y .
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So when i t  i s  c la im e d  t h a t  a l l  human b e in g s  have c e r t a i n  
needs i n  common, what  a r e  t h e  needs i n  q u e s t i o n ?  And what  





NEEDS AND MORAL REASONS
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I  want  t o  show t h a t  in  c e r t a i n  o f  t h e i r  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  between one person  
and a n o t h e r .  Each c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i d e n t i f i e d ,  I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  
i s  a need .  I  w i l l  then  show t h a t  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  
p r o h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  unn ecessary  k i l l i n g ,  c a u s in g  p h y s i c a l  
s u f f e r i n g  and o t h e r  forms o f  i n j u r y ,  can be e x p l a i n e d  and 
j u s t i f i e d  in  te rm s  o f  m ee t in g  c e r t a i n  needs.  I  w i l l  a rg u e  
a l s o  t h a t  where a c o r r e c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a need o c c u rs  t h i s  
i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  a moral  ju d g e m e n t .
I  w i l l  b e g in ,  in  ( 1 ) ,  by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between two t y p e s  
o f  need ,  v o l i t i o n a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l . I  w i l l  t h e n ,  in
( 2 ) ,  i d e n t i f y  two ty p e s  o f  u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  
n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs; a n e e d ( a ) ,  which i s  t h e  sense i n  which  
som eth ing  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  a person i f  he o r  she i s  t o  
f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l ,  and a n e e d ( b ) ,  which i s  t h e  sense in  which  
a person  X needs F, i f  X i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y  o r  t o  
f l o u r i s h .  I  w i l l  show, in  ( 3 ) ,  how t h e  need ' t o  s u r v i v e 5 i s  
a n e e d ( a )  f o r  human be ings  and t h a t  ( 4 )  t h i s  i s  a r a t i o n a l l y  
c o m p e l l in g  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  moral  b e l i e f  t h a t  k i l l i n g  
a n o t h e r  human be ing  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong. I n  ( 5 )  I  w i l l  
c o n s i d e r ,  b r i e f l y ,  some o f  o u r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( b ) .  I n  ( 6 )  I  
w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  moral  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  n e e d (b )  t o  a v o id  
u n n ecess ary  s u f f e r i n g  and i n j u r y .  F i n a l l y ,  in  ( 7 ) ,  I  w i l l  
c o n s i d e r  some o b j e c t i o n s  t o  my t y p e  o f  a c c o u n t  made by 
P h i l l i p s  and Mounce ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
1. V o l i t i o n a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs
What e x a c t l y  do we mean when we a t t r i b u t e  a need t o
anyone? The answer we g i v e  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  by no means
o b v io u s  o r  i n d i s p u t a b l e .  T here  a r e  some t h i n g s  which a l l  
human b e in g s  need,  where what i s  needed i s  an i n d i s p e n s a b l e  
c o n d i t i o n  t o  s u s t a i n  l i f e ,  o r  t o  make i t  p o s s i b l e ;  t h i n g s
such as u n p o l l u t e d  a i r  and w a t e r ,  ( a b o u t  which we would a l l
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a g r e e  y e t  w h ic h ,  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  many o f  us have been l i a b l e  
t o  f o r g e t  t h a t  we need,  s i n c e  we had th e m ) .  T h e re  a r e  some 
t h i n g s  which we a l l  app ear  t o  need,  where what  i s  needed  
co n c e rn s  t h e  human mind.  For  i n s t a n c e ,  we say t h a t  a person  
needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  o r  needs a sense o f  h i s  o r  h e r  
own i d e n t i t y ;  we t a l k  o f  th e  need f o r  a c h ie v e m e n t ,  f o r  
s t a t u s ,  f o r  s e c u r i t y .  R e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  a r e  o t h e r  i te m s  we 
ap p e a r  t o  need w h ic h ,  though t h e y  a r e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l ,  have  
more t o  do w i t h  our  f u n c t i o n i n g  as s o c i a l  c r e a t u r e s ;  we 
speak o f  t h e  need f o r  a f f e c t i o n ,  f o r  t h e  esteem  o f  o t h e r s ,  
f o r  w ork ,  e t c .  P a r t  o f  what  i s  meant by c a l l i n g  such i tem s  
needs i s  t h a t ,  in  some sense ,  t h e y  a r e  re g a r d e d  as  
n e c e s s a r y .  P e op le  can need t h i n g s  w i t h o u t  w a n t in g  them;  
t h e y  can need t h i n g s  w i t h o u t  a l l o w i n g  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  needed.  
Thus X may need F, even where X does n o t  want  o r  d e s i r e  F,  
o r  f e e l  t h e  need f o r  F . 66
Added t o  t h i s  c o n f u s io n ,  t h e r e  a r e  i n d e f i n i t e l y  many 
needs we have where what  i s  needed i s  d i r e c t l y  con nected  
w i t h  our  wants  and d e s i r e s .  In  t h i s  sense ,  a need F i s  t h e  
o n l y  means f o r  o b t a i n i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  end t h a t  X w a n ts .  The 
wanted end m ig h t  be someth ing which has t o  be done t o  comply  
w i t h  a r e g u l a t i o n  o r  law; f o r  exam ple ,  i f  you want  t o  p a rk  
you r  c a r  in  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  c a r  p a r k ,  you need a p e r m i t ;  i f  
you a r e  go ing  ab ro a d ,  you need a p a s s p o r t .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  t h e  need m ig h t  be som eth ing  which i s  t h e  o n l y  means t o  
s a t i s f y  one o f  t h e  numerous o t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  wants  each  
i n d i v i d u a l  has .  I f  I  want  t o  t a k e  a pho tograph  th e n  I  need 
a camera;  i f  I  want  t o  do some c a r p e n t r y ,  I  need t o o l s ;  t o  
c l im b  a m o u n ta in ,  I  need ro p es ,  s p i k e s ,  and so on.  
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  such as th e s e  b eg in  t o  show, I  hope,  t h a t  i t  
i s  by no means c l e a r  what  needs a r e  and how one s e t s  abo u t  
a s s e s s in g  t h e i r  im p o r ta n c e ,  i f  any ,  t o  m o r a l i t y .
L e t  us b eg in  by n o t i c i n g  a few o f  t h e  l o g i c a l  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  o f  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  ' n e e d 5 above.  F i r s t l y ,  i n  t h e  
c l e a r e s t  s o r t s  o f  c as es ,  in  s e n te n c e s  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  v e r b  
' t o  n e e d ’ , t h e r e  has t o  be a s u b j e c t  X, which has t h e  need
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a s c r i b e d  t o  i t ,  t h e r e  has t o  be an o b j e c t  o r  f u n c t i o n  F t h a t  
i s  a need ,  and t h e r e  has t o  be an end R, o r  a purpose  R, f o r  
which F i s  needed.  Regarded in  t h i s  way, a need i s  an
i n s t r u m e n t  o r  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  a c h ie v e  a
p a r t i c u l a r  end .  I n  o t h e r  words 'X needs F i n  o r d e r  t o  R ’ . 
S e c o n d ly ,  as we n o te d ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x p re s s e d  by ' n e e d ’ 
i s  one o f  n e c e s s i t y .  (N o t  a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  n e c e s s i t y ,  
however can be e xp re ssed  in  te rm s  o f  a n e e d . 67) I t  i s  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  means r e q u i r e d  f o r  a s p e c i f i c  end.  
F i s  som eth ing  you must have i f  you a r e  go ing  t o  do a j o b ,  
s o l v e  a p rob lem ,  a c h ie v e  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e s u l t ,  e t c .  T h i r d l y ,  
f o r  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  *F i s  a n e e d ’ t o  be f u l l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  
t h e  end ( o b j e c t i v e ,  p urpo se)  R, f o r  which F i s  needed must  
be e x p l i c i t .  The o r d i n a r y  way o f  a s c e r t a i n i n g  w h e th e r  o r  
n o t  som eth ing  F i s  a need i s  t o  ask:  "What do you need F
f o r ? " .  I f  I  say " I  need F in  o r d e r  t o  a c h ie v e  R", f u r t h e r  
q u e s t i o n s  can a r i s e  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  R, i . e .  
"What do you need t o  a c h ie v e  R f o r ? " .  T h is  i s  t o  ask f o r  a 
more g e n e r a l  o b j e c t i v e  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  one i n i t i a l l y  g i v e n .  
We c o u ld  go on, o f  c o u rs e ,  s e e k in g  f u r t h e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f
o t h e r  g o a ls  and purposes which g i v e  d i r e c t i o n  and meaning t o
more s p e c i f i c  ends.
Are  we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  e v e r y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a need i s  a
r e f e r e n c e  t o  som eth ing  which i s  a n e c e s s a ry  means f o r
a c h i e v i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  end? Are we a b l e  t o  s a y ,  w i t h
H . F r a n k f u r t  ( 1 9 8 4 : 3 )  and o t h e r s , 68
. . . n o t h i n g  i s  needed e x c e p t  in  v i r t u e  o f  b e in g  an 
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  a 
c e r t a i n  end.
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  needs a r e  l i k e  t h i s .  We say t h a t  
a human b e in g  needs t o  b r e a t h e ,  a d i a b e t i c  needs i n s u l i n ,  an 
e l d e r l y  person needs warmth,  a c h i l d  needs a f f e c t i o n ;  we 
speak a l s o  o f  p e o p le  in  t h e  Horn o f  A f r i c a  ' b e i n g  in  n e e d ’ ; 
s o c i a l i s t s  t a l k  o f  g i v i n g  ' t o  each a c c o r d in g  t o  h i s  n e e d ’ , 69 
and so on.  As D .W ig g in s  and S.Dermen ( 1 9 8 7 : 6 4 )  p o i n t  o u t ,  
exam ples  such as t h e  above app ear  t o  r e q u i r e  a n o t h e r  sense
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o f  need ,  which  t h e y  c a l l  ' c a t e g o r i c a l ’ o r  ' a b s o l u t e ’ . A
c a t e g o r i c a l  need,  we a r e  t o l d ,  i s  t h e  sense
. . . b y  which t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  end o r  p u r p o s e . . . i s
a l r e a d y  f i x e d . . .
To u n d e r s ta n d  a need s t a t e m e n t  in  which t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  end  
o r  purpo se  i s  a l r e a d y  f i x e d ,  in  te rm s  o f  a means t o  an end ,  
i s  t o  m is c o n s t r u e  i t .
One reason f o r  t h i s  m ig h t  be t h a t  we need some t h i n g s  
p e r m a n e n t l y .  They can not  be t e m p o r a r i l y  w a iv ed  o r  g iv e n  up.
To see  t h i s ,  compare t h e  two s t a t e m e n t s  'X needs a camera in
o r d e r  t o  t a k e  a p h o t o g r a p h ’ and 'X needs t o  b r e a t h e  i n  o r d e r  
t o  s u r v i v e ’ . I n  t h e  f o r m e r  case ,  what  i s  needed i s  s i m p ly
a means t o  an end. Once th e  end i s  a c h ie v e d ,  v i z .  t h e
p h o to g ra p h  i s  t a k e n ,  X can d is p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  means, v i z .  t h e  
camera i s  no lo n g e r  needed.  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  ca s e ,  however ,  
b r e a t h i n g  i s  n o t  som eth ing  t h a t  X r e q u i r e s  and th e n  he can  
do w i t h o u t ;  r a t h e r  i t  i s  a permanent  c o n d i t i o n  needed f o r  
t h e  s u b j e c t ’ s s u r v i v a l .  S i m i l a r l y ,  ( t o  a d a p t  an example  o f  
a c a t e g o r i c a l  need s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  W igg ins  and Dermen ( i b i d ) 
g i v e  u s ) ,  a p a t i e n t  in  a s t a t e  o f  nervous  c o l l a p s e  needs
r e s t  and q u i e t .  Once t h i s  has been a c h ie v e d ,  r e s t  and q u i e t
a r e  n o t  th e n  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  can be d is p e n s e d  w i t h ,  r a t h e r  
t h e y  ap p e a r  t o  be r e q u i r e d  on a c o n t i n u i n g  b a s is  t o  meet  
t h e  end i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e  p a t i e n t ’ s s t a t e  o f  w e l l - b e i n g .
We can see h e re  a second reason f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h e  
means-end a n a l y s i s  o f  c e r t a i n  need s t a t e m e n t s  m ig h t  be 
t h o u g h t  t o  d i s t o r t  t h e i r  sense.  S o - c a l l e d  c a t e g o r i c a l  needs  
a r e  n o t  m e r e ly  a means t o  an end b u t  a r e  a l s o  p a r t  o f  t h e  
end i t s e l f .  What app ears  t o  be t h e  means t o  an end,  
b r e a t h i n g  in  o r d e r  t o  s u r v i v e ,  i s  a l s o  p a r t  and p a r c e l  o f  
what we mean by s u r v i v i n g  as a human b e i n g .  S i m i l a r l y ,  r e s t  
and q u i e t  ap p ear  t o  be needed f o r  t h e  p a t i e n t ’ s w e l l - b e i n g  
y e t  t h e y  a r e  p a r t  o f  what c o n s t i t u t e s  h i s  w e l l - b e i n g ,  which  
i s  t h e  end we a r e  t o l d  t h e y  a r e  needed t o  m eet .  To p u t  t h e  
p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ;  by s u p p ly in g  t h e  end in  such c a s e s ,  one 
i s  f i l l i n g  o u t  th e  whole  o f  which t h e  t h i n g  needed i s  one  
p a r t .
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T h e re  i s  a t h i r d  reason why s u p p ly in g  t h e  end o f  a 
c a t e g o r i c a l  need s t a t e m e n t  m ig h t  be t h o u g h t  t o  be odd.  
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  means-end s t r a t e g y  above,  someone m ig h t  ask :  
"Why does t h e  p a t i e n t  in  a s t a t e  o f  nervous  c o l l a p s e  need a 
p r i v a t e  room?"* P u t t i n g  t h e  need s t a t e m e n t  i n t o  a f ram ew ork  
o f  b r o a d e r  g e n e r a l i t y  we m ig h t  respond "He needs a p r i v a t e  
room in  o r d e r  t o  have co m p le te  r e s t  and q u i e t " .  The 
i n t e r l o c u t o r  m ig h t  th en  ask "What end do t h e y  ( r e s t  and 
q u i e t )  se rv e ? " .  To say t h a t  t h e  end in  q u e s t i o n  i s  h i s ,  t h e  
p a t i e n t ’ s ,  good h e a l t h  and w e l l - b e i n g ,  i s  t o  say som eth ing  
s l i g h t l y  p e c u l i a r .  I t  i s  odd, p a r t l y  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  p a t i e n t ’ s w e l l - b e i n g  i s  f a r  more o b v io u s  and p e r v a s i v e  
an end th a n  some o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  ends m ent ioned  e a r l i e r .  
The end in  q u e s t i o n  i s  so o b v io u s ,  i t  m ig h t  seem p o i n t l e s s  
t o  s t a t e  i t .  Thus we m ig h t  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  means-ends  
a n a l y s i s  d i s t o r t s  t h e  sense o f  c e r t a i n  need s t a t e m e n t s . 70
However,  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  none o f  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
above g e t  us t o  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
c e r t a i n  needs in  which t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  end o r  purpose i s  
a l r e a d y  f i x e d .  An ad e q u a te  acc o u n t  o f  t h i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  
r e q u i r e s  a l s o  t h a t  som eth ing  be s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  non-  
v o l i t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  needs in  q u e s t i o n .  A l th o u g h  many 
o f  t h e  t h i n g s  we have m ent ioned  so f a r ,  cam eras ,  ro p e s ,  
s p i k e s ,  a r e  needed in  o r d e r  t o  s a t i s f y  ends t h e  a g e n t  
h i m s e l f  w an ts ,  a f e a t u r e  o f  s o - c a l l e d  c a t e g o r i c a l  needs i s  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  means f o r  a t t a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  
t h a t  a r e  unconnected w i t h  t h e  a g e n t ’ s w an ts .  L e t  me r e p e a t  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  h e r e :  i t  i s  between th o s e  t h i n g s  needed in
o r d e r  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  a g e n t ’ s own w an ts ,  ( d e s i r e s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  
p r e f e r e n c e s )  and th o s e  t h i n g s  which a r e  t h e  n e c e s s a ry  means 
f o r  a t t a i n i n g  ends which an a g e n t  has ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  what  he 
w a n ts .  A d i s t i n c t i o n  which c a p t u r e s  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
between v o l i t i o n a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d s . 71
I f  I  want  t o  t a k e  a pho tograph  th e n  my want  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  
c e r t a i n  i n s t r u m e n t a l  needs; e . g .  a camera w i t h  a f i l m .  I  
can n o t  s a t i s f y  my want  w i t h o u t  them. S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  i f  I
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want  t o  hang t h e  f ram ed pho tograph  on t h e  w a l l ,  t o  s a t i s f y  
t h i s  d i f f e r e n t  want  o f  mine,  I  need a hammer and a n a i l .  I  
need a hammer, s p i k e s ,  ropes e t c . ,  i f  I  d e s i r e  t o  c l i m b  a 
m o u n ta in ;  a s t a t e m e n t  o f  my d e s i r e  t o  c l i m b  a m ounta in  
s e r v e s  as an e x p l a n a t i o n  o r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
needs .  L e t  us c a l l  t h e s e  ' v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d s ’ .
S in c e  t h e y  concern  a v o l i t i o n a l  end,  c l a i m s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  
a p p e a r  t o  be c o n t e s t a b l e .  N o t i c e ,  however,  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  need t h a t  i s  c o n t e s t a b l e .  I f  i n  f a c t  
i t  i s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  means t o  s e c u r in g  t h e  end in  v ie w ,  th e n  
t h e  need d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  t r u e .  I f  n o t ,  i t  i s  f a l s e .  The 
p o i n t  i s ,  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  we t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  need o u g h t  t o  be 
s a t i s f i e d  w i l l  depend on our  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  end a t  which  
t h e  need i s  d i r e c t e d .  I n  t h i s  sen se ,  ( r e g a rd e d  as p a r t  o f  
a v o l i t i o n a l  c l a i m ) ,  i t  m ig h t  n o t  be d e s i r a b l e  t o  s a t i s f y  a 
p e r s o n ’ s p a r t i c u l a r  need. I f  my youngest  d a u g h t e r  says  t h a t  
she needs a hammer, ro p es ,  e t c .  because she wants t o  c l im b  
a m o u n ta in ,  I  m ig h t  r e a s o n a b ly  q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  t h i s  i s  a 
need t h a t  sho u ld  be s a t i s f i e d .  A person who wants t o  commit  
a c r im e  needs t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  and means t o  do so b u t ,  
p re s u m a b ly ,  we s h o u ld  no t  f e e l  i n c l i n e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e s e  
n e e d s .
Due t o  t h e  w ide  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  our  wants ( e t c . ) ,  
v o l i t i o n a l  needs v a r y  enorm ously  f rom  one person t o  a n o t h e r .  
One person needs a hammer and a hook t o  hang a f ram ed  
p h o togra ph  on th e  w a l 1, a n o t h e r  can not  s ta n d  p h o togra phs  on 
w a l l s ;  one person needs ropes in  o r d e r  t o  c l im b  m o u n ta in s ,  
f o r  a n o t h e r  t h e  i d e a  o f  c l i m b i n g  m ounta ins  f o r  f u n ,  b o r d e rs  
on i n s a n i t y .  One person needs a new s u i t ,  a n o t h e r  needs a 
v a c a t i o n ,  and so on. The numerous d i f f e r e n c e s  in  our  
v o l i t i o n a l  needs overshadow our  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  b e ing  
common, n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs.
U n l i k e  v o l i t i o n a l  needs,  some o f  t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  we need 
do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  im p ly  a n y t h i n g  ab o u t  t h e  o w n e r ’ s w a n t in g ,  
p r e f e r r i n g  o r  d e s i r i n g  a f u r t h e r  end .  These a r e  t h i n g s  t h a t  
we need n o n -v o l  i t i o n a l  1 y . They a r e  n o t  a s c e r t a i n e d  by
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a s k in g  t h e  a g e n t  ab o u t  t h e  ends f o r  which  he needs t h e  t h i n g  
i n  q u e s t i o n .  When he n o n - v o l i t i o n a l l y  needs som eth ing  h i s  
t e s t i m o n y  c a r r i e s  no more w e ig h t  than  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  anyone  
e l s e  e q u a l l y  o b s e r v a n t .  I n  t h i s  sen se ,  he needs t o  be a b l e  
b r e a t h e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  h i s  d e s i r e  t o  do so ,  whereas  i f  he 
has ceased b r e a t h i n g  ( w h i l e  h i s  h e a r t  i s  s t i l l  b e a t i n g )  he 
n o n - v o l i t i o n a l 1y needs a r t i f i c i a l  r e s p i r a t i o n ;  i f  h i s  h e a r t  
rhythm i s  i r r e g u l a r  he needs an a r t i f i c i a l  pacemaker;  i f  he 
i s  d i a b e t i c  he needs i n s u l i n ,  and so on. S i m i l a r l y ,  we may 
say t h a t  t h e  p a t i e n t  in  a s t a t e  o f  nervous  c o l l a p s e  non-  
vo l  i t i o n a l  l y  needs a p r i v a t e  room f o r  c o m p le te  r e s t  and 
q u i e t ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  poor s o u l ’ s c u r r e n t  w ish t o  be in  
t h e  g e n e r a l  ward;  t h e  d i a b e t i c  needs i n s u l i n ,  even i f  he 
says he does n o t  want  i t .  And he c o n t i n u e s  t o  need i n s u l i n ,
even i f  he n e v e r  wants i t  a g a i n .  What we a r e  c a l l i n g  non-
vo l  i t i o n a l  needs,  in  o t h e r  words,  a r e  th o s e  t h i n g s  which a r e  
t h e  n e c e s s a ry  means f o r  a t t a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  con nected  w i t h  a p e r s o n ’ s own w an ts .
For  reasons  such as t h e  above,  ( v i z .  t h e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  
n a t u r e  o f  some o f  our  needs,  t h e  o d d i t y  o f  a s k in g  why t h e y  
a r e  needed,  e t c . ) ,  w h i l e  t h e  means-end form  o f  a n a l y s i s  i s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  v o l i t i o n a l  needs,  i t  may be t h o u g h t  t o  
d i s t o r t  t h e  sense o f  c e r t a i n  need s t a t e m e n t s .  N o n e th e le s s  
a means-end ac c o u n t  o f  a n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  need i s  p o s s i b l e  and 
can be i l l u m i n a t i n g .  By p u t t i n g  i t  i n t o  a f ram ework  o f
b r o a d e r  g e n e r a l i t y ,  in  which t h e  ends a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  
s p e c i f i e d ,  we can make th e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  need s t a t e m e n t  
f u l l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e .  Thus t o  p u t  'X needs a r t i f i c i a l
r e s p i r a t i o n ’ i n t o  t h e  framework  o f  b r o a d e r  g e n e r a l i t y  would  
r e q u i r e  t h a t  we th en  say why X needs a r t i f i c i a l  r e s p i r a t i o n ,  
i . e .  in  o r d e r  t o  p u t  oxygen i n t o  h i s  b lo o d ,  which he needs  
i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b le  t h e  h e a r t  muscle  and r e s p i r a t o r y  a r e a  o f  
h i s  b r a i n  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  e t c . . . ,  which u l t i m a t e l y  he needs in  
o r d e r  t o  s u r v i v e .  ( S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  a f ram ew ork  o f  b r o a d e r  
g e n e r a l i t y ,  an i n v a l i d  needs an a r t i f i c i a l  pacemaker  t o
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e s t a b l i s h  a r e g u l a r  h e a r t b e a t ,  and so on,  t h e  d i a b e t i c  needs  
i n s u l i n  t o  m e t a b o l i s e  g lu c o s e  i n  h i s  body, and so f o r t h . )
N o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs,  t h e n ,  a r e  t h e  n e c e s s a ry  means f o r  
a t t a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  co n n e c te d  w i t h  
a p e r s o n ’ s own w ants .  What i s  needed in  such cases  c o n n e c ts  
u l t i m a t e l y  t o  ends t h a t  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d  and th e n  d is p e n s e d  
w i t h  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  a r e  a permanent  c o n d i t i o n  which t h e  
s u b j e c t  has .  The com ple te  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  what  i s  needed i s  
p a r t  o f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  end i t s e l f .  And, f i n a l l y ,  we 
would  n o t  n o r m a l ly  ask abo ut  -  l e t  a l o n e  e v a l u a t e  -  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  end s e rv e d  by such needs.  The end o r  p u rp o se ,  as  
W ig g in s  and Dermen s ay ,  i s  a l r e a d y  f i x e d .
I t  m ig h t  seem te m p t in g  t o  g i v e  a f u l l e r  a cc o u n t  o f  non-  
vo l  i t i o n a l  need s t a t e m e n t s ,  in  te rm s  o f  what  some 
p h i l o s o p h e r s  c a l l  ' t r u e  w a n t s ’ . 72 However needs o f  bo th  t h e  
v o l i t i o n a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  k i n d ,  d i f f e r  to p  and bottom  
f ro m  wants  o f  any s o r t .  The d i f f e r e n c e  can be seen in  any  
number o f  ways. I  w i l l  m ent ion  a fe w .  F i r s t l y ,  a need -  
reason  e x p re s s e s  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  n e c e s s i t y .  I t  i s  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  an i te m  as t h e  o n l y  means t o  an end.  Whether  
X needs F o r  n o t  depends s o l e l y  on w h e th er  o r  n o t  F - i n g  i s  
t h e  o n l y  way t o  meet t h e  end s t a t e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e r e  i s  
no n e c e s s i t y  t o  o n e ’ s p a r t i c u l a r  w a n ts ,  e t c .  S e c o n d ly ,  one  
can need so m eth in g ,  we s a i d ,  w i t h o u t  b e in g  aware t h a t  one  
needs i t .  The man in  a s t a t e  o f  nervous  c o l l a p s e  needs a 
p r i v a t e  room though he m ig h t  n o t  b e l i e v e  he needs i t .  I t  
c o u ld  be t h e  case t h a t  he w i l l  n e v e r  want  what  he needs b u t ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  we c o n t i n u e  t o  speak o f  t h e  person h a v in g  t h e  
need in  q u e s t i o n .  T h is  would be an odd c l a i m  t o  make abo ut  
h i s  w a n ts .  I f  he says he wants  o r  p r e f e r s  som eth ing  h i s  
t e s t im o n y  i s  u s u a l l y  e v id e n c e  f o r  t h i s .  I f  Sm ith  says he
wants  s p in a c h  r a t h e r  th an  k a l e ,  h i s  s a y in g  so i s  s u f f i c i e n t
e v id e n c e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e d  p r e f e r e n c e .  When he non-
vo l  i t i o n a l  l y  needs som eth in g ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, h i s
a d d i t i o n a l  t e s t im o n y  so o n l y  begs t h e  q u e s t i o n .  As we 
n o t e d ,  h i s  o p i n i o n  c a r r i e s  no more f o r c e  than  t h e  v iew s  o f
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anyone e l s e .  T h i r d l y ,  i f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t o  t a l k  o f  a need o f  
e i t h e r  s o r t  i m p l i e s  some end o r  o b j e c t i v e  ( a l b e i t  t h a t  t h e  
need in  q u e s t i o n  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  e n d ) ,  whereas t o  t a l k  o f  
wants  o r  p r e f e r e n c e s  does n o t .  I  can say “ I  want  s p in a c h  
and n o t  k a l e "  and i f  somebody asks me "Why?", we no ted  t h a t  
I  can i n t e l l i g i b l y  r e p l y  " I  d o n ’ t  know why. I  j u s t  happen  
t o " .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t o  say " I  need sp in a c h "  n e c e s s a r i l y  
i m p l i e s  an o b j e c t i v e ,  e . g .  I  l a c k  s u c h -a n d -s u c h  and s p in a c h  
i s  t h e  o n l y  food  t h a t  w i l l  g i v e  me i t .  Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  in  
t h e  c l e a r e s t  ca s e s ,  w a n t in g  r e f e r s  t o  a s u b j e c t i v e  s t a t e ,  
w hereas a need i s  a s c r i b e d  o b j e c t i v e l y  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t .  T h i s  
can be seen most c l e a r l y  in  th e  case o f  n o n -v o l  i t i o n a l  
needs .  H is  v e r b a l  r e p o r t s  on h i s  s u b j e c t i v e  s t a t e s  v i z .  " I  
want  F " ,  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  
t h e  s u b j e c t  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l 1y needs F. And a l th o u g h  
v o l i t i o n a l  needs depend on t h e  wants o f  a g e n ts  f o r  t h e  
c h o ic e  o f  ends,  g iv e n  th e  end t h a t  i s  w anted ,  a v o l i t i o n a l  
need i s  a n e c e s s a ry  means f o r  a c h i e v i n g  i t . 73 Needs a r e
d i s t i n c t ,  t h e n ,  f rom  wants ( d e s i r e s ,  p r e f e r e n c e s ) ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e y  o f t e n  con verge  on th e  same o b j e c t .  A need w i l l  o f t e n
f i n d  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e x p r e s s i o n  in  t h e  language  o f
w a n t s . 74
I  have t o  make one f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n .  I  w i l l  show
s h o r t l y  t h a t  in c l u d e d  among t h e  c l a s s  o f  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l
needs a r e  c e r t a i n  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  which a r e
u n i v e r s a l .  T here  a r e  needs,  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  which a l l
p e o p le  must have t h r o u g h o u t  t h e i r  l i v e s ,  o r  which must occ u r
a t  c e r t a i n  s ta g e s  in  e v e r y  p e r s o n ’ s l i f e .  The g e n e r a l  p o i n t
h e re  i s  t h a t  we have c e r t a i n  o f  our  needs in  common. For
exa m ple ,  we need t o  b r e a t h e ,  we need fo o d ,  we need s h e l t e r .
The n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  such needs ap p e a rs  t o  be
i n c o n t e s t a b l e .  D .B ra y b ro o k e  c a l l s  t h e s e  ' c o u r s e - o f - 1 i f e
n e e d s ’ . Such needs,  he w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 7 : 3 2 )
. . . d o  n o t  depend on p r e f e r e n c e s :  P e o p le  have (such  
needs)  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  what  t h e y  w is h ,  p r e f e r ,  want  
o t h e r w i s e ,  o r  choose.
E very  human b e in g  needs t o  b r e a t h e ,  t o  e a t ,  t o  r e s t ,  in  
o r d e r  t o  s u r v i v e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i r e  
f o r  i t .  Such needs a r e  n o t  c u l t u r a l l y  o r  h i s t o r i c a l l y  
v a r i a b l e .  We would say t h a t  p e o p le  in  t h e  Horn o f  A f r i c a  
need f o o d ,  s h e l t e r ,  e t c . ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  
u r g e n t l y  want  i t .  They a r e  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n s ,  m o reo ve r ,  
f o r  any o r  a l l  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r  ends o r  purposes  
which a person m ig h t  p u rs u e .  L e t  us look  a t  t h e s e  c l a i m s  in  
more d e t a i 1.
Two k in d s  o f  u n i v e r s a l ,  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs
Types o f  u n i v e r s a l  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs can be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  For  o u r  pu rp o ses ,  i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  
r e c o g n is e  two o f  them. A u n i v e r s a l  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  need,  
which  we w i l l  c a l l  a n e e d ( a ) ,  i s  t h e  sense in  which an 
i n d i v i d u a l  X needs som eth ing  F in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  o r  t o  
c o n t i n u e  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  as an o b j e c t  o f  a c e r t a i n  k i n d .  To 
p u t  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  w i t h o u t  F, X i s  p r e c lu d e d  f rom  
b e in g  a t h i n g  o f  t h a t  k i n d .  The s o r t  o f  t h i n g s  I  am 
r e f e r r i n g  t o  by n e e d s ( a ) ,  in  o t h e r  words,  a r e  t h e  s o r t  o f  
t h i n g s  which a r e  u n i v e r s a l l y  t r u e  o f  persons  f o r  them t o  
f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l .  They f a l l  b r o a d ly  i n t o  t h r e e  groups;  needs  
o f  t h e  body, o f  t h e  mind,  and s o c i a l  needs.
The c l e a r e s t  cases o f  n e e d s ( a )  a r e  b o d i l y  needs.  To 
f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l ,  f o r  exam ple ,  a human b e in g  n e e d s ( a )  t o  be 
p h y s i c a l l y  a l i v e .  He has a b r a i n ,  a s p i n a l  c o r d ,  a h e a r t ,  
lungs  and o t h e r  v i t a l  o r g a n s ,  which need t o  work.  T h e re  a r e  
o t h e r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( a ) ,  a l s o ,  i f  human b e in g s  a r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  
t o  l i v e ,  such as t h e  need t o  e a t ,  t o  d r i n k ,  t o  e l i m i n a t e ,  t o  
b r e a t h e ,  t o  e x e r c i s e ,  t o  r e s t  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  and t h e  need f o r  
an e n v i r o n m e n t  w i t h i n  which l i f e  can be s u s t a i n e d .  Some o f  
o u r  b o d i l y  needs a r e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  more c o n s t a n t  th a n  o t h e r s .  
A f t e r  you have t a k e n  a b r e a t h ,  you need t o  e x h a l e  and t a k e  
a n o t h e r  whereas a f t e r  you have e a t e n  w e l l  o r  s l e p t  w e l l ,  you 
do n o t  need t o  e a t  o r  s l e e p  a g a in  f o r  a w h i l e .  A l l  such 
needs a r e  u n i v e r s a l .  I n  so f a r  as we can t e l l ,  in  e v e r y
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c u l t u r e  t h a t  e v e r  has been and e v e r  w i l l  be ,  p e o p le  have  
needed and w i l l  need t o  f e e d ,  t o  d r i n k ,  t o  e l i m i n a t e ;  i f  
t h e y  g e t  t o o  h o t  o r  t o o  c o l d ,  t h e y  w i l l  d i e ,  and so on.  
T h e re  a r e  o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  human b e in g s  n e e d ( a )  t o  p r e s e r v e  
t h e i r  b o d ie s  i n t a c t ,  beyond what  i s  c o v ered  by t h e  p r e c e d in g  
i t e m s ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  we a l l  need t o  a v o id  s e r i o u s  i n j u r y  t o  
o u r  v i t a l  o r g a n s .  I n  t h i s  sense ,  a l s o ,  we a l l  n e e d ( a )  
p r o t e i n ,  we a l l  n e e d (a )  t o  m e t a b o l i s e  t h e  g lu c o s e  in  our  
b o d ie s ,  e t c .
I  t h i n k  i t  i s  f a i r  t o  say o f  t h e  needs l i s t e d  above ,  t h a t  
no one can s e n s i b l y  deny them. They a r e  b i o l o g i c a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  need t o  be met f o r  human b e in g s  t o  f u n c t i o n  
a t  a l l .  A l th o u g h  i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  o b v io u s  w h a t ,  i f  
a n y t h i n g ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  between them and o u r  o r d i n a r y  
moral  b e l i e f s  o r  th e  moral  judgem ents  t h a t  we make.
The n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d s ( a )  t h a t  a person has do n o t  s to p  
h e r e .  T h e re  a r e ,  a l s o ,  c o g n i t i v e  and c o n a t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s ,  
a f f e c t i v e  and e m o t io n a l  d i s p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  a l l  p e o p le
n e e d ( a ) ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  -  o r  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  
f u n c t i o n  -  as p e rs o n s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  we a r e  r a t i o n a l
c r e a t u r e s ;  I  w i l l  a rg u e  in  C h a p te r  F i v e  t h a t  a person  
n e e d s ( a ) ,  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ,  t o  t h i n k .  We n e e d ( a )  some l e v e l  
o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  on some o c c a s io n s  we need 
t o  choose r a t i o n a l l y  and t o  a c t  f r e e l y .  We have f e e l i n g s
and e m o t io n a l  s t a t e s  which a l s o  app ear  t o  be p s y c h o l o g i c a l
n e e d s ( a ) ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  some p l e a s u r a b l e  
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  t h e  d r i v e  t o  promote s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  e t c .  I  
w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  i t  i s  i m p o s s ib le  t o  t h i n k  o f  a p e rso n ,  
however much t h i s  co n cep t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  s o c i a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  
as b e in g  o t h e r  th an  som eth ing  which n e e d s ( a )  s e l f - a c t i v i t y  
o f  t h i s  s o r t .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  a range o f  n e e d s ( a )  w h ic h ,  though t h e y  
a r e  con nec ted  w i t h  o u r  p s y c h o lo g y ,  have more t o  do w i t h  a 
p e r s o n ’ s f u n c t i o n i n g  as a s o c i a l  b e in g .  I  hope t o  show, f o r  
exam ple ,  t h a t  any p e rso n ,  a t  some t im e  in  t h e i r  l i v e s ,  
n e e d s ( a )  p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T h i s  means, a t  t h e  l e a s t ,
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t h e y  need some l e v e l  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  and s o c i a l  a c c e p t a n c e ,  
some d eg re e  o f  sympathy and r e s p e c t  f rom  o t h e r  p e rso n s ;  
though we must a l l o w ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  f o r  a c e r t a i n  e l a s t i c i t y  in  
how t h e s e  needs a p p ly  in  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s .  L i k e  b o d i l y  
needs ,  however,  we c an n o t  p r e t e n d  t h a t  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
i te m s  h e re  a r e  m e r e ly  c o n v e n t i o n a l .  We s h o u ld  n o t i c e  a l s o  
t h a t  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs i d e n t i f i e d  a r e  n o t  m o r a l l y  good 
i n  any usual  sense o f  t h i s  t e r m .  They a r e  s im p ly  t h i n g s  
t h a t  a person needs in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n .
B e fo r e  d i s c u s s in g  t h e  second t y p e  o f  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  need,
I  want  t o  m ent ion  t h r e e  o f  t h e  many p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t i o n s  t o
t h e  c l a i m s  above.  I  have c la im e d  t h a t  any n o n - v o l i t i o n a l
need can be p r o f i t a b l y  a n a ly z e d  as a means t o  a c e r t a i n  end
and t h a t  one n e e d (a )  t h a t  human b e in g s  have ,  i s  t h e  need ' t o
s u r v i v e ’ , ( t o  be a l i v e  and t o  remain  a l i v e ) .  I t  has been
q u e r i e d :  can one s e n s i b l y  s ay ,  u s in g  t h e  language o f  needs,
t h a t  a person needs t o  s u r v i v e ?  How a r e  we t o  say t h a t  t h i s
i s  i n s t r u m e n t a l  t o  a c h i e v i n g  o t h e r  ends? S u r e l y ,  t h e r e  i s
no more fundam en ta l  end t h a t  a person c o u ld  invoke?  As
D .B r a y b r o o k e  ( 1 9 8 7 : 3 1 )  w r i t e s :
(A p e rs o n )  does n o t  have t o  e x p l a i n  o r  j u s t i f y  
a im in g  t o  l i v e . . . I t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  end t h a t  he 
m ig h t  be e x p e c te d  t o  have as a moral  a g e n t . . .  
However,  t h e r e  i s  no more fundam en ta l  e n d . . .
We can s ay ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  a human b e in g  needs fo o d ,
meaning by t h i s  t h a t  i t  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  f a c t  a b o u t  any human
b e in g  t h a t  he o r  she needs a c e r t a i n  amount o f  food  i f  t h e y
a r e  t o  s u r v i v e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  we may e x p l a i n  t h e  need t o  a v o id
s e r i o u s  i n j u r y  in  te rm s  o f  s u r v i v a l .  I f  t h e  human body
d e t e r i  o r a t e s , o r  i f  i t  i s  so s e v e r e l y  damaged t h a t  i t s
c o n t i n u e d  f u n c t i o n i n g  i s  i m p o s s i b le ,  th e n  s u r v i v a l  i s
i m p o s s i b l e .  The p o i n t  i s ,  b e ing  a l i v e  and r e m a in in g  a l i v e
seems t o  be t h e  end f o r  th e s e  o t h e r  needs.  For  t h i s  reas o n ,
i t  i s  s a i d ,  we sho u ld  no t  speak o f  ' t h e  need t o  s u r v i v e ’ f o r
s u r v i v a l  i s  a lways  an u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  , fun d am en ta l  end.
I  hope t o  show t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i . e .  t h a t  q u e s t i o n s  do n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  come t o  a h a l t  when t h e  end o r  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t h a t
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o f  r e m a in in g  a l i v e .  S u r v i v a l  can be u n d e rs to o d  as a n e e d ( a )  
f o r  some f u r t h e r  ends.  Once a r t i c u l a t e d ,  m o re o v e r ,  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  ends th row  l i g h t  on t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between t h e  need 
i n  q u e s t i o n  and some o f  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  b e l i e f s .
A second o b j e c t i o n  runs l i k e  t h i s :  i f  i t  i s  conceded t h a t
a person  has c e r t a i n  n e e d s ( a )  th en  i t  i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o
see  t h a t  t h e r e  can be a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them and any
moral  judgem en ts  t h a t  we make. I f  ex h y p o th e s i  e v e ry o n e
needs t o  F in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be no p o i n t
i n  s a y in g  t o  someone t h a t  he ought  t o  F o r  t h a t  he o ug ht  n o t
t o  F. T h i s  i s  t h e  sense o f  C . B a t t e r s b y  ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 7 2 )  o b j e c t i o n
( t o  M .M id g le y  ( 1 9 7 9 ) )  when she w r i t e s :
I f  a l l  men were u n i v e r s a l l y  and n e c e s s a r i l y  
a g g r e s s i v e  ( v i z .  th e y  need t o  be a g g r e s s i v e  i n  o r d e r  
t o  f u n c t i o n )  then  i t  would be p o i n t l e s s  t o  a s s e r t  
'You ought  t o  be n o n - a g g r e s s i v e ’ . . .
I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  we sho u ld  con c lu d e  f rom  t h i s  t h a t  i f  needs
a r e  u n i v e r s a l  and nec e s s a ry  f e a t u r e s  o f  p e rs o n s ,  t h e r e  seems
no p o i n t  in  bas in g  moral  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  upon them.
My g e n e r a l  response h e re  w i l l  be t o  show t h a t  even i f  F 
( a g g r e s s i o n  o r  w h a t e v e r )  i s  u n i v e r s a l  and n e c e s s a ry  f o r  
perso ns  we can s t i l l  ask i f  i t  ought  t o  be. We can s e n s i b l y  
ask :  sh o u ld  m o r a l l y  th e  n e e d (a )  t o  be a g g r e s s i v e  be
s a t i s f i e d ?  The p o i n t  i s ,  one need can y i e l d  t o  a n o t h e r .  A 
person  can choose,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  cease  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a 
human b e in g  -  ( i . e .  he can choose t o  d i e )  -  f o r  t h e  sake o f  
what  he re g a r d s  t o  be a more im p o r t a n t  end.  S i m i l a r l y ,  one 
p e r s o n ’ s l i f e  can be t e r m i n a t e d  by a n o t h e r  t o  meet  ends 
which a r e  deemed t o  be o f  g r e a t e r  v a l u e .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  as  
we s h a l l  s e e ,  we have no d i f f i c u l t y  in  u n d e r s ta n d in g  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  n e e d - r e a s o n  and t h e  moral  
ju d g e m e n t .
A t h i r d  o b j e c t i o n  we shou ld  n o t e ,  in  p a s s in g ,  i s  t h e
d e n i a l  t h a t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d r i v e s  o r  c a p a c i t i e s ,  l i k e  s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o r  f o r  p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  a r e  p r o p e r
n e e d s ( a ) .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  H .McCloskey ( 1 9 7 6 : 4 )  c l a i m s :
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  a t  t h e  c o n c e p tu a l  l e v e l  a t  l e a s t  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  n a t u r a l  d r i v e s ,  d e s i r e s ,  w an ts ,
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e x p e c t a t i o n s . . .  f rom  needs.
T h e re  a r e  two reasons  he g i v e s  f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t l y ,  because  
i t  i s  an e m p i r i c a l  m a t t e r  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i tem s  
o f  t h i s  s o r t  r e l a t e  t o  needs;  f o r  exam ple ,  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  a 
l a c k  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  le a d s  t o  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
s e l f .  Here  McCloskey seems t o  be s a y in g  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
needs has a c o r r e c t  use t h a t  must be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  needs o f  
t h e  s h a r e d ,  p h y s ic a l  s o r t .  Whereas t a l k  o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
needs,  because t h e y  r e f e r  n o t  t o  th e  r e q u i s i t e s  o f  n a t u r a l  
grow th  o r  s u r v i v a l  b u t  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l  f u n c t i o n i n g  as a 
p e rs o n ,  a r e  f o r f e i t  as n e e d s . 75
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  my argument w i l l  run som eth ing  l i k e  t h i s .  
Our minds a r e  n o t  t a b u ! a  r a s a , p a s s i v e l y  r e a c t i n g  t o  
s t i m u l i .  There  i s  such a t h i n g  as 'human n a t u r e ’ . I t  
i n c l u d e s  an i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  s h a re d ,  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l , 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  d r i v e s ,  e t c .  W h i le  
t h e y  a r e  a d m i t t e d l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  our  b o d i l y  needs and t o  
a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  c u l t u r a l l y  o r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  d e t e r m in e d ,  a t  
r o c k - b o t t o m  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i tem s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  a r e  u n i v e r s a l ,  
n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs f o r  pe rso n s .
I  w i l l  p o i n t  t o  such d i v e r s e  f i e l d s  as s o c i o b i o l o g y ,  
e x p e r i m e n t a l  p s y c h o lo g y ,  p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c  t h e o r y ,  t o  show 
som eth ing  o f  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e s e  c l a i m s . 76 
However my needs t h e s i s  i s  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  m e r e ly  by 
e m p i r i c a l  a p p e a l s .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  i s  s u p p o r te d  a l s o  
by arguments  o f  an a p r i o r i  s o r t .  For i n s t a n c e ,  no m a t t e r  
how t h e  c o n cep t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  s o c i a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  I  w i l l  
arg u e  t h a t  we c o u ld  n o t  i d e n t i f y  persons  as o t h e r  th an  
p o s s e s s in g  th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  
d r i v e s ,  t o  be d is c u s s e d .  I  w i l l  show a l s o  t h a t  such needs  
a r e ,  so t o  speak ,  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  l o c a t e d ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  
w i t h o u t  p resu p p o s in g  them we can n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  e x p l a i n  
c e r t a i n  moral p r a c t i c e s .  F u r t h e r ,  I  w i l l  show t h a t  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  c e r t a i n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  ( v i z .  need -  
r e a s o n s )  a r e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons in  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  
judgem ents  in  which t h e y  o c c u r .
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M c C lo s k e y ’ s o t h e r  reason f o r  w a n t in g  t o  keep ( b o d i l y )
needs and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s  d i s t i n c t ,  i s  t h a t  some o f  t h e
l a t t e r  c o u ld  be d e s t r u c t i v e  and ha rm fu l  and,  u n l i k e  b o d i l y
needs ,  do n o t  d e s e rv e  t o  be met .  He w r i t e s  ( i b i d )
T h i s  i s  most e v i d e n t l y  t r u e  o f  t h e  d r i v e s  which  
o c c u r  in  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  I f  t h e  d r i v e  
becomes s t r o n g  e n o u g h . . . w e  may w ish t o  d e s c r i b e  i t  
as a com pu ls ion  because we see i t  as som eth ing  t o  be 
checked and even e l i m i n a t e d ,  i f  t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  
r a t h e r  than  as someth ing t o  be appeased as r e l a t i n g  
t o  a need.
I t  seems th en  t h a t  f rom a n o r m a t iv e  v i e w p o i n t ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
d r i v e s  can be t ro u b le s o m e .  To r e f e r  t o  them as needs i s  
i n v i t i n g  t r o u b l e  and i t  i s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l , r e l a t i v e  t o  t a l k  
a b o u t  p h y s i c a l  needs.
I  want  t o  que ry  t h i s  way o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  d e s t r u c t i v e  and 
h a rm fu l  d r i v e s  on two grounds.  F i r s t l y ,  even though we have  
ado pted  i t  as a c o n v e n i e n t  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  n o t  a hard  
and f a s t  d i v i d e  between th e  two s e t s  o f  needs.  T h e re  i s  a 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d im ens ion  t o  most b o d i l y  needs and v i c e  v e r s a . 
For  i n s t a n c e ,  many b i o l o g i c a l  d i s o r d e r s  ( e . g .  a n o r e x i a  
n e r v o s a )  ap p ear  t o  r e s u l t  f rom  an u n d e r l y i n g  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
need.  S i m i l a r l y  our  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs a r e  dependent  upon 
numerous b i o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  b e ing  s a t i s f i e d .
S e c o n d ly ,  and more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  McCloskey d e n ie s  t h a t  any
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e  i s  a need,  due t o  d e s t r u c t i v e
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d r i v e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  unwelcome f ro m  a
moral  p o i n t  o f  v ie w .  Now by den y in g  d e s t r u c t i v e  and ha rm fu l
d r i v e s  we m ig h t  p u r i f y  our  needs t h e o r y  b u t ,  a t  t h i s  s ta g e
in  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n ,  t h i s  would be a v e r y  ad hoc s t i p u l a t i o n .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  d o m in a t io n ,  a g g r e s s i o n ,  h a t e ,  and o t h e r
em barrassm ents  t o  moral d i g n i t y  a r e ,  as D .B ra y b ro o k e
( 1 9 8 7 : 2 6 5 )  su g g e s ts :
. . . i n e x o r a b l e  enough t o  look l i k e  needs,  and n o t  
g r a t i f y i n g  them has t h e  same consequence in  deranged  
f u n c t i o n i n g . . .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  p l e n t y  o f  e m p i r i c a l  and t h e o r e t i c a l  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  p e o p le  need t o  d o m in a te ,  t o  be
a g g r e s s i v e ,  t o  h a te  one a n o t h e r ,  e t c .  (s e e  p p . 3 1 8 -3 2 0
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a h e a d ) .  L a s t l y  i f ,  l i k e  McCloskey,  we e x c lu d e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
s t a t e s  e n t i r e l y  as needs,  th e n  as w e l l  as b e in g  a r b i t r a r y ,  
t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a human need lo s e s  much o f  i t s  f o r c e  as an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  human co n d u c t .
R a t h e r  th a n  deny t h a t  th e y  a r e  needs,  I  w i l l  show t h a t  
s o - c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs can be e l i m i n a t e d  f ro m  m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t  ju d g e m e n ts ,  by our  uni v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  U . R . I I .  
Not  e v e r y  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  human need can  
s e r v e  as a uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e  n e e d - r e a s o n .  To see t h i s ,  
however ,  we have c o n s i d e r a b l y  more spadework y e t  t o  do. So 
l e t  us t u r n  now t o  t h e  second t y p e  o f  n o n -v o l  i t i o n a l  need we 
m ent io ned  e a r l i e r .
The a l t e r n a t i v e  k in d  o f  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  need,  which we 
w i l l  c a l l  a n e e d ( b ) ,  i s  th e  sense in  which a t h i n g  X needs  
F f o r  i t  t o  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y  o r  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I t  i m p l i e s  
a l s o  a s t a n d a r d ,  o r  norm, by which X ’ s f l o u r i s h i n g  can be 
a s s e s s e d .  As i t  i s  u n i v e r s a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l , a n e e d (b )  
w i l l  be som eth ing  which any person needs i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  
f l o u r i s h ;  and th e  co m p le te  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  what  i s  needed  
w i l l  be p a r t  o f  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  what  i t  i s  f o r  a person  
t o  f l o u r i s h .  So, f o r  exam ple ,  t o  say t h a t  a person n e e d s ( b )  
t o  be p h y s i c a l l y  f i t ,  i s  t o  im p ly  t h a t  he has t h i s  need t o  
f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y  in  e v e ry d a y  l i f e ;  and i t  i m p l i e s ,  a l s o ,  a 
s t a n d a r d  by which t h e  id e a  o f  a person f l o u r i s h i n g  can be 
u n d e r s to o d .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  and more t o  t h e  p o i n t ,  t o  say  
t h a t  a person n e e d s (b )  t o  be p h y s i c a l l y  f i t  i m p l i e s  a 
s t a n d a r d  by which h i s  la c k  o f  f i t n e s s  can be ass esse d .
By s a y in g  t h a t  someth ing i s  a n e e d ( b ) ,  we can r e f e r  t o  a
need t h a t  has been met a l l  a lo n g  and t h a t  i s  go ing  on b e ing
s a t i s f i e d .  However t h e r e  i s  a l s o ,  as D .B ra y b ro o k e  (op  c i t :
2 9 )  p u ts  t h e  m a t t e r ;
. . .  an im p l i  c a t i o n  abo ut  d e f i  c i e n c y . . .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  
i s . . .  t h a t  sho u ld  t h e  need cease  t o  be met ,  a 
d e f i c i e n c y  o f  some im p o r ta n c e  would a p p e a r . . .
Something F i s  a n e e d (b )  i f  a human b e in g  does n o t  f u n c t i o n
p r o p e r l y  -  o r  i f  t h e y  a r e  harmed o r  s u f f e r  -  w i t h o u t  F.
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When we r e f e r  t o  ( n o n - v o l i t i o n a l ) needs ,  i n  e v e r y d a y  
usage ,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  in  t h i s  l a t t e r  sen se .  I t  s e r v e s  as a 
d i a g n o s t i c  te rm  i m p ly i n g  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  wrong because a 
c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n  F i s  l a c k i n g ;  t h i s  a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  
m o re o v e r ,  which i s  damaging t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  who l a c k s  F.  
When we s a y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  ' C h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y ’ , 'A 
person needs a goal in  l i f e ’ , 'The  p a t i e n t  in  a s t a t e  o f  
nervous  e x h a u s t io n  needs a p r i v a t e  room’ , we u s u a l l y  mean i t  
would be i n j u r i o u s  o r  d e t r i m e n t a l  n o t  t o  meet such needs ,  o r  
t h a t  he would s e r i o u s l y  harmed i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  met .
I n  r e c e n t  t i m e s ,  many p h i lo s o p h e r s  have a n a ly z e d  human 
needs in  t h i s  w a y . 77 A person i s  s a i d  t o  have a need f o r  
som eth ing  where i t  i s  assumed t h a t  he w i l l  be s e r i o u s l y  
harmed o r  w i l l  a i l  i f  he does n o t  have i t .  The v a r i o u s  
needs d is c u s s e d  a r e  u n i v e r s a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l . A l l  
persons  have them and an i n d i v i d u a l  does n o t  have t o  want  o r  
be aware  o f  h i s  needs t o  have them. In d e e d ,  he may d i s a g r e e  
w i t h  someone who says he w i l l  be harmed w i t h o u t  i t .  
F u l f i l l i n g  h i s  need, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i s  s a i d  t o  overcome  
t h e  harm o r  t o  remedy t h e  a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  what  
we a r e  c a l l i n g  ' n e e d s ( b ) ’ a l s o  r e f e r s  t o  th o s e  t h i n g s  which  
a r e  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  human be in g s  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  a v o id  s e r i o u s  
harm; n o t  h av in g  i t ,  o r  enough o f  i t ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s u l t s  in  
a s e r i o u s l y  d e t r i m e n t a l  o r  a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n .  However ,  we 
sh o u ld  n o t  o v e r l o o k  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h i s  c o i n .  Something  
i s  a n e e d ( b ) ,  when hav in g  i t ,  o r  h a v in g  enough o f  i t ,  i s  an 
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a s t a t e  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g .
As b e f o r e ,  i t  w i l l  be h e l p f u l  t o  m ent ion  h e re  j u s t  t h r e e  
o f  t h e  many o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  n e e d s (b )  t h e s i s .  I  s h a l l  
postpone  d is c u s s io n  o f  o t h e r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  
u n t i l  t h e  end o f  P a r t  Two, a f t e r  my main argument  has been 
co m p le te d .
Many p h i lo s o p h e r s  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  id e a  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  and 
i t s  c o r r e l a t i v e ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  harm o r  s u f f e r i n g ,  a r e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n t e s t a b l e .  A c o n c e p t io n  o f  human f l o u r i s h i n g ,  
t h e  argument  runs ,  i s  n o t  an i n v a r i a b l e  datum bu t  changes in
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response  t o  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  and h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t i n g s . 78
W ig g in s  and Dermen ( i b i d : 6 3 )  p u t  t h e  m a t t e r  t h u s :
. . .each  age and each c u l t u r e  has t o  make what  i t  can  
o f  (harm and f l o u r i s h i n g ) ;  and t h a t  even w i t h i n  a 
c u l t u r e  a t  a t i m e ,  t h e s e  id e a s  a r e  o f  t h e i r  n a t u r e  
e s s e n t i a l 1y c o n t e s t a b l e .
No dou bt  many o f  our  n o n -v o l  i t i o n a l  needs s e r v e  ends l i k e
t h i s .  I n  t h i s  sense ,  p eo p le  a r e  s a i d  t o  need a bed t o  s l e e p
on,  s p e c t a c l e s  i f  th e y  a r e  s h o r t - s i g h t e d ,  l e i s u r e  f a c i l i t i e s
i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  e n jo y  a d e c e n t  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  in  a
W estern  s o c i e t y .  Looked a t  in  t h i s  way, what  p e o p le  non-
v o l i t i o n a l l y  n e e d (b )  i s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  and c u l t u r a l l y
r e l a t i v e .  I t  i s  a good dea l  more th a n  p e o p le  e n jo y e d  in
such s o c i e t i e s  a c e n t u r y  ago and we a r e  n o t  v e r y  shocked t o
f i n d  t h a t  such needs a r e  n o t  b e ing  met t o d a y .  I t  comes as
no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  a c h i l d  has n o t  g o t  a bed t o  s l e e p  on,  o r
s p e c t a c l e s ,  t o  say n o t h in g  o f  l e i s u r e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  in  r u r a l
T r a n s k e i .  Our c o n c e p t io n s  o f  needs o f  t h i s  s o r t  -  and
judgem en ts  based upon them -  change as s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s  and
o t h e r  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  change,  in  t h e  same s o c i e t y  and f rom
one s o c i e t y  t o  a n o t h e r .
However t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  o r  harm 
t h a t  do n o t  depend upon t h e  v i c i s s i t u d e s  o f  age o r  c u l t u r e ;  
t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s ,  l i k e  enough fo o d ,  a d e q u a te  r e s t  
and s h e l t e r ,  t h a t  a l l  human b e in g s  n e e d (b )  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  
our  o t h e r  v iew s  o f  harm and f l o u r i s h i n g .
My opponent  m ig h t  push t h e  p o i n t .  Even i f ,  as I  c l a i m ,
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  b o d i l y  n e e d s (b )  t h a t  can be shown
t o  be h i s t o r i c a l l y  unchanging and c u l t u r a l l y  i n v a r i a n t ,
s u r e l y ,  t h i s  can not  a p p ly  t o  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( b ) ,  which
i n v o l v e  co n cep ts  l i k e  autonomy, s e c u r i t y ,  lo v e  and so f o r t h .
As K .S o p er  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 - 1 2 )  w r i t e s :
When t h e  ch i  1d - p s y c h o l o g i s t  t e l l s  us t h a t  e x p e r im e n t  
o r  o b s e r v a t i o n  shows t h a t  t h e  young c h i l d  n e e d s . . .  
' s e c u r i t y ’ . . .  we a c c e p t  t h i s  as a f a c t  o n l y  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  we concur  w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  and 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  invoked  ' s e c u r i t y ’ . . .And t h e s e  
judgem ents  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  and r e l a t i v e .
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T h e re  i s  som eth ing  odd ab o u t  t h i s  c l a i m . 79 F i r s t l y ,  i n  a 
normal  c o n t e x t ,  i f  as a r e s u l t  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  e x p e r im e n t s  
and o t h e r  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  a s k i l l e d  c h i l d - p s y c h o l o g i s t  a s s e r t s  
t h a t  " A l l  young c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y "  ( r a t h e r  th a n  him 
s a y in g  "Some ( o r  most)  c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y "  o r  "Nowadays,  
a l l  c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y " )  we a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  assume t h a t  
he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  a l l  c h i l d r e n  need t h i s .  Not j u s t  c h i l d r e n  
i n  Glasgow o r  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  in  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  bu t  
a l l  c h i l d r e n  ev e ry w h e re  and a t  a l l  t i m e s .  W h i le  h i s  
a s s e r t i o n  m ig h t  w e l l  be c o n t e s t e d ,  i t  would n o t  n o r m a l ly  be 
u n d e rs to o d  t o  be r e l a t i v e .  (We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  
t h a t  such n e e d (b )  c l a i m s  a r e  c o n t e s t a b l e  s h o r t l y . )
S e c o n d ly ,  I  c an n o t  see t h a t  t h e  ch i  1d - p s y c h o l o g i s t  o r  
M s.S oper  can t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  v a l u e  judgem ent  t h e y  p l a c e  on 
t h i s  need i s  c u l t u r a l l y  r e l a t i v e  o r  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c h a n g in g .  
I f  t h a t  were so ,  h e r  p o s i t i o n  would a p p a r e n t l y  coun tenance  
such o d d i t i e s  as t h e  c h i l d - p s y c h o l o g i s t  s a y in g  " A l l  c h i l d r e n  
need s e c u r i t y  -  b u t  in  s a y in g  t h i s  d o n ’ t  t a k e  me t o  be 
s a y in g  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  in  T r a n s k e i  ought  t o  have i t " .  O r ,  
even more s t r a n g e l y ,  " C h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y  b u t ,  in  e a r l i e r  
t i m e s ,  oug ht  n o t  t o  have had i t " .  Though we m ig h t  make 
sense o f  t h i s  i f  he were t o  say "Though c h i l d r e n  need 
s e c u r i t y ,  t o  g e t  on in  t h i s  w o r ld ,  t o  become s e l f - r e l i a n t  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  c h i l d r e n  ought  t o  have t h i s  need f r u s t r a t e d " .  
We can u n d e rs ta n d  th e  c l a i m ,  t h i s  i s  t o  sa y ,  t h a t  one need 
oug ht  t o  be o v e r r i d d e n  by a n o t h e r ,  even though we may 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  what he has s a i d  i s  f a l s e .  A p a r t  f rom  t h i s  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  however,  i f  t h e  ch i  1d - p s y c h o l o g i s t  a rgues  
t h a t  "A c h i l d  needs s e c u r i t y "  we a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  assume t h a t  
he b e l i e v e s  t h a t ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , a l l  c h i l d r e n  ought  t o  
have t h i s  need met .  More g e n e r a l l y ,  i f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  
human b e in g s  have a c e r t a i n  n e e d (b )  we n o r m a l ly  co n c lu d e  
t h a t ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , what i s  needed oug ht  t o  be s a t i s f i e d .
The second o b j e c t i o n  l e a d s  on f rom  t h e  p o i n t  above.  To 
say t h a t  som eth ing  i s  a human need i s  a f a c t u a l  c l a i m .  I t  
does n o t  im p ly  a n y t h i n g  abo ut  what  oug ht  t o  be t h e  case .
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Even i f ,  f o r  t h e  sake  o f  a rgum ent ,  i t  i s  g r a n t e d  t h a t
c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y ,  o r  t h a t  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  n e e d s ( a )  and
( b )  e x i s t ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th er  o r  n o t  needs o ug ht  t o  be
s a t i s f i e d  i s ,  s u r e l y ,  a s e p a r a t e  q u e s t i o n .  P . T a y l o r  ( 1 9 5 9 :
111)  e x p re s s e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  th u s :
. . . e v e n  i f  i t  can be e m p i r i c a l l y  shown t h a t  a man 
has c e r t a i n  b a s ic  n e e d s . . . i t  i s  n e i t h e r  s e l f -  
c o n t r a d i  c t o r y  nor  l o g i c a l l y  odd t o  r e f r a i n  f rom  
recommending t h a t  such needs be s a t i s f i e d .
How can moral  jud g em en ts ,  t h e n ,  be s a i d  t o  r e s u l t  f rom
f a c t u a l  c l a i m s  abo ut  what human b e in g s  need?
I n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  which f o l l o w s  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  between n e e d - re a s o n s  and t h e  moral  judgem ents  based  
upon them i s  n o t  one o f  l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t ,  y e t  n e i t h e r  i s  
i t  m e r e ly  a c o n t i n g e n t  c o n n e c t io n ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  a 
n e e d - r e a s o n  m e r e ly  d e s c r ib e s  a c o n v e n t io n a l  moral  p r a c t i c e  
o r  t h a t  i t  i s  in  some o t h e r  way c o n t e s t a b l e .  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  
show, r a t h e r ,  t h a t  in  a l a r g e  and i m p o r t a n t  number o f  cas es ,  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  X n e e d s ( a )  F,  o r  n e e d s ( b )  F,  i s  a l s o  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  n o t  m e r e ly  a c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  
reason  b u t  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  j u d g i n g  'X m o r a l l y  
o u g h t / o u g h t  n o t  t o  have F ’ , o r  'F  m o r a l l y  s h o u l d / s h o u l d  n o t  
be done t o  X ’ . T h is  c l a i m  i s  im p o r t a n t  and i s  w o r th  
s t r e s s i  n g .
I  hope t o  show t h a t  n e e d - re a s o n s  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  good
reasons  f o r  moral  jud g em en ts .  Along s i m i l a r  l i n e s  K . N i e l s e n
( 1 9 6 3 : 1 8 2 )  w r i t e s :
I f  someone needs someth ing t h e r e  i s  a s t a n d i n g  
p resu m p t io n  t h a t  he m o r a l l y  t o  have i t .
So what  i s  th e  f o r c e  o f  th e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  ' s t a n d i n g
p r e s u m p t i o n ’ o r  ' p r im a  f a c i e  good r e a s o n ’ ? T h i s  i s  t o  s ay ,
what  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  f a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t  'A person
X has n e e d s ( a )  and ( b ) ’ and t h e  v a l u e  judgem ent  'X m o r a l l y
o ug ht  t o  d o / t o  have F ’ ?
We can see what I  t h i n k  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  by 
c o n s i d e r i n g  f i r s t  some cases where i t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
g e t  f rom  ' i s ’ t o  ' o u g h t ’ . C o n s id e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  exam ple:  
I f  you want  t o  a v o id  c a t c h i n g  a c o ld  t h i s  w i n t e r  you need t o
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t a k e  v i t a m i n  C. Why n o t  say t h a t  h a v in g  s p e c i f i e d  an end 
t h a t  you want  t o  a t t a i n ,  t h e  s te p s  you o u g h t  t o  t a k e  a r e  
s i m p ly  th o s e  t h a t  a r e  needed t o  meet t h e  end in  q u e s t i o n ?  
I n  o t h e r  words:  i f  you want t o  a v o id  c a t c h i n g  a c o l d  t h i s  
w i n t e r  th e n  you ought  t o  t a k e  v i t a m i n  C. No one i s  p u z z l e d  
by t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ' i s ’ and ' o u g h t ’ in  cases  l i k e  
t h i s ;  t h e  ought  s e n te n c e  i n d i c a t e s  th o s e  t h i n g s  which a r e  
needed as t h e  means t o  a c h ie v e  th e  d e s i r e d  end.
One p o i n t  t h a t  p r e v e n t s  our  a d o p t io n  o f  t h i s  p ro p o s a l  i s  
t h a t ,  in  th e  example  above,  th e  end i s  v o l i t i o n a l .  I f  f o r  
some s t r a n g e  reason you want  t o  c a tc h  a c o ld  t h i s  w i n t e r  i t  
i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  you ought  t o  dose y o u r s e l f  w i t h  v i t a m i n  C. 
However we have s a i d  t h a t  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  a r e  n o t  dependent  
upon what  we w ant .  To say t h a t  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  s t a t e m e n t s  
a r e  n o t  c o n d i t i o n a l  on v o l i t i o n a l  ends,  however,  i s  n o t  t o  
say t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  c o n d i t i o n a l  a t  a l l .
The p ro p o sa l  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r  a n o t h e r  re a s o n .  The 
c o n d i t i o n a l  ' I f  you a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  ( o r  f l o u r i s h )  as a 
person  you need F ’ i s  a c o m b in a t io n  o f  two f a c t u a l  
p r o p o s i t i o n s ;  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a s t a t e  in  which a person  
f u n c t i o n s  ( o r  f l o u r i s h e s )  and a c e r t a i n  need t h a t ,  when met,  
r e s u l t s  i n  t h i s  s t a t e .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, t o  e x p re s s  a 
moral  i m p e r a t i v e  as th e  consequent  o f  a c o n d i t i o n a l  i s  n o t  
t o  s t a t e  a f a c t .  The ' o u g h t ’ i n  'You ought  t o  do F ’ r e f e r s  
n o t  t o  i n s t r u m e n t a l  e f f i c a c y  b u t  t o  agency .  I t  r e l a t e s  n o t  
t o  a f a c t  t h a t  som eth ing  i s  needed t o  meet an o b j e c t i v e ,  bu t  
t o  t h e  do in g  o f  F . 80 The prob lem  i s  t o  g i v e  an a n a l y s i s  o f  
t h e  m o r a l l y  p r e s c r i p t i v e  im p o r t  o f  ' o u g h t ’ .
The h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  we w i l l  e x p l o r e  in  t h e  pages ahead i s  
t h a t  j u s t  as t h e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  end f o r  a person t o  f u n c t i o n  
o r  f l o u r i s h  c r e a t e s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  what  i s  n e e d e d (a )  and 
( b )  so ,  in  t u r n ,  n e e d s ( a )  and n e e d s (b )  a r e  a n t e c e d e n t  ends  
f o r  moral  ought  i m p e r a t i v e s .  T h i s  i s  t o  s ay ,  some o f  our  
needs c r e a t e  c o n d i t i o n a l  moral o u g h ts .  Thus X needs t o  do 
F i f  he i s  t o  f u n c t i o n .  And because X n e e d s ( a )  F,  he 
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  F. Or X needs t o  a v o id  F i f  he i s  t o
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f l o u r i s h  and because he n e e d s (b )  t o  a v o id  F,  he m o r a l l y  
o ug ht  n o t  t o  F.
T h e re  a r e  two f u r t h e r  p o i n t s  t o  n o t i c e  h e r e .  F i r s t l y ,  as  
we n o te d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  end ( v i z .  t o  f u n c t i o n  
o r  t o  f l o u r i s h )  i s  u s u a l l y  th o u g h t  t o  be so o b v io u s  t h a t  i t  
i s  l e f t  u n s t a t e d .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  n e e d (a )  o r  ( b )  i s  t y p i c a l l y  
t a k e n  t o  be u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  so i t  i s  u s u a l l y  n o t  an ' i f ’ b u t  
' b e c a u s e ’ o r  ' s i n c e ’ by which t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y  i s  
e x p r e s s e d .  Thus we say ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  "You oug ht  t o  e a t  
b e c a u s e / ( i f )  you need food"  o r  " S i n c e / ( i f )  c h i l d r e n  need  
s e c u r i t y  t h e y  ought  t o  g e t  i t " .  L e t  me make t h e  p o i n t s  
h e r e  i n  a n o t h e r  way. In  th e  pages ahead I  want  t o  show t h a t  
many o f  our  moral oughts  a r e  c o n d i t i o n a l  on n e e d s ( a )  and 
( b ) .  We m ig h t  e x p re s s  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y  in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
way; e . g .  "You m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  do F t o  X because he needs  
t o  s u r v i v e "  and we l e a v e  u n s t a t e d  t h a t  he needs t o  s u r v i v e  
i f  he i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a p e rso n .  O r ,  perhaps  more 
t y p i c a l l y ,  we would say " I  ought  t o  spend more t im e  w i t h  my 
c h i l d r e n  because t h e y  need t h i s  k in d  o f  s e c u r i t y " ,  and “ i f  
t h e y  l a c k  s e c u r i t y  t h e y  w i l l  a i l "  i s  l e f t  u n s a id .
I  have one f u r t h e r  g e n e ra l  p o i n t  t o  make c o n c e r n in g  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  under  which such c o n d i t i o n a l  s t a t e m e n t s  can be 
h e l d  t o  be t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  A n e e d - re a s o n  does n o t  e n t a i l  a 
moral  judgem ent  y e t  n e i t h e r  i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  two  
m e r e ly  c o n t i n g e n t .  I t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason  
in  a s i n g u l a r  moral judg em en t .  What we w i l l  f i n d  i s  t h a t  
where t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  n e e d - r e a s o n  and t h e  
o u g h t - ju d g e m e n t  i s  d e n ie d  and then  we t r y  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  
q u i t e  fun d am en ta l  concepts  l i k e  t h a t  o f  ' a  p e r s o n ’ o r  o f  ' a  
human s o c i e t y ’ a r e  thrown i n t o  d o u b t .  We c o u ld  n o t  
u n d e r s ta n d  what  a person o r  a s o c i e t y  would be l i k e  in  th e s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I t  i s  in  t h i s  sense r a t i o n a l l y  odd, a l b e i t  
n o t  l o g i c a l l y  odd, f o r  someone t o  r e c o g n is e  a n e e d - re a s o n  
y e t  n o t  t o  a c c e p t  a moral  judgem ent  based upon i t .
One ad v a n ta g e  t h a t  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  o u t l i n e  above shou ld  
be m ent ioned  h e r e ,  namely t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  a c r i t e r i o n  f o r
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a reason  c o u n t i n g  as a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason  in  a moral  
ju d g e m e n t .  By ' a  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason f o r  a ju d g e m e n t ’ we 
w i l l  mean t h a t  t h e  d e n i a l  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  c o n d i t i o n a l  
moral  judgem en t  in  which i t  o cc u rs  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a 
d e f e n s i b l e  v iew  o f  p e rs o n s ,  o r  a d e f e n s i b l e  c o n c e p t  o f  a 
human s o c i e t y .  And i t  i s  h e re  t h a t  I  want  t o  say t h e  onus  
o f  p r o o f  i s  on someone who wants  t o  a rgue  o t h e r w i s e .  We 
w i l l  d is c u s s  a l l  o f  t h i s  in  more d e t a i l  in  t h e  pages ahead.  
L e t  us c o n s id e r  now t h e  t h i r d  o b j e c t i o n  t o  n e e d s ( b )  t h a t  I  
m ent ioned  e a r l i e r .
I t  m ig h t  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  even i f  my response  above t o
W ig g in s  and Dermen i s  a l lo w e d  ( v i z .  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e ,  as
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  u n i v e r s a l ,  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d s ( b )  t h a t  can
be shown t o  be h i s t o r i c a l l y  unchanging and c u l t u r a l l y
i n v a r i a n t ) ,  t h e  needs i d e n t i f i e d  concern  what  we must have
t o  f l o u r i s h  and t h e  c o n cep t  i s  n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  v a l u e - f r e e .
To say t h e  l e a s t ,  we seem t o  presuppose t h a t  i t  i s  v a l u a b l e
t o  f l o u r i s h  as a p e rs o n .  K .S o per  (og  c i t : 1 1 )  makes t h i s
p o i n t  when she w r i t e s :
. . . i n  a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  a rgue  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  such  
c o n d i t i o n s  as n e e d s . . . w e  a r e  a l r e a d y  i n v o l v e d  in  
( v a l u e )  judgem ents  o f  what  c o n s t i t u t e s . . . t h e  good 
f o r  human b e in g s .
A d e c i s i o n  ab o u t  what  a human b e in g  n e e d s ( b )  i n v o l v e s  a
v a l u e  d e c i s i o n  ab o u t  what conduces t o  human harm o r
f l o u r i s h i n g .
B e fo r e  I  respond t o  th e  above I  want  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  we 
r e f e r  t o  a s t a t e  o r  c o n d i t i o n  as ' f l o u r i s h i n g ’ n o t  because  
i t  i s  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  our  n e e d s ( b ) ;  r a t h e r ,  some s t a t e  o r  
c o n d i t i o n  i s  re g a rd e d  as b e in g  one in  which a person  
f l o u r i s h e s  and i t  i s ,  t h e r e b y ,  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  c e r t a i n  needs.  
Thus i f  X n e e d s (b )  F in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  
n e e d (b )  w h ic h ,  t o  use C . T a y l o r ’ s ( 1 9 6 9 : 4 0 )  p h r a s e ,  ' s e c r e t e s  
t h e  v a l u e ’ b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  co n c e p t  o f  human f l o u r i s h i n g .
How a r e  we t o  meet t h e  i m p o r t a n t  c h a l l e n g e  t h a t  
judgem en ts  ab o u t  what  c o n s t i t u t e s  f l o u r i s h i n g  ( o r  harm)  
presuppose t h a t  i t  i s  v a l u a b l e  t o  f l o u r i s h  ( o r  n o t  t o  be
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harmed) and i t  i s  a lw a ys  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n t e s t  such  
n o r m a t iv e  c l a i m s ,  v i z .  t h e y  a r e  ' e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n t e s t a b l e ’ . 
I f  v ie w s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  can a lw a ys  be c o n t e s t e d ,  m o reo ve r ,  
how can n e e d s ( b )  c l a i m s  be made w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
v ie w s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  o f  t h e  person who makes t h e  ju d g e m e n t ,  
o r  t h e  c u l t u r e  o r  t im e  a t  which t h e  judgem ent  i s  made? L e t  
me make t h e  p o i n t  a n o t h e r  way. N e ed (b )  re a s o n s ,  as I  have  
d e s c r ib e d  them, a r e  supposed t o  be n o n - c o n t e n t i o u s . They  
a r e  s a i d  t o  d e s c r i b e  u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e ,  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  which a r e  ne c e s s a ry  f o r  any person t o  f l o u r i s h  
o r ,  w i t h o u t  w h ic h ,  any person w i l l  be harmed.  But how can 
t h i s  be? I f  v iew s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  can a lw a ys  be c o n t e s t e d ,  
i t  w i l l  a lw ays  be p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s a g r e e  ab o u t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
s u c h -a n d -s u c h  i s  a n e e d ( b ) .
I  w i l l  answer t h e  c h a l l e n g e  in  one o f  f o u r  ways.  
F i r s t l y ,  I  w i l l  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  by 
which we can d e c id e  w h e th er  o r  n o t  a person f l o u r i s h e s  ( o r  
a i l s ) .  A c tu a l  d i s p u t e s  ab o u t  what  c o n s t i t u t e s  f l o u r i s h i n g  
o r  harm a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c a p a b le  o f  b e ing  r e s o l v e d .  T h i s  
does n o t  mean t h a t  such a d i s p u t e  can be r e s o l v e d  e a s i l y ,  
f o r  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c r i t e r i a ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
c r i t e r i a ,  a r e  u s u a l l y  com plex .  However ,  i f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a c t u a l l y  needed f o r  f l o u r i s h i n g  o r  w i t h o u t  
which human be in g s  a r e  harmed, can be s e t t l e d  by r e f e r e n c e  
t o  m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t ,  a l b e i t  o f  a somewhat i n t r i c a t e  n a t u r e .  
S e c o n d ly ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show t h a t  some o f  t h e  u n c o n t r o -  
v e r s i a l  b e l i e f s  t h a t  we f i n d  in  o r d i n a r y  moral  d i s c o u r s e  can 
be e x p l i c a t e d  by a p p e a ls  t o  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  v e r y  s o r t  o f  
needs we have been d i s c u s s i n g .  I n  o t h e r  words,  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  a g iv e n  moral b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  a c t i n g  upon i t  
meets a human n e e d ( b ) .  Now i f  a g iv e n  n e e d (b )  i s  u n i v e r s a l ,  
one would e x p e c t  t o  f i n d  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  moral  b e l i e f  t o  be 
p e r v a s i v e  in  a l l  moral  codes.  T h i s  I  w i l l  a rgue  i s  t r u e  o f  
some o f  t h e  b e l i e f s  in  q u e s t i o n ;  o r ,  r a t h e r ,  I  w i l l  show 
t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n c e iv e  o f  what  a person has in  
mind who d e n ie s  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i t y .  I f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h i s
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i s  a d d i t i o n a l  e v id e n c e  f o r  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  a r e  
u n i v e r s a l l y  re g a rd e d  as s t a t e s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  ( o r  harm) and,  
f u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a c t u a l l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l .
T h i r d l y ,  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show t h a t ,  l i k e  n e e d s ( a ) ,  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ents  based upon reasons  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  
n e e d s ( b )  a r e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l ; t h e i r  d e n i a l  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  a d e f e n s i b l e  v iew  o f  p e rs o n s ,  o r  a d e f e n s i b l e  c o n c e p t  
o f  a human s o c i e t y .
I f  a l l  o f  t h e  above f a i l s ,  my f o u r t h  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  be t o  
p u t  t h e  onus o f  p r o o f  on anyone who a c t u a l l y  c o n t e s t s  one o r  
more o f  t h e  s t a t e s  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  o r  harm t o  be d i s c u s s e d .  
Some c h a l l e n g e s  which a p p ly  t o  my a cc ount  a r e  t o  be found in  
t h e  r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e .  I  hope t o  show t h a t  a more p l a u s i b l e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u t a t i v e  c o u n t e r - e x a m p le s  can be 
g i v e n .  I  hope t o  show, in  o t h e r  words,  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  o f  
f l o u r i s h i n g  t o  be d is c u s s e d  i s  n o t  a v a l u e  assum ption  t h a t  
can be s u c c e s s f u l l y  c o n t e s t e d .  I f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  we may 
assume t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  co n cep ts  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  and harm a r e  
n o r m a t iv e  and i t  i s  a lw ays  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n t e s t  a 
n o r m a t iv e  c l a i m ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  a f a t a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  my
p r o p o s a l s .  U n t i l  an a c t u a l  c o u n t e r - e x a m p le  can be fo u n d ,  
t h e  f e a r  -  t h a t  though i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  how, c o u n t e r - e x a m p le s  
c o u ld  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  i n g e n u i t y  be c o n s t r u c t e d  -  i s  an i d l e  
one.
I  want  t o  con c lu de  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  by
e m p h a s iz in g  t h r e e  p o i n t s .  F i r s t l y  I  want  t o  u n d e rs c o re  t h e
d i f f e r e n c e  between n e e d s ( a )  and n e e d s ( b ) .  The d i s t i n c t i o n
I  am making I  am tem pted  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t o  A r i s t o t l e
( M e ta p h y s ic s  V 1015a20 )  who, when a m p l i f y i n g  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n
o f  ' n e c e s s a r y ’ , w r i t e s :
We c a l l  ' n e c e s s a r y ’ ( a )  t h a t  w i t h o u t  w h ic h ,  as a 
c o n d i t i o n ,  a t h i n g  can n o t  l i v e ;  e . g .  b r e a t h i n g  and 
food  a r e  n e c essa ry  f o r  an a n i m a l ,  f o r  i t  i s  
i n c a p a b le  o f  e x i s t i n g  w i t h o u t  t h e s e ;  ( b )  t h e
c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h o u t  which good can n o t  come t o  be, o r
w i t h o u t  which we c an n o t  g e t  r i d  o r  be f r e e d  o f  e v i l ,  
e . g .  d r i n k i n g  th e  m e d ic in e  i s  n e c e s s a ry  in  o r d e r  
t h a t  we be cured  o f  d i s e a s e , . . .
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A r i s t o t l e  r e c o g n iz e s  h e re  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  
an an im a l  t o  e x i s t  and th o s e  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  i t  t o  f l o u r i s h  o r  
t o  a i l  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  F u r th e rm o re  he seems t o  r e g a r d  t h e  
n e c e s s i t i e s  in  q u e s t i o n  as u n i v e r s a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l . 
However h i s  examples app ear  t o o  r e s t r i c t i v e  ( t o  needs o f  t h e  
b o d i l y / p h y s i c a l  s o r t )  t o  e x h a u s t  what  I  have c a l l e d  n e e d s ( a )  
and ( b ) .  An ad e q u a te  account  o f  needs can n o t  s to p  s h o r t  a t  
t h e  p h y s i c a l ,  f o r  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  can occ u r  a l s o  a t  t h e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  ( i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  e m o t i o n a l ,  s o c i a l )  l e v e l .
The d i s t i n c t i o n ,  however,  i s  n o t  as c l e a r - c u t  as my 
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i t  m ig h t  im p ly .  I  do n o t  want  t o  a r g u e ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i f  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e ,  c a p a c i t y ,  d r i v e ,  i s  a 
n e e d ( a )  th e n  i t  c o u ld  n o t  be reg a rd e d  a l s o  as a n e e d ( b ) .  A 
human b e i n g ,  we n o te d ,  n e e d s ( a )  a c e r t a i n  amount and k in d  
o f  food  i f  he i s  t o  s u r v i v e .  A t  t h e  same t im e  he n e e d s ( b )  
a d i f f e r e n t  amount and, p e rh a p s ,  a d i f f e r e n t  k in d  o f  food  i f  
he i s  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I n  many o t h e r  cases a need d e s c r i p t i o n  
can be o f  som eth ing  t h a t  we must have i f  we a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  
a t  a l l  as a p e rso n ,  as w e l l  o f  som eth ing  t h a t  we must have  
t o  f l o u r i s h  o r  w i t h o u t  which we a i l ;  ( s e e ,  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  
n e e d ( a )  and ( b )  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  p p . 2 0 6 -2 1 8  a h e a d ) .
A second p o i n t  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  emphasis  con cerns  how I  
i n t e n d  t o  s u p p o r t  my c l a i m  t h a t  a l l  persons  have c e r t a i n  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  in  common. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  my argument  w i l l  
make use o f  e m p i r i c a l  c r i t e r i a .  G iven c u r r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge ,  t h e  k in d  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i d e n t i f i e d  a r e ,  as a 
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  needs f o r  a n y t h i n g  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a human 
b e in g  o r  a person;  and under  a c t u a l  w o r ld  c o n d i t i o n s  as we 
know them, t h e r e  i s  a s t a b l e  and i d e n t i f i a b l e  s e t  o f  
c o n d i t i o n s  any person needs t o  f l o u r i s h .  These e m p i r i c a l  
p o i n t s  w i l l  be s u p p o r te d  by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  an a p r i o r i  
s o r t .  I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i f  t h e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  we a r e  c a l l i n g  n e e d s ( a )  a r e  n o t  found t o  be 
p r e s e n t  in  an i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  would n o t  be a 
p e r s o n . 81 ( O r ,  more c a u t i o u s l y ,  i f  in  t h e  f u t u r e  such 
c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  found t o  be unnecessary  t o  th e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f
a person  -  o r  a r e  found t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m o d i f i e d  -  we 
s h o u ld  have a l t e r e d  our  c o n cep t  o f  p e r s o n s . )  F u r t h e r ,  I  
hope t o  show t h a t  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  b e l i e f s  can be 
acc ounted  f o r  in  te rm s  o f  m ee t in g  such needs;  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
b e t t e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  c o u n t e r - e x a m p le s  t o  
them; and t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  what  someone 
who c h a l l e n g e s  need c l a i m s  has in  mind.  L a s t l y ,  as we s h a l l  
s e e ,  th e  s t r o n g e s t  l o g i c a l  argument  in  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c l a i m  
t h a t  e v e r y  person has c e r t a i n  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  i s  th e  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral  ju dgem en ts  in  
which t h e y  o c c u r .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  t h e  f i n a l  p o i n t  I  want  t o  em phas ize ;  
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between c l a i m s  c o n c e r n in g  what  a 
person needs and our  d e s id e ra tu m  o f  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons  
in  moral  judgem ents?  My argument  w i l l  be t w o f o l d .  F i r s t l y ,  
I  w i l l  show t h a t  many o f  our  u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  b e l i e f s  
can be e x p l i c a t e d  in  te rm s o f  n e e d - r e a s o n s .  (We w i l l  see  
t h i s  m a i n ly  in  C h a p te r  S i x . )  S e c o n d ly ,  when a person makes 
a moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  w h i l e  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  i s  
autonomous,  where t h e  reason g iv e n  i s  a n e e d - r e a s o n  th en  
t h i s  i s  a p r im a  f  a c i  e good reason f o r  a c o r r e c t  moral  
ju d g e m e n t .  The p o i n t  then  t o  remember i s  t h a t  i f  i t  i s  a 
p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  ju d g em en t ,  th e n  i t  
c o u ld  be a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason f o r  a c o r r e c t  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  
judgem en t  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a l l  such co u rses  o f  a c t i o n  a r e  
r i g h t  o r  wrong. (We w i l l  c o n s id e r  t h i s  a t  l e n g t h  in  C h a p te r  
S e v e n . )
We a r e  now ready  t o  d is c u s s  in  some d e t a i l  t h e  c l a i m s  
above.  When I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  a l l  human b e in g s  have c e r t a i n  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  in  common, what  e x a c t l y  a r e  t h e  needs in  
q u e s t i o n  and what  moral  b e l i e f s  a r e  r e d u c i b l e  t o  them?
The need t o  s u r v i v e
L e t  me b eg in  by s a y in g  a few words ab o u t  what  I  mean by 
' s u r v i v a l * .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  r e f e r s  t o  o u r  o n - g o in g  spontaneous  
o r g a n i c  f u n c t i o n s .  Human be in g s  a r e ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,
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o rg a n is m s ,  s e l f - m a i n t a i n i n g  sys tem s .  Even i n  t h e  absence o f  
c o n s c io u s  s t a t e s ,  our  b lood and lymph c i r c u l a t e ,  p r o t e i n s  
a r e  s y n t h e s i s e d ,  i o n i c  l e v e l s  a r e  k e p t  in  b a l a n c e ,  t h e  
i n v o l u n t a r y  b o d i l y  mechanisms o f  d e fe n c e  c o n t i n u e ,  a lo n g  
w i t h  hundreds o f  o t h e r  b i o c h e m i c a l ,  s o m a t ic  p r o c e s s e s .  
Given  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o n t e x t  o f  s t r e s s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  
c o n t i n u e  t o  s u r v i v e  t h e  body w i l l  s p o n ta n e o u s ly  r e a c t  in  
c e r t a i n  ways. The a t t e m p t  o f  someone t r y i n g  t o  k i l l  h i m s e l f  
o r  a n o t h e r  by p o i s o n i n g ,  c o n f i r m s  t h i s  rem ark .  The w o u ld -b e  
p o i s o n e r  must d e f e a t  t h e  v i c t i m ’ s i n v o l u n t a r y  b o d i l y  
mechanism o f  d e f e n c e ,  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  i n v o l u n t a r y  v o m i t i n g  
o f  t h e  p o is o n .  'To  s u r v i v e ’ , in  t h i s  sense ,  i s  t o  have t h e  
b i o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t y  t o  be a l i v e  and t o  remain  a l i v e .  T h e re  
i s ,  however ,  more t o  s u r v i v a l  th a n  mere spontaneous  
b i o l o g i c a l  a c t i v i t y .
We have a n a t u r a l  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  behave in  a way t h a t  
w i l l  p r e s e r v e  our  own l i v e s .  T h i s  t o o  i s ,  i n  p a r t ,  
con nected  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  human b e in g s  a r e  s e l f -  
m a i n t a i n i n g  sys tem s.  W i t h o u t  any e x p l i c i t  co n sc io u sn e ss  o f  
what  we a r e  d o in g ,  we have a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  im p u ls e  t o  
c o n t i n u e  t o  l i v e  and t o  ward o f f  a t t e m p t s  t o  d e s t r o y  u s . 82 
The w o u ld -b e  p o is o n e r  must d e f e a t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  v i c t i m ’ s 
i n v o l u n t a r y  b o d i l y  mechanism o f  d e fe n c e  bu t  a l s o  t h e  
v i c t i m ’ s an im al  h o r r o r  a t  a n n i h i l a t i o n  and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
d e f e n s i v e  b e h a v i o u r .  We behave in  t h i s  way, i t  seems, n o t  
because we have l e a r n e d ,  s o c i a l l y ,  t h e  need f o r  s e l f -  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  o r  p a r t i c u l a r  forms o f  a v o id a n c e  b e h a v io u r  b u t  
because i t  comes n a t u r a l l y  t o  us .  I f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  what  
I  am c a l l i n g  s u r v i v a l  i s  b a s ic  in  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  human 
bei  n g s .
Sometimes, o f  c o u rs e ,  we do t h i n g s  in  o r d e r  t o  remain  
a l i v e  in  a c a l c u l a t e d  o r  d e l i b e r a t e  way. Where we a r e  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h r e a t s  t o  our  l i v e s  -  t h e  t h r e a t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
o f  b e in g  p o is o n e d ,  o r  o f  a f a t a l  a c c i d e n t  -  we d e l i b e r a t e l y  
t a k e  s t e p s  t o  p r o t e c t  o u r s e l v e s  o r  t o  remove t h e  t h r e a t .  I f  
we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  w he ther  o r  n o t  t o  d r i n k  som eth in g ,  we
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would r e g a r d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  c o n t a i n s  a p o is o n  and t h a t  
d r i n k i n g  i t  c o u ld  r e s u l t  in  our  d e a t h s ,  as a p r im a  f a c i e  
good reason f o r  our  n o t  do ing  so .  I f  we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t o  s c a l e  a dangerous rock  f a c e ,  o r  w h e th e r  o r  
n o t  t o  d r i v e  a v e h i c l e  in  an unroadw orthy  c o n d i t i o n ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f a i l u r e  o r  c o l l i s i o n  and t h e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  
t h i s  m ig h t  r e s u l t  in  d e a t h ,  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e good reason f o r  
d e c i d i n g  n o t  t o  do t h e  a c t  in  q u e s t i o n .  I t  i s  n o t  m e r e ly  
t h e  way we have been s o c i a l i z e d  t o  dea l  w i t h  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
p r e d ic a m e n t  which c r e a t e s  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  d e f e n s i v e  
re s p o n s e .  To d e l i b e r a t e l y  t a k e  s te p s  t o  remain  a l i v e  i n  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  which th e y  a r e  p l a c e d ,  i s  
som eth ing  t h a t  a l l  human be in g s  do, i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  
numerous d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e i r  s o c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n ts  and t h e  
d i s s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h e i r  p r e d ic a m e n ts .
' S u r v i v a l ’ in  any o f  t h e  senses d is c u s s e d  above r e f e r s  t o  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  b e ing  a l i v e  and t o  t h e  d r i v e  we have f o r  s e l f -  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  ( v i z .  s e e k in g  t o  remain a l i v e ) .  So u n d e r s to o d ,  
n o t  o n l y  does s u r v i v a l  j u s t i f y  o r  e x p l a i n  some o f  t h e  ways  
i n  which we u n d e rs ta n d  o u r s e lv e s  and t h e  ways in  which  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in  our  own s o c i e t y  behave,  t h i n k  and f e e l ,  i t  
e x p l a i n s  many o f  t h e  ways in  which we u n d e rs ta n d  what  o t h e r  
p e o p le ,  w i t h  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  behave,  t h i n k  
and f e e l .  Our u n d e r s ta n d in g  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  many o f  
t h e i r  b e l i e f s ,  a c t i o n s  and p r a c t i c e s ,  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  
te rm s  o f  t h e i r  s e e k in g  t o  m a i n t a i n  th e m s e lv e s  in  e x i s t e n c e .
Why c a l l  s u r v i v a l ,  so u n d e rs to o d ,  a need? We m ig h t  c l a i m  
t h a t  human b e in g s ,  both c o n s c i o u s l y  and n o n - c o n s c i o u s l y , 
need t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  se l  f - p r e s e r v a t i  on i f  th e y  a r e  t o  
c o n t i n u e  t o  l i v e  as long as p o s s i b l e  o r ,  anyway, i f  t h e y  a r e  
t o  a v o id  a p re m a tu re  d e a th .  Even f o r  t h e  i r r e v e r s i b l y  
comatose p e rso n ,  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h i s  s o r t  i s  a need.  However  
t h e  a c c o u n t  b e g in s  t o  look  d a n g e r o u s ly  c i r c u l a r ;  v i z .  we 
need t o  s u r v i v e  in  o r d e r  t o  s u r v i v e  as long as p o s s i b l e .  
And t h e  c l a i m  b a r e l y  r i s e s  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a c l e a r  argument  
f o r  s u r v i v a l  as a n e e d (a )  o r  ( b ) .  For  i f  t h i s  i s  a l l  t h e r e
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i s  t o  i t ,  what  seems t o  be needed i s  s i m p ly  more o f  t h e
p ro c e s s  o f  which t h e  need t o  s u r v i v e  i s  i t s e l f  t h e  o b j e c t .
A more p r o m is in g  l i n e  t o  examine i s  t h a t  s u r v i v a l  i s
needed f o r  t h e  more imposing f e a t u r e s  o f  human l i f e .  I t  i s
needed,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  we a r e  t o  have any c o n s c io u s  
e x p e r i e n c e s .  Remain ing a l i v e  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
o u r  s t re a m  o f  p e r c e p t u a l  s t a t e s ,  f o r  o u r  sense o f  o u r  own 
i d e n t i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  f o r  a c o n c e p t io n  o f  our  own p a s t  
and f u t u r e .  A l l  such co n sc io u s  s t a t e s  come t o  a h a l t ,  
p e r m a n e n t l y ,  when we d i e .  A l i v e  human b e in g  has 
d i s t i n c t i v e  f e e l i n g s ,  e m o t io n a l  s t a t e s  and a f f e c t i v e  t i e s .  
A dead one has none.  I t  can not  have l i k e s  o r  d i s l i k e s ,  be 
p le a s e d  o r  s o r r y ,  lo v e  o r  h a t e .  S u r v i v a l  i s  needed f o r  our  
r a t i o c i n a t i v e  a b i l i t i e s ,  our  t h o u g h t s ,  memories,  b e l i e f s ,  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  i n t e n t i o n s .  We have a sense o f  o u r s e l v e s ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  as i n i t i a t o r s  o f  a c t i o n s  and p r o j e c t s  t h a t  make a 
d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  cou rs e  o f  e v e n t s .  We can choose and a c t  
i n  acc o rd an ce  w i t h  our  c h o ic e s .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  h e re  
i s  o u r  moral  agency;  t h i s  to o  presupposes t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n
o f  t h e  need t o  s u r v i v e .  As H. Les ser  ( 1 9 8 0 : 3 8 )  p u ts  t h e
m a t t e r :
. . . t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a moral  a g e n t  i s  a n e c e s s a ry
p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  moral a c t i v i t y .
M ora l  ju d g em en ts ,  no m a t t e r  w hat ,  p resuppose t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a moral  j u d g e m e n t - m a k e r . S u r v i v a l  i s  needed a l s o  f o r
what  we c a l l  th e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  a human b e in g ,  i . e .  t h e
numerous t r a i t s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  v a l u e s ,  e t c .  t h a t  make up our  
c h a r a c t e r .  And, o b v i o u s l y ,  i f  we a r e  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  have  
any r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r  p e o p le  th en  we need t o  s u r v i v e .
We can see now t h a t  in  keep in g  w i t h  t h e  c r i t e r i a  we 
d is c u s s e d  e a r l i e r ,  s u r v i v a l  i s  a need.  F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  non-  
v o l i t i o n a l  and u n i v e r s a l .  A l l  p e o p le  have t h i s  need 
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  what th e y  w is h ,  p r e f e r ,  want  o t h e r w i s e ,  o r  
choose.  I t  i s  a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  f o r  our  h a v in g  any o t h e r  
needs ,  w an ts ,  v a l u e s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and d e a th  i s  t h e  
absence o f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n .  S e c o n d ly ,  s u r v i v a l  i s  no t  
som eth ing  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  and then  can be d ispen sed  w i t h
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b u t  i s  a perm anent  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any o t h e r  ends which  a  
person  has .  T h i r d l y  what  i s  needed -  b e in g  a l i v e  and 
r e m a in in g  a l i v e  -  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  end i t s e l f .  F o u r t h l y ,  we 
would n o t  n o r m a l ly  ask a b o u t ,  l e t  a l o n e  e v a l u a t e ,  t h e  end 
s e r v e d  by t h i s  need.  Regarded in  t h i s  l i g h t ,  b e in g  a l i v e  
and r e m a in in g  a l i v e  seems t o  have as s t r o n g  a f o u n d a t i o n  as  
a need as we c o u ld  hope f o r .  I  w i l l  expand on t h i s  c l a i m  
s h o r t l y .  We must ask f i r s t :  what has s u r v i v a l  t o  do w i t h  
q u e s t i o n s  o f  moral  v a lu e ?
As a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  t h e i r  own s u r v i v a l  does have a 
s p e c i a l  v a l u e  f o r  most human b e in g s .  The reasons  above  
m ig h t  p a r t l y  e x p l a i n  t h i s .  However I  do n o t  want  t o  a rgue  
t h a t  t h e i r  s u r v i v a l  o u g h t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  have a s p e c i a l  
moral  v a l u e  f o r  them; t h a t  we have a moral  r i g h t  t o  s u r v i v e ,  
o r  a d u ty  t o  keep o u r s e l v e s  and o t h e r  human b e in g s  a l i v e .  
We a r e  u n a b le  t o  make a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  d e d u c t i v e  passage  
f rom  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e r n in g  s u r v i v a l  t o  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  moral  
v a l u e .  Many p h i lo s o p h e r s  do make t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n ,  o f  
c o u r s e . 83 N o ta b ly  T .Hobbes ( 1 6 5 1 : 1 0 4 )  who r e c o g n iz e d  t h e  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  im pu lse  t o  p r e s e r v e  o n e ’ s own l i f e  
w h ic h ,  he th en  c l a i m e d ,  i s  a l s o  a r i g h t  t h a t  human b e in g s  
have and can n ev er  c o m p l e t e l y  a b r o g a t e .  I n  s o c i e t y ,  a 
person n e v e r  s u r r e n d e r s  h i s  r i g h t  t o  r e s i s t  th o s e  s e e k in g  t o  
k i l l  him o r  t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e f u s e  t o  obey an o r d e r  t o  t a k e  h i s  
own l i f e .  Hobbes seems t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  r i g h t  d e r i v e s  
d i r e c t l y  f rom  som eth ing  b a s ic  in  human n a t u r e .
What Hobbes does n o t  t e l l  us, o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  how an appea l  
t o  an i n s t i n c t  c r e a t e s  a moral  r i g h t .  The im p u lse  t o  
s u r v i v e  i s  n o t  th e  same t h i n g  as a moral  r i g h t  t o  i t ,  nor  
does t h e  fo r m e r  e n t a i l  t h e  l a t t e r .  T h i s  i s  o b v io u s ,  
f i r s t l y ,  s i n c e  p r i m a r i l y  p e rs o n s ,  ( in d e e d  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  
o n l y  p e r s o n s ) ,  have been c o n s id e r e d  t o  possess r i g h t s .  I f  
som eth ing  has a r i g h t  t o  l i f e  s o l e l y  because o f  a b i o l o g i c a l  
i n s t i n c t ,  we shou ld  have t o  say a l s o  t h a t  a n im a ls  have a 
r i g h t  t o  l i f e  s i n c e  th e y  seem t o  have a s i m i l a r  b i o l o g i c a l  
d r i v e  t o  s u r v i v e .  The l a t t e r  c l a i m ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  n o t  a t
a l l  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . S e c o n d ly ,  w h e th e r  
o r  n o t  p e o p le  go on l i v i n g  depends in  p a r t  on w h e th e r  o r  n o t  
t h e y  want  t o ,  a c o n t i n g e n t  m a t t e r .  P e o p le  do t a k e  g r e a t  
r i s k s  w i t h  t h e i r  own l i v e s  and somet imes t h e y  do,  
i n t e n t i o n a l l y ,  t a k e  t h e i r  own l i v e s .  They may be s a i d ,  in  
th e s e  r e s p e c t s ,  t o  be d i s r e g a r d i n g  o r  f o r g o i n g  t h e i r  own 
i n s t i n c t s .  I t  would be odd t o  s u g g es t  t h a t ,  in  such c a s e s ,  
s i n c e  t h e  i n s t i n c t  t o  s u r v i v e  app ears  t o  be l a c k i n g  t h e  
c l a i m  t o  t h e  moral r i g h t  i s  f o r f e i t .  Sometimes t h e r e  a r e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o t h e r  th an  t h e i r  own s u r v i v a l ,  which p e o p le  
r e g a r d  as p r i m a r y .  Some r e g a r d  t h e i r  own d e a th  as 
p r e f e r a b l e  t o  a f u t u r e  which o f f e r s  o n ly  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a 
l i f e  w i t h i n  a ha ted  p o l i t i c a l  system.  I f  th e y  a r e  i n c u r a b l y  
i l l  and s u f f e r i n g  a g r e a t  dea l  o f  p a i n ,  a person may ask t o  
be p u t  t o  d e a t h ,  t o  p r e v e n t  f u r t h e r  s u f f e r i n g  o r  in  o r d e r  t o  
d i e  p e a c e f u l l y  and w i t h  some d i g n i t y .  I f  a human b e i n g ’ s 
r i g h t  t o  l i f e  d e r i v e s  o n l y  f rom  h i s  i n s t i n c t  f o r  i t ,  s i n c e  
t h e  l a t t e r  does n o t  seem t o  be i n v a r i a b l e ,  a r e  we t o  say  
t h a t  t h e  moral  r i g h t  t o  i t  i s ,  s i m i l a r l y ,  v a r i a b l e ?
I  do n o t  want  t o  a r g u e ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d e d u c t i v e  
c o n n e c t io n  between t h e  need t o  s u r v i v e  and a moral  r i g h t  o r  
d u t y .  N e i t h e r  do I  want  t o  say t h a t  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between  
s u r v i v a l  and many o f  our  e s t a b l i s h e d  moral  b e l i e f s  i s  m e r e ly  
c o n v e n t i o n a l .  The re  i s  a s t r o n g e r  l i n k  between t h e  two but  
t h i s  s t i l l  has t o  be i d e n t i f i e d .  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  show what  I  
t h i n k  t h e  l i n k  i s  by d is c u s s in g  i t  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g .
The need we have t o  s u r v i v e  i s  a t  t h e  r o o t  o f  o u r  b e l i e f  
t h a t  k i l l i n g  a n o th e r  human be ing  i s  p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  
wrong.  I t  h e lp s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  t h i s  
b e l i e f  has f o r  us.
Why k i l l i n g  a n o th e r  human b e ing  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong
I  c la im e d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  one o f  o u r  fu n d am en ta l  moral  
b e l i e f s  -  which any moral t h e o r y  w o r th  t h e  name w i l l  be a b l e
t o  e x p l a i n  and j u s t i f y  -  i s  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y
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k i l l  a n o t h e r  human b e in g  i s  e v i l ,  incommensurable  w i t h  most  
o t h e r  e v i l s .  A g a in s t  such a v ie w ,  we n o t e d ,  cases  a r e  
c i t e d  where t h e  v i c t i m  i s  in  g r e a t  p a in  and i n c u r a b l y  i l l .  
M ig h t  n o t  he be d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l e d ?  T h i s  may be a d m i t t e d  
w i t h o u t  g i v i n g  up t h e  v iew  t h a t  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  i s  a 
p r im a  f a c i e  wrong. T a k in g  t h e  l i f e  o f  someone who i s  
t e r m i n a l l y  i l l  t o  p r e v e n t  t h a t  person f u r t h e r  s u f f e r i n g ,  i s  
sometimes reg a rd e d  as j u s t i f i e d  (m e rc y )  k i l l i n g .  Cases  
c o u ld  a l s o  be c i t e d  where a person in  s e l f - d e f e n c e  o r  who, 
under  e x t rem e  p r o v o c a t i o n ,  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l s  t h e i r  
a d v e r s a r y .  ( I n  law,  e x t rem e  p r o v o c a t i o n  may reduce  a ch a rg e  
o f  murder  t o  m a n - s l a u g h t e r . )  To d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a 
com batan t  in  w ar ,  no m a t t e r  how u n j u s t  t h e  w ar ,  a l s o  would  
seldom cou nt  as a case o f  u n j u s t i f i e d  k i l l i n g .
The q u e s t i o n  o f  when an a c t  o f  k i l l i n g  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  i s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  . But t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  i s  n o t  one  
c o n c e r n in g  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  p r o h i b i t i n g  
k i l l i n g ,  b u t  one c o n c e r n in g  t h e  e x c e p t i o n s .  ' I t  i s  r i g h t  t o  
k i l l  in  s e l f - d e f e n c e ’ , f o r  exam ple ,  i s  n o t  an u n c o n te s te d  
p r i n c i p l e ,  s i n c e  t h e  p a r t i e s  w i l l  somet imes d i f f e r  as t o  
w h e th e r  t h i s  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  r u l e  p r o h i b i t i n g  k i l l i n g  i s  
j u s t i f i e d ,  and t h e y  o f t e n  d i f f e r  as t o  w h e th e r  t h e  case in  
q u e s t i o n  i s  one o f  s e l f - d e f e n c e .  However we can l e a v e  th e s e  
q u e s t i o n s  t o  one s i d e .  For we a l l  seem t o  a g re e  t h a t  any 
such a c t ,  i f  i t  i s  n o t  t o  be c o n s id e r e d  m o r a l l y  wrong,  must  
be j u s t i f i e d ,  m i t i g a t e d  o r  excused .  The moral  b e l i e f  t h a t  
r e q u i r e s  e x p l a n a t i o n  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  i s  
why t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a n o t h e r  human b e ing  i s  a lw a ys  a 
p r ima f a c i e  wrong.
Someone who wants t o  say ' K i l l i n g  i s  m o r a l l y  w ro n g ’ i s  an 
a n a l y t i c  t r u t h  can not  be e a s i l y  r e f u t e d .  U n le s s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  
h i s  moral  system i s  made i n c o n s i s t e n t  by t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ;  (and even h e re  he m ig h t  choose t o  g i v e  up 
o t h e r  moral  b e l i e f s ,  r a t h e r  th an  g i v e  up t h i s  o n e ) .  
However ,  by a p a r a l l e l  a rgum ent ,  someone who says t h a t  
' A d u l t e r y  is  m o r a l l y  w ro n g ’ i s  a x i o m a t i c  a l s o  makes a c l a i m
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which c a n n o t  be e a s i l y  d e f e a t e d .  Must  we say t h a t  c o n c e p ts  
l i k e  ' K i l l i n g  i s  w ro n g ’ , ' A d u l t e r y  i s  w ro n g ’ , b r i n g  t h e  
p o s s i b l e  c h a in  o f  reasons t o  an end? Suppose t h a t  I
condemn an a c t  as one o f  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  and t h a t  you ask  
me "Why i s  t h i s  wrong?".  I s  t h e  b e s t  t h a t  I  can say " J u s t  
because i t  i s  wrong"? To l e a v e  t h i n g s  a t  t h a t ,  ( t o  p u t  t h e  
m a t t e r  m i l d l y ) ,  begs a l l  o f  th e  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s .  The 
c l a i m  s h o u ld  be defended  in  s u b s ta n c e .
T h e re  i s  a n o th e r  reason f o r  our  p u r s u in g  t h e  m a t t e r .  I  
want t o  a rgue  t h a t  our  moral b e l i e f s  a r e  u l t i m a t e l y
r e d u c i b l e  t o  n e e d - r e a s o n s . To a l l o w  ' D e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  i s  
m o r a l l y  w ro n g ’ t o  be a m a t t e r  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  would be t o  
f o r f e i t  t h e  t h e s i s .  How then  do I  a cc o u n t  f o r  t h e  b e l i e f ?  
E a r l i e r  we c o n s id e r e d  and r e j e c t e d  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  v ie w s ,  
v i z .  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  harm t o  th e  v i c t i m ’ s -  o r  h i s  f a m i l y ’ s -  
p r e f e r e n c e s ,  o r  t h a t  i t  r e s u l t s  in  d i s a s t r o u s  consequences  
f o r  them o r  f o r  th e  s o c i e t y  in  which t h e  v i c t i m  l i v e d .  A t  
t h e  t im e  I  showed t h a t  th e s e  a r e  s i d e  i s s u e s .  I  want  t o
arg u e  now t h a t  i t  i s  concern  f o r  th e  needs o f  t h e  v i c t i m
which i s  c e n t r a l  t o  our  condemnat ion o f  k i l l i n g  him.
The s t r o n g e s t  reason f o r  our  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  
wrong t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a person who does n o t  choose t o  
d i e  i s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t o  d e s t r o y  som eth ing  t h e  v i c t i m  n e e d s ( a )  
i f  he i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a person and t h a t  he n e e d s ( b )  f o r  
th o s e  s t a t e s  t h a t  he w i l l  r e g a r d  as w o r th  l i v i n g  a l i f e  f o r .  
T h i s  may seem s t r a n g e  on f i r s t  r e a d i n g ,  bu t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
f o l 1owi n g .
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  be ing  a l i v e  and r e m a in in g  a l i v e  i s  a 
n e e d ( a )  f o r  any k in d  o f  human l i f e .  I t  i s  a u n i v e r s a l  and 
n o n -v o l  i t i o n a l  need; a c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  has t o  be met i f  a 
person i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l .  One n e e d s ( a )  t o  s u r v i v e ,  in  
o t h e r  words,  f o r  a l l  o f  those  o t h e r  t h i n g s  which s u r v i v i n g  
e n t a i l s .  I t  i s  needed f o r  th e  spontaneous b i o l o g i c a l  
p ro ce ss  t o  c o n t i n u e ,  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  t o  be a c e n t r e  o f  
c o n s c io u s n e s s ,  t o  have p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  r a t i o c i n a t i v e  
a b i l i t i e s ,  a sense o f  i d e n t i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  a
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p e r s o n a l i t y ,  e m o t io n a l  and a f f e c t i v e  t i e s ,  e t c .  Regarded as 
a n e e d ( a ) ,  we do n o t  have t o  p l a c e  v a l u e  on any o f  t h e  i tem s  
i n  t h i s  l i s t .  S u r v i v a l  i s  a n e e d ( a ) ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  
norms. I t  becomes someth ing o f  v a l u e  o n l y  when i t  o c c u rs  as 
a reason  in  t h e  moral  judgem ents  o f  an autonomous j u d g e r .
We may see t h i s  most c l e a r l y ,  p e rh a p s ,  in  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
where th e  j u d g e r ’ s l i f e  i s  endangered  by th e  t h r e a t  o f  
m urder .  Someone who i s  about  t o  be k i l l e d  in  t h i s  way has 
a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  ju d g i n g  t h a t  such an a c t  oug ht  
n o t  t o  be done.  U n less  he s u r v i v e s  he can n o t  s a t i s f y  any o f  
h i s  o t h e r  needs.  Why n o t  say " I f  he i s  k i l l e d ,  he won’ t  
have any o f  t h e s e  o t h e r  needs,  so i t  won’ t  m a t t e r  t h a t  t h e y  
a r e  n o t  f u l f i l l e d " ?  As we s h a l l  see in  C h a p te r  Seven,  t h e  
person who r a i s e s  t h i s  s o r t  o f  q u e s t i o n  has f a i l e d  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .  T here  a r e  two t h i n g s  t o  be borne in  
mind h e r e :  ( i )  i f  t h e  reason 'He won’ t  have any o f  t h e s e
o t h e r  n e e d s ’ i s  supposed t o  be a good reason f o r  t h e  
(autonomous)  moral  judgem ent  ' I t  does n o t  m a t t e r  t h a t  he i s  
k i l l e d ’ in  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  cas e ,  th en  i t  i s  a good reason  
f o r  t h e  same cou rse  o f  a c t i o n  ' n o t  m a t t e r i n g  m o r a l l y ’ f o r  
a l l  l i k e  cas es .  And ( i i )  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  o f  such a 
judgem ent  i s  n o t  an i n t e l l i g i b l e  a cc ount  o f  (human) moral  
p r a c t i c e s .  I f  th e  arguments  in  C h a p te r  Seven a r e  c o r r e c t ,  
we a r e  j u s t i f i e d  in  o f f e r i n g  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  n e e d ( a )  t o  
s u r v i v e  -  though in  some cases t h i s  w i l l  be more e x p l i c i t  
th a n  in  o t h e r s  -  as a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reason f o r  a moral  
ju dgem en t  concerned  w i t h  t h e  wrongness o f  k i l l i n g .
The o t h e r  reason I  m ent ioned f o r  our  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  i s  
m o r a l l y  wrong t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a person who does n o t  
choose t o  d i e  i s  t h a t  s u r v i v a l  i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  t o  a l l  forms  
o f  f l o u r i s h i n g .  I t  i s  an i n s t r u m e n t a l  n e e d (b )  f o r  any o t h e r  
t h i n g  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  w i l l  r e g a r d  as w o r th  l i v i n g  h i s  l i f e  
f o r .  I f  he re g a r d s  be ing  dead as n o t h i n g  and i f  t h e  
v i c t i m ’ s own e v a l u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  any s t r e t c h  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s  
b e t t e r  than  n o t h in g  -  t h a t  any s o r t  o f  l i f e ,  even j u s t  t h e  
c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h e  spontaneous b i o l o g i c a l  p ro c e s s ,  i s  b e t t e r
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th a n  none a t  a l l  -  th e n  he n e e d s ( b )  t o  s u r v i v e .  H . R o l s t o n
( 1 9 8 2 : 3 3 7 )  r e f l e c t s  t h i s  v iew  when he co n te n d s :
L i f e  i s  p r e s e n t  where t h e r e  a r e  ongoing  spontaneous  
o r g a n i c  f u n c t i o n s ,  even in  t h e  absence o f  m enta l  
f u n c t i o n s ,  and such l i f e  ought  t o  be g i v e n  moral  
r e s p e c t . . .
The more usual  v i e w , 84 e s p e c i a l l y  in  r e c e n t  m ed ica l  e t h i c s ,
i s  t h a t  ^this spontaneous b i o l o g i c a l  component o f  l i f e ,  by
i t s e l f ,  i s  v a l u e l e s s .  Y e t  i f  th e  v i c t i m  r e g a r d s  t h e
spontaneous  f u n c t i o n  as o n ly  o f  i n s t r u m e n t a l  v a l u e  and he
c o n s i d e r s  b e in g  ' a  c e n t r e  c o n s c io u s n e s s ’ as o f  i n t r i n s i c
v a l u e ,  he s t i l l  n e e d s (b )  t o  be a l i v e .  By d e s t r o y i n g  h i s
l i f e ,  we a r e  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e s e  o t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  m a t t e r  t o
him. Perhaps t h e  most im p o r t a n t  ' o t h e r  s t a t e ’ w h ic h ,  f o r
good re a s o n s ,  p e o p le  g e n e r a l l y  re g a r d  as w or th  h a v in g ,  i s
t h e  sense o f  th e m s e lv e s  as s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  o r  autonomous
b e i n g s .  We can make c h o ic e s ,  we s a i d .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we
can choose ab o u t  r e m a in in g  a l i v e  o r  d y i n g .  Thus t o  k i l l  a
person who does no t  choose t o  d i e ,  i s  t o  t a k e  away t h a t
p e r s o n ’ s autonomy o v e r  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  abo ut  h i s  own l i f e  o r
d e a t h .  As P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 8 3 )  n o te s :
. . . k i l l i n g  a person who does n o t  choose t o  d i e  i s  
t h e  g r a v e s t  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h a t  p e r s o n ’ s autonomy.
Be ing a l i v e  and re m a in in g  a l i v e ,  t h e n ,  i s  an i n s t r u m e n t a l
n e e d (b )  f o r  any o r  a l l  o f  th e s e  o t h e r  t h i n g s  which le a d  t o
human f l o u r i s h i n g .
So a person who i s  about  t o  be k i l l e d  has a n o t h e r  reason  
f o r  j u d g i n g  t h a t  t h i s  ought  n o t  t o  happen.  I t  d e s t r o y s  a 
n e e d (b )  f o r  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  t h e  
v i c t i m  w i l l  r e g a r d  as w or th  l i v i n g  h i s  l i f e  f o r .  For  t h e  
moment t h i s  does n o t  commit us t o  s a y in g  a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  what  
e x a c t l y  makes th e  v i c t i m ’ s l i f e  w o r t h w h i l e .  However as we 
s h a l l  s e e ,  some needs in  t h i s  c o n t e x t  a r e  a l r e a d y  f i x e d ;  
e . g .  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  f o r  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  a sense  
o f  u n i t y  in  o n e ’ s l i f e ,  f o r  p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and so 
on.  T h e re  a r e  c a p a c i t i e s ,  s t a t e s ,  d r i v e s ,  in  o t h e r  words,  
which a r e  n e e d s (b )  f o r  pe rso ns .  Any r a t i o n a l  person w i l l  
r e g a r d  t h e  form o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  which such needs meet as
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w o r th  h a v in g  and t h e y  would be s t r o n g l y  opposed t o  h a v in g
them t e r m i n a t e d .
I  am a r g u i n g  t h a t ,  so u n d e rs to o d ,  t h e  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  t o
s u r v i v e  p r o v i d e  a p r i m a f a c i e  good reason o f  our  commonsense
moral  p r o h i b i t i o n s  on th e  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  o f  o t h e r
p e r s o n s .  To see t h i s ,  i t  i s  im p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  moment t o
d w e l l  on t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which have t o  be f u l f i l l e d  f o r  a
reason  t o  be a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason;  v i z .  we c o u ld  n o t
comprehend what  p r e c i s e l y  i s  b e ing  a d v o ca ted  when t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  n e e d - re a s o n  and t h e  moral  judgem en t
i s  d e n ie d .  L e t  us t a k e  a c o n c r e t e  example:
( i )  Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  g i v e  po ison  t o  Jones;
and l e t  us mean by
( i i )  because he n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  t o  s u r v i v e
t h e  r a t h e r  c o n v o lu te d  'B e in g  a l i v e  and r e m a in in g  a l i v e  i s  a
n e e d ( a )  f o r  Jones i f  he i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a person and a
n e e d (b )  f o r  a l l  th o s e  o t h e r  s t a t e s ,  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,
t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  which w i l l  make t h e  J o n e s ’ l i f e  w o r th
l i v i n g ’ . I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t ,  so i n t e r p r e t e d ,  ( i i )  i s  a
c o n t i n g e n t  y e t  p r im a f a c i e  good reason f o r  ( i ) .
As we noted  e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  c l a i m  a l o g i c a l
e n t a i l m e n t  between t h e  n e e d - re a s o n  and t h e  moral  ju d g e m e n t .
On my a c c o u n t ,  th e  n e e d - r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  moral  judgem ent
a g a i n s t  k i l l i n g  i s  p r e s u m p t iv e ;  w hereas ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  on
P . F o o t ’ s ( 1 9 5 8 : 1 2 6 )  acc o u n t :
. . . i f  i t  i s  d e s c r ib e d  c o r r e c t l y  t h e  l o g i c a l  gap 
between f a c t u a l  p rem ises  and moral  c o n c lu s io n  
di  s a p p e a r s .
M ig h t  we say t h a t  d e s c r ib e d  c o r r e c t l y ,  t h e  l o g i c a l  gap 
between ( i i )  and ( i )  d is a p p e a r s ?  So t h a t  as a m a t t e r  o f  
l o g i c ,  ( i i )  e n t a i l s  ( i ) ?  I t  seems n o t .  We have seen t h a t  
c o n t r a r y  reasons can be o f f e r e d  w h ic h ,  many would say ,  
o v e r r i d e  ( i i ) .  Jones may be h o p e l e s s l y  s e n i l e  o r  a human 
v e g e t a b l e  and Smith  may b e l i e v e  t h a t  p o i s o n in g  him is  
t h e r e f o r e  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  Or l e t  us suppose ( t h e  o l d  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  saw) t h a t  k i l l i n g  him i s  t h e  o n l y  way t o  
p r e v e n t  Jones f rom s l a u g h t e r i n g  many thousands o f  p e o p le .
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No dou bt  i t  would be agreed  t h a t  when t h i s  reason  i s  added,  
k i l l i n g  Jones i s  j u s t i f i e d .  However t h i s  does n o t  r e b u t  Mrs  
F o o t ’ s p o i n t  ab o u t  c l o s i n g  t h e  l o g i c a l  gap.  For  ' d e s c r i b e d  
c o r r e c t l y ’ o u r  moral  b e l i e f  i s  n o t  ( i )  b u t
( i i i )  Sm ith  ought  n o t ,  w i t h o u t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t o  p o is o n  
J o n e s .
Even so ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between ( i i )  and ( i i i )  i s  an odd k in d  
o f  l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t .  The a c c e p ta n c e  o f  ( i i i )  and d e n i a l  
o f  ( i i )  does n o t  t h e r e b y  r e v e a l  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  and we would  
n o t  n o r m a l l y  re g a r d  t h e  c o n j u n c t i o n  o f  ( i i )  and ( i i i )  as a 
l o g i c a l  t r u t h .  To c a l l  i t  such,  s u g g es ts  a c o n c lu s iv e n e s s  
t h a t  does n o t  r e a l l y  o b t a i n ,  (due t o  t h e  v a g a r i e s  a t t a c h i n g  
t o  t h e  n o t i o n  ' w i t h o u t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ’ ) .
However n e i t h e r  i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  between ( i i )  and ( i i i )  
m e r e ly  c o n t i n g e n t  in  th e  sense t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  n e e d - r e a s o n  
i s  u n i v e r s a l ,  th e  s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ent  i t  s u p p o r ts  
d e s c r i b e s  j u s t  one o f  many a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n v e n t io n s .  Moral  
b e l i e f s  can v a r y  f rom  one s o c i e t y  t o  a n o t h e r .  As we noted  
t h e r e  a r e ,  n o n e t h e le s s ,  l i m i t s  t o  such v a r i a t i o n ;  l i m i t s  s e t  
i n  p a r t  by t h e  c o n cep t  o f  a human s o c i e t y .  And t h e  id e a  
t h a t  an a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  c o u ld  be re g a rd e d  as  
i r r e l e v a n t ,  ( o r  a p r im a f a c i e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  a c t i o n ) ,  i n  t h e  
moral  p r a c t i c e s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y ,  seems t o  f a l l  
o u t s i d e  o f  t h e s e  l i m i t s .  How a r e  we t o  show t h i s ?
Could  t h e  a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l i n g  a n o t h e r  human b e in g
be i r r e l e v a n t  in  t h e  moral p r a c t i c e s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r
s o c i e t y ?  The c l a i m  m ig h t  be t h o u g h t  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  when
we n o t i c e  t h e  obv ious  d i v e r s i t y  in  moral  p r a c t i c e s .  As
D . Z . P h i l l i p s  and H.O.Mounce a r g u e ,  what  i s  r e g a rd e d  as moral
o r  immoral can d i f f e r  f rom one s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  t o  t h e  n e x t .
They w r i t e  ( 1 9 7 0 : 1 5 )
To m a i n t a i n  t h a t  w i t h i n  a moral p r a c t i c e  c e r t a i n  
f a c t s  wi 11 e n t a i l  c e r t a i n  moral  c o n c lu s io n s  does no t  
p r e c l u d e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  d i f f e r e n t  
moral  p r a c t i c e s  w i t h i n  which t h e  same f a c t s  e n t a i l  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c lu s io n s .
P resum ab ly ,  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce have in  mind h e re  p r a c t i c e s
t h a t  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom our  p r o h i b i t i o n s  on k i l l i n g ?  They
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would m a i n t a i n ,  p resu m a b ly ,  t h a t  i t  i s  a m is t a k e  t o  suppose  
t h a t  t h e  same f a c t  ' T h i s  i s  an a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g *  
r e s u l t s  in  t h e  same moral  c o n c lu s io n  ' T h i s  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  
m o r a l l y  wrong a c t ’ f o r  e v e ry o n e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  moral  
p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  t o  which he o r  she b e lo n g s .
L e t  us assume t h a t  t h e i r  argument a l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  
be a s o c i e t y  A which has d i f f e r e n t  moral  p r a c t i c e s  t o  our  
own, one o f  which i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no moral  p r o h i b i t i o n s  on 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l i n g  o t h e r  human b e in g s .  How s h o u ld  we 
u n d e r s ta n d  t h i s  c la im ?  I s  i t  t h a t  ( 1 )  k i l l i n g  a n o t h e r  
p e rs o n ,  f o r  w h a te v e r  reason ,  in  s o c i e t y  A i s  n e v e r  m o r a l l y  
wrong? Or i s  i t  ( 2 )  t h a t  some a c t s ,  which we t h i n k  o f  as 
p r im a  f a c i e  wrong a c t s  o f  k i l l i n g ,  t h e y  do n o t  c o n s i d e r  t o  
be u n j u s t i f i e d ?  One and th e  same b r u t e  f a c t  -  Sm ith  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  po isoned Jones -  which in  our  s o c i e t y  we c a l l  
m urder ,  t h e y  would not?
The c l a i m  ( 1 )  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s o c i e t i e s ,  ( o r  we can  
im a g in e  a human s o c i e t y  A ) ,  where t h e  im p o r ta n c e  we a t t a c h  
t o  p r o h i b i t i o n s  on k i l l i n g  t h e y  a t t a c h  no im p o r ta n c e  t o  a t  
a l l .  A member o f  t h i s  s o c i e t y  u n d ers ta n d s  what  i t  i s  t o  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a n o t h e r  human be ing  w i t h o u t  any m i t i g a t i o n  
o r  e x c u s e ,  y e t  th e  e v a l u a t i v e  e le m e n t  we d e r i v e  f rom  t h i s ,  
he does n o t .  To k i l l  someone in  s o c i e t y  A i s  n o t  t o  do 
som eth ing  t h a t  m a t t e r s  m o r a l l y .
T h i s  prompts th e  q u e s t i o n :  would we be a b l e  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  
t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a p r a c t i c e  in  which k i l l i n g  a n o t h e r  
human b e in g  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  moral i n d i f f e r e n c e ?  I t  goes  
w i t h o u t  s a y in g  t h a t  i f  t h e i r  i n d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t o  c o u n t  as 
' m o r a l ’ i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  (as  opposed t o  mere custom o r  h a b i t ) ,  
th e n  i t  w i l l  be based upon reas ons .  And we a r e  n o t  h e r e  in  
t h e  b u s in e s s  o f  m e re ly  d e s c r i b i n g  a p u t a t i v e  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  
i n  which p e o p le  seem t o  behave in  t h e  way s u g g e s te d .  For  
p e o p le  behave in  ways which make l i t t l e  o r  no sense and th e y  
may t a l k  nonsense in  t r y i n g  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r .  
What cou nts  as sense w i l l  be an i n t e l l i g i b l e  answer t o  th e  
q u e s t i o n :  how do th e y  j u s t i f y  a p r a c t i c e  in  which th e
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d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  o f  a n o t h e r  human b e in g  i s  ( a l w a y s )  a 
m a t t e r  o f  moral  i n d i f f e r e n c e ?
G iven  o n l y  t h e  r e s o u rc e s  o f  t h e  needs t h e s i s  t h a t  we have  
d e v e lo p e d  so f a r ,  we a r e  a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h e  a c t  i s  
p r im a  f a c i e  wrong because i t  d e s t r o y s  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  a l l  o t h e r  needs i f  one i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a person  and 
f o r  a l l  th o s e  needs t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  which w i l l  make t h e  
v i c t i m ’ s l i f e  w or th  l i v i n g .  And t h i s  g i v e s  su b s ta n c e  t o  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  ( i i )  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  ( i i i ) .  I  
c a n n o t  see bu t  t h a t  any human s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  i s  bound t o  
a d m i t  t h i s .  (When we c o n s id e r  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm  o f  
ju dgem en ts  which deny ( i i )  and ( i i i ) ,  t h e  case a g a i n s t  t h i s  
fo rm  o f  r e l a t i v i s m  seems i n c o n t e s t a b l e ;  see p p . 3 2 8 -3 3 2  
a h e a d . )  So, l i k e  t h e  Boston l a d i e s ,  we know t h e  h a t  I  am 
w e a r i n g .  I  do n o t  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v i s t  wears  my h a t .  
I  o n l y  want  t o  know what  h a t  he i s  w e a r in g .  He must t e l l  
us,  in  o t h e r  words,  how t h e  a l l e g e d  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  a l l  a c t s  
o f  k i l l i n g  in  s o c i e t y  A i s  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  As f a r  as I
can s e e ,  t h i s  can not  be done. The burden o f  p r o o f  i s  h i s .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ( 2 )  above r e q u i r e s  t h a t  some a c t s  t h a t  we 
t h i n k  t o  be a c t s  o f  u n j u s t i f i e d  k i l l i n g ,  members o f  s o c i e t y  
A do n o t .  A t  f i r s t  b lush  t h i s  seems o b v io u s  bu t  t h e  prob lem  
s t i l l  i s  t o  know how t o  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  c l a i m  ( 2 ) .  Are  we t o  
u n d e rs ta n d  i t  t o  say:  ( i )  th e  same a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e
k i l l i n g ,  f o r  which t h e r e  a r e  no m i t i g a t i n g  o r  e x c u s a b le  
g rounds ,  t h a t  we would ju d g e  t o  be m o r a l l y  wrong,  t h e y  would  
not?  T h i s  seems odd. I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  oddness l i e s  in  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  a c t  as t h e  same a c t .  We may e x e r c i s e
d i s c r e t i o n  in  t h e  way in  which we d e s c r i b e  a c t s .  We can 
speak o f  one and t h e  same a c t ,  namely t h e  f a c t  t h a t  someone 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  po isoned someone e l s e .  T h i s  i s  an a c t  o f  
murder  in  our  s o c i e t y  b u t ,  no d o u b t ,  t h e r e  c o u ld  be a 
s o c i e t y  A where i t  i s  n o t .  However i f  i t  i s  n o t  re g a rd e d  as  
an a c t  o f  murder in  A, can we t a l k  o f  i t  as b e ing  t h e  same 
a c t?
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What seems more l i k e l y  i s  t h a t  we sh o u ld  u n d e r s ta n d  ( 2 )  
as ( i i ) :  one and t h e  same a c t  o f  k i l l i n g ,  which i n  our
s o c i e t y  we c a l l  u n j u s t i f i e d ,  t h e y  would n o t ,  because t h e  
grounds f o r  j u s t i f i e d  hom ic ide  can be d i f f e r e n t  f ro m  one 
s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  t o  a n o t h e r .  Mercy k i l l i n g ,  f o r  exa m p le ,  may 
be r e g a rd e d  as j u s t i f i e d  hom ic ide  in  one s o c i e t y  ( u s u a l l y  
i t  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be N o r t h e r n  European)  y e t  n o t  in  a n o t h e r .  
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  p resu m a b ly ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  harm t h a t  i s  
p r e v e n t e d ,  o r  t h e  good t h a t  comes as a r e s u l t  o f  i t ,  i s  
c o n s id e r e d  t o  make t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  
r e ce d e  in  im p o r ta n c e .  I f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  what  i t  shows i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  needs t o  which an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s n e e d ( a )  
t o  s u r v i v e  may sometimes y i e l d .  Thus t h e  d e l i b e r a t e  t a k i n g  
o f  a l i f e  m ig h t  be j u s t i f i e d ,  in  s o c i e t y  A, because i t  i s  
ju d g e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a g r e a t e r  e v i l  i n v o l v e d  th a n  t h a t  o f  
d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g ,  ( e . g .  a s low and p a i n f u l  t e r m i n a l  
i l l n e s s ) ,  o r  because t h e r e  a r e  t h i n g s  which m a t t e r  more t o  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h a t  s o c i e t y  than  th e  t a k i n g  o f  a l i f e .
We can see t h i s  perhaps more c l e a r l y  in  th e  case  o f
i n d i r e c t  s u i c i d e . 85 A person may s a c r i f i c e  h i s  l i f e  f o r  a
cause in  which he b e l i e v e s ;  e . g .  a Gandhi who i s  p r e p a re d  t o
s t a r v e  t o  d e a th  f o r  an i d e a l .  However t h i s  i s  a s a c r i f i c e .
C l e a r l y ,  where t h i s  happens, what  i s  g a in e d  i s  re g a rd e d  as
som eth ing  o f  g r e a t e r  v a l u e .  As H .L e s s e r  (op  c i t : 4 2 ) w r i t e s :
. . . s i n c e  v a l u e s  r e q u i r e  moral  a g e n ts ,  t h e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  under which t h e  s a c r i f i c e  o f  t h e  l i v e s  
o f  moral a g e n ts  promotes th e s e  v a l u e s  must be h i g h l y  
e x c e p t i o n a l ; . . .
So t h e r e  s t i l l  w i l l  be agreement  t h a t  s u r v i v a l  i s  a need,  
even though t h e r e  may be d is a g r e e m e n t  o v e r  which t h i n g s ,  i f  
any ,  m e r i t  t h e  s a c r i f i c e  o f  a human l i f e .  Should  a h u n g e r -  
s t r i k e r  s a c r i f i c e  h i s  l i f e  by s t a r v i n g  t o  d e a th  f o r  t h e  sake  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  g o a ls  t h a t  he, o r  h i s  g roup ,  may t h e r e b y  
a c h ie v e ?  Should  a C a t h o l i c  mother  r i s k  he r  l i f e  f o r  t h e  
honour o f  h av in g  a baby ( o r ,  e q u a l l y  t e n d e n t i o u s ! y , f o r  t h e  
sake o f  t h e  embryo in  her  womb)? I n  a l l  such c a s e s ,  t h e  
p o i n t  shou ld  no t  be l o s t  t h a t  th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which a
l i f e  i s  s a c r i f i c e d  must be e x c e p t i o n a l .  Not  s u r v i v i n g  can  
be r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  o n l y  t o  a v o id  a g r e a t e r  e v i l  o r  g a in  
a h i g h e r  end.
What we a r e  p r e p a re d  t o  a d m i t  as ' a  h i g h e r  e n d ’ , ( o r
g r e a t e r  e v i l ) ,  m oreover ,  i s  n o t  w i t h o u t  l i m i t s .  S i r  James
F r a z e r  ( 1 9 2 2 : 4 9 7 )  t e l l s  us t h a t  t h e  Nauras I n d i a n s  o f  New
Grenada k i l l e d  in  o r d e r  t o  e a t
. . . t h e  h e a r t s  o f  th e  S p a n ia r d s  when t h e y  had t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y ,  hoping t h e r e b y  t o  make th e m s e lv e s  as 
d a u n t l e s s  as t h e  dreaded C a s t i l i a n  c h i v a l r y .
I n  t h e  pages ahead ( p p . 4 2 1 - 4 2 3 )  we s h a l l  see t h a t  where t h e
need o f  a human be ing  t o  s u r v i v e  i s  d e n ie d  f o r  ends o f  . t h i s
s o r t ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  f o r  us t o  respond t h a t  such a
p r a c t i c e  i s  i r r a t i o n a l  f rom any p o i n t  o f  v iew  and t h e r e b y
m o r a l l y  wrong.
I  am a r g u in g  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  moral  p r a c t i c e s  
c o n c e r n in g  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  a r e  n o t  t o  be e x p l a i n e d  as  
d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e s  t o  th e  g e n e r a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  on k i l l i n g  
b u t  as d i f f e r e n c e s  in  what a r e  c o n s id e r e d  grounds f o r  
m i t i g a t i o n  o r  excuses f o r  i t .  I  hope t o  have shown a l s o  why 
I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  a l l  persons have t h e  n e e d (a )  and ( b )  t o  
s u r v i v e  in  common and, more than  t h i s ,  t h a t  t h e  need does  
n o t  e n t a i l ,  nor  i s  i t  a m e re ly  c o n t i n g e n t  reason b u t  i s ,  
r a t h e r ,  a p r im a f a c i e  good reason f o r  a moral  judgem ent  
condemning d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g .
When we a t t r i b u t e  a n e e d (a )  t o  someone, we a r e  r e f e r r i n g  
t o  a t h i n g  he needs i f  he i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l .  When we 
a t t r i b u t e  a n e e d (b )  t o  him we a r e  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th o s e  t h i n g s  
he needs in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  o r  w i t h o u t  which t h e y  w i l l  be 
harmed. I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we have d is c u s s e d  s u r v i v a l  i n  te rm s  
o f  a n e e d ( a )  and ( b ) .  L e t  us now c o n s id e r  b r i e f l y  some o f  
o u r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( b ) .
B o d i l y  n e e d s (b )
By *x n e e d s ( b ) F in  o r d e r  t o  R ’ we can mean t h a t  he o r  
she b i o l o g i c a l l y  needs F in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  o r  t h a t  i t  
w i l l  be p h y s i c a l l y  i n j u r i o u s ,  o r  d e l e t e r i o u s  t o  X n o t  t o
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have F, o r  enough F. And t h e  c o m p le te  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  what  
i s  needed w i l l  be p a r t  o f  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  what  i t  i s  f o r  
a person  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I n  t h i s  sen se ,  human b e in g s  n e e d (b )  
enough t o  e a t  and t o  d r i n k ,  in  any e n v i r o n m e n t  t h e y  n e e d (b )  
a d e q u a te  s h e l t e r ,  warmth,  c l o t h i n g ,  e t c .
I  want  t o  emphasize  f o u r  p o i n t s  h e r e .  F i r s t l y ,  such 
needs a r e  u n i v e r s a l .  A l l  human be in g s  a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  
s i m i l a r  in  t h e i r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( b ) .  They a r e  n o t  m e r e ly  t h e  
needs o f  p e o p le  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  in  h i s t o r y  o r  o f  j u s t  
a p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  group .  However ,  w i t h i n  t h e  b a s ic  
s i m i l a r i t y  t h e r e  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  immense v a r i e t y .
S e c o n d ly ,  such needs a r e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l . We a l l  n e e d (b )  
a c e r t a i n  amount and k in d  o f  fo o d .  To meet t h i s  need,  a t  
d i f f e r e n t  t im e s  we d e s i r e  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  o f  food  and 
d i f f e r e n t  amounts o f  t h e  same fo o d .  Our n e e d s ( b ) ,  however ,  
a r e  d i s t i n c t  f rom our  w an ts ,  p r e f e r e n c e s  o r  d e s i r e s .  The 
h u n g e r - s t r i k e r ’ s n e e d (b )  f o r  food  i s  n o t  t o  s a t i s f y  a d e s i r e  
o r  any o t h e r  v o l i t i o n a l  end. The v o l u n t a r i n e s s  o f  h i s  
p r e v i o u s  a c t s  does n o t h in g  t o  make h i s  n e e d (b )  f o r  food  l e s s  
now. U n les s  he has s a t i s f i e d  t h i s  need,  on a c o n t i n u i n g  
b a s is  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  t im e ,  he co u ld  n o t  now f o r g o  i t  f o r  
t h e  sake o f  p o l i t i c a l  o r  o t h e r  i d e a l s .
T h i r d l y ,  a l l  o f  th e  b o d i l y  needs h e re  can be t h o u g h t  o f  
as b e in g  e m p i r i c a l l y  d e t e r m i n a t e . 86 I  t a k e  i t  t h a t  l X needs  
food  in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h ’ i s  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t .  T h e re  a r e  
e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  which show t h a t  food  i s  such a need ,  (as  
t h e r e  i s ,  p resu m a b ly ,  f o r  each o f  our  o t h e r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ) .  
A c tu a l  d i s p u t e s  about  what  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  r i g h t  k in d  o f  
food  f o r  human f l o u r i s h i n g ,  ( e . g .  ' I s  a vegan s e r i o u s l y  
harmed by n o t  e a t i n g  an imal  f o o d s ? ’ ) a r e  c a p a b le  o f  be ing  
e m p i r i c a l l y  r e s o l v e d .  T h is  does n o t  mean t h a t  such a 
d i s p u t e  can be r e s o lv e d  e a s i l y ,  f o r  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  p h y s ic a l  
harm h e re  i s  complex.  S i m i l a r l y ,  what  i s  t o  co u n t  as enough  
( o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t )  food  can be s e t t l e d  e m p i r i c a l l y .  What we 
co u n t  as enough fo o d ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  w i l l  v a r y  t o  some e x t e n t  
w i t h  o t h e r  f a c t s  about  us. What counts  as s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  an
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O lym pic  a t h l e t e  w i l l  d i f f e r  f rom  what  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a 
y e a r  o l d  i n f a n t  o r  a m id d le -a g e d  u n i v e r s i t y  l e c t u r e r .  And 
n o t  o n l y  w i l l  i t  v a r y  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ages ,  
t a s k s  and v a l u e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a d i f f e r e n t  k in d  and amount  
o f  fo o d  i s  needed f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p h y s ic a l  e n v i r o n m e n ts ,  e . g .  
in  a t e m p e r a t e  o r  in  a t r o p i c a l  c l i m a t e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  
rem ains  an i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e  f a c t  abo u t  any human b e in g  t h a t  
he o r  she needs a c e r t a i n  t y p e  and amount o f  fo o d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  and i t  i s  i n j u r i o u s ,  o r  d e l e t e r i o u s  t o  
any o f  us n o t  t o  have t h i s .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  o u r  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( b )  a r e  
e m p i r i c a l  p r e - c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  th o s e  o t h e r  t h i n g s  we w i l l  
r e g a r d  as w o r th  l i v i n g  a l i f e  f o r .  As G . A l l p o r t  ( 1 9 6 5 : 2 0 5 )  
w r i  t e s :
I f  someone i s  v e r y  hungry ,  v e r y  much in  need o f  
oxygen,  w a t e r ,  o r  r e s t ,  a l l  o t h e r  m o t iv e s  f a d e  away 
u n t i l  t h e  d r i v e  i s  s a t i s f i e d .
O n ly  when t h e r e  i s  enough food  on a c o n t i n u i n g  b a s i s ,  i t
seems, do t h e  o t h e r ,  h i g h e r  needs,  emerge. When t h e r e  i s
n o t  enough fo o d ,  'man l i v e s  by bread  a l o n e ’ . We m ig h t  n o te
f o r  f u t u r e  r e f e r e n c e  h e re  (s e e  p. 190)  t h a t  in  a s t a t e  o f
c o n t in u o u s  nea r  s t a r v a t i o n ,  n o t  even B ren tan o  c o u ld  have
c o n c e n t r a t e d  on p h i lo s o p h y .  We sho u ld  n o t i c e  a l s o  t h a t  t h e
need f o r  fo o d ,  w a t e r ,  s h e l t e r ,  a r e  o f  a 'now o r  n e v e r ’ s o r t .
I t  i s  p o i n t l e s s  t o  postpone m ee t in g  t h e  n e e d (b )  o f  fa m in e
v i c t i m s .  I f  th e y  a r e  no t  f e d  t h i s  y e a r  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  be
around n e x t  y e a r  t o  b e n e f i t  f rom  an a i d  programme.
A g a in ,  I  do n o t  want  t o  a rgue  t h a t  b e ing  f e d ,  c l o t h e d ,  
e t c .  ought  t o  have some s p e c i a l  moral  v a l u e  f o r  human 
b e in g s ,  o r  t h a t  we have a d u ty  t o  keep o u r s e l v e s  f e d  o r  t o  
h e l p  t o  f e e d  o t h e r  human b e in g s .  My p o i n t  i s ,  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  
such needs do p l a y  a c e n t r a l  p a r t  in  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  
b e l i e f s ,  e . g .  'Human be ings  ought  n o t  t o  be l e f t  t o  s t a r v e ’ . 
I f  i t  i s  in  one p e r s o n ’ s o r  g r o u p ’ s power t o  p r e v e n t  a n o th e r  
f ro m  s t a r v i n g ,  w i t h o u t  t h e r e b y  s a c r i f i c i n g  som eth ing  o f  
com parab le  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  th e m s e lv e s ,  we do b e l i e v e  t h e y  
ought  t o  do i t .  S e cond ly ,  a n e e d (b )  reason e . g .  'P e o p le  a r e
s t a r v i n g  in  t h e  Horn o f  A f r i c a ’ , i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good 
reason  f o r  t h e  moral  judgem ent  e . g .  'We m o r a l l y  oug ht  
ce t e r i s p a r i  bus t o  do som eth ing  t o  h e l p  th e m ’ , ( i f  no o t h e r  
c o n t r a r y  n e e d - r e a s o n  can be o f f e r e d  c a p a b le  o f  o v e r r i d i n g  
i t ) .  M o re o v e r ,  where a p a r t i c u l a r  n e e d (b )  i s  a p p e a le d  t o  as  
a p r i  ma f a c i e  good reason f o r  a judgem ent  t h i s  i s  t o  
i n d i c a t e  f a i r l y  p r e c i s e l y  what ought  t o  be done t o  remedy  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  T h e re  seems t o  be no p o i n t  in  l o o k i n g  f o r  a 
f u r t h e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  a p a r t  f rom t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ’ s f l o u r i s h i n g  which w i l l  be promoted by t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  need o r ,  more u s u a l l y ,  t o  t h e  i n j u r y  o r  
harm t h a t  w i l l  r e s u l t  due t o  i t s  n e g l e c t .
The need t o  a v o id  i n j u r y
A n o th e r  k in d  o f  b i o l o g i c a l  n e e d (b )  we have i s  f o r  o u r  
b o d i l y  o rgans  t o  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y . 87 I f  t h e y  a r e  t o  s u r v i v e  
a t  a l l ,  we n o te d ,  human b e in g s ,  l i k e  a l l  s e n t i e n t  c r e a t u r e s ,  
need t h e i r  v i t a l  o rgans  t o  f u n c t i o n ;  t h e y  need t h e i r  b r a i n ,  
s p i n a l  c o r d ,  t h e i r  h e a r t ,  lu n g s ,  d i g e s t i v e  and e l i m i n a t i n g  
o r g a n s ,  e t c .  t o  work .  I f  t h e y  a r e  t o  f l o u r i s h  -  o r  t h e y  a r e  
n o t  t o  a i l  -  t h e y  need th e s e  organs t o  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y .  
They need,  in  o t h e r  words,  t o  m a i n t a i n  good h e a l t h  and t o  
a v o id  i n j u r y ,  d is e a s e  and o t h e r  forms o f  unnecess ary  
p h y s i c a l  s u f f e r i n g .
Once a g a i n ,  what  we cou nt  as ' f l o u r i s h i n g ’ w i l l  t o  some 
e x t e n t  v a r y  w i t h  p r i o r  v a l u e s .  What c ou n ts  as sound 
p h y s i c a l  h e a l t h ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  t h e  O lym pic  a t h l e t e  w i l l  
d i f f e r  f rom  what  cou n ts  as h e a l t h  t o  a m id d le -a g e d  
p h i lo s o p h y  l e c t u r e r .  The l a t t e r  would be more th an  p le a s e d  
w i t h  a p h y s ic a l  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  would r e g a r d  as 
w o e f u l l y  u n f i t .  What counts  as sound h e a l t h ,  a l s o ,  w i l l  
v a r y  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  and p h y s ic a l  
e n v i r o n m e n ts .  No doubt  a d i f f e r e n t  k in d  and deg ree  o f  
f i t n e s s  i s  needed in  an i n d u s t r i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  l i k e  
G las g o w ’ s ,  t o  t h a t  o f  a n o n - i n d u s t r i a l  one l i k e  t h a t  o f  
T r a n s k e i . N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  rem ains  a c e n t r a l  c o r e  o f
185
o b j e c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  p h y s ic a l  h e a l t h  which  a p p l i e s  
t o  a l l  human b e in g s .
T h e re  i s  a c o re  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  t o o  in  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
human b e in g s  a r e  a l i k e  in  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  t o  p h y s i c a l l y  
s u f f e r .  L e t  me s a y ,  b r i e f l y ,  what I  mean by ' b e i n g  a l i k e ’
in  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  I f  I  am g iv e n  a s l a p  on t h e  back,  I  f e e l
l i t t l e  p a in  and I  do no t  s u f f e r .  My s k i n  i s  q u i t e  hard  and 
p r o t e c t s  me f rom  a mere s l a p .  I f  my you ngest  c h i l d  i s  
s la p p e d  in  t h e  same way she does f e e l  and s u f f e r  f ro m  t h e  
p a i n ,  because she has a more s e n s i t i v e  s k i n .  Now t h e r e  w i l l
be some k in d  o f  blow -  perhaps a blow w i t h  a s t i c k  -  t h a t
would cause me t o  s u f f e r  as much p a in  as I  would  cause my 
d a u g h t e r  i f  I  were t o  s l a p  h e r .  T h i s ,  I  hope,  i n d i c a t e s  
what  we w i l l  mean by ' b e i n g  a l i k e  in  our  c a p a c i t y  t o  s u f f e r  
p a i n ’ o r ,  m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s . by ' l i k e  cases o f  p h y s ic a l  
s u f f e r i  n g ’ .
Human b e in g s  a r e  a l i k e  in  t h e i r  n e e d (b )  t o  a v o i d ,  o r  t o  
end,  p h y s i c a l  s u f f e r i n g .  We re g a r d  i t  as an a i l i n g  
c o n d i t i o n .  T h i s  seems t o  be a n a l y t i c a l l y  t r u e ;  v i z .  in  
v i r t u e  o f  t h e  meaning o f  t h e  words ' s u f f e r i n g ’ and ' a i l i n g ’ . 
( I  w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  s h o r t l y . )  T h i s  i s  n o t ,  
however ,  t o  be confused  w i t h  t h e  s i m i l a r ,  b u t  f a l s e ,  c l a i m  
a b o u t  p a i n .  L e t  me i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h  an 
exam ple  borrowed f rom  R.Bambrough ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 5 ) .  We b e l i e v e  
t h a t  a c h i l d ,  who i s  abo u t  t o  undergo what  would o t h e r w i s e  
be p a i n f u l  s u r g e r y ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  no o t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i o n s ,  
sh o u ld  be g iv e n  an a n a e s t h e t i c  b e f o r e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n .  Not  
g i v i n g  h e r  t h e  a n a e s t h e t i c  w i l l  cause h e r  unnecess ary  and 
e x c r u c i a t i n g  p a in  and in  such c i r c u m s t a n c e s  she would  
n o r m a l ly  be t h o u g h t  t o  s u f f e r .  I t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  
however ,  t h a t  she w i l l  no t  s u f f e r .  And f rom  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
on t h i s  s u b j e c t  t h e r e  a r e  some grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  in  
r a r e  cases t h i s  i s  an e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  a l s o ;  some 
p e o p le  can e x p e r ie n c e  i n t e n s e  p a in  and y e t  n o t  s u f f e r . 88 
N o n e th e le s s  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  would n o r m a l ly  s u f f e r  in  such  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i s ,  s u r e l y ,  a w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n t i n g e n t
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t r u t h .  And i f  she s u f f e r s  due t o  t h e  p a i n ,  she i s  a i l i n g  
and she n e e d s ( b )  t o  end t h e  s u f f e r i n g .
Human b e in g s  a r e  a l i k e  a l s o  in  t h e i r  need t o  a v o id  damage 
t o  t h e i r  o rgans  and l im b s .  The e f f e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n i n g ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  o f  o u r  e y e s ,  e a r s ,  hands, l e g s ,  may be r e g a r d e d  as  
a u n i v e r s a l  and n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d ( b ) .  Though, once a g a i n ,  
what  we c o n s id e r  t o  be ade qua te  s i g h t ,  h e a r i n g  o r  w a lk in g  
a b i l i t y ,  w i l l  v a r y .  A T r a n s k ia n  h u n t e r  w i l l  need t o  have  
b e t t e r  v i s i o n ,  han d -eye  c o o r d i n a t i o n ,  h e a r i n g ,  and be more 
f 1e e t - o f - f o o t  th a n  a G lasw eg ian  o f f i c e  w o r k e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  
t h e  o f f i c e  w o r k e r ,  l i k e  t h e  h u n t e r ,  r e g a r d s  damage t o  h i s  o r  
h e r  organs  and l im bs  as harms.  Why? Because t o  f u n c t i o n  
e f f e c t i v e l y ,  any human b e ing  n e e d s (b )  t o  be a b l e  t o  see ,  
h e a r ,  w a lk ;  t h e s e  a b i l i t i e s  p l a y  such an i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  in  
so many o f  our  e v e ry d a y  o p e r a t i o n s . 89 An i n j u r y  t o  any one 
o f  t h e i r  organs  o r  l im bs  i s  som eth ing  which anybody has a 
good reason t o  a v o i d .  I f  t h e y  a r e  weakened o r  d e s t r o y e d ,  
t h e  v i c t i m ’ s e f f e c t i v e  pe r fo rm ance  as a human b e in g  i s  
impai  r e d .
Can we go f rom h ere  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  f o r  one person t o  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  cause unn ecessary  p h y s ic a l  s u f f e r i n g  t o  
a n o t h e r ,  o r  t o  damage t h e i r  organs  o r  l im b s ,  i s  n o t  m e r e ly  
t o  harm them, bu t  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong? L e t  us c o n s i d e r  t h e  1 
case o f  t h e  c h i l d  s u f f e r i n g  an unnecessary  p h y s ic a l  p a i n .  
Can we say t h a t  i f  she i s  n o t  g iv e n  an a n a e s t h e t i c  b e f o r e  
t h e  o p e r a t i o n  t h i s  i s  no t  m e re ly  t o  cause h e r  t o  s u f f e r  bu t  
a l s o  t o  do someth ing t o  her  which i s  p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  
wrong? C o u ld n ’ t  i t  be asked ,  f o r  exam ple ,  "What i f  her  
s u f f e r i n g  i s  s h o r t - l i v e d .  Does t h i s  r e a l l y  harm h e r  ( o r  
i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  her  f l o u r i s h i n g ) ?  And even i f  i t  does,  i s  i t  
r e a l l y  t h i s  t h a t  makes th e  a c t  m o r a l l y  w rong?".  90
L e t  me p u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  he re  in  a n o t h e r  way. Ex 
h y p o th e s i  t h e  c h i l d  s u f f e r s  unn ecessary  p a in  when she 
undergoes t h e  o p e r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  an a n a e s t h e t i c .  The 
q u e s t i o n e r  ask s ,  f i r s t l y ,  w h e th e r  such s u f f e r i n g  must be 
re g a rd e d  as a harm t o  th e  c h i l d .  Suppose t h a t  th e  c h i l d
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f o r g e t s  a l l  a b o u t  i t .  Doesn’ t  t h i s  show t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  p a i n  
may have been a g o n i z i n g  and n e e d l e s s l y  i n f l i c t e d ,  she  
d o e s n ’ t  r e a l l y  s u f f e r  on ba lanc e?  I n  response  t o  t h i s  
c h a l l e n g e  i t  must be und ers to o d  t h a t  in  such a c o n t e x t ,  we 
a r e  r e f e r r i n g  t o  h e r  a c t u a l  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  s u f f e r i n g .  She 
m ig h t  ( o r  m ig h t  n o t )  s u f f e r  in  t h e  long ru n ,  in  o t h e r  ways;  
e . g .  f rom  v a r i o u s  a f t e r - e f f e c t s ,  such as f e a r  o f  t h e  p a i n f u l  
e v e n t  happening  a g a i n ,  o r  o t h e r  n e u r o t i c  symptoms. We can  
p u t  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o  one s i d e ,  however,  s i n c e  we do 
r e g a r d  h e r  p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  s u f f e r i n g ,  i t s e l f ,  t o  be 
an a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n .  T h is  to o  i s  a c o n c e p tu a l  t r u t h ,  which  
h o ld s  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  meaning o f  t h e  words.  I t  would  be 
l o g i c a l l y  absurd  t o  say t h a t  a l th o u g h  t h e  c h i l d  i s  s u f f e r i n g  
e x t re m e  and unnecessary  p h y s ic a l  p a i n ,  she does n o t  s u f f e r ,  
o r  i s  n o t  b e ing  harmed, by t h i s .
The second q u e s t i o n  asks:  even i f  i t  does g e n u i n e l y  harm 
h e r ,  s u r e l y  t h i s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  reason f o r  m o r a l l y  
condemning t h e  a c t?  L e t  us suppose t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  g i v e  
h e r  t h e  a n a e s t h e t i c  i s  due t o  an o v e r s i g h t ;  t h a t  no one 
i n v o l v e d  f e e l s  p l e a s u r e  a t  s e e in g  t h e  c h i l d  in  agony,  e t c .  
I s  t h e  c h i l d ’ s unnecessary  s u f f e r i n g  n o n e th e le s s  a p r im a  
f  a c i e good reason f o r  m o r a l l y  condemning t h e  a c t?  As 
b e f o r e ,  my response in  C h a p te r  Seven w i l l  be t h a t  someone 
who asks t h i s ,  has f a i l e d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .
When I  c l a i m  t h a t  th e  s u f f e r i n g  caused t o  h e r  i s  a p r im a 
f a c i e  good reason f o r  ju d g i n g  t h i s  a c t  t o  be m o r a l l y  wrong,  
I  am n o t  s a y in g  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  h e re  i s  one o f  l o g i c a l  
e n t a i l m e n t .  O th e r  needs m ig h t  o u tw e ig h  t h i s  one.  I f  t h e y  
d i d  n o t ,  we would n ev er  r e q u i r e  our  c h i l d r e n  t o  undergo  
d e n t a l  s u r g e r y  j u s t  in  case t h e y  s u f f e r  u n n e c e s s a r i l y .  
N e i t h e r  i s  t h e  unnecessary  s u f f e r i n g  she i s  caused m e re ly  
o u r  i d e a  o f  wrong o r  m ere ly  a c o n t i n g e n t  t r u t h  in  o u r  moral  
code.  For  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  what  c o u ld  be in  
t h e  mind o f  anyone who c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
m o r a l l y  wrong. Suppose p e r  a b s u rd u m  someone s a i d  " I  know 
how she f e e l s  bu t  I  would n o t  t h i n k  i t  m o r a l l y  wrong i f
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somebody were t o  do t h a t  t o  me". I f  my argum ent  -  in  
C h a p t e r  Seven -  i s  c o r r e c t ,  he c o u ld  n o t  r e a l l y  know o r  
b e l i e v e  t h i s .  For  i f  we a r e  a l i k e  in  our  need t o  end an 
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  p h y s i c a l  s u f f e r i n g  t h e n ,  l i k e  any o t h e r  human 
b e i n g ,  he has an equal  a v e r s i o n  t o  h av in g  som eth ing  s i m i l a r  
done t o  him. Hence I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  
s u f f e r i n g  i s  a p r i ma f a c j e  good reasons f o r  a ju d g e m e n t ,  
anywhere ,  a t  any t i m e ,  condemning such an a c t ;  e . g .  'She  
o ug ht  n o t  t o  be t r e a t e d  in  t h i s  w ay ’ ; o r  'Anyone who t r e a t s  
h e r  so has done someth ing p r im a f a c i e  m o r a l l y  w ro n g ’ .
I  hope t h a t  f rom  t h e  above,  my answer t o  t h e  m o r a l i t y  o f  
a n o n - a c c i d e n t a l  i n j u r y  w i l l  be o b v io u s ;  a n o n - a c c i d e n t a l  
i n j u r y  caused by one person t o  t h e  body, s i g h t ,  l e g s ,  o r  
o t h e r  l im bs  and organs  o f  a n o t h e r ,  so t h a t  t h e  i n j u r e d  
person  can no l o n g e r  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  a l s o  i s  p r im a  
f a c i e  m o r a l l y  wrong. T h is  seems t o  be som eth ing  we a c c e p t  
as u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  in  o r d i n a r y  e x p e r i e n c e .  We a r e  shocked  
when we h e a r  o f  cases o f  t o r t u r e ,  unprovoked p h y s ic a l  
a s s a u l t ,  c h i l d - b a t t e r i n g  and v i o l e n c e  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  and we 
abhor  such co n d u c t .  We t h i n k ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  p a r e n t  
who b a t t e r s  h i s  o r  he r  c h i l d ,  say ,  c a u s in g  t h e  c h i l d  a 
perm anent  i n j u r y ,  does someth ing m o r a l l y  a b o m in a b le .  We 
c a n n o t  r e g a r d  such a c t s  o f  ch i  1d - b a t t e r i n g  w i t h  moral  
i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  ( o r  as m o r a l l y  r i g h t )  s i n c e  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  
s u f f e r i n g  i n v o l v e d  i s  t o  un d ers ta n d  t h e  reason f o r  m o r a l l y  
condemning i t .
T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  we a u t o m a t i c a l l y  blame th e  
o f f e n d i n g  p a r e n t .  Sometimes th e  f a c t s  upon which a 
judgem en t  ought  t o  be based a r e  h idden  f rom  us.  As a 
r e s u l t ,  we m i s t a k e n l y  r e l a t e  th e  a c t i o n  t o  t h e  c h o ic e  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  p a r e n t .  Whereas a p r o f e s s i o n a l  
p s y c h o l o g i s t  may e x p l a i n  th e  b a t t e r i n g  in  te rm s o f  v a r i o u s  
f e a t u r e s  o f ,  say ,  t h e  m o t h e r ’ s own c h i ld h o o d  -  she may have 
been s i m i l a r l y  a s s a u l t e d  in  e a r l y  l i f e  -  o r  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
c h i l d - b a t t e r i n g  r e s u l t s  f rom t h e  m o t h e r ’ s c l i n i c a l  
d e p r e s s i o n .  Such e x p l a n a t i o n s  sug gest  t h a t  she i s  n o t
r e s p o n s i b l e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  n o t  w h o l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  f o r  he r  
a c t i o n .  For  t h i s  reason we m ig h t  be r e l u c t a n t  t o  blame t h e  
m o th e r ,  d e s p i t e  our  b e l i e f  t h a t  he r  a c t i o n  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong.  
We can ,  so t o  speak ,  h a te  th e  s i n  y e t  lo v e  t h e  s i n n e r .
I  am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  we must r e g a r d  u n n ecessary  s u f f e r i n g  
o r  a v o i d a b l e  i n j u r y  as harms and t h a t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  
such c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  p r i ma f a c i e  good reasons  f o r  moral  
ju dgem en ts  condemning th e  a c t s  in  q u e s t i o n .  Both c l a i m s ,  as 
we have n o te d ,  a r e  c o n t e s t e d .  C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e y  have been 
s u b j e c t  t o  a l o t  o f  c r i t i c i s m  in  th e  r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e .
D . Z . P h i l l i p s  and H.O.Mounce ( 1 9 6 5 ) 91, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a rgue  
t h a t  ( i )  one p e r s o n ’ s v iew s as t o  what  s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s  
c o n s t i t u t e s  p h y s ic a l  harm ( o r  f l o u r i s h i n g )  may d i f f e r  f rom  
a n o t h e r ’ s and, m oreover ,  ( i i )  p e o p le  may d i f f e r  a l s o  in  
t h e i r  v iew  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e s e  reasons  (harm o r  
f l o u r i s h i n g )  t o  what  t h e y  c o n s id e r  t o  be m o r a l l y  r i g h t  
j u d g e m e n ts .  L e t  us c o n s id e r  t h e i r  a rgum ents .
P h i l l i p s ’ and Mounce’ s c r i t i c i s m
P h i l l i p s  and Mounce g i v e  as a c o u n t e r - e x a m p le ,  which
p u r p o r t s  t o  show t h a t  p h y s ic a l  i n j u r y  can n o t  be c o n s id e r e d
t o  be an i n c o n t e s t a b l e  harm, t h e  case o f  B ren tan o  who i t
seems re g a rd e d  h i s  b l in d n e s s  as a b l e s s i n g  and n o t  an
a f f l i c t i o n .  T h is  i s  because i t  a l lo w e d  him t o  c o n c e n t r a t e
more on p h i lo s o p h y .  They t e l l  us ( 1 9 6 5 : 1 4 5 )  t h a t
B ren tan o  was b l i n d  a t  t h e  end o f  h i s  l i f e .  When 
f r i e n d s  commiserated w i t h  him o v e r  t h e  harm t h a t  had 
b e f a l l e n  him, he den ied  t h a t  h i s  lo s s  o f  s i g h t  was 
a bad t h i n g .  He e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  one o f  h i s  
weaknesses had been a tendency  t o  c u l t i v a t e  and 
c o n c e n t r a t e  on too  many d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s .  Now, in  
h i s  b l i n d n e s s ,  he was a b l e  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on h i s  
p h i lo s o p h y  in  a way which had been i m p o s s i b le  f o r  
him b e f o r e .
Here  we a r e  p r e s e n te d  w i t h  a p a r t i c u l a r  p h y s ic a l  d i s a b i l i t y  
t h a t  I  am s u g g e s t in g  has t o  be re g a rd e d  as a harm o r  a i l i n g  
y e t  w h ic h ,  we a r e  t o l d ,  B re n ta n o ,  q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l y ,  d id  n o t  
r e g a r d  as a h a r m .92 C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  sho u ld  lead  
us t o  c o n c lu d e ,  suggest  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce, t h a t  what
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' h a r m ’ c o n s i s t s  in  depends c r u c i a l l y  on o n e ’ s o t h e r  i d e a l s  
o r  a s p i r a t i o n s .
The m a t t e r  can n o t  be s e t t l e d  t h i s  q u i c k l y  and e a s i l y .  I n  
t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  p resu m a b ly ,  we would a l l  a g r e e  t h a t  some o f  
t h e  more ex t re m e  s t a t e s  o f  p h y s ic a l  s u f f e r i n g  a r e  p r im a  
f a c i e  harms. A p e r s o n ’ s h e a l t h  can be damaged o r  can  
d e t e r i o r a t e  t o  such an e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  
i s  f o r f e i t .  L e t  me make th e  p o i n t  in  a n o th e r  way. The 
p h ras e  'human f l o u r i s h i n g ’ , we n o te d ,  does n o t  t e l l  us what  
s o r t  o f  t h i n g s  a r e  needed in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  bu t  i t  does im p ly  
t h a t  we need some l e v e l  o f  good h e a l t h .  C e r t a i n  p h y s ic a l  
s t a t e s ,  l i k e  a b r a i n  tumour,  would make t h i s  i m p o s s i b le .  So 
even B ren tan o  needs a l e v e l  o f  good h e a l t h  -  and a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  l e v e l  a t  t h a t .  W i t h o u t  i t ,  n o t  even he c o u ld  
have c o n c e n t r a t e d  on p h i lo s o p h y .
S e c o n d ly ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  i t  i s  a sound e m p i r i c a l  
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  p e o p le  do r e g a r d  b l i n d n e s s ,  permanent  
dismemberment,  d e a fn e s s ,  i l l n e s s ,  e t c . ,  as harms. T h a t  t h e  
l o s s  o f  o n e ’ s s i g h t  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  u n i m p o r t a n t ,  i s  a v e r y  
unusual  c l a i m  f o r  a r a t i o n a l  person t o  make. Such a v ie w  i s  
n o t  a c t u a l l y  h e ld  by many sane p e o p le .  To a d a p t  an argument  
o f  M i l l ’ s ( 1 8 6 1 : 2 5 9 ) ,  few h e a l t h y  human be in g s  who can see ,  
o r  h e a r  and speak ,  would con sen t  t o  an o p e r a t i o n  which  
changed them i n t o  a b l i n d  and d e a f  mute.  Where a person  
does i n t e n t i o n a l l y  m u t i l a t e  h i s  own body t h i s  u s u a l l y  
i n d i c a t e s  a s e v e r e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d i s t u r b a n c e .
What a r e  we t o  sa y ,  t h e n ,  o f  B ren tan o  who -  i t  appears  
f ro m  P h i l l i p s ’ and Mounce’ s use o f  h i s  example  -  th o u g h t  
t h a t  som eth ing  we r e g a rd  as an i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e  harm was 
a c t u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  him? I  have s a i d  t h a t  a person  t o  
whom a need i s  a s c r i b e d ,  because he l a c k s  som eth ing  and 
t h e r e b y  a i l s ,  may r e s i s t  th e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  need on th e  
grounds t h a t  he d o e s n ’ t  t h i n k  t h a t  he i s  b e ing  harmed. We 
must n o t  assume, as P h i l l i p s  and Mounce seem t o ,  t h a t  
B r e n t a n o ’ s o p i n i o n  on t h e  m a t t e r  can not  be f a u l t e d . 93
A l s o  we need t o  ask i f  P h i l l i p s ’ and Mounce’ s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  t h e  most p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  can be g i v e n  o f  
B r e n t a n o ’ s cas e .  We need t o  know, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  B r e n ta n o  
would have chosen t o  have been b l i n d .  Would he have been 
happy t o  have been born b l i n d ,  o r  t o  have l o s t  h i s  s i g h t  
e a r l i e r  in  l i f e ,  in  o r d e r  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e  more on 
p h i lo s o p h y ?  Would he recommend t o  any a s p i r i n g  p h i l o s o p h e r  
t h a t  he has h i s  o f f e n d i n g  eyes p lu cke d  out?  The p o i n t  h e re  
i s  t h a t  B re n ta n o  may have t h o u g h t  t h a t  he d i d  n o t  need t o  
s e e .  He was n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  wrong.  Y e t  i t  i s  h i g h l y  l i k e l y  
t h a t  he was wrong. We cou ld  show t h i s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  
t h e r e  were some o t h e r  t h i n g s  he wanted t o  do f o r  which he 
would need t o  be s i g h t e d .  A ls o  we c o u ld  c o n f i d e n t l y  
p r e d i c t ,  t o  t h e  a s p i r i n g  p h i lo s o p h e r  anyway, t h a t  in  many 
ways t h e  l i f e  f o r  a p h i lo s o p h e r  would be much more d i f f i c u l t  
i f  he c o u ld  no t  s e e . 94 Few phi l o s o p h i c a l  t e x t s  have been 
t r a n s c r i b e d  i n t o  b r a i l l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  so one would n o t  be 
a b l e  t o  read  t h e  books and a r t i c l e s  o f  o n e ’ s p e e r s .  I n  t h i s  
and in  many o t h e r  ways, o n e ’ s l i f e  would be made more 
d i f f i c u l t  as th e  r e s u l t  o f  b l i n d n e s s .  On th e s e  a ss u m p t io n s ,  
s u r e l y  n o t  u n re a s o n a b le  ones,  ( v i z .  t h a t  B ren tan o  would n o t  
have wanted t o  have been b l i n d  f rom  b i r t h ,  o r  e a r l i e r  in  h i s  
l i f e ,  o r  t h a t  he would n o t  have wanted t o  have made h i s  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  l i f e  more d i f f i c u l t  by becoming b l i n d ,  and so 
o n ) ,  th e n  he d id  n e e d (b )  t o  be a b l e  t o  see .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  l e t  us a c c e p t  B r e n t a n o ’ s own o p i n i o n  abo ut  
what harmed him and what  d id  n o t .  How a r e  we t o  e x p l a i n  
t h i s ?  The c o n n e c t io n  between a b o d i l y  need,  on t h e  one 
hand,  and a v a l u e  ju dgem en t ,  on th e  o t h e r ,  I  have s a i d  i s  
n o t  i n v a r i a b l e .  I t  can be o v e r r i d d e n  by o t h e r  needs.  Human 
b e in g s  have many, sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g  needs.  The re  a r e  
many t h i n g s  t h a t  we reg a rd  as h a r m f u l .  I n  B r e n t a n o ’ s case ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a tendency  t o  c u l t i v a t e  and c o n c e n t r a t e  on to o  
many d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s  and, as a r e s u l t ,  t o  f a i l  t o  p r o p e r l y  
d e v e lo p  o n e ’ s t a l e n t s ,  i s  a v e r y  g r e a t  harm. However  
f a i l u r e  t o  d e v e lo p  o n e ’ s t a l e n t  t o  th e  f u l l  i s ,  as we s h a l l
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s e e ,  som eth ing  any r a t i o n a l  person w i l l  r e g a r d  as a harm.  
S in c e  t h i s  i s  so,  i t  seems more r e a s o n a b le  t o  c o n c lu d e  -  
f ro m  t h e  p a ra g ra p h  quoted  -  t h a t  b l in d n e s s  was a harm f o r  
B r e n ta n o ,  j u s t  as i t  i s  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  us,  b u t  t h e r e  a r e  
t h i n g s  which m a t te r e d  more t o  him which made h i s  b l i n d n e s s  
re c e d e  in  im p o r ta n c e .  To a rgue  t h u s ,  i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  my 
needs t h e s i s .
L e t  us now c o n s id e r  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  we can d i f f e r
a b o u t  t h e  moral  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h i n g s  t h a t  harm us. I n  a
second example  t h e y  o f f e r ,  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce c i t e  t h e  case
o f  a C a t h o l i c  h o u s e w i fe  f o r  whom t h e  t h r e a t  o f  a v o i d a b l e
p h y s i c a l  i n j u r y  i s  c la im e d  t o  be q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  what
she c o n s i d e r s  t o  be m o r a l l y  i m p o r t a n t .  The woman, we a r e
t o l d ,  r e s i s t s  th e  a d v ic e  o f  her  d o c t o r  t h a t  she w i l l  be
p h y s i c a l l y  harmed i f  she has a n o t h e r  baby (and t h a t ,
t h e r e f o r e ,  she shou ld  use a form o f  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ) .  The
d o c t o r ,  t h e y  w r i t e  ( i b i d : 1 4 6 ) .
. . . ( a )  s c i e n t i f i c  r a t i o n a l i s t . . . in  an argument  
w i t h  a Roman C a t h o l i c  h o u s e w i fe  o v e r  b i r t h  c o n t r o l ,  
s t r e s s e d  t h e  harm which c ou ld  r e s u l t  f rom h a v in g  
t o o  many c h i l d r e n .  He o b v i o u s l y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  p h y s ic a l  harm c l i n c h e d  t h e  m a t t e r .  The 
h o u s e w i f e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, s t r e s s e d  t h e  honour a 
mother  has in  b r i n g i n g  c h i l d r e n  i n t o  t h e  w o r ld .
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i f  she t h i n k s  t h a t  a s e r i o u s  and unn ecessary
i n j u r y ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  c h i l d b i r t h ,  does no t  cou n t  as a harm
a t  a l l ,  t h e  woman i s  wrong.  Suppose th e  i n j u r y  i s  f a t a l .
I f  she o r  t h e  baby were t o  d i e  b e f o r e  o r  d u r i n g  t h e  b i r t h
t h e n ,  in  an obv ious  sense,  she would f o r f e i t  t h e  honour o f
b e in g  a m other .  I f  th e  harm t o  her  was n o t  f a t a l  bu t  a
perm anent  i n j u r y ,  no doubt  as a permanent  i n v a l i d  she would
n o t  be t h e  mother  she would want t o  be. So t o  a c h ie v e  ' t h e
honour o f  b r i n g i n g  c h i l d r e n  i n t o  t h e  w o r l d ’ t h e  h o u s e w i fe
needs t o  be a l i v e  and t o  a v o id  s e r i o u s  i n j u r y .
Can t h e  w arn in g  o f  th e  danger  t o  her  l i f e ,  o r  o f  an 
a v o i d a b l e  s e r i o u s  i n j u r y ,  be t h o u g h t  t o  c u t  no i c e  a t  a l l  as 
a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason t o  a dev ou t  C a t h o l i c  woman? I  
t h i n k  t h a t  a more p l a u s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  example  i s
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t h a t  t h e  harm o f  a p h y s ic a l  i n j u r y  does m a t t e r  m o r a l l y  t o  
h e r  y e t  i t  recedes  in  im p or tan ce  when compared w i t h  her  
r e l i g i o u s  commitment.
To see t h i s  we m ig h t  beg in  by r e c o g n is in g  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  
be c o n s i d e r a b l e  agreement  between t h e  h o u s e w i fe  and h e r  
d o c t o r  a b o u t  most o f  t h e  v a l u e  judgem ents  which f o l l o w  f rom  
reasons  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  harm o f  an a v o i d a b l e  i n j u r y .  I f  
t h e r e  was n o t h in g  e l s e  a t  s t a k e  b u t  a l i k e l y  i n j u r y  t o  t h e  
woman, which co u ld  be avo ided  by t a k i n g  p r e c a u t i o n s ,  th en  
p re s u m a b ly ,  h e r  own p h y s ic a l  w e l l - b e i n g  would have a s i m i l a r  
n o r m a t iv e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  her  as f o r  t h e  d o c t o r .  O th e r w is e  
why would she go t o  th e  d o c to r?  I n  many cases where t h e r e  
i s  a c o n t r o v e r s y ,  m oreover ,  t h e r e  i s  u n d is p u te d  f a c t u a l  
e v i d e n c e  and t o  p o i n t  t o  i t  can r e s u l t  in  moral  ag ree m en t .  
C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a d is a g re e m e n t  between th e  h o u s e w i fe  
and t h e  d o c t o r ,  in  which she wants a n a t u r a l  c h i l d b i r t h ,  t h e  
d o c t o r  recommends a C a e s a r ia n  s e c t i o n ,  and t h e  outcome i s  
d e c id e d  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  a v o i d a b l e  i n j u r y  t o  th e  baby.  The 
f a c t s  have t h e  same moral s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  both o f  them.
The n e x t  p o i n t  t o  r e a l i s e  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  would be no moral  
d i s p u t e  between them, i f  i t  were no t  seen on both s i d e s  t h a t  
t h e  woman may d i e  w i t h  th e  burden o f  a n o th e r  b i r t h ,  o r  t h a t  
she may be s e r i o u s l y  unhappy because she has t o o  many 
c h i l d r e n ,  o r  t h a t  her  o t h e r  c h i l d r e n  may s u f f e r  due t o  t h e  
m o t h e r ’ s d e p re s s io n  caused by to o  many c h i l d r e n ,  o r  t h a t  th e  
p o v e r t y  which may r e s u l t  f rom to o  l a r g e  a f a m i l y  may be 
h a r m f u l ,  and so on. On th e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  would be no 
d i s p u t e  i f  i t  were n o t  seen on both s i d e s  a l s o  t h a t  th e  
C a t h o l i c  mother  needs t o  be l o y a l  t o  her  f a i t h ,  h e r  p r i e s t ,  
h e r  c h u rc h ;  t h a t  t h e r e  can be g r e a t  d i s t r e s s  t o  t h e  woman i f  
she i s  b a r r e d  from t h e  sac ram en ts .  S i m i l a r l y  both s i d e s  
a p p e a r  t o  r e c o g n is e  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  she  
uses a c o n t r a c e p t i v e  d e v ic e  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  th e  s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  th e  h o u s e w i fe .  We may assume 
t h a t  though he t a k e s  an o p p o s i t e  v iew  o v e r  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ,  
t h e  d o c t o r  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  hou sew i fe  ought  t o  do what she
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chooses and t h a t  t h i s  m a t t e r  can not  be s e t t l e d  by t h e  d o c t o r  
o r  any o t h e r  e x p e r t .
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  a l l  o f  t h i s ,  a more p l a u s i b l e  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  example  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce g i v e  i s  t h a t  
t h e  t h r e a t  o f  t h e  a v o i d a b l e  p h y s ic a l  i n j u r y  i s  m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  ho u s e w i fe  y e t  t h i s  recedes  in  im p o r ta n c e  
when compared w i t h  her  r e l i g i o u s  commitment.  We have a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  needs and peo p le  weigh some, though n o t  a l l ,  
needs d i f f e r e n t l y .  For th e  h o u s e w i fe ,  he r  C a t h o l i c  b e l i e f s  
a r e  o f  g r e a t e r  im p o r tan ce  than  any s u f f e r i n g  which h a v in g  a 
baby m ig h t  i n v o l v e ,  whereas f o r  t h e  d o c t o r ,  t h e  p h y s ic a l  
harm t o  h i s  p a t i e n t  i s  th e  o v e r r i d i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h e re  
can be l i t t l e  doubt  t h a t  th e  h ou sew ife  w i l l  v iew  t h e  l i k e l y  
i n j u r y  t o  h e r s e l f  as a s a c r i f i c e .  I t  i s  a s a c r i f i c e  t h a t  i s  
r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  o n l y  because t h e r e  a r e  needs which  
m a t t e r  more t o  h e r .  I n  o t h e r  words,  pace P h i l l i p s  and 
Mounce, h e r  d is a g re e m e n t  w i t h  th e  d o c to r  i s  n o t  a b o u t  t h e  
moral  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  l i k e l y  p h y s ic a l  harm t o  h e r  b u t  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  harm in  q u e s t io n  m e r i t s  b e ing  g iv e n  
g r e a t e r  w e ig h t  than  her  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  Should  she r i s k  
h e r  l i f e  f o r  th e  sake o f  her  r e l i g i o u s  c o n v i c t i o n s ?
In  a r g u i n g  t h i s  way I  am a g r e e in g  w i t h  Mrs F o o t ,  o r  any  
a c c o u n t ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  which some reasons have much t h e  same 
moral  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  us a l l .  However,  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  
n o t  due t o  t h e  e n t a i l m e n t ,  o r  any o t h e r  l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n ,  
between ' T h i s  i s  a case o f  an a v o i d a b l e  i n j u r y ’ and ' T h i s  
m o r a l l y  ought  no t  t o  be d o n e ’ . I  am a r g u in g  t h a t  a need-  
reason  R g iv e s  r i s e  t o  th e  s t r o n g  p resum pt ion  t h a t  t h e  ag e n t  
m o r a l l y  o u g h t / o u g h t  no t  do F. By which I  mean t h a t  i f  
someone were t o  deny t h a t  th e  reason p r e s u m p t i v e l y  i m p l i e s  
t h e  judgem en t  then  t h e  burden o f  p r o o f  would be on t h a t  
person  t o  show t h i s .
A n o th e r  way in  which we can see how my a cc o u n t  d i v e r g e s  
f rom  Mrs F o o t ’ s v iew  i s  by c o n s i d e r i n g  what  i t  would mean 
f o r  a person t o  r e j e c t  t h e  judgem ent  ' T h i s  m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  
t o  be done because i t  i s  a case o f  an unnecessary  i n j u r y ’ .
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What would  such a r e j e c t i o n  in v o lv e ?  Would i t  make sen se ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  suppose t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r  m ig h t  g e t  o u t s i d e  
t h e  b e l i e f s  and ask h i m s e l f  w he ther  t h i s  b e l i e f  i s  n o t ,  
p e r h a p s ,  m is tak en ?  I t  should  be c l e a r  t h a t  on my ac c o u n t  
t h i s  i s  c o n c e i v a b l e .  T o r t u r e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  I  would a rgue  
i s  m o r a l l y  wrong and t h e r e  i s  a good n e e d - re a s o n  which shows 
i t  t o  be so.  I t  i s  c o n c e i v a b l e ,  I  suppose,  t h a t  e x p e r i e n c e  
c o u ld  t e a c h  us o t h e r w i s e .  And, no d o u b t ,  some f a n t a s t i c  
exam ples  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  v i o l e n c e  co u ld  be t h o u g h t  up in  
which i t  m ig h t  be shown t o  be l e g i t i m a t e  t o  t o r t u r e  someone.  
On Mrs F o o t ’ s a c c o u n t ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand, i t  i s  by no means 
c l e a r  what  i t  c ou ld  mean t o  suppose t h a t  someone m ig h t  
s e r i o u s l y  s e t  h i m s e l f  t o  q u e s t io n  th e  w o r th  o f  such b e l i e f s .  
I f ,  as Mrs Foot  s u g g e s ts ,  when th e  f a c t s  and v a l u e  
ju d g em en ts  a r e  p r o p e r l y  d e s c r ib e d  t h e  l o g i c a l  gap i s  c l o s e d ,  
t h e n  such an e n t e r p r i s e ,  in  one r e s p e c t ,  would be 
i n c o h e r e n t .  I f  t o  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  t o r t u r e  someone e n t a i l s  
d o in g  som eth ing  m o r a l l y  wrong,  i t  i s  i n c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  o r  some i m a g i n a t i v e  exam ple ,  shou ld  t e a c h  us 
o t h e r w i  s e .
I n c i d e n t a l l y  a n o th e r  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  I  have  
w i t h  Mrs Foot  i s  t h a t  I  r e q u i r e  a f u l l e r  t h e o r y  o f  needs  
th a n  she o f f e r s .  An a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  k i l l i n g  o r  a v o i d a b l e  
i n j u r y  can be m i t i g a t e d ,  we have seen,  f o r  t h e y  can c o n f l i c t  
w i t h  o b j e c t i v e s  which a r e  w e i g h t i e r  o r  m a t t e r  more t o  a 
person  th an  h i s  own s u r v i v a l  o r  w e l l - b e i n g .  T h i s ,  as we 
s h a l l  s ee ,  i s  a c r u c i a l  p o i n t  in  m a t t e r s  o f  moral  
d i s a g r e e m e n t .
What has been e s t a b l i s h e d  so f a r ?  The v iew  t h a t  I  have  
p r e s e n t e d  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  p a r t l y  a v iew  abo ut  t h e  sou rc e  
o f  o u r  moral b e l i e f s .  I  have argued t h a t  a l l  human be ings  
have c e r t a i n  needs e . g .  ' t o  s u r v i v e ’ , ' n o t  t o  a i l  
p h y s i c a l l y ’ , e t c .  and t h a t  t h i s  u l t i m a t e l y  e x p l a i n s  and 
j u s t i f i e s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  some moral  b e l i e f s  — 
c o n c e r n in g  such t h i n g s  as p r o h i b i t i o n s  on k i l l i n g ,  non­
a c c i d e n t a l  i n j u r y  o r  s u f f e r i n g  -  have f o r  us. I t  e x p l a i n s
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a l s o  why c e r t a i n  r e a s o n s  e . g .  ' . . . b e c a u s e  F w i l l  k i l l  X 5 , 
' . . . b e c a u s e  F w i l l  cau s e  X t o  s u f f e r  u n n e c e s s a r i l y ’ a r e
r e g a r d e d  as c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g .  Reasons  
based upon such needs  s e r v e  as p r i m a  f a c i e  good r e a s o n s  f o r  
a j u d g e m e n t  ' F  o u g h t / o u g h t  n o t  t o  be done t o  X ’ .
I t .  w i  I I  be o b j e c t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  even  i f  a l l  o f  th e
above  b e g i n s  t o  e x p l a i n  o r  j u s t i f y  c e r t a i n  o f  o u r  m o ra l  
b e l i e f s ,  i t  does n o t  j u s t i f y  w h a t  i s  f u r t h e r  i m p l i e d ,  
n a m e ly ,  ' E v e r y o n e  r a t i o n a l l y  o u g h t  t o  t a k e  such n e e d -  
r e a s o n s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  in  t h e i r  m ora l  j u d g e m e n t s ’ . I n  t h i s  
and o t h e r  w ays ,  my a c c o u n t  i s  i n c o m p l e t e .  Suppose t h e n ,  
t h a t  I  am a s k e d :  Why s h o u ld  anyone  t a k e  t h e s e  n e e d - r e a s o n s
i n t o  a c c o u n t ? ' .  I  w a n t  t o  show t h a t  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  
t a n t a m o u n t  t o  a s k i n g :  "Why s h o u ld  I  be t h e  k i n d  o f  c r e a t u r e
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  psycho 1o g i c a 1 laws t h a t  I  am?". T h i s  i s  n o t
a m a t t e r  o f  c h o i c e  f o r  w h ic h  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  r e a s o n s  can be 
g i v e n .  I f  someone g e n u i n e l y  t h o u g h t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  
c a u s i n g  a c h i l d  t o  s u f f e r  u n n e c e s s a r y  and e x c r u c i a t i n g  p a i n  
i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t ,  t h e y  w ou ld  be v e r y  abn orm a l  as  a p e r s o n .  
T h i s  a b n o r m a l i t y  w ou ld  be c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  o t h e r  ways i n  w h ic h  
t h e y  r e l a t e d  t o  p e o p l e .  He o r  she w ou ld  l a c k  c e r t a i n  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b )  o f  a p e r s o n .  As we s h a l l  s ee  
i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  i f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h e r e  i s  a p r i c e  t o  
pay f o r  t h i s .  F o r  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  w o u ld  seem t o  be 
i n c a p a b l e  o f  s y m p a th y ,  p i t y ,  m ercy ;  no d o u b t  he w o u ld  l a c k  
t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  m u tu a l  a f f e c t i o n ,  f r i e n d s h i p ,  o r  t o  t r u s t  
o t h e r  p e r s o n s .  He w o u ld  l a c k  a l s o  many o f  o u r  o r d i n a r y  
m o ra l  b e l i e f s .  P u t  u n d e r  t h i s  s o r t  o f  s t r a i n ,  i t  w o u ld  be 
d o u b t f u l  t h a t  we a r e  s t i l l  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  s o m e t h in g  t o  w h ic h  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  *a  p e r s o n ’ a p p l i e s .
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CHAPTER F IV E
PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS
T h e re  a r e  numerous p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  
d r i v e s ,  which a l l  persons  have in  common. For  i n s t a n c e ,  we 
a l l  seem t o  need a sense o f  our  own i d e n t i t y ,  t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g ,  t o  d e v e lo p  our  t a l e n t s ,  and so on. L e t  us c a l l  
t h e s e  p e rs o n a l  needs.  R e la t e d  t o  t h e s e ,  bu t  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  
them, a r e  s o c i a l  needs t h a t  we s h a r e .  We a l l  need t o  be 
a b l e  t o  communicate w i t h  o t h e r s  and t o  have some l e v e l  o f  
a c c e p ta n c e  from them.  A t  c e r t a i n  t i m e s ,  in  a l l  o f  our  
l i v e s ,  we a p p ear  t o  need c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  ( t h e s e  a r e  
u s u a l l y  t o  be found in  f a m i l y  a f f e c t i o n ,  e r o t i c  l o v e ,  
f r i e n d s h i p ,  e t c . ) .  The q u e s t i o n  we must ask in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
i s :  as w e l l  as our  b o d i l y  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  a r e  any o f  t h e s e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  any i n d i v i d u a l  t o  
f u n c t i o n  as a p e rso n ,  o r  such t h a t  t h e y  must be met f o r  any  
person t o  lead  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  l i f e ?
I  w i l l  b e g in ,  in  ( 1 ) ,  by s k e t c h i n g  some o f  t h e  psycho­
l o g i c a l  needs I  have in  mind.  For  reasons  t o  be e x p l a i n e d ,  
we w i l l  fo c u s  upon some o f  th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  and 
( b )  t h a t  a person must presuppose when he makes a moral  
ju d g e m e n t .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  a l l  
persons  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  s i m i l a r  t o  a moral  j u d g e r  in  h a v in g  
t h e  same p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  In  ( 2 ) ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  I  w i l l  
arg u e  t h a t  we a l l  n e e d (a )  and ( b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  
A ls o  I  w i l l  show how a number o f  o r d i n a r y  v a l u e  a t t i t u d e s  
can be e x p l i c a t e d  in  te rm s o f  t h e  need f o r  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  I n  ( 3 )  I  w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  any person n e e d s (b )  
a sense o f  h i s  o r  her  own i d e n t i t y  and th e n  d is c u s s  some o f  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  need; e . g .  f o r  a l e v e l  o f  s e l f -  
knowledge,  f o r  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  f o r  a sense o f  u n i t y  in  
o n e ’ s l i f e ,  and so on. In  ( 4 )  I  w i l l  examine some o f  our  
needs which depend f o r  t h e i r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  upon o t h e r  
p e rs o n s ,  l i k e  t h e  needs f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  and b e lo n g i n g .  In
( 5 )  I  w i l l  o u t l i n e  some o f  our  o t h e r  e m o t io n a l  and a f f e c t i v e  
needs ,  l i k e  t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  p l e a s u r a b l e  e x p e r i e n c e s .  Then  
I  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  some o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  needs;  v i z .  needs t h a t  
a person has in  response  t o  t h e  needs o f  o t h e r  p e rs o n s .  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r  I  w i l l  d i s c u s s ,  in  ( 6 ) ,  our  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  f o r  
a c t i v e  sympathy and,  in  ( 7 ) ,  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  
f o r  p a r e n t / c h i l d  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Some p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs o f  a mora l  . iudger
I  want  t o  i d e n t i f y  some o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  
a b i l i t i e s ,  powers,  d r i v e s ,  s e n t i m e n t s ,  t h a t  we must have in  
o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n  o r  in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h  as p e rs o n s .  ( I  
w i l l  d is c u s s  in  d e t a i l  t h e i r  c o n n e c t io n  w i t h  moral  b e l i e f s  
i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r . )  We a r e  f a c e d  by a prob lem  h e r e .  How 
a r e  we t o  p i c k  o u t  r e l e v a n t  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  f ro m  t h e  
m u l t i t u d e  o f  o t h e r  c o g n i t i v e  and c o n a t i v e  s t a t e s ,  o r  f rom  
o u r  numerous o t h e r  f e e l i n g s ,  em o t io n s ,  d r i v e s  and s t a t e s - o f -  
mind? S in c e  we a r e  p r i m a r i l y  concerned t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  r e l e v a n c e  and e l u c i d a t i o n  f o r  reasons  in  moral  
j u d g e m e n ts ,  we can narrow  t h e  f i e l d  h e re  c o n s i d e r a b l y  by 
s k e t c h i n g ,  f i r s t ,  a few o f  t h e  more obv io u s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l
needs t h a t  we must presuppose abo ut  a person who makes a
moral  ju d g e m e n t .  I f  t h e y  a r e  t o  be needs he has in  o r d e r  t o  
f u n c t i o n  o r  f l o u r i s h  as a p e rso n ,  th en  t h e y  c an n o t  be needs  
which a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  ju d g em en t -m ak in g  o r  t o  
t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  moral jud g em en ts .  (These  m a t t e r s  w i l l  be 
t a k e n  up in  C h a p te r  S e v e n . )  They w i l l  be, r a t h e r ,  t h e
needs t h a t  we must presuppose about  him qua p e rs o n .  To
s t a r t  w i t h ,  we w i l l  presuppose t h a t  he i s  (and t h a t  he 
t h i n k s  o f  h i m s e l f  a s )  a c on sc ious  b e in g ,  equ ippe d  w i t h  th e  
a b i l i t y  t o  reas o n ,  w i t h  th e  power o f  s e l f - d i r e c t i o n ,  th e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r  p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and f o r  sympathy w i t h  
o t h e r  p e rs o n s .  A l l  o f  th e  l a t t e r  a r e  n e c e s s a ry  i f  he i s  t o  
make any moral  judgem ents  a t  a l l .  L e t  us c o n s id e r  them in  
more d e t a i 1.
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I t  goes w i t h o u t  s a y in g  t h a t  a t  t h e  t i m e  he makes a 
ju dgem en t  t h e  person w i l l  need t o  be c o n s c io u s .  T h i s  does  
n o t  seem t o  be a v e r y  p r o m is in g  b e g in n i n g .  Our j u d g e r  a t  
many p o i n t s  in  h i s  l i f e  i s  n o t  c o n s c io u s ,  and many t h i n g s  
b e s id e s  persons  a r e  c o n s c io u s .  My dog, f o r  exa m ple ,  
possesses c o n s c io u s  s t a t e s .  Some m enta l  p r e d i c a t e s  can be 
a s c r i b e d  t o  i t .  He o f t e n  wants t o  be f e d ;  when he b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  food  i s  be ing  p la c e d  in  h i s  d is h  he wags h i s  t a i l ;  he 
e n j o y s  b e in g  s t r o k e d ,  f e e l s  p a in  i f  h i s  t a i l  i s  p u l l e d ,  and 
so on.  However we assume, n o t  u n r e a s o n a b ly ,  t h a t  t h e  dog i s  
n o t  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y  aware o f  t h e s e  s t a t e s .  A p e rs o n ,  on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  can be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ,  as opposed t o  m e r e ly  
c o n s c io u s .  Our moral  j u d g e r  needs t h i s  c a p a c i t y .  He needs  
t o  be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y  aware o f  what  he i s  d o in g .  T h is  does  
n o t  mean t h a t  he needs t o  be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y  aware o f  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  he i s  making a moral  ju d g em en t ,  a t  t h e  moment he 
makes i t .  I t  means t h a t  he needs t h i s  c a p a c i t y ;  i . e .  he 
needs t o  be c a p a b le  o f  be ing  aware o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he i s  
making a judg em en t .
Even i f  we were t o  suppose t h a t  my dog i s  aware o f  i t s
own m enta l  s t a t e s ,  ( i t  i s  aware t h a t  i t  i s  in  p a i n ,
f r i g h t e n e d ,  a n g ry ,  e t c . ) ,  what  we would n o t  a l l o w  i s  t h a t  i t
i s  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y  aware o f  i t s  own c o n t i n u i n g  i d e n t i t y .
I t  i s  n o t  p l a u s i b l e  t o  suppose t h a t  t h e  an im a l  c o u ld  be
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  in  t h e  sense o f  b e ing  a b l e ,  as J . Locke
( 1 6 9 0 : 2 1 1 )  s a y s ,
. . . ( t o )  c o n s id e r  i t s e l f  as i t s e l f ,  t h e  same t h i n k i n g  
t h i n g  in  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s  and p l a c e s ; . . .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  a n o th e r  r e l a t e d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i t e m  in  t h e
make-up o f  our  moral j u d g e r ,  qua p e rso n ,  t h a t  i s ,  a sense o f
h i s  own i d e n t i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l i t y .
To u n i v e r s a l i z e  o v e r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  ca s e s ,  o u r  j u d g e r  w i l l  
need a c o n c e p t io n  o f  h i s  own p a s t  and f u t u r e .  To u n i v e r s a l ­
ize i n  p r o p r i a  p e r sona he must be a b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
h i m s e l f  f rom  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  pe rso n s .  He needs t h e  c a p a c i t y ,  
as we n o te d ,  t o  form b e l i e f s  about  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  and 
h y p o t h e t i c a l  f u t u r e  s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s , a s k in g  w he ther  o r  no t
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h i s  ju dgem en t  ought  t o  be made i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
e n v is a g e d .  We assume t h a t  t h e  dog i s  n o t  a b l e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  
b e l i e f s  o f  t h i s  k i n d .  A t  any r a t e ,  he does n o t  e x h i b i t  
e v i d e n c e  o f  such an a b i l i t y .  We would e x p l a i n  t h e  d o g ’ s 
e r s a t z  b e h a v io u r  o f  t h i s  k in d  in  te rm s  o f  i n s t i n c t  o r  h a b i t .
Our j u d g e r  needs t o  be r a t i o n a l .  F i r s t l y ,  he needs t o  
use h i s  reason when d e l i b e r a t i n g .  I n  p r a c t i c a l  c o n t e x t s ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  he needs t h e  a b i l i t y  d i s p l a y e d  in  s e l e c t i n g  
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  means t o  a d e s i r e d  end.  ( T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  say  
t h a t  he must a lways  succeed in  re a s o n in g  w e l l . )  Some l e v e l  
o f  t h i s  k in d  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  seems t o  be found in  my dog.  
A t  l e a s t  he a c t s  in  ways t h a t  sug ges t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  
such a d e s c r i p t i o n .  For i n s t a n c e ,  he b r i n g s  me h i s  lead  
when he wants  t o  go f o r  a w a lk .  T h is  m ig h t  be th o u g h t  t o  be 
m e r e ly  a s i n g l e  and r e p e a te d  s t r a n d  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r .  
However sometimes he engages in  w e l l - j u d g e d  sequences o f  
a c t i o n s  which can not  be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  e x p l a i n e d  by 
i n s t i n c t .  ( A t  any r a t e  o t h e r  h i g h e r  p r i m a t e s ,  i f  n o t  a dog,  
s a t i s f y  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t . )  However t h e  j u d g e r ,  s e c o n d ly ,  
w i l l  need t o  d i s p l a y  t h e o r e t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  which a l l o w s  
him t o  w e ig h ,  p r e d i c t ,  e x p l a i n  and,  most i m p o r t a n t l y  f o r  us ,  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e .  When making a moral ju d g em en t ,  somet imes  
he w i l l  need t o  weigh c o n f l i c t i n g  needs,  o r  t r y  t o  c a l c u l a t e  
t h e  b e s t  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  ways t o  a c h ie v e  a d e s i r e d  s t a t e  o r  
how t o  a v o id  an unwelcome one. And as we s h a l l  s e e ,  a 
ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r  needs t o  be c a p a b le  o f  r e a s o n in g  a b o u t ,  and 
t o  make complex c h o ic e s  i n ,  a w ide range o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
A j u d g e r  needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ;  t h e  possessor  o f  
a w i l l .  L e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  say h e re  t h a t  t h i s  c o n s i s t s  in  
c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  judgem en ts ,  p r o j e c t s ,  b e h a v i o u r ,  by h i s  own 
u n f o r c e d  c h o ic e s .  S t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g ,  I  am s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
when I  do what  I  choose t o  do, w he ther  my c h o ic e  i s  r a t i o n a l  
o r  n o t ,  ( f r o m  my own p o i n t  o f  v iew  o r  anybody e l s e ’ s ) .  As 
long as my movements and b e h a v io u r  a r e  s e l f - m o t i v a t e d ,  I  can 
m e r e ly  pursue my wants and d r i v e s  w i t h o u t  any sense o f  
s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . So s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  co u ld  amount t o
201
n o t h i n g  more th a n  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  Durkheim ( 1 9 6 1 : 7 1 )  c a l l e d  
a n o m i e . 95 I t  i s ,  n o n e t h e le s s ,  c o r r e c t  t o  say a l s o  t h a t  a 
person  i s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  when he ju d g e s  and a c t s  in  
a c c o rd an ce  w i t h  h i s  r a t i o n a l  c h o ic e s .  I n  t h i s  se n s e ,  we 
t h i n k  o f  t h e  j u d g e r  as pos sess ing  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  r a t i o n a l l y  
choose and th e n  t o  a c t  in  accordance  w i t h  a t  l e a s t  some o f  
h i s  c h o ic e s .  Thus, as a r a t i o n a l  a g e n t ,  he can choose f o r  
h i m s e l f  and f o r m u l a t e  p la n s  o f  h i s  own. As a s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  a g e n t ,  we have a c o n c e p t io n  o f  him (and he needs  
t o  t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f )  as an i n i t i a t o r  o f  a c t i o n s  t h a t  make a 
d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  cou rse  o f  e v e n t s .  These a r e  some o f  t h e  
f e a t u r e s  we want t o  p i c k  o u t  by t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  ' s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  ’ .
T h e re  i s  a r e l a t e d  f e a t u r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  agency t h a t  s h o u ld  
be m ent ioned  h e re  ( a l t h o u g h  we w i l l  d is c u s s  i t  i n  more 
d e t a i l  i n  C h a p te r  S e v e n ) .  Our j u d g e r  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  he 
i s  an autonomous moral a g e n t .  He must t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f  as  
h a v in g  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  make h i s  own moral  judgem en ts  and 
t h e n ,  by U . R . , t o  d e r i v e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ents  which he 
w i l l  ho ld  as b in d in g  n o t  o n ly  on h i s  own conduct  b u t  on a l l  
o t h e r  moral  ag e n ts  as w e l l .  We w i l l  c a l l  t h i s  a b i l i t y  
'm o ra l  au tonom y’ . T h is  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  one  
t h a t  most c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  persons f rom  o t h e r  a n i m a l s .  
For whereas my dog may possess,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  c a r r y  o u t  p la n s  o f  i t s  own d e v i s i n g ,  i t  does n o t  seem 
p l a u s i b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  can f o r m u l a t e  r u l e s  f o r  
d i r e c t i n g  t h e  conduct  o f  i t s e l f  and o t h e r s .
I  want  t o  make two p o i n t s  b e f o r e  s k e t c h in g  t h e  n e x t  s e t  
o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  The f i r s t  p o i n t  con cerns  moral  
autonomy. The person who makes a judgem ent  presupposes t h a t  
he has t h i s  c a p a c i t y  even i f  a l l  c l a i m s  c o n c e r n in g  autonomy  
a r e  i l l u s o r y ;  even i f  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  we a r e  m is ta k e n  in  
t h i n k i n g  abo ut  moral  judg em en t -m ak in g  in  t h i s  way. A l l  t h a t  
we need t o  r e c o g n iz e  i s  t h a t  we do r e g a r d  o u r s e l v e s  as 
autonomous when making ju d g em en ts .  In  o t h e r  words,  t h e  
a cc o u n t  i s  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  d e t e r m i n i s m . 96
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The second p o i n t  i s  in te n d e d  as a r e m in d e r ,  so t o  sp e a k ,  
o f  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  in  which we a r e  h e a d in g .  I t  may be g r a n t e d  
t h a t  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  r a t i o n a l i t y  and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
a r e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs f o r  a ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r .  However i t  
m ig h t  be ob s erved  t h e s e  a r e  n o t  grounds f o r  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
as w e l l  as a moral j u d g e r ,  any person needs t h e m . 97 My 
response  t o  t h i s  i s  t h a t  th e s e  a r e  n o t  q u a l i t i e s  t h e  j u d g e r  
needs s p e c i f i c a l l y  in  o r d e r  t o  ju d g e ,  t h e y  a r e ,  r a t h e r ,  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s  t h a t  ( c o n s c i o u s l y  o r  o t h e r w i s e )  we 
a t t r i b u t e  t o  him when we say t h a t  th e  j u d g e r  i s  a person and 
t h e y  a r e  s t a t e s  t h a t  he must presuppose ab o u t  h i m s e l f .  L e t  
me s t r e s s  t h i s  p o i n t .  When making a moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  t h e  
j u d g e r  needs t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  employ c e r t a i n  fo rm a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s , e . g .  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . T h is  
and o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  he must s a t i s f y  qua ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, as a person he w i l l  need t o  presuppose  
t h a t  he i s  c o n s c io u s ,  t h a t  he has a sense o f  h i s  own 
c o n t i n u i n g  i d e n t i t y ,  t h a t  he has th e  a b i l i t y  t o  reason and 
t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  s e l f - d i r e c t i o n .  Whether  o r  n o t  any person  
needs t o  presuppose t h e s e  t h i n g s  i s  a query  w h ic h ,  f o r  t h e  
moment, I  w i l l  l e a v e  as a q u e ry .
A person who makes moral judgem ents  w i l l  have e m o t io n a l  
s t a t e s  and f e e l i n g s  towards  th o s e  t h i n g s  which a r e  th e  
o b j e c t  o f  h i s  moral c o n cern .  What i s  more, t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  
h i s  l i f e  i s  j u s t  as d i s t i n c t i v e  and, I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  j u s t  as  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  our  id e a  o f  him as a p e rso n ,  as h i s  r a t i o n a l  
c a p a c i t i e s .  But t h e  two a r e  no t  i n c o m p a t i b l e .  Em ot iona l  
s t a t e s ,  such as a n g e r ,  j e a l o u s y ,  re s e n tm e n t ,  e m b a r ra s s m e n t , 
g u i l t ,  o r  more p o s i t i v e l y ,  sympathy,  l o v e ,  a f f e c t i o n ,  e t c .  
accompany our  judgem en ts .
"A j u d g e r  may have e m o t io n a l  s t a t e s " ,  i t  m ig h t  be asked ,  
"b u t  does he need them?". To answer t h i s ,  we sho u ld  ask our  
q u e s t i o n e r ,  f i r s t l y ,  "To whom do t h e y  a p p ly  and f o r  whose 
b e n e f i t  a r e  h i s  moral judgements  made?". We s h a l l  see t h a t  
he i s  r e f e r r i n g ,  i n v a r i a b l y ,  t o  th o s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  groups  
who a r e  o f  p r e - e m in e n t  im p or tan ce  in  h i s  e m o t io n a l  economy.
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S e c o n d ly ,  and more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  we sh o u ld  ask o u r  q u e s t i o n e r  
what  an i n d i v i d u a l  would be l i k e  who la c k s  any f e e l i n g  o r  
e m ot io n  w h a ts o e v e r  when he makes moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  I f  t h e r e  
i s  such an i n d i v i d u a l  i t  would be d o u b t f u l ,  I  w i l l  a r g u e ,  
t h a t  we a r e  s t i l l  t a l k i n g  abo ut  a p e rs o n .  The p o i n t  i s ,  a 
moral  j u d g e r  i s  a p e rso n ,  n o t  a m achine .  He w i l l  need t o  
have f e e l i n g s  about  t h e  person o r  s i t u a t i o n  a t  which h i s  
judgem en t  i s  d i r e c t e d .
We sho u ld  n o t i c e ,  in  p a s s in g ,  t h a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  
e m o t io n a l  s t a t e  t h a t  he does have i s  a s s e s s a b le  in  te rm s  o f  
i t s  b e in g  r e a s o n a b le  o r  u n r e a s o n a b le .  I t  can be assessed in  
t h i s  way, f i r s t l y ,  because such a s t a t e  i m p l i e s  a b e l i e f  
a b o u t  t h e  perso n ,  o r  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s , which i s  b e in g  
j u d g e d .  Thus Smith  may ju d g e  "Jones ought  n o t  pay so much 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  my w i f e "  and because he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
so,  Smith  may w e l l  be j e a l o u s .  However ,  i f  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  i n n o c e n t ,  S m i t h ’ s ju d g em en t ,  b e l i e f  and 
e m o t io n a l  s t a t e ,  a r e  u n r e a s o n a b le .  S e c o n d ly ,  when a
p e r s o n ’ s e m o t io n a l  s t a t e  i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  a n o t h e r  p e rs o n ,  o r  
a t  any s i t u a t i o n ,  he i s  o f t e n  moved t o  do som eth ing  abo ut  
i t .  Thus Smith  may be m o t iv a t e d  t o  a c t  o u t  o f  j e a l o u s y .  
L a t e r  he may ju d g e  t h a t  such b e h a v io u r  was q u i t e  
u n r e a s o n a b le .  I t  would be wrong th en  t o  s u g g e s t ,  (a s  Hume 
i s  o f t e n  ta k e n  t o  s u g g e s t98) ,  t h a t  our  em ot io ns  a r e  
unconnected  w i t h  reason and e x i s t ,  as i t  w ere ,  c u t  o f f  f rom  
o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  our  mental  l i f e .
A person who ju d g e s  w i l l  a l s o  have l i k e s  and d i s l i k e s ,  
p l e a s u r e s  and p a i n s ,  and,  g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k in g ,  he w i l l  t r y  t o  
choose as much o f  t h e  fo r m e r  and as l i t t l e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  as 
p o s s i b l e .  Again  i t  would be wrong t o  sug ges t  t h a t  h i s  l i k e s  
and d i s l i k e s  a r e  unconnected w i t h  h i s  r a t i o n a l  c a p a c i t y .  We 
can see t h i s  i f ,  as b e f o r e ,  we compare a j u d g e r ’ s f e e l i n g s  
w i t h  th o s e  o f  a n o th e r  k in d  o f  s e n t i e n t  c r e a t u r e .  A dog has 
l i k e s  and d i s l i k e s .  L ik e  me, my dog l i k e s  t o  go f o r  long  
w a lk s  and d i s l i k e s  be ing  t o r m e n te d .  However ,  in  many cases  
my reason w i l l  lead  me t o  s u f f e r  more than  t h e  an im al  would
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in  t h e  same c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I  am a b l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  k in d  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  cause s u f f e r i n g ,  in  
a way t h a t  i t  seems p l a u s i b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  an im a l  
c a n n o t . "  I  have g r e a t e r  knowledge o f  what  i s  happen ing  t o  
me, a more d e t a i l e d  memory, and so on. Thus i f  we a r e  both  
d y i n g ,  s a y ,  f rom  c a n c e r ,  I  am l i k e l y  t o  s u f f e r  more th a n  my 
dog. On a h a p p i e r  n o t e ,  I  b e l i e v e  a l s o  t h a t ,  l i k e  me, my 
dog e n j o y s  p l e a s u r a b l e  e x p e r i e n c e s .  However t h e  more 
complex f e e l i n g s  t h a t  I  m ig h t  e x p e r i e n c e ,  s ay ,  when 
l i s t e n i n g  t o  a Beethoven Q u a r t e t ,  w i l l  have no an a lo g u e  w i t h  
t h e  f e e l i n g s  o f  a dog. There  a r e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  many o t h e r  
c o n t e x t s  in  which what  we t a k e  t o  be t h e  ( s u p e r i o r )  r a t i o n a l  
powers o f  persons  makes a d i f f e r e n c e ,  both in  deg re e  and in  
k i n d ,  t o  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  f o r  p l e a s u r e  and f o r  s u f f e r i n g .  The 
g e n e r a l  p o i n t  h e re  i s  t h a t  our  j u d g e r ’ s f e e l i n g s  and h i s  
r a t i o n a l  c a p a c i t i e s  do n o t  f u n c t i o n  s e p a r a t e l y  b u t  c o - e x i s t ,  
so t o  speak ,  when he j u d g e s .  As R .S .D o w n ie  and E . T e l f e r  
( 1 9 6 9 : 2 2 )  n o te :
S e n t i e n c e  in  t h e  form  in  which i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
o f  a person does i n v o l v e  reason
and,  we m ig h t  add,  v i c e  v e r s a . Once a g a in  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
a r i s e s  t h a t  a l th o u g h  t h e  person who ju d g e s  may seek p l e a s u r e  
and t r y  t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g ,  does he need to?
I t  would be odd t o  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  som eth ing  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  a p l e a s u r a b l e  f e e l i n g  c o u ld  a lw ays  
be a m a t t e r  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  him. I t  would rob many o f  
h i s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  judgem ents  o f  a reas o n .  Indeed  i t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d ers ta n d  what  co u ld  be meant by 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  in  most c o n t e x t s  u n le s s  we i n c l u d e  a l s o  
some a cc ount  o f  th e  p l e a s u r e  t h a t  h i s  chosen a c t i v i t y  
a f f o r d s ,  ( o r  o f  th e  s u f f e r i n g  t h a t  w i l l  be a v o i d e d ) .  For  
some o f  h i s  judgem ents  w i l l  be i n te n d e d  t o  b r i n g  about  
c e r t a i n  s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s  and i f  t h e r e  a r e  grounds f o r  
p r e f e r r i n g  one s t a t e  t o  a n o t h e r ,  i t  w i l l  be in  v i r t u e  o f  
some f e a t u r e  i t  possesses .  And one c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e ,  though  
by no means th e  o n ly  f e a t u r e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  chosen s t a t e -  
o f - a f f a i r s  i s  in  some way p l e a s u r a b l e  t o  th e  j u d g e r .  Thus
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w h i l e  t h i s  i s  n o t  an i n v a r i a b l e  m o t iv e ,  o u r  j u d g e r  needs t h e
p r o s p e c t  o f  p l e a s u r e .
There  i s  one k in d  o f  em ot ion  t h a t  d e s e r v e s  p a r t i c u l a r  
em phas is .  Most c o n t e x t s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral  judgem en t  
r e q u i r e  t h e  j u d g e r  t o  f e e l  concern  o r  sympathy f o r  o t h e r s .  
The sympathy r e q u i r e d  i n v o l v e s ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a 
c o n c e p t io n  o f  what  f l o u r i s h i n g  o r  harm i s  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  
p e rs o n .  I n  some c o n t e x t s ,  m oreo ve r ,  t h e  moral  jud g em en t  
demands more than  knowing how t h e y  a i l  and o f  f e e l i n g  s o r r y  
f o r  them. Sometimes t h e  j u d g e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  go beyond  
m e r e ly  showing c o n c e rn ,  t o  a c t i o n .  He needs,  as W.Maclagan  
( 1 9 6 0 : 2 1 1 ) w r i  t e s :
. . . t h e  sympathy o f  p r a c t i c a l  concern  f o r  o t h e r s  as
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from s im p ly  f e e l i n g  w i t h  them.
And in  some ca s e s ,  t h e  a c t i v e  sympathy t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  i s  
tow a rd s  someone who i s  o t h e r w i s e  unknown t o  t h e  j u d g e r .  To 
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  l e t  us t a k e  an e x t rem e  exam ple .  S e e in g  a 
baby whom one does n o t  know, a t t a c k e d  by a savage dog, any  
person  would f e e l  d i s t r e s s .  I n  t h i s  way, one would be 
re s p o n d in g  t o  t h e  needs o f  t h e  baby: i t s  needs t o  s u r v i v e ,  
t o  a v o id  s e r i o u s  p h y s i c a l  i n j u r y .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  person  
w i t n e s s i n g  such an e v e n t  would have a l s o  t h e  im p u lse  t o  do 
som eth ing  t o  save th e  baby.  He would no doubt  j u s t i f y  t h i s  
a lo n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  l i n e s :  " I  had t o  do som eth ing  t o  save
th e  baby because o t h e r w i s e  i t  would have been k i l l e d " .  T h is  
reason can be e x p l a i n e d  in  te rm s  o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  human 
c a p a c i t y  t o  show a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  t h e  needs o f  o t h e r s .
Aga in  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s :  even i f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  most  
p e o p le  do have an a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  t h e  needs o f  a n o t h e r  
in  such e x t re m e  c as es ,  what grounds a r e  t h e r e  f o r  c l a i m i n g  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  a n e e d (a )  o r  ( b )  f o r  t h e  j u d g e r ,  o r  eve ry o n e  
e l s e ?  To answer t h i s  we w i l l  c o n s id e r  what  an i n d i v i d u a l  
would be l i k e  who la c k s  a modicum o f  sympathy f o r  o t h e r s ,  o r  
any o t h e r  f e e l i n g  o r  e m o t io n .  I f  t h e r e  i s  such an 
i n d i v i d u a l  i t  would be d o u b t f u l ,  I  will a r g u e ,  t h a t  we a r e  
s t i l l  t a l k i n g  about  a person .
I  have t h r e e  b r i e f  p o i n t s  t o  make b e f o r e  we d i s c u s s  t h e s e  
c l a i m s  in  more d e t a i l .  The f i r s t  con cerns  a l i m i t a t i o n  t o  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  which f o l l o w s .  I  do n o t  p r e t e n d  t o  g i v e  a 
c om preh ens ive  a cc o u n t  o f  a l l  o f  th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  
and ( b )  o f  p e rs o n s .  We w i l l  exam ine ,  in  some d e t a i l ,  t h e  
needs o f  a person t o  be a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  f o r  a r o b u s t  
sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y ,  f o r  d i s t i n c t i v e  e m o t io n a l  and 
a f f e c t i v e  t i e s ,  and some o f  h i s  o t h e r  needs i m p l i e d  by th o s e  
above.  These a r e  by no means h i s  o n ly  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs;  
however t h e y  a r e ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  some o f  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  
ones.  I t  sho u ld  be n o te d ,  s e c o n d ly ,  t h a t  s i n c e  a person i s ,  
so t o  sp eak ,  an i n t e g r a t e d  whole  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  e t c .  t h e  needs t h a t  w i l l  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  h e re  a r e  o b v i o u s l y  connected  and combined w i t h  
each o t h e r .  The way in  which I  have d i v i d e d  them up and 
c a t e g o r i z e d  them i s  somewhat a r b i t r a r y .  T h i r d l y ,  s i n c e  many 
o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  n e e d s (b )  o f  persons a d m i t  o f  d e g re e s ,  
someone m ig h t  possess a l o t  o f  one s o r t  and l e s s  o f  o t h e r s ,  
hence we s h o u ld  a l l o w  t h a t  th e  d i v i d i n g  l i n e  between th o s e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  as persons  and th o s e  
who do n o t ,  w i l l  be a vague one.
I  have c l a i m e d ,  though n o t  in  t h i s  o r d e r ,  t h a t  o u r  i d e a  
o f  a person who makes a moral judgem ent  i m p l i e s  t h a t  he w i l l  
have ( i )  some l e v e l  o f  sympathy f o r  t h e  needs o f  o t h e r s ;  
( i i )  d i s t i n c t i v e  f e e l i n g s  and e m o t io n a l  a t ta c h m e n t s ;  ( i i i )  
a sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l i t y ;  ( i v )  t h a t  he 
i s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  and ( v )  t h a t  he i s  r a t i o n a l .  I  am 
s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  a l l  persons a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  in  h a v in g  
t h e s e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  L e t  me t r y  t o  show t h a t  t h i s  i s  
so.  B e g in n in g  w i t h  ( i v ) ,  we w i l l  dea l  w i t h  them in  r e v e r s e  
o r d e r .  Along t h e  way, ( v )  w i l l  t a k e  c a r e  o f  i t s e l f .
S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as a need
We want  t o  see i f  e v e r y  person needs t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g .  I f  so, he must be a b l e  t o  c o n s id e r  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  him and t o  d e c id e  between them, in
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a cc o rd an ce  w i t h  h i s  own u n fo r c e d  c h o ic e s .  I n  t h i s ,  he w i l l  
presuppose t h a t  he i s  w i t t i n g ;  c a p a b le  o f  d e c i d i n g  f o r  
h i m s e l f  what  he w i l l  choose.  He w i l l  t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f ,  
a l s o ,  as b e in g  a b l e  t o  a c t  on some o f  h i s  c h o ic e s ,  sometimes  
t h e r e b y  i n i t i a t i n g  e v e n ts  which w i l l  go d i f f e r e n t l y  due t o  
h i s  d e c i s i o n  t o  do t h i s  r a t h e r  th an  t h a t .  I s  t h i s  a n e e d ( a )  
o r  ( b )  f o r  e v e r y  person?
To see what  a p o s i t i v e  answer t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  m ig h t  
i n v o l v e ,  l e t  us c o n s id e r  a f a i r l y  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  c o n t e x t ,  
nam ely ,  when t h e  d e c i s i o n  concerns  a m a t t e r  o f  t a s t e .  Our  
p h y s i o l o g y ,  we have n o te d ,  endows us w i t h  c e r t a i n  needs.  
Our c a p a c i t y  t o  choose prompts us t o  s a t i s f y  t h e s e  needs in  
c e r t a i n  ways. Co ncern ing  th e  need f o r  fo o d ,  f o r  exam ple ,  
c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  can be chosen as s a t i s f y i n g  t o  o u r  t a s t e ,  
e . g .  i f  i t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  I  can choose w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t o  e a t  
s p i n a c h .  Any r a t i o n a l  a g e n t ,  we m ig h t  add, can f o r m u l a t e  
p la n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  such c h o ic e s .  He o r  she can p la n  f o r  
a f u t u r e  c h o ic e  and a c t  now t o  s a t i s f y  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .  T h i s  
i s  n o t  as c o m p l ic a t e d  as i t  m ig h t  sound.  I  can buy sp in a c h  
now f o r  a c h o ic e  o f  th e  v e g e t a b l e  a t  n e x t  Sunday ’ s d i n n e r ;  
I  can p l a n t  s p in a c h  in  t h e  autumn, t o  be cropped in  t h e  
S p r i  n g .
However t h e r e  i s  more t o  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  even in  t h i s  
c o n t e x t ,  th an  th e  mere c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  a s i n g l e  means t o  a 
s i n g l e  end.  We r a r e l y  f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  w i t h o u t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
f rom  which t o  choose.  O f t e n  we f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  h a v in g  t o  
weigh up a number o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  ends.  To pursue one t h i n g ,  
we must f o r g o  a n o t h e r .  So t h a t ,  even in  m a t t e r s  o f  t a s t e ,  
our  f i n a l  c h o ic e  i s  u s u a l l y  based on more than  th e  im m edia te  
p ro m p t in g s  o f  our  t a s t e s ,  o r  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Where c o n f l i c t  
e x i s t s ,  we can choose p r i o r i t i e s .  We can make c h o ic e s ,  t h i s  
i s  t o  sa y ,  based upon e s t i m a t e s  o f  th e  v a r y i n g  im p o r tan ce  o f  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  To c o n t i n u e  w i t h  our  s im p le  exam ple ,  when 
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  I  can choose t o  e a t  sp in ac h  
r a t h e r  than  cabbage.  My d e c i s i o n  can be based,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  on p r u d e n t i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I  can wish t h a t  I
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c o u ld  e a t  cabbage y e t  choose n o t  t o ,  knowing t h a t  i t  does 
n o t  agree  w i t h  me. I  can choose d e s p i t e  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  my 
c u r r e n t  d e s i r e s ,  as when I  choose s p in a c h  -  even though my 
d e s i r e  f o r  cabbage i s  c u r r e n t l y  s t r o n g e r  -  because my h o s t  
has grown t h e  s p in ac h  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  me. I  can make c h o ic e s  
a b o u t  f u t u r e  d e s i r e s ,  some o f  which a r e  n o t  c u r r e n t l y  f e l t  
as d e s i r e s  a t  a l  1 . I  can choose t o  buy s p in a c h  f o r  
t o m o r ro w ’ s d i n n e r  even though ,  a t  t h e  moment, t h e  i d e a  o f  
e a t i n g  s p in a c h  tomorrow le a v e s  me c o l d .
Of c o u rs e ,  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  a g e n ts  have t o  make c h o ic e s  
ab o u t  f a r  more complex is s u e s  than  m a t t e r s  o f  t a s t e .  In  
m a t t e r s  o f  co n d u c t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  as opposed t o  h a b i t  o r  
b l i n d  c o n f o r m i t y  t o  custom, t h e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  person  w i l l  
t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f  as be ing  c a p a b le  o f  choos ing  in  acc ordance  
w i t h  h i s  own b e l i e f s ,  o f  p u rs u in g  h i s  own p l a n s ,  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s ,  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  in  some in s t a n c e s  c o n s c i o u s l y  d e c i d i n g  
t o  d e p a r t  f rom  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  customs and m o r e s . 100 He w i l l  
t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f ,  a l s o ,  as be ing  a b l e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  th o s e  
d e c i s i o n s .  He w i l l  t h i n k  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  some o f  h i s  a c t i o n s  
make a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  cou rs e  o f  e v e n t s .  I t  makes sense  
f o r  him t h e r e f o r e  t o  p la n  p r o j e c t s ,  e n t e r t a i n  e n t e r p r i s e s .  
He i s  a b l e ,  a l s o ,  t o  weigh v a r i o u s  o b j e c t i v e s ;  he w i l l  be 
a b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  some o f  h i s  g o a ls  as i m p o r t a n t ,  o t h e r s  
as u n i m p o r t a n t .  And h av in g  g o a ls  he w i l l  have a sense o f  
a c h ie v e m e n t  and f a i l u r e .
W h i le  i t  may be g r a n t e d  t h a t  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  
sug gested  by th e  s k e tc h  above,  what  grounds a r e  t h e r e  f o r  
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  e v e r y  person needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ?  
One way we can show t h i s  i s  by c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  t y p e  o f  cases  
where human be in g s  a r e  n o t  t h o u g h t  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
and, t h e r e b y ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  t h o u g h t  o f  as perso n s .
Some human be ings  a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  i n c a p a b le  o f  c ho os ing ;  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a d a y - o l d  baby, o r  a s o - c a l l e d  human v e g e t a b l e  
o r  someone who is  t o t a l l y  s e n i l e .  What our  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
t h e  co n c e p t  ' p e r s o n ’ r e q u i r e s  i s  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  i s  no 
doubt  t h a t  i t  i s  a human b e in g ,  we do n o t  c a l l  th e  baby a
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p e rs o n .  I n  t h e  deve lopm ent  o f  t h e  normal i n f a n t  we w i l l  see  
a g r a d u a l  i n c r e a s e  in  t h e  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  and range  o f  i t s  
t a s t e s ,  b e l i e f s ,  e t c . ;  t h e r e  w i l l  be e v id e n c e  o f  an
i n c r e a s i n g  awareness o f  i t s  own p a s t  and f u t u r e  and an
i n c r e a s i n g  d e s i r e  and a b i l i t y  t o  assume c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  
co u rs e  o f  i t s  l i f e .  There  i s  n o t  a s p e c i f i c  p o i n t  in  t h i s  
p ro c e s s  a t  which we t h i n k  th e  i n f a n t  becomes a p e rs o n .  We 
would s ay ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  g r a d u a l l y  i t  becomes a p e rs o n .  
S i m i l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  though as i t  were in  r e v e r s e ,  a p p ly  
i n  t h e  case o f  someone who i s  s e n i l e .  E v e n t u a l l y  t h e y  lo s e  
a sense o f  t h e i r  own i d e n t i t y ,  t h e y  have no c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  t h e y  a r e  in c a p a b le  o f  c h o o s in g .  I n  t h e s e  
ways t h e y  become le s s  o f  a p e rso n ,  l i t e r a l l y ,  th an  t h e  r e s t  
o f  us .  And in  t h e  case o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  g r o s s l y
r e t a r d e d  o r  i r r e p a r a b l y  damaged, t h e r e  i s  no doubt  t h a t  he
o r  she i s  a human b e ing  but  t h i s  to o  i s  a case where we 
m ig h t  doubt  t h a t  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  ' p e r s o n ’ a p p l i e s .  One 
reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t ,  in  a l l  such ca s e s ,  a n o t h e r  person  
i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p l e t e l y  d e t e r m in e  t h e i r  c h o ic e s  and 
a c t i o n s .  T h i s  i s  t o  s u g g e s t ,  a l b e i t  in  a n e g a t i v e  way, t h a t  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a need f o r  pe rso n s .
V a r i o u s  s e v e r e  p s y c h o t ic  and n e u r o t i c  s t a t e s  a l s o  
d i s q u a l i f y  someone who i s  a f f l i c t e d  by one o f  them as be ing  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  and t h e r e b y ,  e i t h e r  c o m p l e t e l y  o r  in  some 
m easure,  as b e ing  d e f e c t i v e  as a p e rso n .  C e r t a i n  k in d s  o f  
c o m p u ls iv e  b e h a v i o u r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a r e  u n a f f e c t e d  by 
a n t e r i o r  d e c i s i o n s .  K le p to m a n ia c s  do n o t  choose t o  s t e a l ,  
indeed  t h e y  may d e c id e  n o t  t o ,  bu t  t h e y  s t e a l  a l l  t h e  same.  
Reasons t h a t  such a person may acknowledge as r e l e v a n t  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make th e  a c t i o n  wrong, when i t  comes t o  i t ,  
a r e  i n e f f e c t i v e .  He i s  im p e l l e d  by d r i v e s  o v e r  which he has 
no c o n t r o l . 101 Psychopaths ,  t o o ,  do n o t  a p p ear  t o  make a 
c e r t a i n  s o r t  o f  c h o ic e .  They seem t o  be i n c a p a b le  o f  
t r e a t i n g  any but  t h e  most imm ediate  reasons as r e l e v a n t  t o  
t h e i r  ju d g em en ts .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e y  a r e  in c a p a b le  o f
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c a r r y i n g  th ro u g h  any p r o j e c t  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  d e f e r r e d
g r a t i f i c a t i o n .  As D . W r ig h t  ( 1 9 7 1 : 9 2 )  n o te s :
For  him ( t h e  psy chopa th )  t o  want  i s  t o  t a k e .  I f  
o t h e r s  g e t  in  th e  way i t  i s  t h e i r  m i s f o r t u n e  i f  t h e y  
g e t  h u r t ,  and t h e  psychopath  f e e l s  no p a in  o r  
rem orse .  H is  e m o t io n a l  l i f e  i s  b a r r e n . . .  He i s  
e g o c e n t r i c ,  both  in  t h e  P i a g e t i a n  sense o f  b e in g  
u n a b le  t o  c o n c e iv e  o t h e r  p o i n t s  o f  v iew  th a n  h i s  
own, and a l s o  in  th e  more g e n e r a l  sense o f  b e in g  
s e l f i s h  and s e l f - c e n t r e d .
I t  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t a l k  o f  ' t h e  p s y c h o p a th ’ s c h o i c e ’ .
He does n o t  choose b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  h i s  i n n e r
c o m p u ls io n s .  We c o u ld  m ent ion  h e re  a l s o  th e  p a r a n o id
i n d i v i d u a l  whose d e f e c t  i s  a b e l i e f  s t r u c t u r e  some a s p e c ts
o f  which  a r e  q u i t e  d i v o r c e d  f rom r e a l i t y .  He a l l o w s  no
e v id e n c e  t o  s e t  a s i d e  h i s  s t r a n g e  b e l i e f  t h a t  e v e ry o n e  i s
a g a i n s t  him. He does no t  choose t o  impugn t h e i r  g o o d w i l l .
For  he i s  u n a b le  t o  t a k e  a cc ount  o f  e v id e n c e  t h a t  u p s e ts
t h i s  odd b e l i e f .  He, t o o ,  i s  in  some sense d r i v e n . 102 A
person  s u f f e r i n g  f rom a r a d i c a l  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d i s o r d e r  l i k e
s c h i z o p h r e n i a  a l s o  l a c k s  t h e  con sc iousne ss  o f  h i m s e l f  as t h e
o r i g i n a t o r  o f  c h o i c e s . 103
The c l a i m  t h a t  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a need f o r  persons  
i s  f u r t h e r  j u s t i f i e d  when we c o n s id e r  t h e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n t e x t  where an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  d i s q u a l i f i e d  as a chooser  
because h i s  responses a r e  made a c c o r d in g  t o  a programme  
im p la n te d  by someone e l s e .  S u b je c t s  a c t i n g  under  h y p n o s is ,  
o r  who a r e  b ra in w ash ed ,  o r  who a r e  u n a b le  t o  c o n te m p la t e  
d i s o b e y in g  a p o l i t i c a l  o r  r e l i g i o u s  a u t h o r i t y ,  a r e  examples  
o f  t h i s  s o r t .  I n  such cas es ,  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s normal  
f u n c t i o n  as a c h o o ser ,  now d e f e c t i v e ,  has been im p a i r e d  by 
someone e l s e .  C o n s id e r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  case o f  b r a i n ­
w ash in g .  The most obv ious  examples o f  t h i s  a r e  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  systems in  n o v e ls  ( e . g .  Brave New 
Worl d ,  1_984), which depend upon th e  s y s t e m a t i c  i n d o c t r i ­
n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c i t i z e n r y .  When i t  i s  c o m p le te ,  we would  
q u e s t i o n  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  personhood t o  t h e  v i c t i m ( s ) .  
S y s t e m a t i c  p o l i t i c a l  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  no t  
r e s t r i c t e d  m ere ly  t o  th e  p o l i t i c a l  systems o f  f i c t i o n .
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Where t h e  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  i s  c o m p le te ,  o r  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t h i s  p r e v e n t s  p u r p o s iv e  a c t i o n ,  t h e  v i c t i m s  a r e  undermined  
as p e r s o n s . 104
T h i s  l a t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  can o c c u r ,  a l s o ,  in  t h e  g u i s e  o f
k i n d n e s s .  For  exam ple ,  i f  a person i s  i n j u r e d  m e n t a l l y  o r
p h y s i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  t h e  tenden cy  t o  h e l p  him to o
much. To t h e  deg ree  and t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  done we
c o u ld  be d e s t r o y i n g  them as pe rso ns .  As R.S Downie and
E . T e l f e r  (of) c i t :21 ) n o te :
. . . i t  i s  o f t e n  e a s i e r  t o  do someth ing f o r  ( i n v a l i d s )  
th a n  t o  w a i t  p a t i e n t l y  and encourage  w h i l e  t h e y  do 
i t  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s . . . t h i s  may w e l l  be a s u b t l e  way o f  
e r o d i n g  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s n a t u r e  as a p e rso n .
I n  a s i m i l a r  way, i t  i s  o f t e n  e a s i e r  t o  t e l l  c h i l d r e n  what
t o  choose,  t o  do, o r  t o  t h i n k .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  i f ,  as E. Fromm
( 1 9 4 2 )  o b s e r v e s ,  c h i l d r e n  f e e l  i n s e c u r i t y  and unhapp iness  as
a r e s u l t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  f reedom . Where a c h i l d  i s  so
c o n t r o l l e d ,  t h e  p a r e n t  o r  t e a c h e r  i s  u nd erm in ing  t h e  c h i l d ’ s
p r o s p e c t s  as a person .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  ways in  which a human b e in g  may 
f a i l  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  He may s im p ly  r e f u s e  t o  make 
h i s  own ju d g e m e n ts .  He may l e t  h i m s e l f  be c o m p l e t e l y  
d om ina ted  by o t h e r s  o r  by some o t h e r  t h i n g .  He may depend  
u n d u ly  on o t h e r s  f o r  encouragement o r  f o r  r e a s s u r a n c e  t o  
overcome a n x i e t i e s  o r  f e a r s .  Or th e  f a i l u r e  m ig h t  be due t o  
a c r a v i n g  f o r  d r i n k ,  which i s  so s t r o n g  t h a t  i t  d i c t a t e s  
most o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s a c t i o n s ,  e . g .  how he spends h i s  
t im e  and h i s  money; o r  i t  m ight  a consuming p a s s io n  f o r  
g a m b l in g ,  o r  j e a l o u s y  o r  some o t h e r  o b s e s s io n .  A g a in ,  where  
t h i s  o c c u rs  he i s  undermined as a p erso n .  These remarks  
a r e ,  p e r h a p s ,  s t i l l  o n ly  s u g g e s t iv e .  They s u g g e s t ,  I  hope,  
t h a t  a person needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .
We can u n d e rs ta n d  th e  l a t t e r  c l a i m ,  we s a i d ,  in  one o f  
two ways.  F i r s t l y ,  t o  f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l  as a p e rs o n ,  a human 
b e in g  n e e d s ( a )  some degree  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  The 
argum ent  in  s u p p o r t  o f  t h i s  c l a i m  i s  both c o n c e p tu a l  and 
e m p i r i c a l .  I t  i s  a c l a i m  about  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e
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c o n c e p t  ' p e r s o n * .  I n  e v e r y d a y  d i s c o u r s e ,  ( t h e  s o r t  o f  
d i s c o u r s e  in  which our  moral  judgem ents  o c c u r ) ,  we r e g a r d  
t h e  t o t a l  absence o f  agency as a f a i l u r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a 
p e rs o n .  I n  o t h e r  words,  we t h i n k  t h a t  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  b e ing  a person i s  t h a t  he i s  a t  l e a s t  on 
some o c c a s io n  aware o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  him and i s  
a b l e  t o  choose between them.
I  do n o t  want  t o  sug gest  by t h e  above,  t h a t  t h e  c o n cep t  
o f  'p e r s o n *  we o r d i n a r i l y  employ i s  a m a t t e r  o f  s o c i a l  
c o n v e n t io n ,  and even l e s s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  
c o u r t e s y . 105 I  am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  in  t h e  e x t re m e  cases  where  
t h e r e  i s  no e v id e n c e  w h a ts o e v e r  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  w h i l e  
t h e r e  i s  no doubt  t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  q u e s t i o n  i s  a human 
b e i n g ,  we would say t h a t  th e  c o n cep t  'p e r s o n *  does n o t  
a p p l y .  ( I f ,  in  t h e  f u t u r e ,  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  found t o  
be unn ecess ary  t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  a p e rso n ,  we s h o u ld  
have a l t e r e d  our  c o n c e p t . )
What con cep t  o f  ' a  person*  would someone have who d e n ie d  
t h i s  p o i n t ?  L e t  us suppose t h a t  due t o  a c c i d e n t  o r  d i s e a s e ,  
a m id d le -a g e d  person becomes a m id d le -a g e d  i r r e v e r s i b l e  
t a b u l a r a s a . S u r e ly  h i s  menta l  s t a t e s  would no lo n g e r  be 
c o r r e c t l y  d e s c r ib e d  by p r e d i c a t e s  t h a t  a p p ly  t o  persons  b u t ,  
r a t h e r ,  t h e y  would be d e s c r ib e d  by th o se  which a p p ly  t o  
t a b u l ae r a s a e . We may s ay ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  
have d e s i r e s  which prompt them t o  behave in  c e r t a i n  ways b u t  
i t  i s  more usual  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h i s  k in d  o f  b e h a v io u r  as a 
f i x e d  i n s t i n c t ,  r a t h e r  than  as an e r s a t z  k in d  o f  
d e l i b e r a t i o n  and c h o ic e .  Thus th e  i n d i v i d u a l  above co u ld  be 
s a i d  t o  want  food y e t  i t  would n o t  make sense t o  speak o f  
h i s  e v e r  w a n t in g  t o  do a n y th i n g  abo ut  a c q u i r i n g  i t ;  he co u ld  
be s a i d  t o  have l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g  o r  p a i n f u l  e x p e r ie n c e s  b u t ,  
even though he m ig h t  a v o id  them, he c o u ld  n e v e r  be s a i d  t o  
choose t o  do so, and so on. Would my opponent  want  t o  say  
t h a t  such an a d u l t  human b e in g ,  t o  whom no i n t e n t i o n a l  
p r e d i c a t e s  -  l i k e  w a n t in g ,  p r e f e r r i n g ,  choos ing  -  e v e r  
g e n u in e ly  a p p l y ,  i s  n o n e th e le s s  a person? W i t h o u t  s e l f ­
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d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and s i m i l a r  f u n c t i o n a l  p r e d i c a t e s ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  
t h e  te rm  'p e r s o n *  would be about  as u s e f u l  as t h e  te rm  
' t h i n g * ,  o r  even worse ,  i t  would be vacuous.
The c l a i m  t h a t  a person n e e d s ( a )  some d eg re e  o f  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  perhaps s t r o n g e r  when i t  i s  re g a rd e d  as an 
e m p i r i c a l  c l a i m .  The e v id e n c e  above,  ( i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  a person needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ) ,  c o n s i s t e d  
m a i n ly  o f  human be in g s  who la c k  th e  c a p a c i t y  e n t i r e l y .  A t  
t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  e v id e n c e  c i t e d  p o i n t s  t o  a t  l e a s t  one 
f a i r l y  c e n t r a l  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  which we use t o  
d e s c r i b e ,  e x p l a i n  and p r e d i c t  t h e  b e h a v io u r  o f  p e rs o n s .  The 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  he re  be longs  t o  what  P . K i t c h e r  
( 1 9 7 9 : 5 4 5 )  c a l l s  'common sense p s y c h o lo g y * .  A c c o rd in g  t o  
t h e  l a t t e r ,  when we say t h a t  Smith  and Jones a r e  p e rs o n s ,  we 
mean t h a t  t h e y  be long t o  a c l a s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who s h a re  
c e r t a i n  f i x e d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  one o f  which i s  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  L ik e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  in  t h e  n a t u r a l  
s c i e n c e s ,  t h i s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  i s  u n i v e r s a l ,  
p r o j e c t i b l e  f rom i t s  i n s t a n c e s ,  c a p a b le  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , and p r o v i d e s  a s t a n d a r d  method o f  
e x p l a i n i n g  and p r e d i c t i n g  a c e r t a i n  t y p e  o f  b e h a v i o u r .
Regarded as a n e e d ( a ) ,  t h e r e  i s  no m e r i t  in  a p e r s o n ’ s 
b e in g  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  I t  t a k e s  on a moral  d im ens ion  o n l y  
when t h e  r e l e v a n t  d e s c r i p t i o n  occ urs  as a n e e d - r e a s o n  in  
moral  ju d g em en ts .  And t h i s  u s u a l l y  happens when someone’ s 
n e e d ( a )  i s  v i o l a t e d ,  o r  in  cases where i t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
y i e l d  t o  o t h e r  needs.  (F o r  I  am a r g u in g  t h a t  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  one n e e d (a )  among m any. )
The second way in  which we m ig h t  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  c l a i m  
t h a t  a person needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  i s  as a n e e d ( b ) .  
The e x e r c i s e  o f  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  i s  n o t  i n v a r i a b l e ;  we can be 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  in  v a r y i n g  d e g re e s ,  so t o  s p e a k . 106 L i k e  
m u scu la r  powers,  m oreover ,  we app ear  t o  r e g a r d  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  
as improved by be ing  used. For i t  seems t h a t  a person who 
e x e r c i s e s  i t  d e v e lo p s  c e r t a i n  powers and a b i l i t i e s ,  e . g .  in  
d i s c r i m i n a t i v e  f e e l i n g ,  p r e f e r e n c e  and ju d g em en t .  Are  we
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a b l e  t o  say when someone uses t h e s e  powers and a b i l i t i e s  t o  
t h i s  e x t e n t  he f l o u r i s h e s  as a person? Can we say t h a t  t h e  
l e s s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  anyone i s ,  o r  i s  a l lo w e d  t o  be,  t h e  
more he a i l s ?  Are we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  h i s  b e in g  s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  i s  p a r t  o f  our  commonsense b e l i e f  c o n c e r n in g  
what  i t  i s  f o r  a person t o  f l o u r i s h ?
I n  o u r  e v e r y d a y  l i v e s ,  we do b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
n e e d (b )  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  c a p a c i t y .  Even where such 
independence  seems t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  a n x i e t y  and unhapp iness  
we f e e l  t h a t  such a n x i e t i e s  sho u ld  be overcome r a t h e r  th a n  
d e c re a s e  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s independence .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  The 
P l owden R e p o r t  ( 1 9 6 7 )  c o n f i d e n t l y  a s s e r t s  t h a t  t e a c h e r s  and 
p a r e n t s  must ' f o r c e  in d e p e n d e n c e ’ in  c h i l d r e n ,  and f o r  good 
re a s o n s .  To th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  an a d u l t ’ s c a p a c i t y  f o r  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d , t h e i r  judgem en ts  and 
a c t i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be governed by unconsc ious  m o t iv e s  and 
c o m p e n sa t io n s ,  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be f r u s t r a t e d ,  
t h e i r  l i v e s  more l i k e l y  t o  be empty and dom inated  by th e  
judgem en ts  o f  o t h e r s .  In  ways l i k e  t h i s ,  our  o r d i n a r y  
i n t u i t i o n  seems t o  be t h a t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  no t  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  t h e y  a i l  as pe rso n s .
T h is  i s  n o t  t o  sa y ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  be happy 
when t h e y  a r e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  Sometimes t h e  s t r a i g h t e s t  
r o u t e  t o  h ap p iness  may be by f o r f e i t i n g  o r  c o n s t r a i n i n g  
o n e ’ s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  T h is  s u g g es ts  t h a t  s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  one n e e d (b )  and t h a t  h ap p ine ss  i s  a n o t h e r ,  
and t h a t  one c a n ’ t  a lw ays  have them b o th .
I n  e v e ry d a y  l i f e  we t h i n k  t h a t  when a person i s  a b l e  t o  
d e c id e  f o r  h i m s e l f  what  he i s  go ing  t o  do -  in  t h e  sense o f  
h i s  b e ing  a b l e  t o  make c h o ic e s  among a l t e r n a t i v e  h yp o th e s e s ,  
p o l i c i e s ,  a c t i o n s  -  t h e  more l i k e l y  he i s  t o  f l o u r i s h .  A 
man who has a j o b  t u r n i n g  a screw on an assembly  l i n e  o r  a 
j o b  s p e n t  s h o v e l l i n g  coa l  may n o t  see t h i n g s  in  t h i s  way;  
b u t  t h e n ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  h i s  whole  l i f e  i s  n o t  s p e n t  on t h e  
assembly  l i n e  o r  a t  th e  c o a l - f a c e .  He w i l l  a t  l e a s t  have t o  
make c h o ic e s ,  (and a c t  upon some o f  t h e m ) ,  c o n c e r n in g  some
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o f  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  f e a t u r e s  o f  l i f e ,  e . g .  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t o  
have a sexua l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  t o  m a r ry ,  t o  have c h i l d r e n ,  a 
f a m i l y  l i f e ,  and so on. He wi 11 make c h o ic e s  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  
groups w i t h  whom he a f f i l i a t e s ,  s o c i a l l y ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  and so 
f o r t h .  And he w i l l  make an enormous number o f  c h o ic e s  
c o n c e r n in g  t h e  more mundane a s p e c ts  o f  l i f e ;  perhaps  even  
t h e  c h o i c e ,  poor f i s h ,  between s p in a c h  o r  cabbage f o r  
di  n n e r .
We s h o u ld  n o t e ,  however,  t h a t  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  i s  
d i f f e r e n t  f rom  w a n t - s a t i s f a c t i o n , which may be b r o u g h t  ab o u t  
w i t h o u t  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  I f  Smith  d e s i r e s  n o t h in g  more 
th a n  t o  have a l l  o f  h i s  wants s a t i s f i e d  and b e l i e v e s  t h a t  
Jones knows b e s t  how t o  a r r a n g e  t h i s  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i  r s , Sm ith  
m ig h t  p u t  h i m s e l f  under  J o n e s ’ c o n t r o l  o b e y in g  e v e r y  p i e c e  
o f  a d v ic e  t h a t  Jones g iv e s  him. Smith  may w e l l  r e c e i v e  
abundant  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  h a v in g  found an e f f e c t i v e  way o f  
g e t t i n g  a l l  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g s  he w an ts .  But he i s  no 
lo n g e r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  h i s  s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  may lead  t o  th e  f r u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  
Smith  most w an ts ,  e . g .  a happy m a r r i a g e ,  d o t i n g  c h i l d r e n ,  
e t c .  Y e t  we t h i n k  t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  needs t o  be a b l e  t o  
choose f o r  h i m s e l f  in  such m a t t e r s .  Where t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
o r  no e v id e n c e  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a human b e ing  i s  h e ld  
t o  a i l  o r  be in  some measure d e f e c t i v e  as a p e rso n .
The im p o r tan ce  we a t t a c h  t o  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  
some o f  our  usual  v a l u e  a t t i t u d e s .  One o f  t h e s e  i s  ' s e l f -  
r e s p e c t ’ . L e t  us suppose t h a t  h i s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  le a d s  
Sm ith  t o  make many dangerous and f o o l i s h  m is ta k e s  so t h a t  he 
d e c id e s  n o t  t o  e x e r c i s e  th e  c a p a c i t y  a g a i n .  He p u ts  h i m s e l f  
i r r e v o c a b l y  under  J o n e s ’ g u id a n c e .  There  i s  a common 
p resu m p t io n  t h a t  such a d e c i s i o n  would be m o r a l l y  wrong.  
W hatever  th e  harm fu l  consequences,  we would say "Smith  ought  
n o t  t o  obey e v e r y  p ie c e  o f  a d v ic e  t h a t  Jones g i v e s  h im " .  
For we b e l i e v e  t h a t  a person n e e d s (b )  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and 
t h a t  t o  f o r g o  i t  in  t h e  way Smith  proposes shows a l a c k  o f  
s e l f - r e s p e c t .
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The c o n n e c t io n  between s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and s e l f -  
r e s p e c t  can be seen ,  a l s o ,  in  such commonplace a t t i t u d e s  as 
t h e  p r i d e  we n a t u r a l l y  t a k e  in  our  s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d  
acc om pl ishm en ts  o r  t h e  i n d i g n a t i o n  and re s e n tm e n t  we f e e l  
when we b e l i e v e  t h a t  we a r e  b e in g  m a n ip u la t e d  by o t h e r s  o r  
when, in  some o t h e r  way, we t h i n k  t h a t  o u r  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  b e ing  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h .  We would n o r m a l ly  
say som eth ing  l i k e  "You a r e  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  my p r o j e c t  and 
you o ug ht  n o t  t o  do s o " .  Such r e s e n tm e n t ,  as a d e f e n s i v e  
r e a c t i o n  t o  i n t e r f e r e n c e  f rom o t h e r s ,  i s  a l s o  an e x p r e s s i o n  
o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t .
The n e e d (b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  I  am s u g g e s t i n g ,  i s  
an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  our  moral a p p ro v a l  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t .  
Perhaps t h i s  can be seen more c l e a r l y  in  o u r  f i r m  
d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  cases where s e l f - r e s p e c t  i s  a b s e n t .  Someone 
who r e f u s e s  t o  make h i s  own ju d g e m e n ts ,  who a l l o w s  o t h e r s  t o  
'push him a r o u n d ’ , o r  who i s  m o t i v a t i o n a l l y  dependent  on 
o t h e r s ,  ( o r  who i s  a d d i c t e d  t o  a l c o h o l ,  g a m b l in g ,  o r  who has 
a consuming j e a l o u s y ,  e t c . ) ,  i s  accused o f  l a c k i n g  ' s e l f -  
r e s p e c t ’ , ' b e i n g  to o  dependent  on o t h e r s ’ , ' o f  n o t  knowing  
h i s  own m in d ’ . On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a person shows s e l f -  
r e s p e c t  when he a t t e m p t s  t o  be in d e p e n d e n t  o f  o t h e r s  in  h i s  
judgem en ts  and h i s  a c t i o n s ;  when he i s ,  so t o  speak ,  h i s  own 
m a s t e r .  S e l f - r e s p e c t ,  in  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  we i d e n t i f y  w i t h  
t r a i t s  o f  c h a r a c t e r  l i k e  ' s e l f - r e l i a n c e ’ , ' s t a n d i n g  on o n e ’ s 
own f e e t ’ , 'knowing  what  one w a n t s ’ , ' b e i n g  a b l e  t o  d e c id e  
f o r  o n e s e l f ’ .
We can i d e n t i f y  th e  n e e d ( b ) ,  a l s o ,  as a sou rc e  o f  a n o t h e r  
e v e r y d a y  v a l u e ,  namely ' r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r  p e r s o n s ’ . To 
r e s p e c t  o t h e r  persons we a r e  no t  r e q u i r e d  t o  l i k e  them, o r  
t o  want  t o  spend t im e  in  t h e i r  company, o r  t o  v a l u e  t h e i r  
p r o j e c t s ,  r e s p e c t  t h e i r  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  e t c .  R a t h e r ,  l i k e  
them o r  n o t ,  t o  r e s p e c t  them i s  t o  r e c o g n iz e  t h e i r  need t o  
be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  and t o  a c c e p t  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  a g a i n s t  
i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  them o r  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s .  We can accord  them
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r e s p e c t ,  in  t h i s  sen se ,  w h i l e  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  s o c i e t y  would  be 
b e t t e r  o f f  i f  t h e y  had n o t  e x i s t e d .
* D i s r e s p e c t  * , on t h e  o t h e r  hand, can be seen in  t h e  
a t t e m p t  o f  one person t o  be o v e r b e a r i n g ,  o r  t o  dom in a te  
a n o t h e r .  I t  can be seen in  o n e ’ s l a c k  o f  concern  f o r ,  o r  
som et imes,  b loo d y -m in d ed n e ss  tow ard s  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s .  A t  i t s  
most e x t r e m e ,  i t  can mean t r a m p l i n g  on t h e i r  p r o j e c t s  o r  
t r e a t i n g  t h e  o t h e r  person as a mere im p ed im ent ,  o r  as an 
i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  o n e ’ s own ends.  T h is  s o r t  o f  b e h a v i o u r ,  a t  
r o c k - b o t t o m ,  i s  t o  d i s r e g a r d  t h e i r  n e e d (b )  t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g .  (T h e r e  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  more t o  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  
o t h e r  p e r s o n s ’ th an  t h i s ;  bu t  ' n o t  i n t e r f e r i n g  in  t h e i r  
p r o j e c t s ’ i s  p a r t  o f  what  i s  i n v o l v e d . )  N e e d le s s  t o  say we 
d is a p p r o v e  o f  such d i s r e s p e c t .
C l e a r l y ,  t h e n ,  many o f  our  moral a t t i t u d e s  can be t r a c e d  
t o  t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  And t h e r e  can be no 
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  moral p resu m p t io n  in  
i t s  f a v o u r .  However I  do no t  want  t o  s u g g es t  t h a t  t h e  more 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  he i s ,  t h e  more a person i s  what  he m o r a l l y  
oug ht  t o  b e . 107 To re g a r d  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as a fo rm  o f  
f l o u r i s h i n g  commits us t o  n o t h in g  more, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  th an  
a c o n c e p t io n  o f  a person as a r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  
c h o o s e r .  Moreover  w h i l e ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  we u s u a l l y  
r e g a r d  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as a moral  good, t h e r e  i s  no 
n e c e s s i t y  t h a t  we s h o u ld ,  o r  t h a t  i t  i s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
we a r e  n o t  p r e p a re d  t o  l e t  p e o p le  d e c id e  t h a t  t h e y  oug ht  t o  
do w h a t e v e r  t h e y  l i k e ,  in  t h e  name o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  
P r o h i b i t i o n s  on m urder ,  c a u s in g  a n o t h e r  person p h y s ic a l  o r  
m enta l  t o r t u r e ,  we n o r m a l ly  would say o v e r r i d e  th e  a g e n t ’ s 
n e e d (b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  d i s p u t e s  t h a t  
we have c o n c e r n in g  m a t t e r s  l i k e  a b o r t i o n ,  c e n s o r s h i p ,  c i v i l  
d i s o b e d ie n c e ,  a r e  o f t e n  ab o u t  w h e th e r  t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  sho u ld  be g iv e n  more w e ig h t  th a n  o t h e r  
n e e d - r e a s o n s  in  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n t e x t .  The usual  d i s p u t e s  
abo ut  a b o r t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a r e  n o t  ab o u t  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  
a woman shou ld  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  in  m a t t e r s  c o n c e rn in g
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what  happens t o  h e r  body. They a r e  a b o u t  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  
t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  n e e d - r e a s o n s ,  l i k e  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  
f o e t u s ,  which o v e r r i d e  t h e  woman’ s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p r e s u m p t io n  in  f a v o u r  o f  
moral  c l a i m s  based on t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  
'Because  i t  i s  h e r  u n f e t t e r e d  d e c i s i o n ’ i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  
good reason f o r  t h e  C a t h o l i c  h o u s e w i f e ’ s judgem ent  t h a t  she  
oug ht  n o t  p r a c t i c e  c o n t r a c e p t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  we j u d g e  
t h a t  'S m i th  ought  n o t  t o  obey e v e r y  p i e c e  o f  a d v ic e  t h a t  
Jones g i v e s  h i m ’ th en  'becau se  a person n e e d s ( b )  t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g ’ i s  a pr_i_ma f a c i e  good reason f o r  j u d g i n g  so;  i f  
i t  i s  c o r r e c t  t o  say 'You a r e  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  my p r o j e c t ’ 
th e n  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  n e e d - r e a s o n  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a 
p r im a  f a c j e  good reason f o r  t h e  judgem ent  'You m o r a l l y  oug ht  
n o t  t o  behave in  t h i s  m anner ’ . 108
I  hope I  have s a i d  enough t o  show why I  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  
c o n c e p t  o f  ' a  p e r s o n ’ r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  which  
i t  i s  c o r r e c t l y  a s c r i b e d  has some d eg re e  o f  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  We re g a r d  t h e  t o t a l  absence o f  agency as a 
f a i l u r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  as a p e rso n .  A ls o  we have a n o r m a t iv e  
image o f  o u r s e l v e s ,  so t o  speak ,  as f l o u r i s h i n g  as persons  
and t h i s  image i n c l u d e s  e f f e c t i v e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  We 
r e g a r d  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  t h i s  power as an a i l i n g  o r  d e f i c i e n c y .  
I n  moral  c o n t e x t s ,  t h i s  can be seen ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  in  t h e  
g u i l t  we f e e l  i f  we a r e  n o t  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  in  m a t t e r s  
which r e q u i r e  a moral  judg em en t ,  o r  th e  moral d i s a p p r o v a l  we 
f e e l  i f  ou r  a c t i o n s  a r e  c o n t r a r y  t o  our  s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d  
ju d g e m e n ts .  (We w i l l  see what  happens when t h e s e  c l a i m s  a r e  
c o n t e s t e d  when we r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  in  C h a p te r  
S e v e n . )
P a r t  o f  th e  con cep t  o f  a person and o f  o u r  n o r m a t iv e  
image o f  o u r s e l v e s  i s  o f  b e in g  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  a g e n ts .  
There  a r e  o t h e r  c a p a c i t i e s ,  s t a t e s ,  d r i v e s ,  which a r e  
e q u a l l y  n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l . One o f  t h e s e ,  we n o te d ,  i s  t h a t  
a person needs t o  have a sense o f  h i s  o r  h e r  own i d e n t i t y .  
L e t  us t u r n  t o  t h e  n e e d (a )  f o r  s e l f - i d e n t i t y .
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The need f o r  s e l f - i d e n t i t y
The person who makes a moral  ju d g e m e n t ,  I  s a i d ,  n e e d s ( a )  
a sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y .  What does t h i s  i n v o l v e ?  He 
needs t o  r e g a r d  h i s  ju d g e m e n ts ,  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  h i s  a c t i o n s ,  
as t h e  judgem ents  and a c t i o n s  o f  a u n iq u e  and c o h e r e n t  s e l f .  
Put  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  a j u d g e r  needs an id e a  o f  h i m s e l f  as a 
person e x i s t i n g  in  h i s  own r i g h t ,  w i t h  a c e r t a i n  h i s t o r y ,  
w i t h  a l i f e  o f  h i s  own, and w i t h  id e a s  and g o a ls  o f  h i s  own. 
For t h i s  sense o f  i d e n t i t y  t o  be p o s s i b l e ,  I  want  t o  show 
t h a t  f a i r l y  c e n t r a l  among h i s  o t h e r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs w i l l  
be t h e  needs f o r  s e l f - k n o w l e d g e ,  f o r  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  f o r  
u n i t y  o r  coh erence  in  h i s  l i f e ,  and a need f o r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  o t h e r  p e rso n s .  L e t  us examine t h e s e .
To have a sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y ,  ( t o  say n o t h i n g  o f  
h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ) ,  a moral  j u d g e r  needs  
s e l f - k n o w l e d g e . 109 He needs t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  be aware o f  what  
he i s  d o in g ,  when he i s  do ing  i t ,  and t h a t  he i s  do in g  i t .  
I f  he i s  t o  be m o r a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h i s  judgem ents  and 
a c t i o n s  he must be c a p a b le  o f  ackno w led g in g  them as h i s  own.
The j u d g e r ’ s need f o r  s e l f - k n o w l e d g e  i s  e v i d e n t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  when he a t t e m p t s  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i n  p r o p r i a  
p e r s o n a . The b e t t e r  he knows h i m s e l f ,  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  h i s  
m o t iv e s ,  h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  t y p i c a l  r e a c t i o n s  o f  o t h e r s  
t o  him, and so on, t h e  b e t t e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h i s  
b r i n g i n g  h i s  th o u g h ts  and a c t i o n s  under  co n sc io u s  c o n t r o l .  
We can see t h i s  l a s t  p o i n t  b e t t e r ,  p e rh a p s ,  i f  we c o n s id e r  
t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  c o i n .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  he does n o t  
know h i s  own t a s t e s ,  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  b e l i e f s ,  w ishes  
i n t e n t i o n s ,  v a l u e s ,  i d e a l s ,  o r  what  k in d  o f  t h i n g s  make him 
happy, e x c i t e d ,  annoyed,  j e a l o u s ,  h u r t ,  w o r r i e d ,  f r i g h t e n e d ,  
t h e  j u d g e r  l a c k s  a sense o f  h i s  i d e n t i t y .  H is  s i n g u l a r  
judgem ent  w i l l  be u n c e r t a i n ,  he w i l l  l a c k  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  what  
he would a c c e p t  in  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  and h y p o t h e t i c a l  s t a t e s -  
o f - a f f a i r s  and a f o r t i o r i  he w i l l  l a c k  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  p r o p r i a  p e r sona.
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W h i le  i t  m ig h t  be a d m i t t e d  t h a t  a moral  ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r  
needs such an id e a  o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y ,  why sh o u ld  i t  be a 
n e e d ( a )  f o r  e v e r y  person? Can we say t h a t  we would  n o t  
t h i n k  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  as a person i f  he l a c k e d  t h i s  
awareness c o m p le t e ly ?
We noted  e a r l i e r  an i n t u i t i v e  b a s is  f o r  c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e
v iew  t h a t  t h e  co n cep ts  o f  ' a  human b e i n g ’ and ' a  p e r s o n ’ a r e
one and t h e  sam e .110 Very  young b a b ie s ,  human b e in g s  in  a
s e n i l e  coma, who s u f f e r  f rom a r a d i c a l  menta l  d e f i c i e n c y ,  o r
s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e d  human b e in g s  who have lap sed  i n t o  a more
o r  l e s s  v e g e t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n ,  a r e  n o t  n o r m a l ly  r e g a rd e d  as
p e rs o n s .  I t  i s  c o n c e i v a b l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld
be a human b e ing  who remained in  a coma f rom  b i r t h  t o  d e a t h ,
t a k i n g  n o u r is h m e n t ,  d i g e s t i n g  i t  and p e r f o r m in g  t h e  o t h e r
b o d i l y  f u n c t i o n s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  i t s  s u r v i v a l .  Ex h y p o th e s i
such an i n d i v i d u a l  would n e v e r  be c o n s c io u s ;  y e t  i t  would be
a human b e in g  in  a l l  o f  i t s  b o d i l y  r e s p e c t s .  To i d e n t i f y
t h i s  human b e in g  as a person would be t o  i d e n t i f y  persons  by
t h e  s i m p l e s t  k in d  o f  marks,  i . e .  a c e r t a i n  range o f  shape,
s i z e ,  o r ,  p e rh a p s ,  as P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 7 4 )  su g g e s ts :
. . . b y  an e x a m in a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
chromosomes in  t h e  c e l l s . . .
We may c o n t r a s t  t h i s  poor soul  w i t h  an i n d i v i d u a l  who 
does have an o c c a s io n a l  menta l  s t a t e ,  who i s  somet imes  
co n sc io u s  o f  t h i n g s ,  b u t  i s  t o t a l l y  unaware t h a t  he i s  
co n sc io u s  o f  them. ( N o t i c e  t h a t  i f  t h i s  l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n  
were t o  be adopted  as th e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  b e in g  a p e rs o n ,  
t h e r e  a r e  human b e in g s  who a r e  n o t  persons  v i z .  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  n e v e r  c o n s c io u s .  ) Would a human b e in g  who 
l i v e d  h i s  whole  l i f e  n e v e r  once b e in g  aware o f  any o f  h i s  
co n sc io u s  s t a t e s  be ' a  p e r s o n ’ ? I t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  
t h a t  he would .  For i t  would mean, pace Strawson ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 0 2 ) ,  
t h a t  someth ing c o u ld  be a person y e t  i t  would be 
i n a d m i s s i b l e  t o  a s c r i b e  menta l  p r e d i c a t e s  t o  t h e m . 111 I f  a 
person c o u ld  be t o t a l l y  unaware o f  any o f  h i s  own menta l  
s t a t e s ,  we co u ld  n o t  m e a n i n g f u l l y  a s s ig n  menta l  s t a t e s  t o  
him. As A .Q u in to n  ( 1 9 6 8 : 3 9 3 )  p o i n t s  o u t :
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We can a s c r i b e  m enta l  s t a t e s  t o  a b e in g  t h a t  i s  n o t
aware o f  them o n l y  i f  t h e r e  a r e  some m enta l  s t a t e s
o f  which t h e y  a r e  aw are .
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  would mean a l s o ,  pace Kant  ( 1 7 8 1 : 9 4 -
9 5 ) ,  t h a t  a person need n e v e r  once t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f  as
som eth ing  o n t o l o g i c a l 1y d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  o b j e c t s  he i s
e x p e r i e n c i n g . 112 W i t h o u t  some sense o f  h i s  own c o n s c io u s
s t a t e s ,  he*w ou ld  la c k  a sense o f  h i s  own s e p a r a t e  i d e n t i t y ,
and w i t h o u t  t h e  l a t t e r ,  how co u ld  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e
s e l f  and e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s  be made? On t h e s e  grounds,  l e t  i t
s u f f i c e  f o r  us t o  assume t h a t  a person has t o  be aware o f  a t
l e a s t  some o f  h i s  own co n sc io u s  s t a t e s .  T h i s  commits us t o
t h e  v iew  t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  in  a l i m i t e d  d e g re e ,  a person
n e e d s ( a )  t o  be aware o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y .
To be aware o f  o n e ’ s i d e n t i t y ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  n o t  t o  be 
aware o f  a new o b j e c t ,  any more th an  l e a r n i n g  t h a t  one sees  
adds s p e c i a l  v i s i b i l i a  t o  o n e ’ s p e r c e p t u a l  f i e l d .  I t  i s  
r a t h e r  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  r e f e r  t o  o n e s e l f ;  o r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  
r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  I  am th e  t h i n g  t o  which o t h e r s  r e f e r  when 
t h e y  r e f e r  t o  me. T h i s  i s  n o t  so much a m a t t e r  o f  m a s t e r i n g  
a s p e c i a l  v o c a b u l a r y  as o f  m a s t e r in g  a r e f e r e n t i a l  system
th ro u g h  which t h e  v o c a b u l a r y  i s  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  w o r ld .
T h i s  c r i t e r i o n  -  v i z .  a person i s  someone who n e e d s ( a )  a 
c o n c e p t io n  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  own i d e n t i t y  -  i s  in  p r a c t i c e  a 
c r i t e r i o n  we a c t u a l l y  use in  e v e ry d a y  c o n t e x t s  (a s  w e l l  as 
h a v in g  t h e  w e ig h t  o f  c o n c e p tu a l  reasons beh ind  i t ) .
O r d i n a r i l y  we t h i n k  t h a t  a person n e e d s ( a )  t o  be aware o f  
h i m s e l f  as an a c t i v e  s u b j e c t .  He needs t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  be 
aware o f  h i s  own t h o u g h t s ,  i n t e n t i o n s ,  f e e l i n g s ,  and h i s  own 
memories o r  c o n t i n u i n g  i d e n t i t y .  We e x p e c t  a person who has 
t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  use t h e  f i r s t  
person pronoun t o  r e c a l l  h i s  own p a s t  h i s t o r y .  F u r t h e r ,  
what makes a person ho ld  h i m s e l f  a c c o u n t a b l e  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n s  
i s ,  in  p a r t  anyway, h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  r e c o g n iz e  them as h i s  
own. He needs t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  remember ( tho ugh  n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  memory) t h a t  he per fo rm ed  an a c t i o n  F.
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To see t h i s ,  c o n s i d e r  an i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  u n a b le  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  h i m s e l f  and h i s  p a s t  a c t i o n s  f rom  o t h e r  persons  
and t h e i r s ;  who i s ,  f o r  exam ple ,  u n a b le  t o  remember 'who he 
i s ’ o r  a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  h i m s e l f .  I f  he g e n u i n e l y  l a c k s  a l l  
s e l f - k n o w l e d g e ,  ( a p a r t ,  p e rh a p s ,  f rom t h e  awareness o f  h i s  
a m n e s ia ) ,  he can h a r d l y  h o ld  h i m s e l f  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  F.  He 
can n o t  a c c e p t  t h e  p r a i s e ,  o r  s h o u ld e r  t h e  blame f o r  F,  o r  
any o f  h i s  p a s t  a c t i o n s ,  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s ,  e t c .  T h i s  i s  n o t  
t o  say t h a t  o t h e r s  would f r e e  him from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
h a v in g  F ’ d. They h o ld  him r e s p o n s i b l e ,  p resu m a b ly ,  because  
t h e y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  he knew what  he was do ing  a t  t h e  t i m e .  
I t  i s  a common p h i l o s o p h i c a l  (and l e g a l )  n o t i o n  t h a t  
awareness o f  t h i s  s o r t  i s  a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  o f  a c t i o n s  f o r  
which we ho ld  a person r e s p o n s i b l e .  T h is  i s  t o  s a y ,  a 
person needs t o  know -  o r  can be r e a s o n a b ly  presumed t o  know 
-  what  he i s  do ing  and t h e  reasons  f o r  h i s  h a v in g  chosen t o  
a c t  so.  I f  he d i d n ’ t  t h e n ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i  b u s , he i s  n o t  
r e s p o n s i b l e .  I t  i s  a g e n ts ,  w i t h  knowledge o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  
e x e c u t i n g  t h e i r  own pu rp o ses ,  whom we re g a r d  as p e r s o n s . 113
There  i s  a n o t h e r  reason why we sho u ld  ad o p t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
a person as someone who n e e d s ( a )  some c o n c e p t io n  o f  h i s  own 
c o n t i n u i n g  i d e n t i t y  and who n e e d s ( b )  a r o b u s t  sense o f  h i s  
own i d e n t i t y .  I t  h e lp s  t o  e x p l a i n  why our  p e rs o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  why a sense o f  co h es io n  o r  u n i t y  in  o u r  l i v e s  
and,  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  why s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  have a s p e c i a l  
i n t e r e s t  f o r  us.  L e t  us c o n s id e r  t h e  l a t t e r .
I t  i s  o f t e n  suggested  t h a t  o n e ’ s sense o f  i d e n t i t y  
depends i m p o r t a n t l y  upon t h e  deve lopm ent  o f  o n e ’ s p o t e n t i a l ­
i t i e s  o r  t a l e n t s . 114 For  most o f  us ,  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  our  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  deve lopm ent  app ears  t o  become r o o t e d  in  l a t e  
c h i ld h o o d  when we choose t o  u n d e r ta k e  t a s k s  which we f i n d  
c h a l l e n g i n g  and in  which t h e r e  i s  some p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
su ccess .  A young person has an a p t i t u d e  f o r  a c t i n g  and he 
i s  t o l d  t o  d e v e lo p  t h i s  a p t i t u d e ,  ( t o  ' a c t u a l i s e  t h i s  
p o t e n t i a l i t y ’ ) ,  which he has and many o t h e r s  have n o t .  Thus 
he i s  encouraged t o  r e a l i z e  h i s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  becoming an
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a c t o r ,  a r t i s t ,  a u t h o r ,  o r  w h a t e v e r .  By r e a l i z i n g  h i s  
p o t e n t i a l ,  i t  a p p ears  he i s ,  i n  a m e t a p h o r i c a l  sen se ,  
r e a l i z i n g  ' h i m s e l f ’ .
Can we say t h a t  any person n e e d s ( b )  t o  d e v e lo p  in  t h i s  
way t o  f l o u r i s h ?  T h e re  a r e  reasons  f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  n o t  so.  In  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  in  t h e  absence o f  any  
f u r t h e r  a rgum ent ,  t h e  usual  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  p ic k e d  o u t  as 
m e r i t i n g  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a r e  v a l u e - l a d e n e d  and d i s p u t a b l e .  
What we have in  mind,  u s u a l l y ,  i s  t h e  deve lopm ent  o f  o n l y  
c e r t a i n  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o r  t a l e n t s .  As R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 6 6 : 5 6 )  
s a y s :
The s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  ( t h e n )  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  
l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  deve lopm ent  o f  t h e  s e l f  in  a c t i v i t i e s  
and modes o f  conduct  t h a t  a r e  r e g a rd e d  as d e s i r a b l e .
The assum ption  i s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  k in d s  o f  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ,  
r a t h e r  th an  o t h e r s ,  sho u ld  be d e v e lo p e d ,  namely th o s e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  some u s e f u l  o r  s o c i a l l y  approved o b j e c t i v e .  
R a th e r  th an  a s p i r i n g  t o  p l a y  t h e  p a r t  o f  H a m le t ,  however,  
why s h o u l d n ’ t  someone w i t h  a s k i l l  f o r  a c t i n g ,  r e a l i z e  t h i s  
p o t e n t i a l ,  n o t  in  t h e  t h e a t r e ,  bu t  as a c o n f i d e n c e  
t r i c k s t e r ?  Why s h o u l d n ’ t  a person w i t h  a s k i l l  a t  p a i n t i n g  
j u s t  as much d e v e lo p  t h i s  t a l e n t  by r e g u l a r l y  p a i n t i n g  h i s  
house d i f f e r e n t  c o lo u r s ?  Why s h o u l d n ’ t  someone w i t h  a 
w r i t i n g  t a l e n t  d e v e lo p  i t  by w r i t i n g  l a s c i v i o u s  g r a f f i t i  
eve ryw he re?  And by d e v e lo p in g  our  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  f o r  
p ig -h e a d e d n e s s ,  a g g r e s s i o n ,  c r u e l t y ,  o r  a s i n i n i t y ,  we would  
a l l  ap p ear  t o  be j u s t  as much ' r e a l i z i n g  our  p o t e n t i a l ­
i t i e s ’ . The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  do n o t  app ear  t o  be grounds  
f o r  s a y in g  t h a t  c e r t a i n  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  q u a l i f y  as v a l u e -  
n e u t r a l  reasons  in  moral  jud g em en ts .
We m ig h t  a t t e m p t  t o  meet t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  by t a k i n g  
s e r i o u s l y  A r i s t o t l e ’ s s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  we can d e v e lo p  our  
d i s t i n c t i v e l y  human p o t e n t i a l i t y .  For  A r i s t o t l e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  
t h i s  i s  r a t i o n a l i t y .  The p e r  genus e t  d i f f e r e n t i a m  o f  human 
be in g s  i s  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  reason;  t o  t h i n k ,  t o  form  t r u e  
b e l i e f s ,  t o  make ju d g em en ts .  The deve lopm ent  o f  th e  
c a p a c i t y  t o  reason seems t o  be p r o m is in g  as a c a n d id a t e  f o r
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a n e e d ( a ) .  I t  a p p e a rs  t o  be n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  and,  a t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  t o  g i v e  u n i v e r s a l  c o n t e n t  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  s e l f -  
r e a l  i z a t i o n .
We have e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  some s o r t  i s  a 
need f o r  a moral  j u d g e r .  I f  what  I  have argued i s  c o r r e c t ,  
he w i l l  be u n a b le  t o  a c c e p t  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,  con fu s ed  o r  
i n c o h e r e n t  a rgum ents ;  p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s  o f  t i m e ,  p l a c e  and 
i d e n t i t y  w i l l  be i r r e l e v a n t  in  h i s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  what  i s  
a r e l e v a n t  moral  ju d g e m e n t .  He w i l l  n o t  s e t t l e  what  i s  a t  
i s s u e  by an appea l  t o  an a u t h o r i t y  o r  t o  a s e t  o f  cus tom ary  
s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  r a t h e r  th a n  by an appeal  t o  r a t i o n a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I n  t h e s e ,  and o t h e r  ways, t h e  moral  j u d g e r  
can n o t  a v o id  b e in g  r a t i o n a l .  And s i n c e ,  as we s h a l l  s e e ,  he 
can e x e r c i s e  r a t i o n a l i t y  in  h i s  judgem ents  in  v a r y i n g  
d eg re es  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  more r a t i o n a l  t h e  j u d g e r  i s ,  
t h e  more he i s  r e a l i z i n g  h i s  a b i l i t y  qua j u d g e r .
Does a l l  o f  t h i s  a p p ly  t o  any person? We w i l l  n o t
d i s p u t e ,  as an e m p i r i c a l  f a c t ,  t h a t  persons  want  t o  be
r a t i o n a l .  A r i s t o t l e  g i v e s  us a good reason f o r  c l a i m i n g
t h i s .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 5 3 : 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 )
. . . n o b o d y  would choose t o  pass th ro u g h  l i f e  w i t h  t h e  
menta l  o u t l o o k  o f  a c h i l d ,  even i f  he c o n t in u e d  t o  
t a k e  u n l i m i t e d  p l e a s u r e  in  t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  
1 i k e .
We w i l l  no t  d i s p u t e  e i t h e r  th e  f a c t  t h a t  o n l y  p e r s o n ’ s can
be r a t i o n a l  in  t h e  senses d e s c r i b e d .  I t  i s  l o g i c a l l y
p o s s i b l e ,  we a r e  t o l d ,  f o r  non-human be ings  t o  possess such
a r a t i o n a l  a b i l i t y . 115 B u t ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  we know
o n l y  t h a t  persons  can reason in  t h e  ways d e s c r i b e d .  As
A .Q u in t o n  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 9 )  w r i t e s :
. . . t h e  o n l y  a n im a ls  we know o f ,  r a t h e r  th an  t h i n k  
a b o u t ,  t h a t  a r e  r a t i o n a l  a r e  human b e in g s .
The q u e s t i o n  i s :  does a person n e e d (a )  t o  be r a t i o n a l ?
The answer i s ,  s u r e l y ,  t h a t  s i n c e  ex h y p o th e s i  any person  
needs t o  be a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  chooser  -  and he i s  n o t  
r e a l l y  a person u n le s s  he i s  -  any person n e e d s ( a )  some
l e v e l  o f  r a t i o n a l  competence.  He needs,  on some o c c a s io n s  
a t  l e a s t ,  t o  use h i s  reason t o  d e t e r m in e  what  he i s  go ing  t o
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do; a l t h o u g h ,  as I  have s a i d ,  t h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  he 
must reason w e l l .  M oreover  t h i s  a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  t o  be found  
in  t h e  new -b o rn ,  t h e  s e n i l e ,  o r  in  any o f  t h e  ty p e s  o f  human 
n o n -p e rs o n s  d is c u s s e d  in  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  as  
we s h a l l  see ,  t h e  case h e re  i s  i n c o n t e s t a b l e  when we 
c o n s i d e r  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  o f  t h e  judgem ent  where t h i s  
need i s  d e n ie d ,  (s e e  p p . 3 3 7 -3 4 2  a h e a d ) .
Does a person n e e d (b )  t o  be r a t i o n a l .  We have seen t h a t  
p r a c t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  one o f  t h e  c a p a c i t i e s  he w i l l  
n e e d (b )  t o  d e v e lo p  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  c h o o s e r .  He w i l l  
need t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  i d e n t i f y  som eth ing  as r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  some want  o r  need t h a t  he has;  t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  s e l e c t  o r  t o  d i s c o v e r  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  a p ro b lem ,  
t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  t h i n k  th r o u g h  a l t e r n a t i v e s  in  te rm s  o f  what  
i t  i s  f e a s i b l e  f o r  him t o  do, and so on. He w i l l  n e e d (b )  t o  
be r a t i o n a l  in  t h i s  sen se ,  i f  he i s  t o  be a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
c h o o s e r .
Does t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a person can e x e r c i s e  t h i s  a b i l i t y  in  
v a r y i n g  d eg rees  im p ly  t h a t  t h e  more r a t i o n a l  he i s  t h e  more 
he i s  r e a l i z i n g  h i s  p o t e n t i a l  as a person? Once a g a in  an 
a f f i r m a t i v e  answer h e re  would n o t  im p ly  t h a t  m e r e ly  t o  
d e v e lo p  our  reason i s  a l l  t h e r e  i s  t o  our  f l o u r i s h i n g  as  
p e rs o n s .  The re  i s  no i n c o n s i s t e n c y  in  t a k i n g  ' t o o  r a t i o n a l ’ 
t o  be an u n f a v o u r a b l e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a p e rso n .  C o n s id e r  
a g a in  th e  case o f  B ren tan o  who, on P h i l l i p s ’ and Mounce’ s 
a c c o u n t ,  app ears  t o  have become so immersed in  h i s  s t u d i e s  
t h a t  he has l o s t  a g rasp  o f  h i s  more mundane needs.  And 
somet imes t o  acknowledge t h a t  a person i s  to o  r a t i o n a l  
su g g e s ts  t h a t  he l a c k s  o t h e r  s e n s i b i l i t i e s ,  such as th o s e  o f  
sympathy and a f f e c t i o n .  S e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  in  th e  
g e n e r a l  sense in  which t h i s  m ig h t  a p p ly  t o  e v e r y  p e rso n ,  
app ears  t o  r e q u i r e  more than  a d e v e lo p e d  r a t i o n a l  a b i l i t y . 116 
However t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  deny t h a t  d e v e lo p in g  o n e ’ s 
r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  one o f  th e  ways in  which an i n d i v i d u a l  can 
d e v e lo p  as a p e rso n .  Reason i s  j u s t  one o f  t h e  many 
c a p a c i t i e s  we n e e d (b )  t o  d e v e lo p .  O th e rw is e  t h e  te rm  ' s e l f -
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r e a l i z a t i o n ’ does n o t  t e l l  us what  t h e s e  c a p a c i t i e s  a r e .  
I t  does s u g g e s t ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h  as  
persons  we n e e d (b )  t o  r e a l i z e  some o f  them and a s u b s t a n t i a l  
s e t  o f  them a t  t h a t .
B e fo r e  we l e a v e  t h e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  I  
want t o  draw a t t e n t i o n  b r i e f l y  t o  some o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  t h i s  need in  o t h e r  f i e l d s .  F i r s t l y ,  t o  f u n c t i o n  in  t h i s  
way a t  a l l ,  a person w i l l  n e e d (a )  t o  o b t a i n  a t  l e a s t  some 
b a s ic  forms o f  knowledge and s k i l l s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  he w i l l  
need t o  l e a r n  a lang u a g e ,  ( h i s  m o t h e r - t o n g u e ) .  To do t h i s ,  
he w i l l  need some l e v e l  o f  s o c i a l  t r a i n i n g .  Language i s  
l e a r n e d  s o c i a l l y .  And in  l e a r n i n g  i t ,  one a c q u i r e s  n o t  
m e r e ly  a s e t  o f  words,  bu t  a s e t  o f  co n c e p ts  and id e a s  which  
a r e  b u i l t  i n t o  th e  language  i t s e l f .  Such co n cep ts  a r e  n o t  
som eth ing  t h a t  t h e  l e a r n e r  can t a k e  o r  l e a v e  as he w is h e s .  
He needs them ( v i z .  an i m p o r t a n t  s u b s e t  o f  th e  id e a s  and 
c o n cep ts  p r o v id e d  by th e  la n g u a g e )  t o  apprehend h i m s e l f  and 
t h e  w o r ld  abo u t  him. He n e e d s ( a )  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  use t h e  
language  t o  e x i s t  as a r a t i o n a l ,  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
i n d i v i d u a l ,  as w e l l  as an i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n ,  t o  
g e t  o t h e r s  t o  do t h i n g s ,  t o  e n jo y  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  them,  
and so on.
The p r e c i s e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  many o t h e r  s k i l l s  and b o d ie s  o f
knowledge t h a t  he w i l l  need t o  be t a u g h t  and t o  u n d e rs ta n d
w i l l  v a r y  f rom s o c i e t y  t o  s o c i e t y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  as P . H i r s t
& R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 7 0 : 5 6 )  w r i t e :
. . . i n  any c u l t u r e . . .  t h e r e  i s  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  
minimum f u n c t i o n i n g  t h a t  i s  e x p e c te d  o f  anyone . . . i f  
he i s  t o  be v i a b l e . . .
The common m in im al  f a c t o r  w i l l  be t h e  s k i l l s  and knowledge
n e c e s s a ry  t o  f u n c t i o n  in  t h e  s o c i e t y  in  q u e s t i o n .  For
exam ple ,  in  most s o c i e t i e s  in  th e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  a
person needs t o  be a b l e  t o  r e a d .  He needs t o  read because
in  many ways, in  th e  modern w o r ld ,  l i f e  i s  much more
d i f f i c u l t  and an i n d i v i d u a l  a i l s  i f  he c a n n o t .  Whereas in
s o c i e t i e s  in  t h e  p a s t ,  l i t e r a c y  m ig h t  be s a i d  t o  have been
an unnecessary  s k i l l .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  w i l l  have been, in
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t h a t  s o c i e t y ,  a b a s ic  knowledge and s k i l l s  t h a t  were  
n e e d s ( b )  f o r  any i n d i v i d u a l  t o  o p e r a t e  p u r p o s i v e l y ,  in  o r d e r  
f o r  him t o  b e g in  t o  d e v e lo p  h i s  t a l e n t s ,  o r  t o  have a sense  
o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y .
Can t h e r e  be any doubt  t h a t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a person  
l a c k s  t h i s  b a s ic  knowledge,  o r  where such s k i l l s  a r e  
und eve lo p ed ,  he w i l l  f a i l  t o  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y ?  Suppose  
p e r  abs^u^um t h a t  somebody s a i d  " I  do n o t  t h i n k  I  need 
s k i l l s  and knowledge o f  t h i s  k i n d " .  He c o u ld  n o t  r e a l l y  
b e l i e v e  t h i s .  For t o  i n t e l l i g e n t l y  q u e s t i o n  t h e  need,  he 
has t o  presuppose i t .  He needs a t  l e a s t  t o  have l e a r n e d  a 
language  and t o  have a modicum o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .
My second p o i n t  concerns  th e  s t a t u s  o f  work .  I t  i s
commonly argued t h a t  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  (and t h e r e b y  an
i n d i v i d u a l ’ s sense o f  h i s  i d e n t i t y ) ,  h in g e s  upon t h e  work
which t h e y  do. T h e re  a r e  p l e n t y  o f  reasons f o r  t h i s .
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  work t h a t  we do p l a y s  a c r u c i a l  r o l e  in  s ha p in g
o u r  id e a  o f  who we a r e .  We i d e n t i f y  who and what  a n o t h e r
person i s ,  in  te rm s  o f  t h e i r  work .  T h i s  i s  because,  as
R.Norman ( 1 9 8 3 : 1 7 8 )  w r i t e s ,  i t  i s
. . . t h e  most c l e a r l y  p u b l i c  a s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s .  I t  
i s  t h e i r  work above a l l  t h a t  d e f i n e s  them in  t h e  
eyes o f  o t h e r s . . .
T h i s  th row s  some l i g h t  on t h e  sense o f  r e j e c t i o n  and lo s s  o f
i d e n t i t y  t h a t  accompanies an ex ten d ed  p e r i o d  o f
unemployment.  I t  su g g es ts  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r
m e a n in g fu l  work i s  a commonly f e l t  need.  T h is  i s  n o t  t o
deny t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many f o r  whom work i s  an u n a v o id a b le
d r u d g e r y . 117 In  such cas es ,  i f  he f i n d s  h i s  work s o u l -
d e s t r o y i n g ,  t h e  w o rk e r  m ig h t  be s a i d  t o  be a l i e n a t e d  f rom  a
sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  work which he does
t a k e s  up a g r e a t  dea l  o f  t i m e .  No doubt  t h i s  i s  a n o th e r
reason why th e  work t h a t  we do p l a y s  a c r u c i a l  r o l e  in
shap in g  our  i d e a  o f  who we a r e .  T h i r d l y ,  whereas most o f
t h e  o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  p e o p le  engage i n ,  t h e y  do so
l a r g e l y  as a r e s u l t  o f  c h o ic e ,  work i s  someth ing t h a t  n e a r l y
a l l  o f  us have t o  do t o  m a i n t a i n  o u r s e l v e s  and our
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d e p e n d a n ts .  Most a d u l t  p e o p le ,  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  c a n n o t  a v o id  
t h e  f a c t  o f  work .  These a r e  some grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t ,  
f o r  most p e o p le ,  t h e i r  work i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e i r  i d e a  o f  
th e m s e lv e s  as p e rs o n s .  I t  s u g g es ts  a l s o  why most p e o p le ,  
in  W estern  c u l t u r e ,  do re g a r d  work as a need.
A v a r i a n t  o f  t h i s  v iew  i s  f u l l y  e l a b o r a t e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  by
K .M a rx .  ( I  do n o t  want  t o  go i n t o  M a r x ’ s a cc o u n t  in  any
d e t a i l  b u t  s im p ly  t o  t a k e  i t  up in  te rm s  o f  t h e  p o i n t  abo u t
s e l f - i d e n t i t y . )  Marx ( 1 8 4 4 : 1 4 1 )  w r i t e s  t h a t  work
. . .must  n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  s im p ly  as b e in g  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  ( o f  t h i n g s ) . . . R a th e r  i t  i s  a d e f i n i t e  
form  o f  a c t i v i t y  o f  ( t h e s e )  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a d e f i n i t e  
form  o f  e x p r e s s i n g  t h e i r  l i f e ,  a d e f i n i t e  mode o f  
l i f e  on t h e i r  p a r t .  As i n d i v i d u a l s  e x p re s s  t h e i r  
l i v e s ,  so t h e y  a r e .  What t h e y  a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e  
c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n ,  both w i t h  what  t h e y  
produce and w i t h  how t h e y  produce i t .
The way in  which he produces t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  he needs,  Marx
t h o u g h t ,  g i v e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y ,
r e c o g n iz e d  and c o n f i r m e d  by o t h e r s .  I s  th e  work t h a t  th e y
do, t h e n ,  a n e e d (a )  o r  ( b )  f o r  persons?
We have t o  be c a u t i o u s  h e r e .  From th e  passage above and 
s i m i l a r  p a s s a g e s , 118 we m ig h t  t h i n k  t h a t  Marx r e g a rd e d  o n e ’ s 
d a i l y  l a b o u r  ( o r  j o b )  t o  be what  we a r e  c a l l i n g  a non-  
v o l i t i o n a l  n e e d ( a ) .  However i t  c o u ld  be argued t h a t  t h e  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between work and s e l f -  
i d e n t i t y  i s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  r e l a t i v e .  W h i l s t  a t  p r e s e n t  work 
p l a y s  an im p o r t a n t  p a r t  in  t h e  l i f e  o f  most a d u l t s ,  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  i t  seems r e a s o n a b le  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  d e v o te  
l e s s  o f  t h e i r  t im e  t o  i t .  C e r t a i n l y  i t  i s  a commonplace 
b e l i e f  t h a t  in  t h e  Western w o r ld ,  we can look f o r w a r d  t o  an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  s h o r t e r  w o rk in g  day ,  a sharp  d e c re a s e  i n  t h e  
y e a r s  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  spend a t  work and,  p e rh a p s ,  t o  a t im e  
when few i f  any i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  need t o  work a t  a l l .  I n  
due c o u rs e ,  a u to m a t io n  w i l l  f r e e  human be in g s  f rom  th e  
d r u d g e r y  o f  d a i l y  l a b o u r .  T h is  i s  t o  sug ges t  t h a t  th e  
im p o r ta n c e  g iv e n  t o  a j o b  o f  work i s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  v a r i a b l e .
One dark  c loud  hanging o v e r  t h i s  sunny p i c t u r e  i s  t h e  
p r e d i c t e d  consequences o f  th e  T h i r d  World  p o p u l a t i o n
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e x p l o s i o n  r e f e r r e d  t o  e a r l i e r .  W i th  an i n c r e a s i n g  w o r ld  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  i t  seems e q u a l l y  p l a u s i b l e  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e  most b a s ic  needs w i l l  r e q u i r e  n o t  a d i m i n u t i o n  
b u t  an i n c r e a s e  in  work,  i . e .  an i n c r e a s e  i n  m e d i c a l ,  
e d u c a t i o n a l ,  hous ing  and t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e  
c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  even more m a r g in a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  and so on.
L i k e  e v e ry o n e  e l s e ,  I  am unsure o f  t h e  f a c t s  h e r e .
W hatever  t h e  f a c t s  a r e ,  t h e  p o i n t  can n o t  be d e n ie d  t h a t  
our  b o d i l y  needs w i l l  a lways  be f i r m l y  embedded as needs.  
I f  human l i f e  i s  t o  s u r v i v e  in  th e  f u t u r e  th e n  t h e y  we w i l l  
need t o  produce fo o d ,  p r o v i d e  s h e l t e r ,  warmth,  e t c . ,  i n  some 
fo rm  o r  a n o t h e r .  P r o d u c t io n  f o r  t h e  means o f  s u b s i s t e n c e  i s  
n o t  an h i s t o r i c a l  v a r i a b l e .  I n  o t h e r  words,  h a v in g  a j o b  o r  
o c c u p a t io n  i s  n o t  som eth ing  w i t h o u t  which an i n d i v i d u a l  
c o u ld  n o t  f u n c t i o n ;  i t  i s  n o t  a n e e d ( a ) .  N e i t h e r  i s  i t  
som eth ing  he n e e d s (b )  t o  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  in  e v e r y  
s o c i e t y  (even  i f  he does so in  modern s o c i e t i e s ) . 119 On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, t h e  means f o r  p r o v i d i n g  f o o d ,  s h e l t e r ,  and th e
o t h e r  t h i n g s  we need t o  s u r v i v e ,  i s  a n e e d ( a ) .  I t  i s  t h i s
sense in  which work f u n c t i o n s  as a need.  L e t  us now
c o n s i d e r  a n o t h e r  f a i r l y  c e n t r a l  need we have,  t h a t  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  s e l f - i d e n t i t y .
Persons need a sense o f  u n i t y  in  t h e i r  l i v e s ,  o r  an 
o v e r a l l  shape t o  them. As M .M id g le y  ( 1 9 7 9 : 3 0 3 )  says:
. . . ( t h e y  need)  a c o n t in u o u s  c e n t r a l  l i f e  t h a t  l a s t s
th ro u g h  g e n u in e ,  b u t  p a s s in g ,  changes o f  m o o d . . .
Even i f  an i n d i v i d u a l  were t o  ado p t  a p o l i c y  o f  c o n s t a n t  
change in  t h e i r  l i f e s t y l e ,  l i k e  Don Juan,  he would s t i l l  
have a sense o f  u n i t y  t o  h i s  l i f e .  I n  t h e  case o f  most 
o r d i n a r y  m o r t a l s  i t  may be t h a t  th e  need f o r  u n i t y  i s  met by 
i n v o lv e m e n t  in  o n e ’ s work,  o r  in  a commitment t o  a r e l i g i o u s  
o r  p o l i t i c a l  movement,  o r  th e  u n i t y  in  o n e ’ s l i f e  may be 
found in  o n e ’ s f a m i l y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  o r  o t h e r  k in d s  o f  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  p e o p le ,  ( o r  a c o m b in a t io n  o f  any o f  th e s e  
t h i n g s ) .  W hatever  i t  i s ,  t o  have a f l o u r i s h i n g  sense o f  our  
own i d e n t i t y ,  we seem t o  need t h i s  u n i f y i n g  e le m e n t .  Can we
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say t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  h e re  i s  som eth ing  we n e e d ( a )  o r
( b ) ?
We m ig h t  s u p p o r t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  i t  i s  a n e e d (b )  by 
o b s e r v in g  how p e o p le  a r e  d e v a s t a t e d  i f  t h e  o v e r a l l  shape t o  
t h e i r  l i v e s ,  w h a te v e r  i t  happens t o  be, b re a k s  down.  
A c c o r d in g  t o  A . M a c I n t y r e ,  t h i s  can le a d  t o  a breakdown in
p e r s o n ’ s co n cep t  o f  s e l f h o o d .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 1 : 2 0 2 )
When someone co m pla ins  -  as do some o f  th o s e  who 
a t t e m p t  o r  commit s u i c i d e  -  t h a t  h i s  o r  h e r  l i f e  i s  
m e a n in g le s s ,  he o r  she i s  o f t e n  and perhaps  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l 1y c o m p la in in g  t h a t  t h e  n a r r a t i v e  o f  
t h e i r  l i f e  has become u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  them, t h a t  
i t  l a c k s  any p o i n t ,  any movement tow ard s  a c l im a x  o r  
t e l  o s . Hence t h e  p o i n t  o f  do ing  any one t h i n g  
r a t h e r  than  a n o th e r  a t  c r u c i a l  j u n c t u r e s  in  t h e i r  
l i v e s  seems t o  such a person t o  have been l o s t .
I n  such c a s e s ,  i f  s u i c i d e  was i n v a r i a b l e ,  we would say t h a t
a person n e e d s ( a )  t o  g i v e  h i s  l i f e  a sense o f  u n i t y ,  ( o r
what  M a c I n t y r e  c a l l s  ' a  n a r r a t i v e ’ ) .  For  w i t h o u t  i t ,  he
c o u ld  n o t  f u n c t i o n .  However,  o f  c o u rs e ,  i f  and when t h e
n a r r a t i v e  o f  our  l i v e s  break s  down, many o f  us do c o n t i n u e
t o  f u n c t i o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  seems t o  be more t o  t h e  m a t t e r  th an  
t h i s .  The re  i s  no doubt  t h a t  p e o p le  a r e  d e v a s t a t e d  when 
som eth ing  t h e y  r e a l l y  c a r e  a b o u t ,  a m a r r i a g e ,  a l o n g - t e r m  
e n t e r p r i s e  o r  w h a t e v e r ,  b reak s  down o r  i s  t h w a r t e d .  Now 
suppose t h a t  somebody, perhaps under  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  
J a s p e r s ’ p h i l o s o p h y , 120 s a i d :  " I  do know what  i t  i s  l i k e  when 
t h e  t h i n g  t h a t  one has b u i l t  o n e ’ s l i f e  around c o l l a p s e s  but  
I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  I  was harmed as a r e s u l t " .  I  must  
em phas ize  t h a t  th e  imagined s i t u a t i o n  must concern  som eth ing  
t h a t  he r e a l l y  c a r e s  a b o u t ,  which then  break s  down, i s  
t h w a r t e d  o r  f a i l s  him. Then t o  say 'h e  need n o t  a i l ’ does  
seem l o g i c a l l y  odd; f o r  i t  sug ges ts  t h a t  a t h i n g  he r e a l l y  
ca re d  a b o u t ,  he d id  n o t  r e a l l y  c a r e  a b o u t .  Of c o u rs e ,  he 
m ig h t  add "My s u f f e r i n g  was s h o r t - l i v e d .  I  am now 
r e m a r r i e d ,  I  have a new c a r e e r ,  a new f a i t h .  I  was n o t  
r e a l l y  harmed on b a l a n c e " .  I  have two sm al l  p o i n t s  t o  make 
h e r e .  F i r s t l y ,  when he i s  u nd ergo in g  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r
e x p e r i e n c e ,  he must re g a r d  t h e  breakdown as an a i l i n g  
c o n d i t i o n .  S e c o n d ly ,  t o  say t h a t  he i s  r e m a r r i e d ,  o r  
w h a t e v e r ,  does n o t  r e b u t  th e  c l a i m  t h a t ,  l i k e  any p e rs o n ,  he 
has a n e e d (b )  f o r  u n i t y  in  h i s  l i f e ;  on t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  
s t r e n g t h e n s  i t .  I f  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  n o t  'harmed on b a l a n c e ’ 
t h i s  i s  because he has a d i f f e r e n t ,  perhaps  new, n a r r a t i v e  
t o  h i s  l i f e .
Our b r i e f  a cc ount  o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  s e l f - i d e n t i t y  i s  in c o m p le te  r e s t i n g  s im p ly  on th o s e  
above.  I f  we l e f t  t h i n g s  l i k e  t h i s ,  t h e  t h e o r y  t h a t  would  
r e s u l t  would be an undu ly  s e l f - r e l i a n t  v ie w  o f  p e rs o n s .  I  
have o v e r -e m p h a s iz e d  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which persons  a r e  t h e  
a u t h o r s  o f  t h e i r  own l i v e s .  A person i s  a s o c i a l  an im a l  as  
w e l l  as an i n d i v i d u a l ,  o r ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  he o r  she i s  a 
s o c i a l  i n d i v i d u a l .  For w h a te v e r  reasons -  human
v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s ,  l i m i t e d  s t r e n g t h ,  
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  e n e rg y ,  s k i l l ,  e t c .  -  f a m i l y  and s o c i a l  l i f e  
e x i s t  and w i t h i n  them o t h e r  p e rs o n a l  needs a r i s e  and a r e  
m et.  L e t  us c o n s id e r  a few o f  th e s e  needs;  th o s e  which  
r e l a t e  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s sense o f  s e l f - i d e n t i t y .  (We w i l l  
d is c u s s  some o f  th e  v a l u e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s e l f - i d e n t i t y  a t  
t h e  end o f  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n . )
The need f o r  p e r sonal  r e l a t i ons h ips
One p r e c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  h a v in g  a sense o f  h i s  
own i d e n t i t y  i s  t h a t  o f  be ing  r e c o g n iz e d  by o t h e r s .  We 
need r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r  pe rso n s .  A t  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t ,  
we need them t o  respond t o  us.  We need them t o  r e c o g n iz e  us 
as someone whose u t t e r a n c e s ,  ju d g e m e n ts ,  a c t i o n s ,  make a 
d i f f e r e n c e .  In  o t h e r  words,  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s con sc iousne ss  
o f  h i m s e l f  depends, in  p a r t ,  upon h i s  i d e n t i t y  b e ing  
c o n f i r m e d  by o t h e r s .  I t  i s ,  in  p a r t ,  due t o  t h e i r  responses  
t o  me -  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s u p p o r t i v e  responses b u t  a t  l e a s t  
responses  which show t h a t  t h e y  r e c o g n iz e  me as an i n d i v i d u a l  
-  t h a t  I  have a g rasp  o f  m y s e l f  as a p erso n .
232
A c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  e m o t io n a l  c o n d i t i o n  t o  t h e  one above i s
t h a t  o f  b e lo n g in g  o r  o f  b e ing  a c c e p te d  by o t h e r s .  About
t h i s  c o n d i t i o n ,  E.Fromm ( 1 9 5 5 : 3 0 )  says:
T h i s  need i s  beh ind  a l l  phenomena which c o n s t i t u t e  
t h e  whole  gamut o f  i n t i m a t e  human r e l a t i o n s ,  o f  a l l  
p a s s io n s  which a r e  c a l l e d  lo v e  in  t h e  b r o a d e s t  sense  
o f  t h e  w o r d . . . 121
We need s o c i a l  t i e s .  We need t o  f e e l  t h a t  we have a p l a c e
in  a c e r t a i n  group ,  l i k e  a f a m i l y ,  o r  in  a s o c i e t y  as a
w h o le .  We need t o  r e l a t e  t o  o t h e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  g roup ,  t o
s h a re  a t  l e a s t  some o f  our  e x p e r ie n c e s  w i t h  them, t o  do
t h i n g s  w i t h  them, t o  have some l e v e l  o f  i n t i m a c y  o r  some
d eg re e  o f  commitment t o  them. As M .M id g le y  ( 1 9 8 3 : 9 4 )
c o l o u r f u l l y  say s ,  we need t o
. . . s t r i k e  r o o t s  in  each o t h e r ’ s b e in g .
O b v io u s ly  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t  v a r i e t y  between one person and
a n o t h e r  in  th e  deg ree  t o  which t h e y  need t o  be r e c o g n iz e d  o r
t o  b e lo n g .  Some i n d i v i d u a l s  d e s i r e  fame w h i l e  o t h e r s  p r e f e r
o b s c u r i t y ;  some a r e  a f f e c t i o n a t e  and g r e g a r i o u s ,  o t h e r s
p r e f e r  c o o l e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e i r  a c q u a i n t a n c e s .
However none o f  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  d i s t u r b  t h e  b a s ic
s i m i l a r i t y  o f  our  needs.  One can r e t r e a t  f rom  s o c i e t y  o f
c o u r s e ,  b u t  th e  w i t h d r a w a l  can o n l y  be p a r t i a l .  Those t h a t
choose t o  become h e r m i t s ,  a t  some s t a g e  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s
e m o t i o n a l l y  needed t o  b e lo n g .  They needed t h i s  in  i n f a n c y
t o  become a c q u a in te d  w i t h  th e  s o c i a l  t i e s  which t h e y  l a t e r
r e j e c t .  ( I f  t h e r e  c o u ld  be Mowgl is  o r  f e r a l  i n f a n t s ,  which
I  d o u b t ,  t h e s e  r e p r e s e n t  b o r d e r l i n e  cases ;  we do n o t  know
what  t o  say abo ut  them qua p e r s o n s . )  Presumably  a h e r m i t
w i l l  read  books, l i g h t  h i s  d w e l l i n g  w i t h  an o i l  lamp e t c .
and depend on o t h e r  persons f o r  v a r i o u s  k in d s  o f  s u p p o r t .
H is  w i t h d r a w a l  can o n ly  be p a r t i a l .  I f  he were t o t a l l y
in d e p e n d e n t  o f  o t h e r s  my guess i s  t h a t ,  sooner  o r  l a t e r ,  he
would s i n k  i n t o  a p u r e l y  an im al  l e v e l  o f  e x i s t e n c e .  For  as
A r i s t o t l e  ( 1 9 6 2 : 2 8 )  w r i t e s :
He who by h i s  n a t u r e . . . h a s  no c i t y ,  no s t a t e ,  
i s . . . e i t h e r  sub-human o r  s u p e r h u m a n . . .
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C la im s  f o r  needs o f  t h i s  s o r t  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  c r i t i c i z e d .
The most common c r i t i c i s m  i s  t h a t  by c a l l i n g  such t h i n g s  as
r e c o g n i t i o n  and b e lo n g in g  ' n e e d s ’ we a r e  t r a d i n g  on t h e
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  b i o l o g i c a l  needs,  which a r e  u n i v e r s a l  and
n o n - v o l i t i o n a l . Such e m o t io n a l  a t ta c h m e n t s  a r e  n o t  needs,
i t  i s  a rg u e d ,  bu t  u n i v e r s a l l y  f e l t  w an ts .  O b j e c t i n g  t o
E.Fromm’ s n o t i o n  o f  r e l a t e d n e s s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  P . S p r i n g b o r g
( 1 9 8 1 : 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 )  ob s erves  t h a t
I f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  r e l a t e d n e s s . . .w ere  r e a l l y  
' n e e d s ’ , man would show a g r e a t e r  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e m . . .
What i s  a t  i s s u e  i s  n o t  w h e th er  persons  g e n e r a l l y  want  t o  
r e l a t e  t o  o t h e r s ,  which S p r in g b o rg  would a d m i t ,  b u t  w h e th e r  
o r  n o t  r e l a t e d n e s s  -  and, p resu m a b ly ,  she would  add 
r e c o g n i t i o n  and b e lo n g in g  -  a r e  needs.  J u s t  how e x a c t l y  a r e  
t h e y  t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d  as n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b ) ? 122
Fromm c l a i m s  t h a t  r e l a t e d n e s s  i s  a need s i n c e  i t  and
s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  nec e s s a ry  f o r  menta l  h e a l t h .  Of such
needs,  Fromm (op c i t :81 ) w r i t e s :
. . . ( t h e y )  a r e  i n h e r e n t  in  (human) n a t u r e .  They a r e  
a l s o  dynamic f a c t o r s  in  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  p rocess  
w hich ,  i f  f r u s t r a t e d ,  ten d  t o  a rous e  p s y c h ic  
r e a c t i o n s . . .
T h i s  c l a i m  has c o n s i d e r a b l e  p l a u s i b i l i t y .  C o n s id e r  f i r s t  
t h e  need f o r  a t  l e a s t  some r e c o g n i t i o n .  Some o f  t h e  
p a t h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s  d e s c r ib e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
can be c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s deranged sense o f  
i d e n t i t y ,  due t o  a l a c k  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  in  e a r l y  c h i l d h o o d .  
R.Peck  and R . H a v in g h u r s t  ( 1 9 6 0 : 1 0 9 —1 1 ) a r g u e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  psy ch o p a th s ,  who l i v e  on t h e i r  im p u ls es  and f o r  whom 
t h e  f u t u r e  has l i t t l e  r e a l i t y ,  a r e  u s u a l l y  th e  p r o d u c ts  o f  
a c h i ld h o o d  in  which t h e i r  f a m i l y  was r e j e c t i n g  tow ard s  
them. R . D . L a i n g  ( 1 9 6 5 : 3 9 )  p u r p o r t s  t o  show t h a t  where a 
p e r s o n ’ s a c t i o n s  and u t t e r a n c e s  a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  ig n o r e d ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h i n  t h e  f a m i l y ,  i t  can produce in  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a lo s s  o f  any c o h e r e n t  sense o f  'who he i s ’ . 
T h i s  u s u a l l y  r e s u l t s  in  a mental  breakdown. D . W r ig h t
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s u g g e s ts  t h a t  a s c h i z o i d  temperament  r e s u l t s  f ro m  a l a c k  o f
b e lo n g in g  in  c h i l d h o o d .  W r ig h t  ( 1 9 7 1 : 2 1 0 )  says :
A l l  t h e  e v id e n c e  we have ( f o r  s o - c a l l e d  s c h i z o i d  
tem peram ent )  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  p r e v a l e n c e  in  c h i l d h o o d  
i n  which c l o s e  a f f e c t i o n a t e  t i e s  w i t h  p a r e n t s  o r  
p e e rs  were a b s e n t .
C o n d i t i o n s  l i k e  th o s e  m e n t io n e d ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  s e r i o u s  enough,
p r e v e n t  a person d o ing  a n y t h i n g  p lanne d  o r  p u r p o s i v e .
Someone who i s  s u f f e r i n g  f ro m ,  s a y ,  a lo s s  o f  h i s  own
i d e n t i t y ,  has n o t  chosen an e c c e n t r i c  way o f  l i f e .  He i s
p r e v e n t e d  f ro m  choos ing  a n y t h i n g .  M enta l  s u f f e r i n g  o f  t h i s
s o r t ,  i n  o t h e r  words,  can p r e v e n t  someone f u n c t i o n i n g  as a
p ers o n .  T h e re  seem t o  be good e m p i r i c a l  grounds f o r
c l a i m i n g  t h a t  r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  a n e e d ( a )  f o r  p e r s o n s . 123
T h e re  a r e  e m p i r i c a l  grounds a l s o  f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t
s u f f e r i n g  o f  t h i s  s o r t  can be an impediment  t o  t h e
f l o u r i s h i n g  o f  a p e rso n .  No doubt  some c h i l d r e n  who grow up
w i t h o u t  much f a m i l y  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  do n o t  b reak  down m e n t a l l y .
Even so,  t h e  e v id e n c e  shows t h a t  i f  t h e y  do n o t  have an
ad e q u a te  amount o f  i t  in  i n f a n c y  t h e y  w i l l  become s t u n t e d  as
persons  in  a d u l t  l i f e .  A c c o rd in g  t o  R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 4 4 )
They w i l l  be u n r e l i a b l e ,  i n c a p a b le  o f  f o r m in g  
l a s t i n g  a t ta c h m e n t s ,  d i s t r a c t i b l e , i n c a p a b l e  o f  
b e ing  absorbed  in  a n y t h i n g  f o r  lo ng ,  and so on.
I f  P e t e r s  i s  c o r r e c t , 124 th en  an i n f a n t  has a n e e d (b )  f o r
r e c o g n i t i o n .  He w i 11 a i l  as an a d u l t ,  u n le s s  t h i s  need i s
s a t i  s f i  e d .
S i m i l a r l y ,  e m p i r i c a l  s u p p o r t  i s  l e n t  t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
p e o p le  n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  t h e  sense o f  b e l o n g i n g ,  by o b s e r v in g  
t h e  e f f e c t s  on i n d i v i d u a l s  where t h i s  need i s  n o t  met; i . e .  
t h e i r  f e e l i n g  o f  i s o l a t i o n  and l o n e l i n e s s .  P e o p le ,  v e r y  
o f t e n  e l d e r l y  p e o p le ,  who a r e  n e g le c t e d  by t h e i r  f a m i l y  and 
n e ig h b o u r s ,  s u f f e r  s e v e r e l y  f rom  d e p r e s s i o n ;  many p e o p le  
l i v i n g  a lo n e  in  h i g h - r i s e  f l a t s  e x p e r i e n c e  e x t rem e  
despondency;  in  a p r i s o n ,  s o l i t a r y  c o n f in e m e n t  i s  c o n s id e r e d  
t o  be t h e  most s e v e r e  form o f  pun ishm ent .  Such examples  
s u g g e s t ,  pace S p r in g b o r g ,  t h a t  f e e l i n g s  o f  i s o l a t i o n  and 
l o n e l i n e s s  do not  cause j u s t  t h e  l i m i t e d  unhapp iness  o f  a
235
f r u s t r a t e d  w a n t .  U n s a t i s f i e d ,  t h e  need t o  r e l a t e  t o  o t h e r s  
o r  f o r  some fo rm  o f  human c o n t a c t ,  c a n n o t  a lw a y s  be 
compensated by s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  l o n e l y  p e r s o n ’ s w ants  f o r  
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  o r  even by m ee t in g  t h e i r  o t h e r  needs .  For  
l o n e l i n e s s  and f e e l i n g s  o f  i s o l a t i o n  i n t e r f e r e  in  a b r o a d e r  
way w i t h  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s a b i l i t y  t o  cope w i t h  l i f e .  T h i s  
s u g g e s ts  t h a t  we n e e d (b )  some l e v e l  o f  human c o n t a c t .
I t  seems t o  be e m p i r i c a l l y  t r u e ,  a l s o ,  t h a t  i f  we d i d  n o t  
f e e l  t h a t  we b e lo n g ,  t o  some e x t e n t  and in  some s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  we would n e v e r  be d e l i v e r e d  f rom  f e a r  o r  
s u s p i c i o n  o f  o t h e r s .  And we n e e d (b )  t o  g e t  by w i t h o u t  b e in g  
c r i p p l e d  by f e a r  o r  s u s p i c i o n .  We need t o  be a b l e  t o  r e l y  
upon o r  t r u s t  th o s e  w i t h  whom we have r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  when we a r e  yo u n g ) .  I n  our  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  
them, we need t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  most o f  t h e  t im e  t h e y  can be 
r e l i e d  upon, t h a t  n o r m a l ly  t h e y  a r e  h o n e s t ,  t h a t  t h e y  do 
what t h e y  say t h e y  w i l l  do. A g r e a t  d ea l  o f  our  a d u l t  
l i v e s ,  ( f r i e n d s h i p ,  employment,  m a r r i a g e ,  p a r e n t h o o d ) ,  i s  
conducted  upon t h e  b a s is  o f  such t r u s t . 125
The examples  above a r e  f a i r l y  c l e a r l y  e m p i r i c a l ,  based 
( h o p e f u l l y )  upon o b s e r v a t i o n s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  Fromm c l a i m s  
t h a t  t h e  need f o r  r e l a t e d n e s s  -  l i k e  h i s  o t h e r  e x i s t e n t i a l  
needs126 -  r e p l a c e s  an observed  i n s t i n c t u a l  bond. On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, w h i l e  t h e y  c an n o t  run c o u n t e r  t o  them, our  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  a r e  n o t  a r r i v e d  a t  m e r e ly  on t h e  b a s is  o f  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f  b e h a v io u r  o r  as i n d u c t i v e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  
f rom s p e c i f i c  c a s e s .  I f  th e y  a r e  needs,  in  o u r  sen se ,  th e y  
a r e  a l s o  c o n c e p t u a l l y  n e c essa ry  c o n d i t i o n s  ( f o r  f u n c t i o n i n g  
o r  f l o u r i s h i n g  as a p e r s o n ) .  How a r e  t h e  needs f o r  
r e c o g n i t i o n  and b e lo n g in g  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  in  t h i s  way?
L e t  us fo c u s ,  b r i e f l y ,  on t h e  n e e d ( a )  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n ;  
( c o m p a ra b le  arguments  a p p ly  t o  t h e  n e e d ( a )  t o  b e l o n g ) .  We 
have noted  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c o g n i t i v e  and a f f e c t i v e  a b i l i t i e s  
w i t h o u t  which a person co u ld  n o t  q u a l i f y  as a s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  c h o o s e r .  L ik e  t h e  moral  j u d g e r ,  any p e rs o n ,  on 
some o c c a s io n s  a t  l e a s t ,  needs t o  d e c id e  what t o  do in  t h e
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l i g h t  o f  p u b l i c l y  a s s e s s a b le  r e a s o n s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  a lw a y s  
f o l l o w i n g  l i n e s  d i c t a t e d  by i n d i v i d u a l  whims o r  a v e r s i o n s .  
Comple te  l a c k  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  f rom  o t h e r s  r u l e s  o u t  a 
f o r t i o r i  p u b l i c  a s s e s s i b i 1 i t y .  We have seen t h a t  l i k e  o u r  
j u d g e r ,  any person must be a b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  h i s  own 
judgem en ts  and t h e  consequences b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by h i s  own 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d  agency ,  f rom th o s e  o f  o t h e r s  which a r e  
in d e p e n d e n t  o f  h i s  w i l l .  A n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  
a b i l i t y ,  s u r e l y ,  i s  a sense o f  o n e s e l f  as a d i s t i n c t  
i n d i v i d u a l .  We noted  t h a t  a person l e a r n s  t o  r e f e r  t o  
h i m s e l f  as ' m y s e l f ’ by r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  he i s  t h e  one t o  
whom o t h e r s  r e f e r  when t h e y  r e f e r  t o  him. I  c o u ld  n o t  so 
much as r i s e  t o  a co n c e p t  o f  ' m y s e l f ’ , as m y s e l f ,  i f  I  d i d  
n o t  have some l e v e l  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n .  We have seen a l s o  t h a t  
l i k e  t h e  j u d g e r ,  any person must have a sense o f  h i s  
c o n t i n u i n g  i d e n t i t y .  He may be a k in d  o f  Robinson Crusoe ,  
i n s u l a r l y  s t r a n d e d  f rom  o t h e r s .  S t i l l  he can h a r d l y  
c o n c e iv e  o f  h i m s e l f  as ' b e i n g  a l o n e ’ w i t h o u t  h a v in g  had t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  o t h e r s  in  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .
The p o i n t s  above can n o t  be c la im e d  t o  have t h e  f o r c e  o f  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .  But enough has been s a i d  I  t h i n k  t o  show 
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  a p r i o r i  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  case  
f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  as a n e e d ( a ) .  Are  t h e r e  com parab le  
c o n c e p tu a l  p o i n t s  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  case above f o r  
t h e  n e e d s ( b )  ' f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n ’ and ' t o  b e l o n g ’ ? T h i s  t i m e ,  
l e t  us fo c u s  on t h e  l a t t e r .
F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  m a i n ly  th ro u g h  o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  
o t h e r s  t h a t  we d e f i n e  o u r s e l v e s .  My w i f e ,  my c h i l d r e n ,  my 
f r i e n d s ,  my c o u n t r y ,  e t c .  a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  in  v a r y i n g  deg re es  
t o  my sense o f  who I  am. T h is  i s  t o  s ay ,  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and commitments t o  o t h e r s ,  a p p ear  t o  be an 
i m p o r t a n t  component in  t h e  sense he has o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y .  
T h is  i s  no t  m e re ly  an e m p i r i c a l  p o i n t  b u t  a l s o  a c o n c e p tu a l  
one. As F . H . B r a d l e y  ( 1 8 7 6 : 1 7 2 )  w r i t e s ,  t h e  c o n cep t  o f  my 
s e l f
. . . t h e  o b j e c t  o f  ( o n e ’ s )  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  i s
p e n e t r a t e d ,  i n f e c t e d ,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by th e
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e x i s t e n c e  o f  o t h e r s .  I t s  c o n t e n t  i m p l i e s  i n  e v e r y  
f i b r e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  community.
To u n d e r s ta n d  who one i s  as an i n d i v i d u a l ,  one needs t o
u n d e r s ta n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  which one s t a n d s  t o  o t h e r
p e o p le ;  t h e  r o l e  one o c c u p ie s  in  o n e ’ s f a m i l y ,  i n  o n e ’ s
w ork ,  in  o n e ’ s community ,  and t h e  commitments which each o f
t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c a r r y  w i t h  them. I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e
le s s  u n d e r s ta n d in g  one has in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  more
un in fo rm e d  one i s  a b o u t  o n e ’ s own i d e n t i t y .  And we have
e s t a b l i s h e d  a l r e a d y  t h a t  t h i s  la c k  o f  s e l f - k n o w l e d g e  can be
a fo rm  o f  a i 1 i n g .
T here  i s  a more im p r e s s i v e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  b a s is  f o r  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  we n e e d (b )  t o  b e lo n g .  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  many 
o f  our  moral  b e l i e f s  depends upon i n d i v i d u a l s  b e in g  looked  
upon n o t  as a - s o c i a l  b e in g s ,  b u t  as persons  h a v in g  r e a l  t i e s  
t h a t  in  f a c t  b ind  them in  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r s .  We 
w i l l  f i n d ,  t h i s  i s  t o  s ay ,  t h a t  many o f  our  moral  b e l i e f s  
can be r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  o n l y  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d ( b ) .  We w i l l  c o n s i d e r ,  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  
v i t a l  p a r t  t h a t  t h i s  need p l a y s  in  our  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
l o y a l t y  and p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g .
One f u r t h e r  p o i n t  sho u ld  be s t r e s s e d  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  
Peop le  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  and th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between them makes 
i t  s e n s i b l e  and j u s t i f i a b l e  f o r  them t o  r e l a t e  t o  one 
a n o t h e r  in  d i f f e r e n t  ways, t a k e  d i f f e r e n t  j o b s ,  d e v e lo p  
d i f f e r e n t  t a l e n t s  and lead  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  o f  l i v e s .  
What I  am a r g u in g  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a c o r e  o f  
o b j e c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  th e y  a r e  s i m i l a r  in  c e r t a i n  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e s p e c t s .  Any person has t h e  n e e d ( a )  f o r  
p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and t h e  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  f o r  a r o b u s t  
sense o f  t h e i r  own i d e n t i t y .  (We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
d i s c u s s io n  o f  our  needs v i s - a - v i s  o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  
o t h e r  persons  s h o r t l y . )
There  a r e  many v a l u e - a t t i t u d e s  we n o r m a l ly  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  
a p e r s o n ’ s need f o r  an ade qua te  sense o f  t h e i r  own i d e n t i t y .  
We speak a p p r o v i n g l y ,  f o r  exam ple ,  o f  a person h a v in g  a t r u e  
sense o f  h i s  own w o r th ,  o f  amour p r o p r e ,  o f  s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e ,
2 38
w hereas we d i s a p p r o v e  o f  someone who o v e r r a t e s  o r  u n d e r r a t e s  
t h e m s e lv e s  in  t h i s  r e g a r d .  We d i s a p p r o v e  o f  undue  
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s e l f ,  c o n c e i t ,  n a r c i s s i s m  o r  o v e r ­
c o n f i d e n c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  we d i s a p p r o v e  o f  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  s e l f - a w a r e n e s s ;  we speak o f  ' a  poor  s e l f -  
im a g e ’ , o r  ' l a c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t ’ , o r  'undue s e l f -  
d e p r e c a t i o n  ’ .
I t  m ig h t  be o b j e c t e d  "What one person c a l l s  modesty  
a n o t h e r  c a l l s  l a c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  and so on. W hether  o r  
n o t  a v a l u e  o f  t h i s  k in d  a p p l i e s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  case  i s  
o f t e n  c o n t e s t e d " .  However t h i s  misses t h e  p o i n t .  What i s  
n o t  c o n t e s t e d  i s  t h a t  'm o d e s t y ’ and ' s e l f - r e s p e c t ’ as such,  
a r e  e v e r y d a y  v a l u e s .  And t h e y  a r e  v a l u e s ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  based  
upon t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  need f o r  an a d e q u a te  sense  
o f  o n e ’ s own i d e n t i t y .
O th e r  v a l u e s  concerned  w i t h  a sense o f  o n e ’ s own i d e n t i t y  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a p e r s o n ’ s need t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  
We approve  o f  a person 'h a v i n g  t h e  cou ra ge  o f  h i s  
c o n v i c t i o n s ’ , o f  h i s  a c t i n g  ' i n  acc ordance  w i t h  h i s  moral  
c o n s c i e n c e ’ , o f  h i s  hav in g  ' s e l f - f i d e l i t y ’ o r  ' i n t e g r i t y ’ . 
I t  would be p r i  ma f a c i e  u n a c c e p t a b l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  
r e q u i r e  someone t o  abandon a p r o j e c t ,  j u s t  in  case  t h e  
p r e d i c t e d  r e s u l t s  m ig h t  no t  y i e l d  maximum u t i l i t y .  I f  he 
were t o  do so,  we would r e g a r d  t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  as l a c k i n g  
t h e  courage  o f  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n s ,  o r  o f  l a c k i n g  i n t e g r i t y . 127 
Though we w ould ,  no d o u b t ,  e x p e c t  a p r o j e c t  t o  be h a l t e d  i f  
i t  can be shown t h a t  i t  i s  ha rm fu l  t o  th e  needs o f  o t h e r  
members o f  t h e  community,  (s e e  p. 3 6 3 ) .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a p_rJma f a c i e  case a g a i n s t  i n r o a d s  i n t o  i n t e g r i t y  
o f  t h i s  k in d ;  a case a g a i n s t  what  we m ig h t  c a l l ,  more 
g e n e r a l l y ,  in r o a d s  i n t o  t h e  u n i t y  o f  a p e rs o n .  Along  
s i m i l a r  l i n e s  we may t e n t a t i v e l y  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  i f  I  say  
"Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  t o  be so b i d d a b l e "  and t h e  reason  
t h a t  I  g i v e  i s  "because a person n e e d s ( b )  t o  a c t  in  
accordance  w i t h  what h i s  c o n s c ie n c e  d i c t a t e s " ,  t h i s  i s  a 
pr im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  t h e  moral judg em en t .
I  want  t o  c o n s i d e r  now j u s t  one more exam ple  o f  what  I  am 
c a l l i n g  ' a  s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  n e e d ’ .
The n e e d ( b )  f o r  p l e a s u r e
To be a b l e  t o  cope,  human b e in g s  need t o  g e t  by w i t h o u t
any d e b i l i t a t i n g  s u f f e r i n g ,  m enta l  o r  p h y s i c a l ;  b u t  t h i s
c o n s t i t u t e s  a bare  minimum. They s h a re  a l s o  a need f o r
p l e a s u r e  (and t h e  r e l a t e d ,  more e l u s i v e ,  need f o r
h a p p i n e s s ) .  These c o n c e p ts ,  ' p l e a s u r e ’ and ' h a p p i n e s s ’ , a r e
n o t o r i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a n a l y z e  and I  s h a l l  n o t  do more
th a n  g i v e  a few i n d i c a t i o n s  ab o u t  t h e i r  n a t u r e  as needs.
' P l e a s u r e ’ i s  n o t  a s im p le  n o t i o n .  We c an n o t  assume t h a t
a l l  fo rm s o f  p l e a s u r e  a r e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b y - p r o d u c t s  o f  a
p e r s o n ’ s s u c c e s s fu l  engagement  in  d i v e r s e  a c t i v i t i e s .  W h i le
some p l e a s u r e s  may be l i k e  t h i s ,  ( v i z .  sup ervene  upon o t h e r
a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  as A . M a c I n t y r e  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 8 4 )  w r i t e s :
. . . s o m e  ( a r e )  t h e  p l e a s u r e  o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and 
p h y s ic a l  s t a t e s  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  a c t i v i t y .
M a c I n t y r e  has in  mind,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  p l e a s u r a b l e
s e n s a t io n s  produced on t h e  normal p a l a t e  when e a t i n g  c e r t a i n
t h i n g s ,  o r  t h e  p l e a s u r e  which a t t a c h e s  t o  p r e s t i g e ,  money o r
power.  He con tends  t h a t  th e s e  s t a t e s  can be p l e a s u r a b l e
in d e p e n d e n t  o f  a c t i v i t y .  T h i s  seems c o r r e c t .
However ,  f rom t h e  passage above i t  app ears  t h a t  M a c I n t y r e
r e g a r d s  p l e a s u r e ,  in  some o f  i t s  forms a t  l e a s t ,  as a
p h y s i c a l  s e n s a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  q u e s t i o n a b l e . 128 For  as
E . T e l f e r  ( 1 9 8 0 : 1 4 )  w r i t e s :
. . . o n e  can be s a i d  t o  be p le a s e d  by a lm o s t  any k in d  
o f  t h i n g ;  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a G enera l  E l e c t i o n ,  o n e ’ s 
own success in  kee p in g  o n e ’ s tem per  in  t r y i n g  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a new d r e s s ,  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ’ s s ta n d  
on p orno graphy .
I f  t h e r e  i s  a u n i t a r y  n o t i o n  o f  p l e a s u r e  -  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,
som eth ing  in  common between t h e  s e n s a t i o n  o f  e a t i n g  c e r t a i n
foods  and a response t o  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a G enera l  E l e c t i o n  -
th en  t h i s ,  s u r e l y ,  i s  n o t  a s e n s a t i o n .  I t  i s  b e t t e r ,  I
t h i n k ,  t o  d e s c r i b e  i t  as an e m o t io n a l  s t a t e ;  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  
u s u a l l y  a more t r a n q u i l  s t a t e  th a n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t u r m o i l
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su g g es ted  by many o f  our  e m o t io n s .  And th e n  we m ig h t  s a y ,  
pace M a c I n t y r e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s e n s a t i o n s  which  g i v e  
p l e a s u r e ,  o r  t h e r e  a r e  s e n s a t io n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  ( t h e  
e m ot io n  o f )  p l e a s u r e .
N e i t h e r  i s  ' h a p p i n e s s ’ a s im p le  n o t i o n .  I n  o r d i n a r y  
d i s c o u r s e ,  we speak o f  a person 'h a v i n g  a happy t e m p e r a m e n t ’ 
by which we mean t h a t  t h e y  have a c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n ,  we 
speak o f  t h e i r  ' b e i n g  in  a happy mood’ , meaning by t h i s  t h a t  
t h e y  f i n d  t h i n g s  a g r e e a b l e  (even  sometimes when t h e  t h i n g s  
i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  b a d ) ,  and so on. However i t  i s ,  p re s u m a b ly ,  
h a p p in e s s  in  l i f e  g e n e r a l l y  t h a t  we would be r e f e r r i n g  t o  i f  
h a p p in e s s  i s  t o  be re g a rd e d  as a n e e d (a )  o r  ( b ) .  I n  t h i s  
sense we m ig h t  speak o f  a person ' l e a d i n g  a happy l i f e ’ o r  
o f  h i s  'h a v i n g  found hap p in e ss  in  l i f e ’ . L e t  us assume,  
f o r  t h e  moment, t h a t  we a r e  r e f e r r i n g  t o  a s t a t e  o f  mind o r  
a t t i t u d e  when we r e f e r  t o  someone l e a d i n g  a happy l i f e .  
Perhaps t h i s  i s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  mind o r  a t t i t u d e  we mean when 
we d e s c r i b e  them as ' b e i n g  p le a s e d  w i t h  t h e i r  l i f e ’ . 129 Are  
we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  persons  a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  in  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ?
M a c I n t y r e  t h i n k s  n o t .  He o b s e rv e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  p e o p le
d e r i v e  p l e a s u r e  and h ap p ine ss  f rom  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s .
T h is  le a d s  him, (and o t h e r s  13° )  t o  deny t h a t  t h e r e  can be
any o b j e c t i v e  c o n t e n t  in  th e  n o t i o n  o f  ' l i k e  c a s e s ’ h e r e .
M a c I n t y r e  (op c i t : 6 2 )  w r i t e s :
The h ap p ine ss  which be longs  p e c u l i a r l y  t o  t h e  way o f  
l i f e  o f  t h e  c l o i s t e r  i s  no t  t h e  same h a p p in e s s  as 
t h a t  which be longs  p e c u l i a r l y  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
l i f e .  For d i f f e r e n t  p le a s u r e s  and d i f f e r e n t  
hap p in e sses  a r e  t o  a l a r g e  d eg re e  i n c o m m e n s u r a b le . . .
Our en thus ias m s  and p r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  w i d e l y  d i f f e r e n t .  We do
n o t  a l l  f i n d  p l e a s u r e  o r  a happy l i f e  in  t h e  same k in d s  o f
t h i n g .  A t  l e a s t  t h e r e  i s  no one a c t i v i t y  t h a t  comes t o
mind,  ( w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  e r o t i c
s e n s a t i o n s 131) ,  ab o u t  which i t  co u ld  be s a i d  t h a t  ev e ry o n e
f i n d s  p l e a s u r e  by eng ag ing  in  i t ,  o r  h ap p in e ss  as a r e s u l t
o f  e x p e r i e n c i n g  i t .
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However f o r  t h e  moment t h i s  i s  a s i d e - i s s u e .  I r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  t h e  t h i n g s  we f i n d  p l e a s u r e  o r  h a p p in e s s  
i n ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  p l e a s u r a b l e  ( o r  t h a t  i t  w i l l  make a 
p e r s o n ’ s l i f e  happy)  i s  a v e r y  common m o t iv e  f o r  do in g  
s o m e th in g .  E a r l i e r  I  sug gested  t h a t  p l e a s u r e  i s  a k i n d  o f  
e m o t io n a l  s t a t e .  So r e g a r d e d ,  i t  c a r r i e s  w i t h  i t  c o n a t i v e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s ;  a person who t h i n k s  he w i l l  be p l e a s e d  w i t h  
som eth ing  F w i l l  be m o t iv a t e d  t o  a c t  in  c e r t a i n  ways to w a rd s
F. He w i l l  want  t o  do F o r  t o  o b t a i n  F, and when he has i t ,  
he w i l l  want  F t o  go on,  o r  a t  l e a s t ,  he w i l l  want  i t  n o t  t o  
be i n t e r r u p t e d .  The f a c t  t h a t  X i s  l i k e l y  t o  be p le a s e d  
w i t h  F i s  a good reason f o r  X choos ing  i t . 132
I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  som eth ing  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  be, o r  i s ,  p l e a s u r a b l e ,  o r  w i l l  l e a d  t o  
h a p p in e s s ,  i s  o f t e n  a reason we g i v e  f o r  ju d g e m e n ts .  We 
j u d g e  in  f a v o u r  o f  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s  o r  i te m  r a t h e r  
th an  o t h e r s  because i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be more p l e a s u r a b l e  th an  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  S i m i l a r l y  we o f t e n  ju d g e  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
a c t i v i t i e s  ought  t o  be done because t h e y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b r i n g  
g r e a t e r  h ap p ine ss  th a n  o t h e r s .  These a r e  p o w e r fu l  reasons  
f o r  a ju d g em en t .  In  g i v i n g  such a reas o n ,  m oreover ,  one i s  
u s u a l l y  r u l i n g  o u t  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  o f  what  i s  b e in g  done 
in  r e l a t i o n  t o  some o t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  e n d . 133 T h is  i s  n o t  t o  
s u g g es t  t h a t  e i t h e r  p l e a s u r e  o r  h ap p in e ss  a r e  t h e  o n l y  ends 
o f  our  a c t i o n s  and ju d g em en ts .  A person may do t h i n g s  o r  
o r g a n i s e  h i s  l i f e  in  p u r s u i t  o f  a goal which i s  q u i t e  remote  
f rom  e i t h e r  p l e a s u r e  o r  h a p p in e s s .  He may choose t o  
s a c r i f i c e  h i s  l i f e  in  t h e  name o f  j u s t i c e  and so c u t  o f f  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c h i e v i n g  f u r t h e r  p l e a s u r e  o r  h a p p in e s s .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s  we n o r m a l ly  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  p l e a s u r e  i t  a f f o r d s ,  
o r  t h e  h ap p ine ss  i t  b r i n g s ,  i f  n o t  in  t h e  s h o r t  run in  t h e  
long run ,  i s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  enough f o r  eng ag in g  in  an 
a c t i v i t y .
Are p l e a s u r e  and h ap p iness  n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b ) ?  L e t  us 
c o n c e n t r a t e  on h ap p ine ss  as a n e e d ( b ) .  I s  b e in g  happy,  in
th e  h e d o n i s t i c  sense o f  b e ing  p le a s e d  w i t h  o n e ’ s l i f e ,
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a n o t h e r  way in  which a person may be t h o u g h t  t o  f l o u r i s h ?  
(We s h o u ld  n o t i c e  t h a t  i f  h ap p in e ss  i s  a n e e d ( b )  what  i s  
needed i n  t h i s  case i s  n o t  m e r e ly  a means t o  an end b u t  a l s o  
p a r t  o f  t h e  e n d . )  A t  f i r s t  s i g h t  t h e  answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
seems t o  be a f a i r l y  o b v io u s  ' y e s ’ . S u r e l y  i t  must be s a i d  
t h a t  e v e r y  person n e e d s ( b )  ha p p in e s s  f o r  a sense o f  
f l o u r i s h i n g  and he n e e d s ( b )  t o  be happy i f  o t h e r s  a r e  t o  say  
he f l o u r i s h e s .
I t  m ig h t  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  a s t o i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  does n o t
need t h i s ,  even i f  i t  were a t t a i n a b l e .  C o n c e rn in g  t h e
l a t t e r  p o i n t ,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  added t h a t  ha p p in e s s  i s  n o t  t o
be found in  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  we e x p e r i e n c e  anyway. Any
p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  we have,  l ead  i n e v i t a b l y  t o
g r i e f ;  one f a l l s  in  l o v e  o n l y  t o  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  lo ved  one
f i n d s  a n o t h e r  o r  i s  s t r u c k  down by i l l n e s s  and d e a t h .
S i m i l a r l y  fame,  f o r t u n e ,  t h e  r e s p e c t  o f  o n e ’ s f e l lo w m a n ,  a r e
h e re  one day and gone t h e  n e x t .  I n  t h i s  v e i n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
A . Schopenhauer  ( 1 8 8 3 : 3 9 0 )  w r i t e s :
E v e r y t h i n g  in  l i f e  shows t h a t  e a r t h l y  h a p p in e s s  i s  
d e s t i n e d  t o  be f r u s t r a t e d  and r e c o g n iz e d  as an 
i 11 u s i o n . . .
We a r e  c o n t i n u a l l y  f a c e d ,  n o t  by h a p p in e s s ,  b u t  by 
f r u s t r a t i o n s  and m i s f o r t u n e s  and th e s e  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  a l l  
o t h e r  a s p e c ts  o f  our  l i v e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  S t o i c  says  
t h a t  r a t h e r  th a n  h a p p in e s s ,  t o  f l o u r i s h  we need a p a t h e i a . 134 
v i z .  f o r t i t u d e  in  t h e  f a c e  o f  a d v e r s i t y ,  t o  be calm and 
p r e s e r v e  our  e m o t io n a l  e q u a n i m i t y  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  what  
happens.  Such a v iew  app ears  t o  be q u i t e  c o n t r a r y  t o  what  
I  am c l a i m i n g  i s  a b a s ic  d r i v e  o f  human n a t u r e  t h a t  i s  
needed f o r  any o f  us t o  f l o u r i s h .
A t  f i r s t  b lush  t h e  S t o i c a l  p o s i t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  as I  have  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  i t ,  i s  p l a i n l y  f a l s e .  The w o r ld  does o f f e r  
many o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  h ap p in e ss  ( s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  pp.  
2 4 5 - 2 4 6 ) .  But a l s o  th e  S t o i c a l  b e l i e f  i s  r a t i o n a l l y  odd.  
I f  o n l y  a p a t h e i a  i s  needed f o r  persons  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  t h e r e  
would be n o t h in g  t o  choose between two groups ,  both  
c o n t a i n i n g  th e  same amount o f  a p a t hei  a y e t  one f i l l e d  w i t h
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happy p e o p le ,  t h e  o t h e r  w i t h  unhappy p e o p le .  What i s  even  
more odd, i f  t h e r e  were two s o c i e t i e s  and t h e  f i r s t  
c o n t a i n e d  v e r y  happy p e o p le  b u t  l i t t l e  a p a t h e i a  and t h e  
o t h e r  was f i l l e d  w i t h  v e r y  unhappy p e o p le  and much a p a t h e i a , 
t h e  S t o i c  seems t o  be com m itted  t o  cho os ing  t h e  l a t t e r  as  
h i s  example  o f  a f l o u r i s h i n g  community .  But i f  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  p e o p le  t o  be v e r y  happy w i t h o u t  i t ,  what  would  
t h e y  need a p a t h e i  a f o r ?
A ls o  i t  seems odd t o  sug ges t  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  som eth ing  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  hap p in e ss  o r  p l e a s u r e  c o u ld  a lw a y s  
be a m a t t e r  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  any p e rs o n .  For i t  would  rob  
many o f  our  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  judgem en ts  o f  a r e a s o n .  I n  
many c a s e s ,  as we n o te d ,  th e s e  t a k e  t h e  fo rm  o f  t r y i n g  t o  
a t t a i n  c o n c r e t e  g o a ls  which we would n o t  pursue  u n l e s s  we 
t h o u g h t  we would be happy o r  p le a s e d  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l
s i t u a t i o n  which r e s u l t s .  In d e e d ,  i t  would  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  
u n d e rs ta n d  what c o u ld  be meant by s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g
judgem en ts  u n le s s  we i n c l u d e  some ac c o u n t  o f  h a p p in e s s  o r
p l e a s u r e .  These a r e  n o t  i n v a r i a b l e  m o t iv e s .  N o n e th e le s s
th e  f a c t  we commonly and r e g u l a r l y  choose s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s  
which we hope w i l l  r e s u l t  in  them, i s  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
c l a i m  t h a t  human b e in g s  n e e d (b )  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  h ap p in e ss  
and p l e a s u r e .
There  a r e  many o t h e r  grounds f o r  t h i s  l a t t e r  c l a i m .  
F i r s t l y ,  o f t e n  p e o p le  f e e l  g u i l t  a t  n o t  b e ing  happy.
C o n s id e r  t h e  case when, f o r  no o b v io u s  re a s o n ,  Sm ith  does 
n o t  manage t o  f e e l  happy. "Given a l l  o f  th e  ad v a n ta g e s  t h a t  
I  have in  my l i f e " ,  he m ig h t  s ay ,  "how i s  i t  t h a t  I  can not  
manage t o  be happy?".  Peop le  who f e e l  g u i l t  a t  n o t  b e ing  
happy o r  o f  n o t  g e t t i n g  any p l e a s u r e  o u t  o f  l i f e ,  in  t h i s
sense ,  r e c o g n is e  t h e  f a u l t  as t h e i r  own. They u s u a l l y
re g a r d  i t  as a moral  f a i l u r e ,  l i k e  a l a c k  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
p e r s e v e r a n c e , o r  s im p ly  t h a t  t h e y  have t h e  wrong a t t i t u d e .  
A c t i o n s  t h a t  e x e m p l i f y  th e s e  f a u l t s  a r e  r e g a rd e d  as a form  
o f  a i l i n g ,  a f a i l u r e  t o  s a t i s f y  som eth ing  which any
i n d i v i d u a l  needs.
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A n o th e r  reason f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  a n e e d ( b )  can  
be found in  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  on most v iew s  o f  m o r a l i t y ,  we a r e  
th o u g h t  t o  have a d u ty  t o  promote t h e  h a p p in e s s  o f  o t h e r s .  
N o r m a l ly  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  -  when t h i s  would  n o t  r e q u i r e  our  
s a c r i f i c i n g  a n y t h i n g  o f  com parab le  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  o u r s e l v e s  
-  we oug ht  t o  do more t o  h e l p ,  sa y ,  e l d e r l y  p e o p le  who l i v e  
on t h e i r  own. I n  o t h e r  words,  we t h i n k  t h a t  we sh o u ld  be 
d o in g  more t o  promote t h e i r  h a p p in e s s .  T h is  i s  r e g a r d e d  as  
i m p o r t a n t ,  I  am s u g g e s t in g ,  because i t  i s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  
h a p p in e s s  i s  a n e e d (b )  f o r  a l l  human b e in g s  w h ic h ,  in  t h e  
case o f  p e o p le  who a r e  e l d e r l y  and f r i e n d l e s s ,  i s  n o t  b e in g  
m e t .
The o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h i s  c o in  i s  t h a t  we do n o t  n o r m a l ly  
c o n s i d e r  o u r s e l v e s  o b l i g e d  t o  s a c r i f i c e  a l l  o f  o u r  own
h a p p in e s s  t o  h e lp  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  unhapp iness  o f  o t h e r s .  
What I  mean by t h i s  i s  t h a t  w i t h o u t  g u i l t ,  we spend a l o t  
o f  money on our  own p r o j e c t s  and p a s t im e s ;  money w h ic h ,  
t h e r e  i s  no d o u b t ,  c o u ld  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  l i v e s  o f  o t h e r s  i f  i t  
were s p e n t  on them i n s t e a d .  We c o u ld  make many o l d  and 
l o n e l y  p e o p le  happy i f  we s p e n t  a l l  o f  our  s p a re  t im e
v i s i t i n g  them. N o n e t h e le s s ,  u s u a l l y  we would d i s r e g a r d
t h e i r  h ap p iness  where t h i s  s e r i o u s l y  enc ro ach es  on o u r  own. 
Why? P a r t  o f  t h e  answer i s  because we t h i n k  t h a t  we 
o u r s e l v e s  would a i l  as a r e s u l t .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  say t h a t  
we t h i n k  we a r e  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  in  l e a v i n g  t h e  needs o f  
o t h e r s  o u t  o f  t h e  a c c o u n t ,  o r  t h a t  we have a moral  d u t y  t o  
meet our  own needs f i r s t .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  when t h e i r
p o s s i b l e  h ap p ine ss  c l e a r l y  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  our  own, we g i v e  
p r i o r i t y  t o  our  own. T h is  to o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  we r e g a r d  ( o u r  
own) hap p in e ss  as a n e e d ( b ) .
From t h e  f a c t  t h a t  in  our  judgem ents  we do t y p i c a l l y  g i v e  
p r i o r i t y  t o  our  own h a p p in e s s ;  we do commonly b e l i e v e  t h a t  
i f  i t  i s  in  someone’ s power t o  enhance t h e  h ap p in e ss  o f  
a n o t h e r ,  t h e y  m o r a l l y  s h o u ld ;  we do f e e l  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  i f ,  
f o r  no good reas o n ,  our  l i v e s  a r e  n o t  happy;  and f rom  t h e  
oddness o f  th e  c o n t r a r y  c l a i m  t h a t  we do n o t  n e e d (b )  i t ,  we
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may c o n c lu d e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  we need h ap p in e ss  in  o u r  l i v e s  i f  we a r e  t o  
f l o u r i s h .  S i m i l a r  arguments  a p p ly  m u t a t i s  m u tan d is  t o  t h e  
n e e d (b )  f o r  p l e a s u r e .
To see t h i s ,  l e t  us c o n s id e r  an argument  t h a t  d a t e s  back  
t o  A r i s t o t l e , 135 which su g g es ts  t h a t  an o b j e c t i v e  b a s is  f o r  
f l o u r i s h i n g  can be found in  t h e  p l e a s u r e  t h a t  accompanies  
o n l y  c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t i e s .  I  want  t o  c o n t r a s t  t h i s  v ie w  w i t h  
my c l a i m  t h a t  p l e a s u r e  i s  a n o n - v o l i t i o n a l , u n i v e r s a l  and 
n e c e s s a ry  need ( a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d ( b ) )  f o r  p e r s o n s .  I  
want t o  show t h a t  t h e  k in d  o f  p l e a s u r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  in  t h i s  
w e l l - k n o w n  argument  i s  n o t  a n e e d (b )  f o r  p e rs o n s .
The argument  asks one t o  c o n s id e r  t h e  g e n e r a l  f e a t u r e s  
which any a c t i v i t y  r e q u i r e s  i f  i t  i s  t o  f i g u r e  h ig h  in  t h e  
l i s t  o f  p l e a s u r a b l e  a c t i v i t i e s .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  
m a s t e r in g  a s k i l l  o r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  a body o f  knowledge i s  
i n v a r i a b l y  accompanied by f e e l i n g s  o f  p l e a s u r e .  A c t i v i t i e s  
a r e  u s u a l l y  th o u g h t  t o  be l e s s  p l e a s u r a b l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  when t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t  l a c k s  competence o r  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g .  S e c o n d ly ,  i t  seems t h a t  human b e in g s  do n o t  
d e r i v e  f u l l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  f rom  an e v e n t  in  which t h e y  a r e  
p u r e l y  p a s s iv e  s p e c t a t o r s .  N o r m a l l y ,  as we a c q u i r e  s k i l l s  
o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  i f  t h e  o c c a s io n  a l l o w s ,  we e n j o y  u s ing  
them; t h e  more o c c a s io n s  we have f o r  e x e r c i s i n g  t h e  s k i l l ,  
in  unexpected  ways e s p e c i a l l y ,  t h e  more p l e a s u r a b l e  i t  
becomes as an a c t i v i t y .  T h i r d l y ,  in  o r d e r  t o  f i n d  many 
a c t i v i t i e s  p l e a s u r a b l e  -  though o b v i o u s l y  n o t  a c t i v i t i e s  
l i k e  e a t i n g  -  a person w i l l  need t o  e x p e r i e n c e  i t  as  
som eth ing  t h a t  i s  demanding,  which o f f e r s  scope f o r  
i n i t i a t i v e  and c r e a t i v i t y ,  o r  which makes use o f  h i s  
c r i t i c a l  a b i l i t y ,  e t c .  The r e l i g i o u s  r e c l u s e  and th e  
m i l i t a r y  man may d i f f e r  in  t h e  t h i n g s  t h e y  f i n d  p l e a s u r a b l e .  
However both w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  s h a re  a t  l e a s t  
some g e n e r a l  f e a t u r e s  in  common, which i s  why t h e y  a r e  found  
t o  be p l e a s u r a b l e .
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The t h e o r y  goes on t o  su g g e s t  t h a t  some a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  
r i c h e r  th a n  o t h e r s  as p o s s i b l e  so u rces  o f  p l e a s u r e  because ,  
in  th e m s e lv e s ,  t h e y  p r o v i d e  more o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
d e v e lo p in g  s k i l l s ,  o r  f o r  t h e  use o f  c r e a t i v e  and c r i t i c a l  
a b i l i t i e s .  When compared w i t h  o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e i r  
c o n t e n t  i s  w i d e - r a n g i n g ,  t h e y  w i l l  p r o v i d e  g r e a t e r  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  f r e s h  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s ,  and so on. Due t o  
t h e i r  c o m p l e x i t y ,  t h e y  w i l l  be c a p a b le  o f  h o l d i n g  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t ’ s a t t e n t i o n  f o r  a lo n g e r  span o f  t i m e .  They  
w i l l  be found more re w a r d in g  a l s o  because t h e y  can deepen  
o n e ’ s v ie w  o f  t h i n g s  o r  i l l u m i n a t e  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  o n e ’ s 
l i f e .  I n  t h i s  way, th e y  w i l l  l e a d  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s s e l f -  
r e a l i z a t i o n  and g i v e  him a sense o f  h a v in g  what  i s  w o r th  
h a v in g  in  l i f e .
By s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  an o b j e c t i v e  b a s is  f o r  p l e a s u r e  can be 
found in  t h i n g s  l i k e  ' t h e  use o f  o n e ’ s c r e a t i v e  a b i l i t i e s ’ 
t h e  argument  seems t o  be t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  such as t h e s e  a r e  
n e c e s s a ry  f o r  p l e a s u r e ,  t h a t  no one w i l l  be happy w i t h  h i s  
l i f e  u n le s s  h i s  i n t e l l e c t  o r  i m a g i n a t i o n  i s  s t r e t c h e d .  And 
I  have no doubt  t h a t  f o r  many o f  us t h i s  i s  a f a m i l i a r  road  
t o  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  and t o  h a p p in e s s .  What I  doubt  i s  t h a t  
i t  i s  a n e e d (b )  f o r  p e rs o n s .  For  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a 
person t o  f i n d  p l e a s u r e  and be happy even i f  he o n l y  e v e r  
engages in  t h e  more mundane k in d  o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  And i t  
seems c o r r e c t  t o  say o f  someone who has p r o s t i t u t e d  h i s  
t a l e n t s ,  o r  o f  someone who has a way o f  l i f e  t h a t  most o f  us 
would f i n d  a w f u l ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  p e r f e c t l y  happy.  On th e  
o t h e r  hand, i t  would be p o s s i b l e  f o r  a person t o  engage in  
p l e a s u r a b l e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a c t i v i t i e s  bu t  s t i l l  s u f f e r  f rom  a 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  g rave  t o  s p o i l  h i s  h a p p in e s s .  
Perhaps he c r a v e s  f o r  a happy f a m i l y  l i f e  and t h i s  escapes  
him. And o b v i o u s l y  t h e r e  a r e  many t h i n g s  o t h e r  th an  
p a r t a k i n g  in  c r e a t i v e  o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p u r s u i t s  t h a t  can make 
d i f f e r e n t  persons happy; m ee t in g  c a r e e r  a m b i t i o n s ,  f a m i l y  
l i f e ,  f r i e n d s h i p ,  l o v e ,  and so on. The v iew  t h a t  a 
p l e a s u r a b l e  o r  happy l i f e  n e c e s s a r i l y  depends on s t r e t c h i n g
247
t h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  p u ts  t h e  m a t t e r  t h e  wrong way round .  I t  
makes p l e a s u r e  depend on c e r t a i n  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  so t o  speak ;  
w hereas my g e n e r a l  p o i n t  i s  t h a t ,  w h a t e v e r  e le m e n t s  i t  may 
c o n t a i n ,  a person n e e d s ( b )  p l e a s u r e  (and  h a p p in e s s )  f o r  a 
sense o f  f l o u r i s h i n g .
C l e a r l y  t h e r e  a r e  a g r e a t  many gaps in  t h e  a rgum ents  
above .  Someth ing more sho u ld  be s a i d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a b o u t  
t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between h ap p ine ss  and our  o t h e r  needs.  
F o l l o w i n g  M i l l  ( 1 8 5 1 : 1 3 5 - 1 4 0 )  i t  seems t r u e  t o  s a y ,  f o r  
ex a m p le ,  t h a t  when t h e i r  a c t i o n s  concern  th e m s e lv e s  a l o n e ,  
more ha p p in e s s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e  by l e t t i n g  a person  be 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  I f  h i s  a c t  d o e s n ’ t  a f f e c t  anyone e l s e ,  i t  
w i l l  n o t  harm anyone e l s e ,  and in  t h e  long run a p erso n  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  g a in  in  te rm s  o f  h ap p in e ss  by o t h e r s  n o t  
i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  h i s  p r o j e c t s .  U n l i k e  M i l l ,  however ,  I  have  
argued  t h a t  t h e  need f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  n o t  a need  
f o r  h ap p in e ss  as such,  f o r  i t  can be r e p r e s e n t e d  as
som eth ing  a person needs t o  f u n c t i o n  and t o  f l o u r i s h  even i f  
he w i l l  n o t ,  t h e r e b y ,  be happy.  And t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  
n e e d s ( b )  t h a t  c u t  a c ro s s  t h e  s i n g l e - m i n d e d  a c h ie v e m e n t  o f  
happi  n e s s .
A ls o  som eth ing  more s ho u ld  be s a i d  ab o u t  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  
between t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  h ap p in e ss  and moral  ju d g e m e n t .
We a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  h ap p ine ss  and p l e a s u r e  as p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
needs f o r  persons  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  f l o u r i s h ;  where by 
' f l o u r i s h ’ we mean a m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  ( n o t  in  
t h e  sense o f  n o n -n o r m a t iv e  bu t  in  t h e  sense o f  non­
c o n t e s t e d ) .  The f a c t  t h a t  p e o p le  n e e d (b )  h a p p in e s s  o r  
p l e a s u r e  does n o t  e n t a i l  t h e i r  moral r i g h t  t o  i t .  I t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  we a r e  n o t  p r e p a re d  t o  l e t  a person do j u s t
a n y t h i n g  because i t  makes them happy.  However n e i t h e r  i s  
t h e  c o n n e c t io n  m e r e ly  c o n t i n g e n t .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between  
t h e  two ( v i z .  h a p p i n e s s / p l e a s u r e  and m o r a l i t y )  s t i l l  has t o  
be i d e n t i f i e d .  What we can say a t  t h i s  s t a g e  i s  t h a t
'b e cau se  F makes X h a p p y ’ o r  'b ecau se  F p l e a s e s  X ’ a r e  p r im a
f a c i e  good reasons  f o r  t h e  judgem en t  * F o u g h t  t o  be done t o  
X ’ o r  *X o ug ht  t o  do F ’ .
My a c c o u n t  o f  a p e r s o n ’ s p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  
i s  s t i l l  i m p o r t a n t l y  i n c o m p l e t e ,  r e s t i n g  s i m p ly  on t h e  needs  
above .  I f  we l e f t  t h i n g s  l i k e  t h a t ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  t h e o r y  
would  be an u n d u ly  e g o c e n t r i c  v iew  ( o f  a p e r s o n ’ s n e e d s ) .  
To base i t  upon t h e  needs f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  s e l f -  
r e a l i z a t i o n  e t c .  seems t o  reduce m o r a l i t y  t o  an e g o i s t i c  
c a l c u l a t i o n .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  in  o u r  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  we n o t  o n l y  need o t h e r  persons  t o  respond t o  us ,  we 
need t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  respond t o  t h e i r  needs.  And t h i s ,  i n  
t u r n ,  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  q u i t e  a d i f f e r e n t  k in d  o f  need i n  t h e  
e m o t io n a l  and m o t i v a t i o n a l  s u b s t r a t e  o f  a p e rs o n .  We must  
now t u r n  t o  t h e s e  o t h e r  needs.
Sympathy as a n e e d (a )
We have a c a p a c i t y  t o  be moved by o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s needs,  
by t h e i r  h a p p in e s s ,  by t h e i r  s u f f e r i n g s .  Sympathy o r  
f e l l o w - f e e l i n g  o f  t h i s  k in d  app ears  t o  be u n i v e r s a l .  I t  i s  
e x h i b i t e d  in  a t  l e a s t  two ways.  We can e m o t i o n a l l y  i d e n t i f y  
w i t h  o t h e r s  in  a p a s s iv e  way. I f  a n o t h e r  person f e e l s  
p le a s e d  we can f e e l  p le a s e d  f o r  them. I f  t h e i r  p l e a s u r e  i s  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  an a c t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r  p a r t y ,  we can warm 
tow a rd s  him and h i s  a c t i o n .  We may m o r a l l y  approve  o f  what  
he has done.  I f  a n o t h e r  person s u f f e r s ,  we may f e e l  
d i s t r e s s  f o r  them. I f  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  i s  caused non­
a c c i d e n t a l  l y  by a n o t h e r  p a r t y ,  we may f e e l  h o s t i l e  to w a rd s  
him o r  h i s  a c t i o n s .  We m o r a l l y  d is a p p r o v e  o f  what  he has 
d o n e .
'E m p a th y ’ i s  th e  name g iv e n  by p h i l o s o p h e r s  and
p s y c h o l o g i s t  a l i k e  t o  t h i s  component o f  sympathy .  As
D . W r i g h t  ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 3 4 )  o b s e rv e s :
Empathy i s  one component o f  sympathy ,  namely  
r e s p o n d in g  t o  t h e  o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s e m o t io n a l  
e x p r e s s i o n  ( i n  t h i s  case  o f  d i s t r e s s )  w i t h  a s i m i l a r  
e m o t io n a l  response ( a g a i n  d i s t r e s s ) .
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We can f e e l  p i t y  a t  t h e i r  d i s t r e s s  and,  we s h o u ld  n o t  f o r g e t  
t h a t  on t h e  p o s i t i v e  s i d e ,  we can f e e l  p l e a s e d  f o r  them a t  
t h e i r  s u c cess .  But we may do n o t h in g  more th a n  t h i s .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  we can be a c t i v e l y  c o n c e rn e d ,  w a n t in g  
t o  a s s i s t  them in  t h e i r  d i s t r e s s .  Any normal  person  s e e in g  
an unknown c h i l d  a t t a c k e d  by an a n i m a l ,  we n o t e d ,  would  n o t  
o n l y  f e e l  d i s t r e s s  b u t  would have an im p u ls e  t o  save  t h e  
c h i l d ,  i f  t h e y  c o u ld .  Our e m p a t h e t i c  im p u ls e ,  t h a t  i s ,  can  
i n i t i a t e  s y m p a t h e t i c  b e h a v i o u r .  Sympathy o f  t h i s  a c t i v e  
s o r t  i s  m a n i f e s t  in  more th an  w a n t in g  t o  a s s i s t  a n o t h e r  in  
t h e i r  d i s t r e s s .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  shown t o  them in  p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;  t h e  
s u p p o r t  and encouragem ent  g iv e n  t o  them as t h e y  d e v e lo p  
t h e i r  t a l e n t s  o r  in  t h e i r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  p r o j e c t s .  We 
w i l l  d i s t i n g u i s h  such b e h a v io u r  f rom  empathy by c a l l i n g  i t  
' a c t i v e  s y m p a th y ’ . 136 L e t  us a s k ,  f i r s t ,  w h e th e r  empathy i s  
a n e e d ( a )  f o r  p e rs o n s .
T h e re  can be no doubt  t h a t  p e o p le  d i f f e r  in  t h e  way t h e y  
e x e r c i s e  t h i s  c a p a c i t y ;  t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  we d i f f e r  in  t h e  
d eg re e  t o  which we f e e l  empathy to w a rd s  o t h e r s .  T h e re  a r e  
t i m e s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  when an y o n e ’ s empathy may be l a c k i n g  o r  
i n h i b i t e d ;  one may be so wrapped up w i t h  o n e ’ s own prob lem s  
t h a t  one may o v e r l o o k  t h e  d i s t r e s s  o f  o t h e r s .  However t h a t  
a normal person possesses t h i s  c a p a c i t y  t o  some d e g r e e ,  i s  
c la im e d  t o  be a b r u t e  f a c t  o f  human n a t u r e .
We a r e  t o l d  t h a t ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  a l l  p e o p le  have a 
p r e d i s p o s i t i o n  f o r  e m p a t h e t i c  c o n c e rn .  T h i s  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n  
i s  r e i n f o r c e d  by most known ch i  1d - r e a r i n g  p r a c t i c e s ;  a 
c h i l d ’ s i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  i t s  m other  and o t h e r  members o f  i t s  
f a m i l y ,  d e v e lo p s  t h i s  c a p a c i t y .  As W r ig h t  ( i bi  d : 1 3 4 )  t e l l s  
u s :
. . . s u p e r i m p o s e d  upon such a p r e d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  t h e  
p rocess  o f  c o n d i t i o n i n g .
When a baby i s  u p s e t  i t  c a l l s  f o r t h  an e m p a t h e t i c  response
in  t h e  p a r e n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  b a b y ’ s p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e
m o t h e r ’ s d i s t r e s s  w i l l  evoke d i s t r e s s  in  i t .  As i t  grows
up, i t  i s  encouraged t o  d e v e lo p  such a concern  f o r  o t h e r
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members o f  i t s  f a m i l y ,  household  p e t s ,  e t c .  L a t e r  i t s  
empathy i s  e x te n d e d  t o  p e e rs  a t  school  and t o  o t h e r  p e o p le  
known th r o u g h  l a r g e r  s c a l e  a t t a c h m e n t s .  A t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  o u r  
empathy o cc u rs  n o t  o n l y  in  response t o  t h e  v i s i b l e  s i g n s  o f  
s u f f e r i n g  in  o t h e r s  b u t  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  
t h e y  a r e  s u f f e r i n g  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e y  a r e  showing i t  and 
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e y  a r e  p r e s e n t .  However i t s  im p o r ta n c e  f o r  
us does n o t  l i e  in  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  r e i n f o r c e d  by c h i l d -  
r e a r i n g  p r a c t i c e s ,  ( i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  o f  a l l  known human 
c u l t u r e s ) . 137 N e i t h e r  i s  i t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  most p e o p le  want  
t o  f e e l  concern  f o r  o t h e r s .  The im p o r ta n c e  o f  a t h i n g ,  f o r  
o u r  a c c o u n t  o f  ' p e r s o n s ’ , i s  n o t  gauged by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
p e o p le  a c t u a l l y  f e e l  i t  o r  want  i t ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e y  need i t .  
Can we say  t h a t  empathy i s  som eth ing  an i n d i v i d u a l  n e e d s ( a )  
t o  f u n c t i o n  as a person?
One way we m ig h t  show t h a t  i t  i s ,  i s  by an ad hominem 
exa m p le 138 t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t o  deny t h a t  some l e v e l  o f  
empathy i s  needed would  l e a d  t o  c o n c lu s io n s  t h a t  any normal  
person would f i n d  r e p u g n a n t .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  Sm ith  i s  
d r i v i n g  t o  work in  h i s  c a r  and he sees t h a t  a branch has  
broken f rom  a t r e e  and l i e s  in  h i s  p a t h .  He does n o t  t h i n k  
t h a t  t h e  branch w i l l  h u r t  t h e  c a r ’ s t y r e s ,  so he d r i v e s  o v e r  
i t .  T h i s  seems t o  be a r e a s o n a b le  t h i n g  f o r  Sm ith  t o  do.  
Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  case  where Smith  i s  d r i v i n g  a lo n g  and he 
sees a s t u d e n t  l y i n g  in  t h e  m id d le  o f  t h e  road (w h ic h  t h e y  
do f r e q u e n t l y  in  T r a n s k e i ) .  He " reaso ns"  ( s i c )  t h a t  t h i s  
w i l l  n o t  h u r t  h i s  c a r ’ s t y r e s  so ,  l a c k i n g  any v e s t i g e  o f  
empathy ( i . e .  t o t a l l y  unconcerned f o r  t h e  needs o f  t h e  o t h e r  
p e r s o n ) ,  he d r i v e s  o v e r  h e r .  Even i f  t h e r e  were no laws  
which p r o h i b i t e d  such b e h a v i o u r ,  we c o u ld  n o t  u n d e rs ta n d  
such a re a s o n .  We would n o t  u n d e rs ta n d  how t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
h i s  a c t i o n  k i l l e d  o r  caused a n o t h e r  person s e r i o u s  i n j u r y  
c o u ld  p o s s i b l y  be o f  no concern  w h a ts o e v e r  t o  even t h e  most  
com m it ted  e g o i s t .  No one would s e r i o u s l y  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  a response o f  a r a t i o n a l  p e rso n .  I f  we were a r g u i n g  w i t h  
th e  man who d i d  n o t  f e e l  any sympathy f o r  t h e  person he had
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so t r e a t e d ,  I  t h i n k  we would have s e r i o u s  d o u b ts  a b o u t  h i s  
s a n i t y .  I f  we suppose,  p e r  absurdum, t h a t  he d i d  t r y  t o  
a rg u e  m o r a l l y  in  f a v o u r  o f  such c o n d u c t ,  we can show him
t h a t  such a ju dgem en t  i s  n o t  uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e .
Though t h e y  c o u ld  n o t  a rg u e  f o r  i t ,  e v i d e n t l y  a few  
i n d i v i d u a l s  do behave in  such a way. Someone who does ,  can
o n l y  e x i s t  as a d e v i a n t  in  a s o c i e t y .  We would  say  t h a t
someone who i s  i n c a p a b l e  o f  sympathy in  t h i s  r u d i m e n t a r y  
se n s e ,  so t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a lw a ys  t o t a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  
m is e r y  and s u f f e r i n g  o f  o t h e r s ,  i s  p a t h o l o g i c a l l y  d e f e c t i v e .  
I t  must be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  we a r e  n o t  s im p ly  c o n s i d e r i n g
someone who a c t s  i n c o n s i d e r a t e l y  o r  c r u e l l y  to w a rd s  o t h e r s  
b u t  someone who l i t e r a l l y  i s  i n c a p a b l e  o f  sympathy i n  t h i s  
r u d i m e n t a r y  sen se .  Psychop ath s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a r e
n o t i c e a b l y  l a c k i n g  in  t h i s  c a p a c i t y ;  t h e  psychopa th  i s ,  
q u i t e  l i t e r a l l y ,  l e s s  o f  a person th a n  t h e  r e s t  o f  us.
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t o  have p a s s iv e  sympathy f o r  
a l i m i t e d  number o f  o t h e r  p e o p le  and d i s r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  needs  
o f  o t h e r s .  One s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  r a c i a l  p r e j u d i c e  in  
South  A f r i c a  i s  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  some p e o p le  t o  respond
e m p a t h e t i c a l 1y t o  t h e  s u f f e r i n g s  o f  members o f  o t h e r  r a c i a l  
group s .  T h is  i s  p r o b a b ly  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e r r o n e o u s  b e l i e f ,  
o f  some w h i t e  p e o p le ,  t h a t  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  b l a c k  p e o p le  i s
in  some way m e r i t e d ,  o r  t o  t h e  even more a s t o n i s h i n g  b e l i e f
t h a t  n o n - w h i t e s  a r e  n o t  q u i t e  p e rso n s .  However someone who 
f e e l s  empathy f o r  j u s t  one o t h e r  person y e t  who r e f u s e s  i t  
t o  o t h e r s  in  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  as we s h a l l  s e e ,  can be 
accused o f  h a v in g  f a i l e d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .
Even i f  i t  i s  conceded t h a t  some deg re e  o f  empathy i s  a
sha re d  n e e d ( a )  o f  pe rso n s ,  i t  has n o t  been shown t h a t  an
a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  them, i s  som eth ing  t o o  t h a t  we s h a r e .
I t  would be n i c e  t o  assume, w i t h  W.Maclagan ( 1 9 6 0 : 2 1 2 ) ,  t h a t
. . . w e  a r e ,  I  t h i n k ,  so c o n s t i t u t e d . . . t h a t  i t  i s  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  i m p o s s i b le  g e n u i n e l y  t o  s y m p a th is e  
w i t h  anyone in  t h e  p a s s iv e  mode, w i t h o u t  a t  t h e  same 
t im e  h a v in g  some measure o f  a c t i v e  sympathy a l s o  
. . . f o r  him.
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I f  t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  be t r i v i a l  ( i . e .  by d e f i n i n g  ' g e n u i n e  
empathy* in  te rm s  o f  s y m p a t h e t i c  a c t i o n ) ,  th e n  we need  
e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  c l a i m .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  t h e r e  i s  a l o t  o f  
e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  i s  o f t e n  t h e  case  t h a t  
when f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s s u f f e r i n g ,  we may 
e m p a th is e  y e t  do n o t h i n g ,  on t h e  p r e t e x t  t h a t  we a r e  
p o w e r le s s  t o  h e l p , 139 o r  because we d e p r e c a t e  t h e  s e l f -  
i n f l i c t e d  cause o f  t h e  v i c t i m ’ s s u f f e r i n g . 140 We may be 
e m p a t h e t i c a l 1y moved, t h u s ,  by p i c t u r e s  o f  s t a r v i n g  c h i l d r e n  
i n  Oxfam p o s t e r s  o r  by someone who, th r o u g h  d ru n k e n n e s s ,
c o l l a p s e s  in  f r o n t  o f  us on a pavement  in  Glasgow, y e t  t h i s
i s  n o t  a lw a ys  f o l l o w e d  by s y m p a t h e t i c  b e h a v i o u r .
I t  i s  u s u a l ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t o  have a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  a 
l i m i t e d  number o f  p e o p le .  The u n p r i n c i p l e d  m o t o r i s t  may be 
m o t i v a t e d  t o  do h i s  b e s t  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  and w e l l - b e i n g  o f  
h i s  own c h i l d r e n ,  a w h i t e  r a c i s t  may t h i n k  t h e  w o r ld  o f  h i s  
c h i l d h o o d  Xhosa nanny and a lw ays  t r y  t o  show h e r  h i s  c a r e  
and c o n c e r n ,  w h i l e  most o f  us, most o f  t h e  t i m e ,  show a l o t  
o f  a c t i v e  concern  f o r  a few p e o p le  and a l a c k  o f  i t  f o r  many
o t h e r s .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  t h e
c a p a c i t y  f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy to w a rd s  someone, a t  l e a s t  some 
t i m e s ,  i s  som eth ing  we f i n d  in  t h e  make-up o f  any normal  
p e rs o n .  Once a g a i n ,  someone who b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  m o r a l l y  
j u s t i f i e s  h i s  t r e a t m e n t  o f  some p e rs o n s ,  y e t  who r e f u s e s  i t  
t o  o t h e r s  where t h e  same reason a p p l i e s ,  has f a i l e d  t o  f u l l y  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  ju d g e m e n t .
The prob lem  f o r  us i s  t o  show t h a t  some d eg re e  o f  a c t i v e  
sympathy i s  a n e e d ( a )  f o r  p e rs o n s .  We m ig h t  show t h i s ,  as  
b e f o r e ,  by an ad homi nem exam ple .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  on 
h i s  way i n t o  work Sm ith  o b s e rv e s  t h a t  a c h i l d  has f a l l e n  
i n t o  a pond and i s  in  danger  o f  d ro w n in g .  We can add t h a t  
Smith  f e e l s  p a s s iv e  sympathy f o r  t h e  c h i l d .  He f e e l s  
concern  and rem orse .  He t h i n k s  'how t e r r i b l e  i t  i s  t h a t  t h e  
c h i l d  s h o u ld  d ro w n ’ b u t  he does n o t  wade in  and l i f t  t h e  
c h i l d  t o  s a f e t y  because Smith  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  one oug ht  n e v e r
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t o  a l l o w  t h e  empathy one f e e l s  f o r  a n o t h e r  t o  m a n i f e s t  
i t s e l f  i n  a c t i v e  c o n c e rn ,  n o t  even f o r  t h i s  d row n in g  c h i l d .
T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  s o r t  o f  reason we would  e v e r  c o u n te n an ce  
f ro m  a normal  p e rs o n .  I f  we were a r g u i n g  w i t h  S m i th ,  I  
t h i n k  we would  have s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t y  in  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  him.  
We would n o t  u n d e rs ta n d  how a p o l i c y  o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  
c o u ld  p o s s i b l y  o u tw e ig h  t h e  c h i l d ’ s need t o  s u r v i v e .  We 
e x p e c t  a modicum o f  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  t h e  needs o f  o t h e r s ,  
t h i s  i s  t o  s a y ,  in  t h e  normal p e r s o n ’ s p s y c h o l o g i c a l  make-up  
and b e h a v i o u r .  I f  we were a r g u i n g  w i t h  Sm ith  and he d i d  n o t  
a l l o w  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d ’ s drowning was a reason f o r  h i s  a c t i n g  
t o  save  i t  t h e n ,  once a g a i n ,  we can show him t h a t  he has 
f a i l e d  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .  We w i l l  see a l s o  t h a t  t o  
c o n s i d e r  S m i t h ’ s c on duc t  as a n y t h i n g  b u t  d e f e c t i v e  would  be 
t o  t r e a t  as an a c c e p t a b l e  o p t i o n  a v iew  w h ic h ,  i f  s t a n d a r d ,  
would be an i n c o h e r e n t  v iew  o f  a human moral  p r a c t i c e  ( s e e  
p p . 3 3 1 - 3 3 3  a h e a d ) .
I  am s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  i t  i s  r a t i o n a l  t o  assume what  we 
o r d i n a r i l y  do assume t h a t  any person has t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
show sympathy .  So u n d e r s to o d ,  sympathy i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  
a w ide  range o f  b e h a v i o u r .  I t  i s  possessed by what  o t h e r ­
w ise  may be a r u t h l e s s  o r  c r u e l  c h a r a c t e r .  I f  an i n d i v i d u a l  
ne v e r  once showed any e v id e n c e  o f  sympathy f o r  anyone o r  
a n y t h i n g ,  however ,  we would have s e r i o u s  doubts  ab o u t  
w h e th e r  t h e  te rm  ' p e r s o n ’ a p p l i e d  t o  him.
I t  m ig h t  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  I  am a d o p t in g  h e re  an u n d u ly
s e n t i m e n t a l  o r  a c o n t e n t i o u s  v iew  o f  human n a t u r e .  I t  i s
o f t e n  a rg u e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  human n a t u r e  i s  a t  r o o t
e g o i s t i c .  For  some, t h i s  i s  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  u l t i m a t e l y  a l l  o f
o u r  m o t iv e s  must be s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ,  i . e .  p s y c h o l o g i c a l
ego ism.  However t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  I  have s a i d  t o  r e b u t  t h e
v iew  t h a t  th e  n e e d ( a )  f o r  sympathy o f  e i t h e r  k i n d ,  m ig h t  n o t
be based on s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  I t  m ig h t  be ,  as D . W r ig h t  ( i b i d :
1 3 4 - 1 3 5 )  a s s e r t s ,  t h a t  a l l  ' s y m p a t h e t i c  b e h a v i o u r ’ aims
. . . a t  t h e  removal  o f  t h e  o b s e r v e r ’ s own e m o t io n a l  
u p s e t  by removing i t s  im m ed ia te  cau se ,  t h e  d i s t r e s s  
o f  t h e  s u f f e r e r . 141
I  w ant  t o  deny t h i s .  However,  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  I  have s a i d  
so f a r  which would r u l e  o u t  such an a c c o u n t .  O t h e r s  a rg u e  
t h a t  we can g i v e  an ac c o u n t  o f  our  usua l  moral  b e l i e f s  on 
t h e  assum pt ion  o f  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  needs a l o n e .  We 
do n o t  r e q u i r e  sympathy ,  which i s  a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d  o f  
em o t io n  and which i s  l i k e l y  t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  needs o f  t h e  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  v a r i e t y , ( e . g .  s u r v i v a l ,  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  
p l e a s u r e ) .  I  hope t o  show, however ,  t h a t  an a c c o u n t  based  
o n l y  on r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  needs does n o t  p r o v i d e  an 
a d e q u a te  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  many o f  o u r  moral  b e l i e f s .  As we 
s h a l l  see in  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  we c a n n o t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
j u s t i f y  our  o r d i n a r y  sense o f  j u s t i c e  w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
a c t i v e  sympathy .
B e fo r e  t h i s ,  I  want  t o  c o n s i d e r  sympathy as a n e e d ( b ) .  
T h i s  can be shown in  a m u l t i t u d e  o f  ways. We s h a l l  d i s c u s s  
j u s t  one o f  them, t h e  l o v e  between p a r e n t  and c h i l d .
Sympathy as a n e e d (b )
T h a t  most p a r e n t s  lo v e  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  and t h a t  t h e i r
ju dgem en ts  a r e  w i d e l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h i s  a f f e c t i o n ,  c a n n o t
be d e n ie d .  P a r e n t a l  l o v e ,  we m ig h t  s a y ,  i s  n a t u r a l .  T h i s
m ig h t  be e x p l a i n e d ,  in  p a r t ,  as D .B a ra sh  ( 1 9 8 2 : 1 3 8 )  w r i t e s
. . . p a r e n t s  l o v e  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  "because" o f . . . t h e  
u l t i m a t e  cause :  P a r e n ts  s h a re  one h a l f  o f  t h e i r  
genes w i t h  each c h i l d .
T here  a r e  many such a f f e c t i o n s ,  e . g .  c a r e ,  c o n c e rn ,  l o y a l t y
w h ic h ,  we a r e  t o l d ,  a r e  g e n e t i c a l l y  t r a n s m i t t e d  and which
u l t i m a t e l y ,  though n o t  p r o x i m a t e l y ,  have som eth ing  t o  do
w i t h  s u r v i v a l  o f  th e  genes which t r a n s m i t  them. However
t h e r e  i s  more t o  t h e  cau sa l  acc o u n t  th a n  t h a t .  S t ro n g
f e e l i n g s  o f  l o v e ,  c a r e  and concern  a r e  engendered  by s h a r i n g
in  t h e  p roce ss  o f  b r i n g i n g  a c h i l d  up, i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e
f a c t  t h a t  one i s ,  o r  i s  n o t ,  t h e  n a t u r a l  p a r e n t .  B e s id e s ,
w h a t e v e r  t h e  ca u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  i t  does n o t  j u s t i f y  o u r
moral  a p p ro v a l  o f  p a r e n t a l  l o v e .
We have f e e l i n g s  o f  lo v e  and,  a t  an i n t u i t i v e  l e v e l ,  we
t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a good t h i n g .  I n  l o v i n g  t h e  c h i l d ,  t h e
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p a r e n t  i s  d o in g  what  he o r  she m o r a l l y  o ug ht  t o  do. Can we 
r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f y  v a l u i n g  lo v e  o f  t h i s  k in d ?  P resum ably  
we do n o t  p r i z e  j u s t  a f l o w  o f  e m o t io n ,  f o r  which  t h e  p a r e n t  
i s ,  so t o  sp e a k ,  a p a s s iv e  s o u rc e .  ( T h i s  i s  w hat  we c a l l  
s e n t i m e n t a l i t y . )  We v a l u e  such l o v e ,  i t  seems, where  t h e  
s e n t i m e n t  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  endorsed  f rom  t h e  p a r e n t ’ s r a t i o n a l  
p e r s o n a l i t y .  How can we p r i z e  i t  on r a t i o n a l  grounds? To 
answer t h i s ,  we need t o  say a l i t t l e  more a b o u t  p a r e n t a l  
l o v e .
C l e a r l y  i t  i n v o l v e s  c a r i n g  f o r  t h e  c h i l d ’ s p h y s i c a l  w e l l ­
b e in g  and p r o v i d i n g  f o r  h e r  o t h e r  b o d i l y  needs.  I t  i n c l u d e s  
a l s o  concern  f o r  h e r  a - r a t i o n a l  needs;  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
b e l o n g i n g ,  and so on. T h is  i s  m a n i f e s t  in  such t h i n g s  as  
t h e  p l e a s u r e  t h e  p a r e n t  shows a t  t h e  c h i l d ’ s p r e s e n c e ,  h i s  
encouragem ent  and a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c h i l d  as she d e v e lo p s  
s k i l l s  and t a l e n t s ,  and so f o r t h .  I t  i n v o l v e s  a l s o  t h e  
p a r e n t  e n c o u r a g in g  t h e  c h i l d ’ s e f f o r t s  t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g ,  he r  need t o  in d e p e n d e n t ly  pursue  h e r  own 
p r o j e c t s .  I n  t h i s ,  t h e r e  i s  even a d eg re e  o f  t o l e r a t i o n  
acc orded  t o  t h e  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t .  As E.Newson 
( 1 9 7 8 : 1 6 )  says:
I n  many d i f f e r e n t  ways, p a r e n t s  a c c e p t  as v a l i d  and 
w o r th y  o f  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  and r e s p e c t ,  demands f rom  
t h e  c h i l d  which t h e y  m ig h t  r e a s o n a b ly  j u d g e  as 
i r r a t i o n a l  whims.
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  p a r e n t a l  lo v e  i s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by 
f e e l i n g s  o f  a f f e c t i o n  and a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c h i l d  s im p ly  
f o r  h e r  own sak e .  T h i s  i s  a f e e l i n g .  But i t  i s  a f e e l i n g  
which can be i d e n t i f i e d  by i t s  f u n c t i o n .  I t  i s  a f e e l i n g  by 
which  t h e  p a r e n t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h e  c h i l d ’ s w o r th  and, by h i s  
c o n d u c t ,  a f f i r m s  t h e  c h i l d ’ s sense o f  h e r  own w o r th  as a 
p e r s o n . 142 To p u t  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y :  w h a t e v e r  i t s  a c t u a l  
e m o t io n a l  t o n e ,  p a r e n t a l  lo v e  can be i d e n t i f i e d  m a i n ly  in  
t h e  r e s p e c t  g iv e n  by t h e  p a r e n t  t o  t h e  c h i l d  as a n o t h e r  
p e r s o n .
P a r e n t a l  l o v e ,  t h e n ,  i s  t h e  g e n e r a l  name we g i v e  t o  t h e  
s t r o n g  p o s i t i v e  f e e l i n g s  o f  sympathy t h a t  a p a r e n t  has f o r
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a c h i l d ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  h i s  con cern  t o  meet  t h e  c h i l d ’ s o t h e r  
n e e d s . 143 The f o r m e r  has ,  we n o te d ,  a q u a l i t y  o f  s e l f ­
l e s s n e s s  a b o u t  i t ;  i t  seems t o  be an example  o f  t h e  k i n d  o f  
l o v e  c a l l e d  a g a p e . Downie and T e l f e r  (op  c i t : 2 9 )  d e s c r i b e  
agape as
. . . t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  r e s p e c t  which  i t  i s  f i t t i n g  t o
d i r e c t  a t  p e rs o n s ,  c o n c e iv e d  as r a t i o n a l  w i l l s .
I n  o t h e r  words,  r e s p e c t  i s  th e  r a t i o n a l  backbone o f  p a r e n t a l  
l o v e .  I t  i s  t h e  r e s p e c t  we show when we concede t h a t  o u r  
c h i l d  i s  a n o t h e r  p e rso n .
I t  i s  i n  t h i s  l i g h t  t h a t  p a r e n t a l  l o v e  can be seen as t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g  n e e d (b )  t o  have p o s i t i v e  f e e l i n g s  o f  sympathy  
w i t h  a n o t h e r  p e rs o n .  I t  i s  c h i e f l y  t o  be found i n  what  I  
have c a l l e d  ' a c t i v e  s y m p a th y ’ which i s  m a n i f e s t  i n  t h e  
r e s p e c t  we f e e l  f o r  t h e  w o r th  o f  t h e  c h i l d  as a n o t h e r  
p e r s o n .  'R e s p e c t  o f  w o r t h ’ h e re  i s  s u p e r v e n i e n t  on o t h e r  
t h i n g s .  I t  can be i d e n t i f i e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  in  a p a r e n t  
e n c o u r a g in g  t h e  c h i l d  t o  in d e p e n d e n t ly  pursue  h e r  own 
p r o j e c t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  i s  con sp icuous  by i t s  
absence in  t h e  p a r e n t  who c l a i m s  t o  lo v e  t h e  c h i l d  and does  
n o t  respond t o  t h e  c h i l d ’ s s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  needs .  A 
c e n t r a l  e le m e n t  o f  l o v e  i s  m is s in g .  I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  
s e n s i b l e  t o  say t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  g en u ine  l o v e  b u t ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  v i c a r i o u s  a m b i t i o n  o r  p o s s e s s iv e n e s s .  An example  
o f  t h e  f o r m e r  would be t h e  p a r e n t  who can n o t  r e c o g n iz e  t h e  
w o r th  o f  som eth ing  in  which t h e  c h i l d ,  b u t  n o t  t h e  p a r e n t ,  
i s  i n t e r e s t e d ;  an example  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t h e  f a t h e r  who 
can n o t  r e l e a s e  t h e  c h i l d  f rom  t h e  p a r e n t a l  a p r o n - s t r i n g s .
I  want  now t o  b r i n g  o u t  some o t h e r  a s p e c ts  o f  t h e  n e e d (b )  
f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy ,  t o  be found in  p a r e n t a l  l o v e ,  by 
comparing my acc o u n t  b r i e f l y  w i t h  one o f  a K a n t i a n  f l a v o u r .  
I n  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  t h e  b a s is  f o r  p a r e n t a l  lo v e  i s  t o  be 
found in  our  ( p o s i t i v e )  need t o  f e e l  and g i v e  sympathy ,  v i z .  
t h e  r e s p e c t  we f e e l  f o r  th e  w o r th  o f  t h e  c h i l d  as a n o t h e r  
p e rs o n ,  I  may seem t o  be t e n d i n g  in  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  K a n t .  
However Kant  does n o t ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  o f f i c i a l l y  r e c o g n iz e  th e  
em ot ions  as p a r t  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  m o r a l i t y .  A t  any r a t e
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we c a n n o t  a t t r i b u t e  moral  v a l u e  t o  a c t i o n s  m o t i v a t e d  by 
p a r e n t a l  l o v e ,  where t h e  l a t t e r  r e s u l t s  f ro m  a need i n  human 
n a t u r e .
Kant  s u g g e s t s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  a p a r e n t  can do what  he 
o ug ht  f o r  h i s  c h i l d .  He can c a r e  f o r  h e r  and r e s p e c t  h e r  
even when he does n o t  f e e l  lo v e  f o r  h e r .  Kant  s u g g e s t s ,  
m o reo ve r ,  t h a t  t h i s  i s  how a f u l l y  autonomous p a r e n t  sh o u ld  
a r r i v e  a t  h i s  moral  ju d g e m e n ts .  O t h e r w i s e ,  Kant  ( 1 7 8 5 : 1 0 5 )  
w r i t e s
. . . t h e  w i l l  does n o t  g i v e  i t s e l f  t h e  law ,  b u t  an 
a l i e n  im p u ls io n  does so th r o u g h  t h e  medium o f  t h e  
s u b j e c t ’ s own n a t u r e . . .
I t  a p p e a r s ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  some s o r t  o f  p a r e n t a l  c a r e  and
r e s p e c t  i s  due t o  a c h i l d ,  even i f  t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  be l o c a t e d
in  f e e l i n g s  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy .
However i t  i s  an odd k in d  o f  c a r i n g  and r e s p e c t  where t h e  
e m o t io n a l  e le m e n t  i s  e n t i r e l y  l a c k i n g .  I t  seems an a lo g o u s  
t o  b e in g  r e q u i r e d  t o  laugh a t  a j o k e  o u t  o f  d u ty  i n s t e a d  o f  
f i n d i n g  i t  f u n n y .  I t  i s  odd because reasons  and f e e l i n g s  
c an n o t  be s e p a r a t e d  in  t h i s  way. What a r e  we t o  make o f  t h e  
K a n t i a n  p a r e n t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  who " c a re s "  ( s i c )  f o r  h i s
c h i l d  y e t  who f e e l s  n o t h in g  bu t  h o s t i l i t y ,  c o n s t a n t  
r e s e n tm e n t  o r  e x a s p e r a t i o n  tow a rd s  her?  S i m i l a r l y  how c o u ld  
he have r e s p e c t  f o r  h e r  as a n o t h e r  person i f ,  a t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  he a lw a ys  has e n t i r e l y  t h e  o p p o s i t e  d i s r e s p e c t f u l
f e e l i n g s  tow a rd s  h e r .  I t  seems more r e a s o n a b le  t o  say t h a t  
c a r i n g  i n v o l v e s  n o t  o n l y  what  we do b u t  a l s o  t h e  s p i r i t  i n  
which we do i t .  M e r e ly  go ing  th ro u g h  t h e  m o t io n s  i s  n o t
c a r i n g  a t  a l l .  No doubt  t h e  e m o t io n a l  to n e  o f  c a r e  and
r e s p e c t  can v a r y  f rom  one person t o  a n o t h e r ,  as i t  can v a r y  
w i t h i n  t h e  same i n d i v i d u a l  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s .  A p a r e n t ,  
however ,  can n o t  d u t i f u l l y  c a r e  f o r  t h e  c h i l d  and l a c k  
c o m p l e t e l y  p o s i t i v e  f e e l i n g s  o f  sympathy .
A n o th e r  d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  Kant  i s  t o  e x p l a i n  why t h e  
r a t i o n a l  w i l l  o f  any p a r e n t  s h o u ld  chance upon, as a p r im a  
f a c i e  d u t y ,  t h e  d u ty  t o  c a r e  and make s a c r i f i c e s  f o r  t h e i r  
c h i l d r e n ,  in  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  Kant  has t o  e x p l a i n  t h e
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s o u rc e  o f  t h e  d u t y ,  i f  i t  i s  n o t  f ro m  t h e  ' s u b j e c t ’ s own 
n a t u r e ’ . I  am a r g u i n g  t h a t  p a r e n t s  make t h e  s a c r i f i c e s  t h e y  
do because o f  t h e i r  n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  and show r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  
w o r th  o f  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  ( v i z .  a c t i v e  s y m p a th y ) ;  and t h i s  
e x p l a i n s  t h e  s o u rc e  o f  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e y  o u g h t .  
F u r t h e r m o r e  i f ,  as I  am c l a i m i n g ,  a c t s  o f  a f f e c t i o n ,  c a r i n g  
and con cern  can be an e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  t h i s  n e e d ( b ) ,  more i s  
i n v o l v e d  th a n  do ing  what  one ' o u g h t ’ , in  t h e  K a n t i a n  se n s e .  
R a t h e r  what  i s  i n v o l v e d  i s  t h e  k in d  o f  c a r i n g  e x p re s s e d  when 
p a r e n t s  do a l l  t h e y  can .
One f i n a l  p o i n t  t o  s u p p o r t  my c l a i m  t h a t  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  
p a r e n t a l  lo v e  i s  an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a n e e d (b )  can be seen in  
t h e  case where t h e  p a r e n t  does n o t  lo v e  h i s  c h i l d .  The 
reason f o r  t h e  judgem ent  ' I  ought  t o  l o v e  h e r ’ i s  l i k e l y  t o  
r e f l e c t  t h e  knowledge t h a t  he has t h a t  a c t i v e  sympathy i s  
p r e v a l e n t  in  most normal p a r e n t - c h i l d  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;  i t  i s  
d i s p l a y e d  in  conduct  ( a f f e c t i o n ,  c a r e  and c o n c e r n )  w h ic h ,  
f o r  some re a s o n ,  he l a c k s  and, t h e r e b y ,  he a i l s :  i . e .  ' I  
oug ht  t o  l o v e  my c h i l d ,  b u t  t h e r e  i s  som eth ing  wrong w i t h  
me’ . I n  t h i s  sense ,  t h e  v iew  t h a t  a p a r e n t  n e e d s ( b )  t o  f e e l  
a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  h i s  c h i l d  i s  commonplace.
I t  m ig h t  be q u e r i e d  " S h o u ld n ’ t  t h e  p a r e n t  c o n s t r u e  t h e  
m a t t e r  h e re  as a s t r o n g  m o t iv e  o r  p r e s s u r e  t o  s y m p a th is e ,  
r a t h e r  th a n  h i s  l a c k i n g  a n e e d ( b ) ? “ . 144 My answer i s  a 
q u a l i f i e d  "no" .  I f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h e  normal p a r e n t ’ s l o v e  
f o r  t h e  c h i l d  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a response t o  any m e r i t  o f  
t h e  c h i l d ,  (she  may have n o n e ) ,  o r  t o  any o b s e r v a b l e  
q u a l i t i e s ,  (she  may be a d i s a g r e e a b l e  b r a t ) .  I n  such a 
c a s e ,  i t  i s  n o t  a q u a l i t y  in  t h e  c h i l d  t h a t  can be c i t e d  as  
a reason in  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r e n t ’ s l o v e .  Are  we t o  
s ay ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e  lo v e  t h e  p a r e n t  f e e l s  i s  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  
o r  m y s te r io u s ?  I  t h i n k  n o t .  We a r e  n o t  s u r p r i s e d  t h a t  
p a r e n t s  lo v e  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  no m a t t e r  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d  la c k s  
any o b v io u s  m e r i t ,  because we assume t h a t  normal human 
b e in g s  a r e  equ ipped  by t h e i r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e s  w i t h  t h e  
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  r e a c t  in  j u s t  t h a t  way tow ard s  t h e i r  own
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c h i l d r e n .  To ( g e n u i n e l y )  l a c k  such a d i s p o s i t i o n  would  be 
t o  l a c k  an i m p o r t a n t  i te m  in  o n e ’ s p s y c h o l o g i c a l  m ake-up .  
T h i s  i n  t u r n  can g i v e  r i s e  t o  a s t r o n g  m o t iv e  o r  p r e s s u r e  
t o  want  t o  s y m p a th is e .
L e t  me make t h e  p o i n t  in  a n o t h e r  way. I  am a r g u i n g  t h a t  
p a r e n t a l  lo v e  f o r  a c h i l d  i s ,  i n  p a r t ,  a m a t t e r  o f  
r e s p e c t i n g  i t s  w o r th  as a p e rso n .  I n  a t t r i b u t i n g  w o r th  t o  
t h e  c h i l d ,  we do n o t  seem t o  be a s c r i b i n g  t h i s  t o  a s e t  o f  
p r o p e r t i e s ,  r a t h e r  we a r e  e x p r e s s i n g  an a t t i t u d e  t h a t  a 
p a r e n t  needs,  (w h a t  I  am c a l l i n g  ' a c t i v e  s y m p a th y ’ ) .  T h i s  
a t t i t u d e  f o l l o w s  n a t u r a l l y  f rom  t h a t  p e r s o n ’ s p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
make-up b u t  i s  n o t  grounded on a n y t h i n g  more u l t i m a t e  th a n  
t h i s .  We f i n d  i t  i n  most p a r e n t s .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  w i t h o u t  
i t ,  t h e y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  a i l .  F u r th e r m o r e  t h e  so u rc e  o f  t h e  
p a r e n t ’ s d i s c o n t e n t  in  t h e  exam ple ,  i s  most l i k e l y  t o  be 
e x p l a i n e d  as an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  h i s  awareness t h a t  i t  i s  an 
a t t i t u d e  t h a t  p a r e n t ’ s need y e t  w h ic h ,  in  t h i s  c a s e ,  he does  
n o t  have .
The arguments  above do n o t  c o n s t i t u t e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
l o g i c a l l y  c o e r c i v e  grounds t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  case  o f  a c t i v e  
sympathy as a n e e d ( b ) .  However I  w i l l  o f f e r  more e v id e n c e  
t o  show t h a t  i t  i s ,  in  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  g r a t i t u d e  and 
l o y a l t y  t o  f o l l o w .  For  t h e  moment l e t  i t  s ta n d  as an 
e m p i r i c a l  c l a i m .
One o t h e r  p o i n t  t h a t  we s h o u ld  n o t e ,  in  p a s s in g ,  i s  t h e
g e n e r a l  unease which su r ro u n d s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  we n e e d (b )
c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g s .  We have been persu ad ed ,  I  t h i n k  q u i t e
w r o n g ly ,  t h a t  we c a n n o t  h e lp  t h e  way we f e e l .  We a r e  t h e
s l a v e s  t o  our  p a s s io n s  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e  m a s te rs  o f  them.
H . S i d g w ic k  (of) c i t : 2 3 9 )  r e f l e c t s  t h i s  v ie w  when he w r i t e s :
. . . i t  can n o t  be a s t r i c t  d u ty  t o  f e e l  an em ot io n  so 
f a r  as i t  i s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  w i t h i n  t h e  power o f  t h e  
W i l l  t o  produce i t  a t  a g iv e n  t i m e .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  we can be
t a u g h t  how t o  c o n t r o l  c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g s ,  e . g .  d e s t r u c t i v e
f e e l i n g s  l i k e  rage  and j e a l o u s y ,  and even how t o  f e e l
d i f f e r e n t l y  in  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  where f e e l i n g s  o f  t h i s  s o r t
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t y p i c a l l y  o c c u r .  I t  seems odd t o  suppose th e n  t h a t  we 
c a n n o t  s i m i l a r l y  c o n t r o l  -  and by t h i s  I  i n c l u d e  c u l t i v a t e  
i n  c h i l d r e n  -  p o s i t i v e  s e n t i m e n t s ,  such as a f e e l i n g s  o f  
a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  o t h e r  human b e in g s .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  when 
we b e l i e v e  t h a t  as a d u l t s  t h e y  n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  i n  t h i s  way 
f o r  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .  However i f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  one c a n n o t  
h e l p  t h e  way one f e e l s ,  t h a t  one can n o t  c u l t i v a t e  f e e l i n g s ,  
t h i s  does n o t  damage th e  c l a i m  t h a t  where a person l a c k s  a 
f e e l i n g  o r  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  he n e e d s ( b ) ,  th en  he a i l s .
Many o f  t h e  arguments above a p p ly  t o  o t h e r  c l o s e  f a m i l y  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where we n e e d (b )  a form  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy .  
C o n s id e r  a g a in  S a r t r e ’ s example  o f  a young man t o r n  between  
j o i n i n g  t h e  R e s is t a n c e  and c a r i n g  f o r  h i s  e l d e r l y  m o th e r .  
L e t  us assume t h i s  t im e  t h a t  t h e  s t u d e n t  chooses t o  s t a y  
w i t h  h i s  e l d e r l y  m other .  I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  be based ( c a u s a l l y  n o t  l o g i c a l l y )  upon f e e l i n g s  
o f  a c t i v e  sympathy t h a t  he has f o r  h i s  p a r e n t . 145 One o f  
t h e s e  may w e l l  be t h e  r e s p e c t  he has f o r  h e r ,  i n  t h e  sense
t h a t  we have t i e d  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  r e s p e c t i n g  h e r  w o r th  as a
p e r s o n .  When t h i n k i n g  o f  h e r  in  t h i s  way he w i l l  n o t
n e c e s s a ry  a s c r i b e  t h e  ' w o r t h ’ he f e e l s  t o  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o r  p r o p e r t y ;  v i z .  t h a t  she i s  o l d  and a i l i n g ,  o r  t h a t  she i s  
v u l n e r a b l e  in  occ u p ied  F ra n c e ,  and so on. The a c t i v e
sympathy t h a t  he has f o r  h i s  m other  can be,  in  a sen se ,  
g r o u n d le s s .  C h i l d r e n  t o o  a r e  a b l e  t o  lo v e  t h e i r  p a r e n t s  in  
a g r o u n d le s s  and u l t i m a t e  way because,  we assume, t h e y  a r e  
eq u ip p e d  by t h e i r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e s  w i t h  t h e  c a p a c i t i e s  
and d i s p o s i t i o n s  t o  do so. The r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h e r  w o r th  
shows i t s e l f  in  h i s  re g a r d  f o r  h e r  as someone who i s  more 
t h a n  m e r e ly  an i n s t r u m e n t  t o  h i s  ( t h e  s o n ’ s )  w e l f a r e ;  i t  
shows i t s e l f  in  t h e  s t r o n g  f e e l i n g  o f  a f f e c t i o n  t h a t  he has  
f o r  h e r ,  and so on. However t h e r e  seems t o  be more t o  t h e  
m a t t e r  th a n  t h i s .
The e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s o n ’ s response may i n c l u d e  a l s o  
some acc o u n t  o f  th e  need he f e e l s  t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  f o r  t h e  
c a r e ,  concern  and a f f e c t i o n  t h a t  h i s  m other  has shown t o
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him. When we r e c o g n iz e  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  a n o t h e r  person  t o  
a c t  f o r  o u r  w e l l - b e i n g ,  we have a t e n d en cy  t o  c a r e  f o r  
t h e i r ’ s in  r e t u r n .  The b a s ic  i d e a  h e re  i s  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y .  
We have a te n d e n c y  t o  r e t u r n  in  k in d  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s a c t i v e  
sympathy to w a rd s  us. I f  t h e  son responds in  t h i s  way, t h e  
son i s  l i k e l y  t o  be acknow ledg ing  t h a t  h i s  m other  i s  someone 
who has shown t h a t  she v a lu e s  o r  c a r e s  f o r  him, t h a t  she i s  
someone who has a c te d  f o r  h i s  b e n e f i t  and w i t h  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  
in  mind,  t h a t  she i s  someone who has s a c r i f i c e d  a c o n s i d e r ­
a b l e  amount f o r  him, and so f o r t h .  I  hope t o  show s h o r t l y  
t h a t  t h i s  to o  can be a form o f  a c t i v e  sympathy .
By t h i s  I  am n o t  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  t h e  s o n ’ s concern  f o r  
h i s  m other  i s  due s o l e l y  t o  a need he has t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  f o r  
h i s  m o t h e r ’ s e a r l i e r  a c t i o n s  f o r  h i s  good. I  have argued  
t h a t  any person n e e d s ( a )  th e  c a p a c i t y  t o  respond w i t h  a c t i v e  
sympathy t o  th e  needs o f  o t h e r  persons i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  
t h o u g h t  t h a t  he has o r  w i l l  b e n e f i t  f rom them. I n  e v e r y d a y  
l i f e ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  we have t o  s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  respond t o  t h e  
needs o f  a n o t h e r  t r a n s f e r s  e a s i l y  t o  s t r a n g e r s ,  t o  whom we 
f e e l  no need t o  r e c i p r o c a t e .  When d r i v i n g  a lo n g  in  a c a r  
i f  we were t o  see a s t u d e n t  l y i n g  in  t h e  m id d le  o f  t h e  road  
ahead ,  we would no t  c o n s id e r  w he ther  o r  n o t  t h e  s t u d e n t  i s  
someone f rom  whom we have o r  w i l l  b e n e f i t ,  b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  
t o  s to p  t h e  c a r .  I f  we see someone in  danger  o f  d ro w n in g ,  
b e f o r e  go ing  t o  h i s  a i d  we a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  ask w h e th e r  o r  
n o t  we have o r  w i l l  b e n e f i t  f rom do ing  so.  The f a m i l i a r i t y  
o f  t h i s  k in d  o f  example  sug gests  t h a t  we a t t a c h  a v a l u e  o r  
w o r th  t o  t h e  l i f e  o r  w e l l - b e i n g  o f  any p e rs o n ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  need t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  and no m a t t e r  what  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  
q u a l i t i e s  ( e . g .  moral c h a r a c t e r )  may be o f  t h a t  p e rs o n .  I  
am s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  we e x p l a i n  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  we have t o  
a t t a c h  w o r th  t o  o t h e r s  s im p ly  in  te rm s o f  a c a p a c i t y  f o r  
sympathy in  human n a t u r e .  N o n e th e le s s  we do have a l s o  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  r e t u r n  in  k in d  t h e  a c t i v e  sympathy shown t o  
us. I n  many cas es ,  as we s h a l l  see ,  t h e  r e c i p r o c i t y  we show 
a l s o  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  terms o f  a c t i v e  sympathy.
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The c a p a c i t y  we have t o  be moved by a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s 
needs and t o  respond t o  t h e i r  a c t i v e  sympathy to w a rd s  us,  
a r e  p o w e r f u l  m o t iv e  f o r c e s .  Our f e e l i n g s  o f  c a r e ,  c o n c e r n ,  
and a f f e c t i o n ,  t h e  v a l u e  we a t t a c h  t o  human w o r t h ,  t h e  need  
t o  r e c i p r o c a t e ,  a r e  t h e  k in d  o f  t i e s  t h a t  i n  f a c t  b in d  
p e o p le  and m o t i v a t e  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .  They a r e  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  
n e e d (b )  t o  show a c t i v e  sympathy t h a t  i s  e x p re s s e d  i n  t h e  
k i n d s  o f  reasons  we g i v e  in  t h e  moral judgem ents  we make.
None o f  t h i s  i s  t o  say t h a t  our  n e e d (b )  f o r  a c t i v e  
sympathy e n t a i l s  c e r t a i n  moral ju d g e m e n ts .  I t  i s  o b v io u s ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  sympathy shown tow ard s  one i n d i v i d u a l  may 
l e a d  us t o  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a t  t h e  expense o f  o t h e r s  
i n  a way t h a t  i s  m o r a l l y  o f f e n s i v e .  As I .M u r d o c h  ( 1 9 7 0 : 7 5 )  
n o t e s :
. . . h u m a n  lo v e  i s  n o r m a l ly  t o o  p o s s e s s iv e .
M o r e o v e r ,  i f  someone s a i d  "Though t h e  s t u d e n t  needs t o  show 
a c t i v e  sympathy t o  h i s  m o th er ,  he oug ht  n o t  t o  do so because  
t h e  needs o f  t h e  R e s is t a n c e  a r e  w e i g h t i e r " ,  we would u n d e r ­
s t a n d  what  t h e  s p e a k e r  i s  a d v o c a t i n g .  He i s  n o t  s a y in g  
som eth ing  t h a t  i s  n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ,  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  o r  
i n  some o t h e r  way r a t i o n a l l y  i n c o h e r e n t .  However i f  we d i d  
n o t  have such an e x p l a n a t i o n ,  in  te rm s  o f  o t h e r  p u t a t i v e l y  
w e i g h t i e r  needs,  we would n o t  u n d e rs ta n d  what  i t  would  mean 
t o  say t h a t  ' h i s  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  h i s  m o t h e r ’ i s  n o t  t h e  
w e i g h t i e s t  reason f o r  a judgem ent  c o n c e r n in g  what  t h e  
s t u d e n t  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do.
L e t  me co n c lu d e  by p u l l i n g  some o f  t h e  argum ents  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r  a l i t t l e  c l o s e r  t o g e t h e r .  I  have argued  t h a t  a l l  
perso ns  have c e r t a i n  f i x e d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  On t h e  one 
hand,  we have p e rs o n a l  needs such as t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  
f o r  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  ( e . g .  r e c o g n i t i o n  by o t h e r s  and 
a sense o f  b e l o n g i n g ) ,  f o r  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  a sense o f  
u n i t y  in  o u r  l i v e s ,  f o r  p l e a s u r a b l e  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  and so on.  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, we have o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  needs f o r  p a s s iv e  
and a c t i v e  sympathy .  The l a t t e r  can be r e c o g n iz e d  when, in
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o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r  p e rs o n s ,  we respond t o  t h e i r  
n e e d s .
I  w ant  t o  em phas ize  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  n o t  ' m o r a l ’ b u t  
' p s y c h o l o g i c a l ’ needs.  S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  s e l f - i d e n t i t y ,  
e t c .  a r e  n o t  n o t i o n s  p e c u l i a r  t o  m o r a l i t y .  Any more t h a n ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  co n cep t  o f  ' c a u s a t i o n ’ which i s  c e n t r a l  t o  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  p o is o n ,  makes ' c a u s a t i o n ’ a c o n c e p t  p e c u l i a r  
t o  b i o c h e m i s t r y .  The r e l a t i o n  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  o t h e r  way 
round .  Mora l  b e l i e f s ,  l i k e  th o s e  we have i n  many o t h e r  
f i e l d s ,  presuppose  t h a t  a person has c e r t a i n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b ) .  I  am c l a i m i n g ,  however ,  t h a t  we can 
u n d e r s ta n d  many o f  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  b e l i e f s  as ways o f  
m e e t in g  t h e s e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  Many o f  our  commonsense 
moral  b e l i e f s  presuppose t h a t  a l l  persons  have c e r t a i n  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  and t h a t  by a c t i n g  upon o u r  
moral  b e l i e f s  we s a t i s f y  th e s e  needs.
I t  w i l l  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  we 
can a c c o u n t  f o r  our  o r d i n a r y  moral b e l i e f s  a lo n g  t h e s e  
l i n e s .  N o r m a l l y ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  moral  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  most o f  
o u r  a c t u a l  judgem ents  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we s ta n d  in  a q u i t e  
s p e c i f i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  o t h e r  p e rso n s .  The k in d s  o f
r e l a t i o n s  I  have in  mind i n c l u d e  ( a )  s h o r t  t e rm  p e r s o n - t o -  
person  r e l a t i o n s h i p s , such as casua l  a c q u a i n t a n c e s h i p s ,  e . g .  
w i t h  a shop a s s i s t a n t .  T y p i c a l l y ,  t h e  moral  judgem en ts  we 
make in  such c o n t e x t s  i n v o l v e  t h i n g s  l i k e  g r a t i t u d e ,  
t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  e t c .  ( b )  We have more long te rm  p e r s o n - t o -  
person  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  l i k e  th o s e  we have in  a f a m i l y  o r  a 
f r i e n d s h i p  o r ,  pe rh a p s ,  between a t u t o r  and a s t u d e n t .  
E t h i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  reasons h e re  i n c l u d e  t h i n g s  l i k e  
l o y a l t y  and p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g .  F i n a l l y  t h e r e  a r e  ( c )  l a r g e r  
s c a l e  a t t a c h m e n t s  e . g .  t o  an e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  a
b u s in e s s  e n t e r p r i s e ,  a p o l i t i c a l  movement, a c o u n t r y ,  e t c .
A t y p i c a l  e t h i c a l  f e a t u r e  in  reasons h e r e  i s  j u s t i c e ,  
f a i r n e s s ,  e t c .  I t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  such moral  b e l i e f s
c o u ld  be a n a ly z e d  in  te rm s  o f  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b ) .  The burden  
o f  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r  w i l l  be t o  show how t h e s e  o t h e r  moral
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c o n c e p ts  can be a cc ounted  f o r  i n  te rm s  o f  needs .  F o r  o u r  
p u rp o s e s ,  i t  must s u f f i c e  t o  show how t h e  needs t h e s i s  
a p p l i e s  i n  j u s t  f i v e  exa m p les ,  v i z .  g r a t i t u d e ,  l o y a l t y ,  
t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  p r o m i s in g ,  and j u s t i c e .
CHAPTER S IX
MORAL BELIEFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS
We b e l i e v e  t h a t  we have a moral  d u t y  t o  show g r a t i t u d e ,  
t o  be l o y a l  t o  o u r  f a m i l y  and f r i e n d s ,  t o  t e l l  t h e  t r u t h ,  t o  
keep p r o m is e s ,  t o  be j u s t  ( i n  t h e  sense o f  b e in g  f a i r ) ,  e t c .  
Such b e l i e f s  a r e  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  commonsense m o r a l i t y .  I f  
my needs t h e s i s  i s  t o  make any c l a i m  a t  b e in g  a p l a u s i b l e  
a c c o u n t ,  I  have t o  show t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t h e s e  b e l i e f s  can be 
e x p l i c a t e d  in  te rm s  o f  i t .  I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  
show t h a t  t h e y  can .  I  w i l l  p o i n t  o u t  a l s o  why my 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  s h o u ld  be p r e f e r r e d  t o  o t h e r  a c c o u n ts  o f  
them.
I n  s e c t i o n  ( 1 )  we w i l l  c o n s id e r  K a n t ’ s v ie w  t h a t  
g r a t i t u d e  i s  a h o ly  d u t y  and c o n t r a s t  t h i s ,  i n  ( 2 ) ,  w i t h  my 
a c c o u n t  o f  g r a t i t u d e  based upon m e e t in g  c e r t a i n  needs .  I n  
( 3 )  I  w i l l  show t h a t  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  we oug ht  t o  be l o y a l  t o  
a f r i e n d  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  te rm s  o f  n e e d s ( b ) .  I n  ( 4 ) ,  I  
w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h r e e  a cc o u n ts  o f  p r o m i s in g .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  p r o m is e - k e e p in g  can n o t  be j u s t i f i e d  in  te rm s  o f  
a n a t u r a l  m o t i v a t i o n  bu t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  an a r t i f i c i a l  v i r t u e .  
I  w i l l  show some o f  t h e  f l a w s  in  t h i s  ap p ro ach .  S e c o n d ly ,  
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  in  t h e  a c t  o f  p r o m is in g  t h e r e  i s  a l o g i c a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between f a c t  and v a l u e ;  and t h i r d l y ,  t h e  v iew  
t h a t  moral  p r a c t i c e s  can d i f f e r  in  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  t o  
p r o m i s in g .  I n  ( 5 )  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  moral  p r a c t i c e s  o f  
l y i n g  o r  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ;  i . e .  
t h e r e  i s  n o t  a l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  h e re  between f a c t  and 
v a l u e .  However ,  in  ( 6 ) ,  I  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  t h e  needs t h a t  
u n d e r l i e  t h e  co n c e p t  o f  p r o m is in g .  T h i s  i n d i c a t e s ,  i n  t u r n ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l i m i t  t o  t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  t h a t  human moral  
p r a c t i c e s  can t a k e  and t h a t  one such l i m i t a t i o n  i s  on a 
g e n e r a l  p r a c t i c e  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g .  I n  t h e  n e x t  two  
s e c t i o n s  we w i l l  c o n s id e r  t h e  needs i n v o l v e d  i n  o u r  sense o f  
j u s t i c e .  I n  ( 7 )  I  w i l l  o u t l i n e  J . R a w l s ’ ( 1 9 7 2 )  d e c i s i o n  
p ro c e d u re  w i t h  which he a r r i v e s  a t  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e .  
I  w i l l  summarize a l s o  R a w ls ’ m o t i v a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  which i s
c l a i m e d  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  o u r  sense o f  j u s t i c e ;  i t  i s  based  
upon s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and r e c i p r o c i t y .  T h i s  p r e s e n t s  a p rob lem  
f o r  my t h e s i s  f o r ,  we n o te d ,  i t  su g g es ts  t h a t  t h e  need f o r  
sympathy i s  i r r e l e v a n t  in  an acc o u n t  o f  t h i s  q u i t e  
fu n d a m e n ta l  moral  c o n c e p t .  I n  ( 8 )  I  hope t o  show t h a t  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  has t o  be supp lem ented  by t h e  need 
f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy in  an a d e q u a te  acc o u n t  o f  a sense o f  
j u s t i c e .  F i n a l l y ,  in  ( 9 ) ,  I  want  t o  m ent io n  some m a jo r  
prob lem s f o r  my needs t h e s i s .
Kant  on t h e  d u ty  o f  g r a t i t u d e
G r a t i t u d e  i s  n o t  much d is c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
1 i t e r a t u r e . 148 Kant  ( 1 7 9 7 : 1 2 3 )  m en t io n s  i t .  He d e f i n e s  
g r a t i t u d e  as
. . . h o n o u r i n g  a person because o f  a k in d n e s s  he has 
done us.
He m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a d e b t  o f  honour .  M o re o v e r ,  Kant
( i b i d ) w r i t e s :
. . . t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  i t  c a n n o t  be 
d is c h a r g e d  c o m p l e t e l y  by any a c t  in  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  (so  t h a t  no m a t t e r  what  he does t h e  
person who i s  under  o b l i g a t i o n  a lw a ys  rem ains  under  
o b i i  g a t i o n ) .
I f  I  a c c e p t  a k in d n e s s ,  f o r  which g r a t i t u d e  i s  t h e  
o b l i g a t o r y  respo nse ,  I  c o n t r a c t  a d e b t  which I  can n e v e r  
r e p a y .  For  I  can n e v e r  p u t  m y s e l f  on equa l  te rm s  w i t h  t h e  
person  who has c o n f e r r e d  th e  k in d n e ss  on me. He has ,  as i t  
w e re ,  s t o l e n  a march on me. I f  I  do him a f a v o u r  i n  r e t u r n  
I  am o n l y  r e t u r n i n g  g u id  pro  q u o . But t h e  donor had no such  
o b l i g a t i o n .  He a c t e d  f r e e l y  in  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  S in c e  h i s  
f i r s t  f a v o u r  was f r e e l y  g i v e n ,  I  s h a l l  a lw a ys  owe him an 
a d d i t i o n a l  d e b t  f o r  t h i s .  T h i s  d e b t  i s  u n d i s c h a r g e a b l e .  
And who wants  a d e b t  l i k e  t h a t ?
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  argument  a r e  even more gloomy.  
S in c e  most p e o p le  t h i n k  t h a t ,  l i k e  e v e r y o n e ,  I  am due t h e  
m in im al  d e c e n c i e s ,  f o r  which I  sho u ld  be g r a t e f u l ,  I  seem t o  
be f o r  e v e r  in  t h e  u n d is c h a r g e a b le  d e b t  o f  o t h e r s .  And my 
d e b t  w i l l  be g r e a t e s t  t o  th o s e  w i t h  whom I  am most d e e p ly
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i n v o l v e d ,  l i k e  f r i e n d s ,  o r ,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  my w i f e .  ( I t  i s  n o t  
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  Kant  n ev er  m a r r i e d . )
We m ig h t  t r y  t o  s o f t e n  th e  blow by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e
s o r t s  o f  d e b t  w h ic h ,  n o r m a l l y ,  we would say c o n f e r  r i g h t s  on
a c r e d i t o r  o r  b e n e f a c t o r ,  f rom  th o s e  which do n o t .  T h i s  i s
a t a c t i c  C .C ard  employs.  She w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 0 )
. . . a  b e n e f i c i a r y ’ s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  d i f f e r  f rom  
th o s e  o f  a b o r ro w er  o r  c o n t r a c t e e .  The T a t t e r ’ s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  r e t u r n  what was borrowed o r  t o  
f u l f i l  th e  c o n t r a c t . . .  The b e n e f a c t o r  does n o t  have  
a r i g h t  t o  o n e ’ s a c t i n g  in  accordance  w i t h  them ( t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a b e n e f i c i a r y )  bu t  o n l y  des e rv e s  
i t .
On t h e  one hand, d eb ts  can be f o r m a l .  I n  t h i s  sen se ,  
b o r ro w e rs  o f  money, l i b r a r y  books, e t c . ,  commit th em se lves  
t o  r e p a y in g  t h e i r  d e b ts ,  o r  r e t u r n i n g  what  i s  borrowed.  
R e v e r t i n g  t o  our  e a r l i e r  exam ple ,  s i n c e  in  o r d e r  t o  borrow  
t h e  money, Smith  promised t o  repay Jones,  t h e  l a t t e r  has a 
r i g h t  t o  demand t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  S m i t h ’ s p a r t  o f  t h e i r  
ag reem ent .  ( O f t e n ,  in  th e s e  c o n t e x t s ,  t h e  c r e d i t o r  o r  
l e n d e r  has a l e g a l  r i g h t  a g a i n s t  th e  b o r r o w e r . )  By r e p a y in g  
Jones,  Smith  d is c h a r g e s  t h a t  o b l i g a t i o n  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
in  which he i n c u r r e d  t h e  d e b t  i s  t e r m i n a t e d .  Now we can 
d i s t i n g u i s h  t h i s  sense o f  d e b t  f rom a w eaker ,  l e s s  f o r m a l ,  
one.  U n l i k e  l i t e r a l  d e b ts ,  in  t h e  in fo r m a l  case we g i v e  t h e  
b e n e f a c t o r  n o t  what he has a r i g h t  t o  bu t  what he d e s e r v e s .  
To see t h i s  c o n s i d e r ,  by a n a lo g y ,  t h e  case where Jones  
i n v i t e s  Smith  t o  d i n n e r  ( w i t h  no i n t e n t i o n  o f  demanding  
a n y t h i n g  in  r e t u r n ) .  In  some sense,  Jones may be owed a 
r e t u r n  i n v i t a t i o n . We would no t  say t h a t  he has a r i g h t  t o  
one.  However we m ig h t  say t h a t  Jones des e rv e s  a r e t u r n  
i n v i t a t i o n .  Can we und ers ta nd  *a d e b t  o f  g r a t i t u d e ’ in  t h i s  
i n f o r m a l  way?
L e t  us ask ,  f i r s t ,  how t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  h e lp s  us o u t  o f  
t h e  o d d i t y  suggested  by K a n t ’ s t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  m a t t e r .  The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  s e rv e s  in  th e  f o l l o w i n g  way. I f  we re g a r d  a l l  
g i f t s  o r  f a v o u r s  as c r e a t i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s  l i k e  t h e  bond o f  a 
d e b t o r  t o  a c r e d i t o r ,  th en  we may w o rry  i f ,  l i k e  K an t ,  we
268
r e g a r d  them as u n d is c h a r g e a b le .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  we 
r e g a r d  a d e b t  o f  g r a t i t u d e  as an in f o r m a l  d e b t  th e n  t h i s  
c o n f e r s  no fo r m a l  r i g h t s  on t h e  b e n e f a c t o r .  For  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a r y ’ s g r a t i t u d e  i s  n o t  som eth ing  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  has 
a r i g h t  t o  b u t  som eth ing  he d e s e r v e s .  I n  r e t u r n  f o r  th e  
i n i t i a l  a c t  o f  k in d n e s s ,  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  d e s e rv e s  th e  
r e c i p i e n t ’ s g r a t i t u d e .  We m ig h t  n o t  w o rry  und u ly  then  i f ,  
as Kant  s a y s ,  a d e b t  l i k e  t h i s  can not  be f u l l y  d is c h a r g e d .
However I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  answer i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  as an account  o f  g r a t i t u d e ,  i t  l e t s  t h e  
e n t i t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  'w e a r  t h e  t r o u s e r s ’ . 147 T h is  
b l u r s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  c l e a r e s t  s o r t  o f  cas es ,  
a c t s  o f  ben evo lence  t o  which g r a t i t u d e  i s  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
response  a r e  g iv e n  f r e e l y .  L e t  us suppose t h a t  Sm ith  g iv e s  
som eth ing  t o  Jones,  a s k in g  f o r  n o t h in g  in  r e t u r n ,  and Jones  
f a i l s  t o  e x p re s s  any g r a t i t u d e  a t  a l l .  S i n c e ,  on th e  
a cc o u n t  above,  Smith  des e rv e s  g r a t i t u d e ,  he can r e a s o n a b ly  
r e g r e t  h i s  b e n e v o le n c e .  T h is  i s  how C .C ard  sees t h e  m a t t e r .  
Not  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  e x p r e s s io n  o f  g r a t i t u d e ,  she 
s u g g e s ts ,  (op  c i t : 1 2 0 )
. . . m i g h t  g i v e  ( t h e i r )  b e n e f a c t o r s  r e a s o n a b le  cause
t o  r e g r e t  th e  r e l e v a n t  good t u r n s .
Y e t  i f  Smith  co m pla ins  o r  r e g r e t s  h i s  a c t  o f  b en e v o le n c e ,  
w o u ld n ’ t  we remind him t h a t  he gave h i s  g i f t  f r e e l y ,  w i t h  no 
s t r i n g s  a t t a c h e d ,  n o t  in  o r d e r  t o  r e c e i v e  som eth ing  in  
r e t u r n ?  T h i s  sug gests  t h a t  t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s g r a t i t u d e ,  
though u s u a l ,  i s  someth ing o v e r - a n d -a b o v e  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  someone who g iv e s  someth ing f r e e l y .  Most o f  
us would a r g u e ,  a l s o ,  t h a t  Smith  sho u ld  c o n t i n u e  t o  do such 
t h i n g s  f o r  o t h e r s  even i f  he n ev er  r e c e i v e d  a g r a t e f u l  
respo nse .  T h i s  sug ges ts  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  o f  b e ing  someth ing  
de s e rv e d  by t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  (som eth in g  he des e rv e s  as a 
r e t u r n  f o r  h i s  k i n d n e s s ) ,  shou ld  n o t  have such a c e n t r a l  
p l a c e  in  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  con cep t  o f  g r a t i t u d e .  To see 
what i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  we need t o  answer th e  
q u e s t i o n :  'Why ought  a person t o  be g r a t e f u l ? ’
The K a n t ia n  answer i s  t h a t  t h i s  o b l i g a t i o n ,  l i k e  any 
o b l i g a t i o n ,  i s  t o  be met p u r e l y  f rom  a sense o f  d u t y . 148 But  
i t  seems odd t o  be g r a t e f u l  m e re ly  o u t  o f  d u t y .  S u r e l y ,  as 
we s a i d  e a r l i e r  abo u t  c a r e  and r e s p e c t ,  do ing  i t  m e r e ly  f rom  
a sense o f  d u ty  b e t r a y s  a la c k  o f  g r a t i t u d e .  For  b e ing  
g r a t e f u l  n o t  o n l y  r e q u i r e s  a spoken u t t e r a n c e  l i k e  "Thank  
you " ,  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  i t  i s  g iv e n  in  t h e  r i g h t  s p i r i t .  I  
am n o t  o b l i g a t e d  m e re ly  t o  e x p re ss  g r a t i t u d e .  I  am supposed  
t o  f e e l  i t .  I  must ,  in  some measure,  be ' t r u l y  g r a t e f u l ’ . 
I n  t h i s  sense ,  one does no t  show i t  i f  o n e ’ s h e a r t  i s  n o t  in  
i t ;  r a t h e r ,  one f e i g n s  g r a t i t u d e .  I t  seems, t h e n ,  t h a t  t o  
meet t h e  moral r e q u i r e m e n t  one needs n o t  o n l y  t o  e x p re s s  
g r a t i t u d e ,  one needs t o  f e e l  i t .
I t  m ig h t  be asked:  i s  th e  d u ty  t o  f e e l  g r a t i t u d e  a lw ays  
p o s s i b l e  t o  per fo rm ? My answer i s  a q u a l i f i e d  " y e s " .  To 
see t h i s ,  we have t o  see how g r a t i t u d e ,  under  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  te rm s  o f  t h e  n e e d s ( a )  and
( b )  o f  pe rso ns .
G r a t i t u d e  as a n e e d (b )
We must beg in  by c o n s i d e r i n g  th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which  
we would  n o r m a l ly  say t h a t  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  e x p re s s  
g r a t i t u d e .  N o r m a l ly ,  we e x p re s s  g r a t i t u d e  as t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
r e c e i v i n g  a g i f t ,  a k in d n e s s ,  o r  f o r  a n o t h e r ’ s sympathy,  f o r  
t h e i r  h e l p ,  f o r  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  and e n c o u rag em en t , and f o r  any 
number o f  o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  one person does f o r  a n o t h e r .  
However such an e x p r e s s io n  i s  n o t  a r e q u i r e d  response m e re ly  
because a n o th e r  person has done someth ing which b e n e f i t s  us.
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  b e n e f i t  was 
in te n d e d  by t h e  b e n e f a c t o r .  Where a b e n e f i t  i s  r e c e iv e d  and 
t h e r e  i s  no such i n t e n t i o n  then  g r a t i t u d e ,  e i t h e r  f e l t  o r  
e x p re s s e d ,  does no t  seem t o  be due. Suppose t h a t  Smith  
does som eth ing  which b e n e f i t s  Jones b u t  t h a t  Sm ith  i s  f o r c e d  
t o  do so,  o r  does so under some s o r t  o f  d u re s s .  I n  th e s e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  we would no t  say "Jones ought  t o  f e e l  g r a t e f u l  
t o  Sm ith"  o r  t h a t  "Smith i s  due J o n e s ’ g r a t i t u d e " .  I f  Smith
270
g i v e s  som eth ing  t o  Jones because he has been f o r c e d  t o  do so 
by Brown th en  t h e  m o r a l l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  response  i s  n o t  
g r a t i t u d e  b u t  f o r  Jones t o  r e t u r n  “t h e  g i f t "  ( s i c )  t o  S m i th .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  Jones b e n e f i t s  f rom  Smith  in  a way t h a t  Smith  
d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  so t h a t  Smith  r e g r e t s  o r  r e s e n t s  J o n e s ’ good 
f o r t u n e  a t  h i s  expense ,  o r  i f  Smith  i s  i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  he i s  t h e  cause o f  J o n e s ’ good f o r t u n e ,  th e n  Jones may 
be p l e a s e d ,  b u t  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  Jones ought  t o  f e e l  o r  
e x p r e s s  g r a t i t u d e  t o  Smith  in  th e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
S e c o n d ly ,  th e  r e c i p i e n t  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
b e n e f a c t o r ’ s i n t e n t i o n  i s  t o  g i v e  someth ing t h a t  he ,  t h e  
b e n e f a c t o r ,  r e g a rd s  as be ing  o f  v a l u e  t o  t h e  r e c i p i e n t .  The 
b e n e f a c t o r  must be assumed t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  
r e q u i r e s  o r  in  some way w i l l  g a in  f rom  t h e  g i f t ,  h e lp  o r  
s e r v i c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  Jones b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Smith  
( t h e  d on or )  r e g a rd s  h i s  g i f t  t o  be harm fu l  ( f o r  J o n e s ) ,  o r  
t h a t  Jones w i l l  n o t  l i k e  i t ,  then  i t  would n o t  be counted  as 
som eth ing  f o r  which J o n e s ’ g r a t i t u d e  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  
resp o n se .  However,  as we s h a l l  see ,  th e  g i f t  o r  s e r v i c e  
does n o t  have t o  be something t h a t  Jones a c t u a l l y  w an ts ,  o r  
i s  g l a d  t o  have,  o r  which does in  f a c t  b e n e f i t  him. The 
p o i n t  i s ,  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  must t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s .
T h i r d l y ,  th e  b e n e f a c t o r ’ s i n t e n t i o n  in  g i v i n g  someth ing  
o f  v a l u e  must be w i t h o u t  h i s  w a n t in g  o r  demanding a n y t h i n g  
f ro m  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  in  r e t u r n .  We s a i d ,  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  
c l e a r e s t  cas es ,  t h e  g i f t  f o r  which i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  
e x p re s s  g r a t i t u d e  is  f r e e .  I t  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Smith  does  
som eth ing  f o r  Jones n o t  in  o r d e r  t o  g e t  som eth ing  in  r e t u r n  
t h a t  makes us say Jones ought  t o  be g r a t e f u l .
J o n e s ’ g r a t i t u d e  r i g h t l y  d i s s o l v e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  he 
d i s c o v e r s  t h a t  S m i t h ’ s m o t iv e  f o r  t h e  g i f t  was s im p ly  f o r  
t h e  l a t t e r ’ s own rew ard .  Most commercial  o r  o t h e r
c o n t r a c t u a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a r e  l i k e  t h i s ;  i . e .  a c t i o n s  a r e  
p e r fo r m e d ,  o r  t h i n g s  g i v e n ,  w i t h  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  
on t h e  i n v e s t m e n t .  I f  Smith  r e n d e rs  Jones such a s e r v i c e ,  
Jones does n o t  owe Smith  g r a t i t u d e  b u t  h i s  p a r t  o f  th e
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b a r g a i n .  As a c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t y  Jones ought  t o  f u l f i l  h i s  
p a r t  o f  t h e  d e a l .  T h is  i s  n o t  t o  say t h a t  g r a t i t u d e  i s  
a lw a y s  o u t  o f  p l a c e  in  a commercial  t r a n s a c t i o n .  Q u i t e
o f t e n  p e o p le  a c c e p t  u n f a v o u r a b le  te rm s  in  a c o n t r a c t  in
o r d e r  t o  h e l p  t h e  o t h e r  person .  When t h i s  happens,  we t h i n k  
t h a t  an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  g r a t i t u d e  i s  c a l l e d  f o r .
O t h e r  com parab le  cases where we do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t
g r a t i t u d e  i s  r e q u i r e d  i n c l u d e  th o se  where t h e  d o n o r ’ s 
u l t e r i o r  m o t iv e  i s  t o  o b l i g a t e  t h e  donee, o r  t o  d e m o n s tra te  
h i s  w e a l t h  o r  h i s  power, o r  where he i s  m e r e ly  i n d u l g i n g  in  
a c h a r i t a b l e  a c t  f o r  h i s  own en joym ent  o r  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  
own s e l f - e s t e e m .  ( O f t e n  Band-Aid  c o n c e r t s  and o t h e r  
' o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  be c h a r i t a b l e ’ seem t o  be l i k e  t h i s . )  Of  
c o u rs e  t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  f r e q u e n t l y  ex p re s s  t h e i r  g r a t i t u d e .  
I n  cases  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  however,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  somewhat  
m is p la c e d .  I t  i s  m is p la ced  where th e  m o t iv e  f o r  t h e  a c t  i s  
t h e  b e n e f a c t o r ’ s ego t r i p ,  o r  t o  d e m o n stra te  h i s  w e a l t h  and 
power r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  poor  and p o w e r le s s ,  e t c .  M is p la c e d  
g r a t i t u d e  i s  u s u a l l y  t h o u g h t  t o  be ha rm le s s .  However i t  may 
i n d i c a t e  a la c k  o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r  p eo p le  on t h e  p a r t  o f  
t h e  donor and, as i m p o r t a n t l y ,  where t h i s  m o t iv e  i s  known t o  
t h e  r e c i p i e n t ,  a la c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t  on h i s  p a r t .
So much, t h e n ,  f o r  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  when i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  a person t o  f e e l  and exp re ss  g r a t i t u d e .  Where do 
' n e e d s ’ f i t  i n t o  t h e  p i c t u r e ?  The c o n d i t i o n s  above -  v i z .  
t h e  r e c i p i e n t  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  b e n e f a c t o r ’ s i n t e n t i o n  
,is t o  f r e e l y  g i v e  something t h a t  he re g a r d s  as b e ing  o f  
v a l u e  t o  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  -  show t h a t  g r a t i t u d e  i s  n o t  s im p ly  
t h e  r e q u i t a l  f o r  b e n e f i t s  r e c e i v e d .  I t  i s  a response t o  a 
c e r t a i n  k in d  o f  a c t ;  one t h a t  t h e  donee b e l i e v e s  i s  
m o t i v a t e d  by th e  d e s i r e  o f  th e  donor t o  h e lp  o r  t o  b e n e f i t  
him ( t h e  d o n e e ) ,  f o r  t h e  T a t t e r ’ s sak e .  I n  i t s  parad igm  
ca s e ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  g r a t i t u d e  appears  t o  be t h e  response  
o f  a b e n e f i c i a r y  t o  what  he b e l i e v e s  i s  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s 
d e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy towards  him.
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We can be more p r e c i s e  about  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  
o f  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  when he f e e l s  g r a t e f u l .  When he f e e l s  
g r a t e f u l ,  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  i s  respo nd ing  t o  a n o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l  
whom he b e l i e v e s  a c t e d  f o r  h i s  ( t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s )  b e n e f i t  and 
w i t h  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  in  mind. T h is  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  when a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount o f  s a c r i f i c e  o r  con cess io n  has been 
shown which t h e  donor has been w i l l i n g  t o  f o r g o  a t  h i s  own 
c o s t  o r  in c o n v e n ie n c e .  At  t h e  same t i m e ,  a f e e l i n g  o f  
g r a t i t u d e  i n d i c a t e s  a l s o  t h a t  th e  r e c i p i e n t  has a c e r t a i n  
r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  donor .  The fo rm e r  can not  f e e l  g r a t i t u d e  y e t  
look  upon t h e  donor as someone who was f o r c e d  t o ,  o r  who 
j u s t  happened t o  have bestowed b e n e f i t s .  A t  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t ,  
by f e e l i n g  g r a t e f u l  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  shows h i m s e l f  t o  re g a r d  
t h e  donor as someone who i s  more th an  m e re ly  an i n s t r u m e n t  
t o  h i s ,  t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s ,  w e l f a r e .
T h i s  sug ges ts  t h a t  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  our  f e e l i n g  o f  
g r a t i t u d e  i s  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  t o  a n o t h e r ’ s 
d e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy tow ards  us. For  where th e  
r e c i p i e n t  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  donor ,  on h i s  own v o l i t i o n ,  
chose t o  g i v e  something t h a t  he re g a rd s  as v a l u a b l e  t o  him 
( t h e  r e c i p i e n t ) ,  he must b e l i e v e  a l s o  t h a t  t h i s  i s  e v id e n c e  
o f  some l e v e l  o f  v a l u i n g  and c a r i n g  f o r  him ( t h e  r e c i p i e n t )  
and, t o  f e e l  g r a t e f u l ,  th e  l a t t e r  needs t o  respond t o  th e  
donor w i t h  some l e v e l  o f  v a l u i n g  in  r e t u r n .  I n  o t h e r  words,  
h a v in g  re c o g n is e d  t h e  d o n o r ’ s e v i d e n t  v a l u i n g  o f  h im, t o  
f e e l  g r a t i t u d e  th e  donee h i m s e l f  needs t o  f e e l  some l e v e l  o f  
r e c i p r o c a l  v a l u i n g .  By showing g r a t i t u d e ,  he shows he 
v a l u e s  h i s  b e n e f a c t o r ,  even i f  t h i s  i s  in  t h e  m in im al  sense  
o f  v a l u i n g  him as more than  m ere ly  an i n s t r u m e n t  t o  h i s ,  th e  
r e c i p i e n t ’ s ,  w e l f a r e .
T h i s  does no t  have t o  be as s e n t i m e n t a l  a v ie w  o f  th e  
m a t t e r  as i t  m ight  sound. One can f e e l  and show g r a t i t u d e  
under  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  we n o te d ,  even when one would have  
p r e f e r r e d  n o t  t o  have been h e lp e d ,  o r  when one does n o t  
r e g a r d  t h e  g i f t  o r  s e r v i c e  as a b e n e f i t ,  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e  donor  
m u s t ) ;  o r  when one does not  o t h e r w is e  l i k e  t h e  donor .  On
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t h e  o t h e r  hand,  f e e l i n g  and showing a c t i v e  sympathy o f  any  
s o r t  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  we s a i d ,  i f  no i n d i c a t i o n  o f  c a r i n g  
o r  v a l u i n g  on t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  donor i s  i n v o l v e d .  I f  Smith  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Jones has o f f e r e d  t o  h e l p  him o n l y  in  o r d e r  t o  
c a r r y  on h i s  a f f a i r  w i t h  Mrs S m ith ,  such an o f f e r  does n o t  
r e q u i r e  g r a t i t u d e .  G r a t i t u d e ,  as a r e c i p r o c a l  a t t i t u d e ,  i s  
a p p l i c a b l e  o n l y  i f  Smith  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Jones w ishes  t o  h e lp  
him because Jones v a lu e s  him as someone w o r th  h e l p i n g .
We can see h e re  why I  wanted t o  a rgue  e a r l i e r ,  in  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s t u d e n t ’ s d e c i s i o n  t o  s t a y  w i t h  h i s  m other ,  
t h a t  a c e r t a i n  a s p e c t  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  c o n c e p t u a l l y  t i e d  t o  
t h e  n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  a c t i v e  sympathy.  For  I  am a r g u i n g  t h a t  
o u r  co n c e p t  o f  g r a t i t u d e  in c l u d e s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f
r e c i p r o c i t y .  To f e e l  g r a t e f u l ,  we need t o  r e c o g n is e  t h a t
o u r  b e n e f a c t o r  chose t o  g i v e  us someth ing t h a t  he re g a r d s  as  
v a l u a b l e  and, in  r e t u r n ,  we need t o  respond by v a l u i n g  our
b e n e f a c t o r .  And t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  th e  n o t i o n  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y
may i t s e l f  be e x p l a i n e d  in  terms o f  f e e l i n g  a c t i v e  sympathy.  
I f  t h e  s t u d e n t  f e e l s  t h e  need t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  t o  h i s  m o t h e r ’ s 
l o v e ,  t o  h e r  i n t e n t i o n s  t o  a c t  f o r  h i s  good, and so on, t h i s  
goes beyond a sense o f  r e g a r d in g  her  as someone who i s  
m e r e ly  u s e f u l  t o  h i s  w e l f a r e .  I t  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  terms  
o f  a c t i v e  sympathy.  R e c o g n iz in g  t h a t  h i s  mother  v a l u e s  him,  
he v a l u e s  h e r  in  r e t u r n .
I  have g iv e n  c o n t e n t ,  both c o n c e p t u a l l y  and c a u s a l l y ,  t o  
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  g r a t i t u d e  i s  based upon a f e e l i n g  which a 
normal person has and shows in  response t o  an a c t  o f  a c t i v e  
sympathy o f  a n o t h e r .  T h is  i s  n o t  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  p e o p le
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  f e e l  t h i s  way. R a th e r  i t  i s ,  f i r s t l y ,  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  a c o n c e p t .  I t  i s  an a t t e m p t  t o  answer th e  
q u e s t i o n  'What  do we u nd ers tand  by ' g r a t i t u d e ’ when i t  i s  
used i n  moral c o n t e x t s ? ’ . G r a t i t u d e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  in  
response  t o  h i s  a c t  o f  ben evo lence ,  we f e e l  and show t h a t  we 
v a l u e  our  b e n e f a c t o r .  I  am no t  s a y in g  t h a t  we ought  t o  use
' g r a t i t u d e ’ in  t h i s  way, I  am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  we do. The
a n a l y s i s  does not  i n v o l v e  my making o r  d e fe n d in g  any
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c o n t e s t a b l e  n o r m a t iv e  judgem en ts .  The l a t t e r  o n l y  o cc u rs  
when an autonomous j u d g e r  makes a judgem en t  l i k e  "You ought  
t o  be g r a t e f u l  t o  X" .
I t  i s ,  s e c o n d ly ,  a f a c t u a l  c l a i m .  O r d i n a r i l y  we approve  
o f  g r a t i t u d e ,  we d is a p p ro v e  o f  i n g r a t i t u d e .  We wanted t o  
see why t h i s  i s  so.  We have e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  any person  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  needs t o  v a l u e  and c a r e  f o r  o t h e r s .  When, 
as b e n e f i c i a r i e s , we f e e l  and show t h a t  we v a l u e  our  
b e n e f a c t o r ,  we meet t h i s  need. To s t r e s s  t h e  p o i n t :  an a c t  
o f  g r a t i t u d e  i s  something t h a t  m a t t e r s  t o  us because in  
f e e l i n g  o r  showing g r a t i t u d e  we meet c e r t a i n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
n e e d s .
The q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s :  I s  th e  need in  q u e s t i o n  t o  be
t h o u g h t  o f  as a n e e d (a )  o r  ( b ) ?  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  someone 
would  s t i l l  f u n c t i o n  as a person w i t h o u t  f e e l i n g  o r  showing  
t h e y  v a l u e  a b e n e f a c t o r ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  con cep t  o f  
g r a t i t u d e  may be e x p l i c a t e d  in  terms o f  m ee t in g  our  n e e d (b )  
f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy. As a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  we n e e d (b )  on th e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  o c c a s io n s  t o  f e e l  and behave in  th e  ways I  have  
d e s c r i b e d .  We a i l  u n le s s  we do. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  we 
f l o u r i s h  when we f e e l  and show we v a l u e  a b e n e f a c t o r .  By 
t h i s ,  I  do n o t  mean t h a t  f l o u r i s h i n g  i s  a s t a t e  o f  mind t h a t  
r e s u l t s  when we f e e l  and show g r a t i t u d e ;  r a t h e r ,  f e e l i n g  and 
showing i t ,  i s  p a r t  o f  what we mean by f l o u r i s h i n g .
We can see t h i s ,  by c o n s id e r in g  what  t h e  d e n i a l  would  
i n v o l v e ;  i . e .  t h a t  a person who n ever  f e e l s  o r  e x p re s s e s  
g r a t i t u d e  does n o t  a i l .  F i r s t l y ,  suppose t h a t  Smith  a lways  
f e i g n s  g r a t i t u d e  when he e x p re sses  i t ;  he n ev er  a c t u a l l y  
f e e l s  g r a t e f u l .  As long as he i s  c o n s i s t e n t  in  h i s  
b e h a v i o u r ,  t h i s  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i s c o v e r .  However h i s  
b e h a v i o u r  would t r a d e  on an awareness o f  how o t h e r  pe rso n s ,  
a t  l e a s t  on some o c c a s io n s ,  do f e e l  in  such c o n t e x t s ;  v i z .  
t h e y  g e n u in e ly  f e e l  a c t i v e  sympathy towards  t h e i r  b e n e f a c t o r  
when t h e y  respond t o  h i s  a c t s  o f  b e n evo len ce .  To ask why 
t h e y  have such f e e l i n g s  i s  tan tam o u n t  t o  a s k in g  'Why do 
persons  have th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs t h a t  th e y  h a v e ? ’ . I f
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Sm ith  n e v e r  f e e l s  any g r a t i t u d e  w h a ts o e v e r  when he u t t e r s  
i t ,  he i s  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  d e f i c i e n t ,  r a t h e r  
th a n  m o r a l l y  d e f i c i e n t ,  as a person .
N e x t  suppose t h a t  Smith  f e e l s  i t  b u t  he n e v e r  e x p re s s e s  
t h e  g r a t i t u d e  he f e e l s .  L e t  us assume t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  due 
t o  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d i s o r d e r  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  t h i s  i s  an 
outcome o f  S m i t h ’ s moral p o i n t  o f  v ie w .  We can show t h a t  i t  
i s  r a t i o n a l l y  f l a w e d .  Le t  us suppose t h a t  he j u s t i f i e s  h i s  
r e s t r a i n t  by p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  he i s  a rugged i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
who a lw a ys  c a r e s  and p r o v id e s  f o r  h i m s e l f  and he r e g a r d s  th e  
b e n e v o l e n t  a c t s  o f  o t h e r s  and t h e i r  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  g r a t i t u d e  
w i t h  moral con tem pt .  " G r a t i t u d e "  he says " i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  
when a person i s  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t " .  One reason why S m i t h ’ s 
v iew  m ig h t  be r a t i o n a l l y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i s  t h a t ,  even f rom  
t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  a rugged i n d i v i d u a l i s t ,  i t  would be an 
im p ru d e n t  p r a c t i c e  i f  he cannot  g u a ra n te e  t h a t  h i s  own 
r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  a lways  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  meet a l l  o f  h i s  
g o a l s .  And i f  what I  argued e a r l i e r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  no one i s ,  
o r  can be ,  c o m p l e t e l y  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t .  So f rom a p r u d e n t i a l  
p o i n t  o f  v ie w ,  Smith  ought  t o  e x p re s s  t h e  s e n t i m e n t  o f  
a c t i v e  sympathy t h a t  he f e e l s .  Much more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  when 
S m i t h ’ s o u t l o o k  i s  seen from t h e  w id e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  
p i c t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  l i f e  i m p l ie d  by t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm  o f  
h i s  ju d g em en ts ,  th e  moral  p r a c t i c e s  e n v is a g e d  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  
i m p l a u s i b l e .  Thus a g e n e ra l  answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  'Why 
oug ht  a person t o  be g r a t e f u l ? ’ -  i f  what  i s  meant by t h i s  
i s  why s h o u ld  a person e v e r  choose t o  e x p re s s  g r a t i t u d e  he 
f e e l s  on a p p r o p r i a t e  o c c a s io n s  -  i s  t h a t  when t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  no t  do ing so a r e  r e c o g n iz e d ,  i t  i s  n o t  a 
m a t t e r  o f  c h o ic e  f o r  a r a t i o n a l  j u d g e r ,  ( s e e  t h e  argument  on 
p p . 3 4 4 -3 4 6  a h e a d ) .
More u s u a l l y  th e  q u e s t io n  'Why oug ht  a person t o  be 
g r a t e f u l ? ’ occurs  in  cases where someone does n o t  f e e l  
g r a t i t u d e  on a p a r t i c u l a r  o c c a s io n ,  u s u a l l y  because t h e y  do 
n o t  l i k e  t h e i r  b e n e f a c t o r  a n d / o r  t h e  b e n e f i t .  I n  such a 
c a s e ,  in  commonsense m o r a l i t y ,  we would say:  'You ought  t o
be g r a t e f u l "  g i v i n g  as th e  n e e d - re a s o n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
b e n e f a c t o r  went  o u t  o f  h i s  way t o  show h i s  c a r i n g  f o r  t h e  
p erso n  t o  whom t h e  judgem ent  i s  a d d re s s e d .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  we 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r y  ought  n o t  m e r e ly  t o  e x p re s s  h i s  
g r a t i t u d e ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  he ought  t o  f e e l  i t ,  even where  
he does no t  o t h e r w is e  l i k e  t h e  b e n e f a c t o r  o r  t h e  b e n e f i t ,  
s i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  has done someth ing f o r  h i s ,  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a r y ’ s ,  sake .
O r d i n a r i l y  we would say t h a t  th e  r e c i p i e n t  ought  t o  f e e l  
a c e r t a i n  way and,  on be ing  shown th e  reason why, i t  i s  n o t  
i m p o s s i b le  f o r  them t o  g e t  th em se lves  t o  do so .  I f  what  I  
s a i d  e a r l i e r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  a normal person has a n e e d (b )  t o  
f e e l  a c t i v e  sympathy and can l e a r n  t o  c u l t i v a t e  t h i s  f e e l i n g  
under  a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  However I  do n o t  want  t o  
say y e t  t h a t  th e y  ' m o r a l l y ’ ought  t o  c u l t i v a t e  such a 
f e e l i n g .  I  want  t o  say o n l y  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
b e n e f a c t o r  went o u t  o f  h i s  way t o  show h i s  c a r i n g  i s  a p r im a  
f a c i e  good reason f o r  th e  judgem ent  'One ought  t o  be 
g r a t e f u l ’ .
L e t  us t u r n  now t o  a n o th e r  commonly a c c e p te d  moral b e l i e f  
which t y p i c a l l y  f i g u r e s  in  more long te rm  p e r s o n - t o - p e r s o n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  namely ,  l o y a l t y .  How i s  t h i s  r e d u c i b l e  t o  
n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b ) ?
The n e e d (b )  f o r  l o y a l t y
L o y a l t y  i s  p a r t  and p a r c e l  o f  commonsense m o r a l i t y  y e t  
i t  t o o  has r e c e iv e d  s c a n t  a t t e n t i o n  in  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
1 i t e r a t u r e . 149 The l o y a l  p erso n ,  we would n o r m a l ly  say ,  i s  
one who can be r e l i e d  upon t o  s u p p o r t  th o s e  w i t h  whom he i s  
r e l a t e d ,  ( o r  t o  t h e  causes t o  which he has committed  
h i m s e l f 150) .  H is  l o y a l t y ,  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  c l e a r e s t  c a s e s ,  i s  
g iv e n  t o  th o s e  t o  whom he f e e l s  a s t r o n g  sense o f  b e lo n g in g ,  
such as h i s  f a m i l y ,  h i s  f r i e n d s  o r ,  p e rh a p s ,  t o  an 
i n s t i t u t i o n ,  h i s  c o u n t r y ,  e t c .  An a c t  o f  l o y a l t y ,  where  
t h e r e  a r e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e ,  o r  i f  i t  c a l l s  f o r
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a s a c r i f i c e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  a c t o r ,  we t h i n k  has moral  
w o r t h .
We b e l i e v e ,  p a r t i c u l a r ! y , t h a t  we m o r a l l y  oug ht  t o  be
l o y a l  t o  a f r i e n d  in  t h e i r  a d v e r s i t y .  T h i s  l a t t e r  remark i s
n o t  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  b a l d l y  u n i n f o r m a t i v e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  i t
i s  a d u t y .  As H .S id g w ic k  ( 1 9 0 7 : 2 2 3 )  w r i t e s :
. . . t h e  degree  in  which an a c t  de s e rv e s  p r a i s e  a s . . .  
l o y a l . . . d o e s  no t  seem t o  be reduced by i t s  b e in g  
shown t h a t  t h e  p redo m inan t  m o t iv e  t o  t h e  a c t  was 
n a t u r a l  a f f e c t i o n  and n o t  lo ve  o f  v i r t u e  as such.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  someone who s t i c k s  by a c o l l e a g u e  m e r e ly  o u t  o f
a sense o f  d u ty  f a i l s  t o  d i s p l a y  a sense o f  f r i e n d s h i p .
( A g a i n ,  i t  i s  l i k e  l a u g h in g  a t  a j o k e  o u t  o f  d u ty  i n s t e a d  o f
f i n d i n g  i t  f u n n y . )  'B e in g  l o y a l ’ i n v o l v e s  n o t  o n l y  what  we
do b u t  a l s o  t h e  s p i r i t  in  which we do i t .  T h is  does n o t
mean t h a t  l o y a l t y  i s  th e  spontaneous e x p r e s s io n  o f  a need
t h a t  one f e e l s  a t  th e  t i m e .  I  m ig h t  be f u r i o u s  w i t h  my
f r i e n d  a t  t h e  t im e .  Our f r i e n d s h i p ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  demands
l o y a l t y  o f  me. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  I  am d i s l o y a l ,  I
a p p e a r  t o  d e v a lu e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Does t h i s  a lw ays  m a t t e r  t o  us m o r a l l y ?  L e t  us suppose  
t h a t  Smith  i s  d i s l o y a l  t o  Jones and th e  l a t t e r  does n o t  
l e a r n  o f  t h i s .  I f  Jones i s n ’ t  harmed by i t ,  does S m i t h ’ s 
d i s l o y a l t y  m a t te r ?  P a r t  o f  t h e  answer h e r e ,  s u r e l y ,  i s  t h a t  
f a i l u r e  t o  show l o y a l t y  in  such c i r c u m s ta n c e s  harms th e  
a g e n t  h i m s e l f .  For  showing l o y a l t y  t o  a f r i e n d  i s  p a r t l y  a 
m a t t e r  o f  s e l f - f i d e l i t y .  Being l o y a l  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  o n e ’ s 
own i n t e g r i t y .  When Smith i s  d i s l o y a l  t o  h i s  f r i e n d ,  he 
f a i l s  t o  show r e s p e c t  f o r  h i s  own person .
However I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  we would say t h a t  a c t s  o f  
l o y a l t y  a r e  good s i m p ! i c i t e r . 151 There  i s  a lw ays  a d an ger ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  a p e r s o n ’ s sense o f  l o y a l t y  b l i n d s  him t o  
o t h e r  needs t h a t ,  in  t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  o u tw e igh  t h e  needs  
upon which l o y a l t y  i s  founded.  Sometimes,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  
can c o m p l e t e l y  b lock  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  Thus p e o p le  can 
d i s p l a y  h e a r t f e l t  l o y a l t y  t o  a t y r a n t  (who may w e l l  have s e t  
o u t  t o  c r e a t e  t h i s  response in  them, by d i s t o r t i n g  f a c t s ,
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s u p p r e s s in g  c o n t r a r y  o p i n i o n ,  e t c . ) .  What such l o y a l t y  can 
i n d i c a t e  i s  a l a c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  and a l a c k  o f  r e s p e c t  
f o r  o t h e r  p e o p le  on t h e  p a r t  o f  th o s e  who i n s i s t  on i t .  
A l t h o u g h ,  in  ex t rem e  cas es ,  we would be i n c l i n e d  t o  say t h a t  
b l i n d  ob e d ie n c e  t o  a t y r a n t  i s  n o t  l o y a l t y  b u t  f a n a t i c i s m .
A second k in d  o f  case where we would q u e s t i o n  t h e  c l a i m  
t h a t  l o y a l t y  i s  an i n t r i n s i c  good i s  where t h e  l o y a l t y  in  
q u e s t i o n  i s  g iv e n  t o  an e v i l  cause,  such as one t h a t  demands 
i n j u s t i c e  o r  c r u e l t y .  Most N a z is ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  were l o y a l  
t o  t h e i r  cause and most o f  us would say t h a t  i t  would have  
been b e t t e r  had th e y  no t  have been. However we m ig h t  say  
h e re  t h a t  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  be l o y a l ,  even t o  a bad cause ,  i s  
b e t t e r  th a n  h av in g  no such c a p a c i t y  a t  a l l ,  p resumably  f o r  
t h e  good reason t h a t  l o y a l t y  a l r e a d y  e x e r c i s e d  t o  a bad o r  
i n d i f f e r e n t  cause may s u b s e q u e n t ly  be used in  a good cause;  
whereas i f  one had no sense o f  l o y a l t y  a t  a l l ,  i t  c o u ld  n o t  
be used f o r  good.
U n l i k e  f a n a t i c i s m  o r  d e v o t io n  t o  an e v i l  cause (where  
t h e  l o y a l t y  in v o lv e d  goes beyond what  can be reg a rd e d  as 
m o r a l l y  due f rom a p e r s o n ) ,  we do appear  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  
r e q u i r e d  where th e  l o y a l t y  in  q u e s t i o n  i s  t o  a f r i e n d  who 
has behaved i m m o r a l l y .  A t  l e a s t ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  we would be 
i n c l i n e d  t o  say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a d m i r a b l e  s i d e  t o  th e  
person  who shows l o y a l t y  o f  t h i s  k i n d .  There  a r e  e m p i r i c a l  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s .  We a r e  t o l d  t h a t  a g r e a t  many o f  our  
p a r t i c u l a r  l o y a l t i e s  a r e  g e n e t i c a l l y  t r a n s m i t t e d ;  i t  i s  
s u g g e s te d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  l o y a l t y  we f e e l  t o  a f a m i l y  
group i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  s o c i o b i o l o g i c a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  
group d e f e n c e ,  group f e e d i n g ,  e t c . 152 T h is  may be so.  
However we want  t o  know i f  t h e r e  i s  a r a t i o n a l  f o u n d a t i o n  t o  
t h e  a c t s  o f  l o y a l t y  we t h i n k  a r e  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  We want  
t o  know, in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  t h e  moral b e l i e f  t h a t  we ought  t o  
be l o y a l  t o  a f r i e n d  in  h i s  a d v e r s i t y ,  can be j u s t i f i e d  in  
te rm s  o f  t h e  n e e d s (a )  o r  ( b )  o f  a person? To see t h a t  
l o y a l t y  can be e x p l a i n e d  in  t h i s  way, we have t o  lo o k ,
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f i r s t l y ,  a t  t h e  k in d  o f  r e l a t i o n  in  which one person s ta n d s  
t o  a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  f r i e n d s h i p .
I  w i 11 assume, b u t  n o t  a rg u e ,  t h a t  we have a n e e d (b )  f o r  
f r i e n d s h i p .  Of cou rse  th e  k in d  o f  f r i e n d s  and t h e  k in d s  o f  
f r i e n d s h i p  we l i k e  v a r y  immensely .  We noted  e a r l i e r  t h a t  
some p e o p le  a r e  g r e g a r i o u s  and o u tg o in g  and l i k e  a l a r g e  
c i r c l e  o f  f r i e n d s ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  a r e  n o t  so s o c i a b l e  and 
p r e f e r  c o o l e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e i r  a c q u a i n t a n c e s .  And 
some human b e in g s  a r e  d e p r iv e d  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  a l t o g e t h e r  -  o r  
d e p r i v e  th e m s e lv e s  o f  i t  -  y e t  th e y  c o n t i n u e  t o  f u n c t i o n .  
But none o f  th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  d i s t u r b  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  we 
n e e d ( b )  f r i e n d s h i p ,  v i z .  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  f o r  a p e r s o n ’ s l i f e  
t o  be f u l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  t h i s  need must be met .  We n e e d (b )  
o t h e r s  t o  whom we f e e l  a sense o f  b e l o n g in g .
I t  i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  f r i e n d s h i p ,  
w hich  h e lp s  t o  g iv e  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t e n t  t o  t h e  sense o f  
l o y a l t y  we f e e l .  L e t  me t r y  t o  show t h i s .  When Smith  and 
Jones a r e  f r i e n d s ,  t h i s  i n d i c a t e s  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  about  th e  
e m o t io n a l  s t a t e s  o f  Smith and o f  Jones.  To be J o n e s ’ f r i e n d  
means t h a t  Smith  re c o g n iz e s  h i s  f r i e n d ’ s w or th  as a perso n ,  
t h a t  he c a r e s  f o r  Jones f o r  h i s  own sake ,  t h a t  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  no t  v a lu e d  m ere ly  as a u s e fu l  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  
S m i t h ’ s own ends.  T h is  i s  most o b v io u s ly  e xp re ssed  in  
c e r t a i n  o f  S m i t h ’ s a t t i t u d e s ;  (once a g a in ,  th e s e  a r e  
a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s ) .  
S in c e  Smith  and Jones a re  f r i e n d s ,  Smith  w i l l  a c t  f o r  J o n e s ’ 
w e l l - b e i n g ,  (and v i c e  v e r s a ) . Each o f  them w i l l  c o - o r d i n a t e  
a t  l e a s t  some o f  t h e i r  own p r o j e c t s  w i t h  th o s e  o f  t h e  o t h e r .  
No doubt  t h e y  w i l l  have shared  c o n f id e n c e s  and t h e y  w i l l  
have lowered  o t h e r  em ot io na l  b a r r i e r s ,  (w h ic h ,  p resu m ab ly ,  
t h e y  e r e c t  a g a i n s t  n o n - f r i e n d s ) ,  each b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  th e y  
can r e l y  on t h e  o t h e r ,  and so on.
We can see h e re  some o f  th e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  s e n t i m e n t  o f  
a c t i v e  sympathy; e .g .  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  by each ,  o f  t h e  o t h e r ’ s 
w o r th  as a p erso n .  I n  r e c o g n is in g  such w o r th ,  Smith i s  no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a s c r i b i n g  i t  t o  a p r o p e r t y  o r  s e t  o f  q u a l i t i e s ,
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( l i k e  J o n e s ’ am ia b le n e s s  o r  k i n d n e s s ) .  He w i l l  c a r e  f o r  
Jones f o r  J o n e s ’ own sake and n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o r  any c l e a r  
re a s o n s .  Once a g a in ,  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s e n t i m e n t  h e re  app ears  
t o  f o l l o w  n a t u r a l l y  f rom  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs t o  be found in  
any p e rs o n .  As f a r  as I  can see i t  i s  n o t  grounded on 
a n y t h i n g  more u l t i m a t e .
These a r e  e m p i r i c a l  c la im s  about  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e s
in  human n a t u r e .  Perhaps ,  however,  t h e y  can be r e s t a t e d  as
c o n c e p tu a l  c l a i m s .  Someone who d o e s n ’ t  u n d e rs ta n d  t h a t  th e
a c c o u n t  above i s ,  in  p a r t ,  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,  has
f a i l e d  t o  u n d ers ta n d  f r i e n d s h i p .  To f e e l  no such p o s i t i v e
s e n t i m e n t s  -  such as b e lo n g in g ,  t r u s t ,  a c t i v e  sympathy -
robs a s o - c a l l e d  f r i e n d s h i p  o f  c o n t e n t .  To r e g a r d  a f r i e n d
m e r e ly  as a u s e fu l  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  o n e ’ s own ends,  o r  t o  ask
*0n what  i t  i s  based? ’ o r  ' F o r  t h e  sake o f  what  does i t
e x i s t ? ’ o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i s  t o  miss an i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t .
Thus A . M a c I n t y r e  ( 1 9 6 6 : 8 0 )  w r i t e s  o f  A r i s t o t l e ’ s d is c u s s io n
o f  f r i e n d s h i p :
. . . h i s  c a t a l o g u e  o f  ty p e s  o f  f r i e n d  presupposes t h a t  
we can a lways  ask th e  q u e s t i o n s ,  On what  i s  t h i s  
f r i e n d s h i p  based? f o r  t h e  sake o f  what  does i t  
e x i s t ?
I f  we have unders tood  th e  concept  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,  M a c I n t y r e  
s u g g e s ts ,  we would n o t  r a i s e  t h i s  t y p e  o f  q u e s t i o n .
L e t  us r e t u r n  now t o  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  l o y a l t y .  I t  i s  n o t  
founded j u s t  on any casua l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p e rs o n s .  I t  
i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  s p e c i a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  t i e s  t h a t  b ind  
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o g e t h e r  i n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  f r i e n d s h i p  t h a t  
p r o v i d e s  th e  b a s is  f o r  l o y a l t y .  Once a g a in  t h i s  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a m a t t e r  o f  r e c o g n i z i n g  a p r o p e r t y  o r  s e t  o f  
q u a l i t i e s  in  th e  o t h e r  p erso n .  I t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  th e  need t o  b e lo n g ,  t o  t r u s t ,  and f o r  th e  
a c t i v e  sympathy we f e e l  towards  a n o t h e r  person in  such a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  So u n d ers to o d ,  l o y a l t y  i n d i c a t e s  an a t t i t u d e  
and a s e n t im e n t  in  o n e s e l f ,  towards  a f r i e n d .  However t h e r e  
i s  more t o  th e  m a t t e r  than  t h i s .
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E a r l i e r  we noted  t h a t  i t  i s  th r o u g h  o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  o t h e r s  t h a t  we d e f i n e  o u r s e l v e s .  My w i f e ,  my c h i l d r e n ,  
my f r i e n d s ,  a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  in  v a r y i n g  d e g re es  t o  my sense o f  
who I  am. Thus my f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  t h e  r e p r o b a t e ,  a lo n g  w i t h  
a l l  my o t h e r  commitments and l o y a l t i e s  t o  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
h e l p s  t o  d e f i n e  my i d e n t i t y .  A lso  I  c la im e d  t h a t  t h e  u n i t y  
i n  o n e ’ s l i f e  may be found in  f r i e n d s h i p s .  For  many o f  us,  
t h i s  k in d  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  o t h e r  p e o p le  h e lp s  t o  g i v e  
o u r  l i f e  a meaning. T h is  i s  n o t  t o  say t h a t  when we a c t  
l o y a l l y  we do i t  in  o r d e r  t o  r e t a i n  our  sense o f  i d e n t i t y ,  
o r  in  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  u n i t y  t o  our  l i v e s .  I t  i s  t o  say ,  
r a t h e r ,  t h a t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e s e  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  a p a r t  o f  
o n e ’ s i d e n t i t y ,  and p a r t  o f  what  g i v e s  meaning t o  o n e ’ s 
l i f e ,  f i n d s  i t s  n a t u r a l  e x p r e s s io n  in  o n e ’ s w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
show l o y a l t y .  I t  i s  f o r  such reasons t h a t  one g iv e s  l o y a l t y  
t o  him in  h i s  a d v e r s i t y ,  even when t h e  f r i e n d  i s  a k n a v e . 153
These a r e  e m p i r i c a l  c la im s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  sou rce  o f  a 
v a l u e  t h a t  i s  u s u a l l y  p la c e d  on l o y a l t y  in  f r i e n d s h i p .  
However t h e y  to o  can be r e s t a t e d  as c o n c e p tu a l  c l a i m s .  For  
i n s t a n c e ,  we would say t h a t  someone who d o e s n ’ t  un d ers ta n d  
t h a t  t o  show l o y a l t y  i s  -  a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t  -  what f r i e n d s h i p  
means, o r  who d id  n o t  d i s p l a y  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  a t  a l l  t o  a 
f r i e n d ,  has f a i l e d  t o  und ers ta nd  f r i e n d s h i p .  The p o i n t  i s :  
' b e i n g  l o y a l  t o  him in  h i s  a d v e r s i t y ’ i s  p a r t  o f  what  i s  
meant  by be ing  a f r i e n d .  Thus “ I  am h i s  f r i e n d  a f t e r  a l l "  
m ig h t  be s a i d  t o  e x p l a i n  t o  o t h e r s  an a c t  o f  s u p p o r t  t h a t  
o t h e r w i s e  m ig h t  seem u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  But s a y in g  t h i s  does  
n o t  s t a t e  t h e  ground f o r  th e  f r i e n d s h i p ,  r a t h e r  i t  f o l l o w s  
f rom  what  i s  i n v o l v e d  in  be ing  a f r i e n d .  L o y a l t y  t o  o n e ’ s 
f r i e n d ,  i t  i s  assumed, i s  p a r t  o f  what i t  i s  t o  be a f r i e n d .  
One s ta n d s  by a f r i e n d  j u s t  because he i s  a f r i e n d .  I  am 
s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  when we probe t h i s  b e l i e f  f u r t h e r ,  we f i n d  
t h a t  i t  i s  because in  f r i e n d s h i p  we s a t i s f y  u n d e r l y i n g  
n e e d s ( b ) f o r  a ro b u s t  sense o f  o u r  own i d e n t i t y ,  ( u n i t y ,  
b e l o n g i n g ) ,  we meet our  need t o  t r u s t  and be t r u s t e d  and f o r
a c t i v e  sympathy .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  why l o y a l t y  in  f r i e n d s h i p  
m a t t e r s  t o  us m o r a l l y .
However 'becau se  he i s  my f r i e n d ’ does n o t  e n t a i l  t h e  
moral  judgem ent  ' I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be l o y a l  t o  h im ’ . T here  
can be c o n f l i c t s  o f  l o y a l t i e s .  S m i t h ’ s l o y a l t y  t o  h i s  w i f e  
can c o n f l i c t  w i t h  l o y a l t y  t o  h i s  f r i e n d  Jones.  ~0r i f  t h e  
a c t  o f  l o y a l t y  r e q u i r e s  th e  e x c l u s i o n  o r  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
h i s  o t h e r  needs,  we m ig h t  say t h a t  l o y a l t y  i s  m is p la c e d .  
Where a moral judgement  i s  based upon such a n e e d - r e a s o n ,  
t h e  l a t t e r  o n l y  p r e s u m p t i v e l y  i m p l i e s  t h e  f o r m e r .  Thus t o  
s u p p o r t  a judgem ent  'S m ith  has n o t  behaved as he m o r a l l y  
o ug ht  t o  J o n e s ’ a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason we can g i v e  i s  
'b ecau se  he has been d i s l o y a l ’ o r  'becau se  he has broken t h e  
t r u s t  Jones gave him as a f r i e n d ’ .
T h e re  a r e  more d i f f i c u l t  r e d u c t i o n s  t o  p e r f o r m .  How a r e  
we t o  e x p l a i n  our  moral a p p r o v a l ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o f  p r o m is e -  
keep in g?  Where t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Smith  promised t o  repay  Jones  
i s  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  judgement  'S m i th  ought  t o  repay  t h e  
money’ , how can t h i s  judgement  be s a i d  t o  be based upon 
needs?154 To answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n  I  want t o  c o n t r a s t  my 
acc o u n t  w i t h  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  accounts  o f  p ro m is in g  and,  
h o p e f u l l y ,  t o  i n d i c a t e  th e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  t h e  needs t h e s i s .
T h re e  accounts  o f  p ro m is in g
The f i r s t  a c c o u n t ,  ( a ) ,  i s  th e  v iew  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h
D.Hume155 t h a t  t h e  r u l e  o f  keep in g  promises  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  a
moral  p r i n c i p l e  but  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  a c o n v e n t io n .  Hume
( 1 7 3 9 : 2 5 3 )  w r i t e s :
. . . p r o m i s e s  have no n a t u r a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  and a r e  mere 
a r t i f i c i a l  c o n t r i v a n c e s  f o r  t h e  con ven ience  and 
advan tage  o f  s o c i e t y .
P r o m is e - k e e p in g  can not  be e x p l a i n e d  in  te rm s o f  a n a t u r a l
m o t i v a t i o n .  I t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  an a r t i f i c i a l  v i r t u e .
( b )  A second,  d i f f e r e n t  response i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an
e n t a i l m e n t  between th e  f a c t  t h a t  someone promised t o  do
som eth ing  and t h e  moral judgement  t h a t ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i  b u s , he
ought  t o  do i t .  I f  Smith promised t o  repay Jones th e  money
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th e n  Sm ith  p la c e d  h i m s e l f  under  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  repay  
Jones ,  t h e r e f o r e  Smith  ought  t o  repay  Jones .  T h i s  
c e l e b r a t e d  argument i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  J . S e a r l e  ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 0 1 -  
1 1 4 ) . 156
( c )  A t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  n e e d s - t h e s i s  ac c o u n t  o f  
p r o m is in g  i s  t h e  r e l a t i v i s t  v ie w ,  a v iew  t h a t  we a r e  p i n n i n g  
on D . Z . P h i l l i p s  and H.Mounce ( 1970: 1 1 - 1 7 ) . 157 T h is  argument  
runs :  p e o p le  in  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  can d i f f e r  in  t h e i r  
a t t i t u d e  t o  a s t a t e m e n t  l i k e  ' I  hereby prom ise  t o  repay  you,  
Jones ,  t h e  money’ . I f  Smith  l i v e s  in  s o c i e t y  A, where  
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g  i s  a moral p r a c t i c e ,  by u t t e r i n g  th e  
s t a t e m e n t  he w i l l  p la c e  h i m s e l f  under  an o b l i g a t i o n .  
However t h i s  m ig h t  n o t  be th e  case f o r  a person in  a n o t h e r  
s o c i e t y  B. For t h e  con cep t  o f  ' a  p r o m i s e ’ may n o t  f u n c t i o n
i n  t h e  same way w i t h i n  th e  moral p r a c t i c e s  o f  B.
The accounts  ( a ) - ( c )  a r e  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  
each o t h e r .  For i n s t a n c e ,  someone m ig h t  w e l l  ho ld  ( a )  and
( c )  t o g e t h e r ;  i . e .  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  a moral  c o n v e n t io n  in  our  
s o c i e t y ,  t h e r e  i s  no a p r i o r i  l i m i t  t o  th e  c o n v e n t io n s  t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  may ho ld  and t h e r e  co u ld  be a s o c i e t y  
w i t h o u t  a moral p r a c t i c e  o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g .  Each o f  ( a ) -
( c ) ,  however,  i s  a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  my v iew  o f  t h e  m a t t e r .  I  
w i l l  r e j e c t  each o f  them and by do ing  so,  h o p e f u l l y ,  we w i l l  
see why a needs t h e s i s  i s  t o  be p r e f e r r e d .  L e t  us s t a r t  
w i t h  ( a ) .
( a )  The main p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p r i n c i p l e  which Hume a p p l i e s  
in  a l l  o f  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  moral ap p ro v a l  and d i s a p p r o v a l  
i s  a d i s t i n c t i v e  k in d  o f  p l e a s u r e  and p a i n .  A c t i o n s  which  
g i v e  r i s e  t o  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i v e  f e e l i n g  o f  p l e a s u r e  we c a l l  
v i r t u o u s ;  th o s e  which g i v e  r i s e  t o  p a in  we c a l l  v i c e s .  He 
w r i t e s  ( 1 7 3 9 : 5 4 )
The v e r y  essence o f  v i r t u e . . . i s  t o  produce p le a s u r e
and t h a t  o f  v i c e  t o  g i v e  p a i n .
Not  a l l  a c t s  o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g ,  however,  can be a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h  p l e a s u r e  f o r  th e  ag e n t  o r  f o r  anyone e l s e  concerned .
So t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  keep promises p r e s e n ts  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r
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Hume. H is  answer i s  t h a t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  d e r i v e s  f rom  an 
a r t i f i c i a l  c o n v e n t i o n . 158
I n  f a c t  Hume does c o n s id e r  a n a t u r a l  m o t iv e  on which t o  
base o u r  moral  a p p ro v a l  o f  p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g .  S e l f - i n t e r e s t  
m ig h t  n a t u r a l l y  m o t i v a t e  a person in  t h i s  r e g a r d .  Hume’ s 
a rgum en t ,  b r i e f l y ,  i s  t h i s .  People  a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  induced  
t o  do t h i n g s  f o r  o t h e r s .  They do a s s i s t ,  b u t  o n l y  in  
e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  a r e t u r n .  Hume ( i b i d : 249 )  d e s c r ib e s  th e  
m a t t e r  th u s :
Your corn  i s  r i p e  to d a y ;  mine w i l l  be so tom orrow.  
I t  i s  p r o f i t a b l e  f o r  us b o th ,  t h a t  I  shou ld  l a b o u r  
f o r  you t o d a y ,  and t h a t  you shou ld  a i d  me tom orrow.
Now i f  a person d id  n o t  keep such a p ro m ise ,  o t h e r s  would no
l o n g e r  t r u s t  him and would n o t  e n t e r  i n t o  agreem ents  w i t h
him.  So he would n o t  g e t  t h e i r  h e lp  when he needed i t .  To
r e v e r t  t o  our  exam ple ,  i f  Smith  does no t  keep h i s  prom ise  t o
rep ay  Jones,  i t  m ight  n o t  be in  h i s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  W ith  a
t a r n i s h e d  r e p u t a t i o n ,  he would be no lo n g e r  t r u s t e d  and, in
t h e  long  ru n ,  Smith  co u ld  v e ry  w e l l  be worse o f f  th an  he
would have been i f  he had k e p t  h i s  p rom ise .
However th e s e  a r e  p r u d e n t i a l  reasons .  H is  concern f o r  
h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  o r  l o n g - t e r m  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  would n o t  e x p l a i n  
why we b e l i e v e  t h a t  Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  keep t h i s  
p ro m is e ,  o r  why we b e l i e v e  t h a t  he ought  no t  t o  have made a 
f a l s e  prom ise  t o  repay Jones. Long-term  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  does 
n o t  e x p l a i n  t h e  sense o f  o b l i g a t i o n .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  i f  Smith  
i s  persuaded t o  keep t h i s  promise o n ly  because he f e a r s  t h e  
consequences o f  be ing  found o u t  i f  he d o e s n ’ t ,  th en  he w i l l  
n o t  be m o t iv a t e d  on e v e r y  occ as ion  on which com pl iance  i s  
r e q u i r e d .  He w i l l  no t  be m o t iv a te d  e s p e c i a l l y  in  those  
cases  where he i s  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  he can g e t  away w i t h  i t .  
I f  he knows t h a t  Jones i s  f o r g e t f u l  and t h a t  he w i l l  n o t  g e t  
found o u t ,  why should  i t  be in  S m i t h ’ s s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  keep  
h i s  p ro m is e ,  as opposed t o  s im p ly  doing  w h a te v e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  g e t  Jones t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  he w i l l  keep i t ?  Un less  Smith  
i s  i n e p t  o r  u n le s s  he and Jones l i v e  in  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
v i g i l a n t  community,  i f  he knows t h a t  he can g e t  away w i t h
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i t ,  i t  c o u ld  o f t e n  be in  S m i t h ’ s r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o
make f a l s e  p ro m is e s .  Hume was aware o f  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y .
T h i s  b r i n g s  us t o  Hume’ s s u b s t a n t i v e  a cc o u n t  o f  p r o m is in g .
A l th o u g h  a person does n o t  have a n a t u r a l  m o t iv e  which would
l e a d  him t o  keep e v e r y  prom ise ,  Hume a r g u e s ,  i t  i s  in  any
p e r s o n ’ s r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be a
s o c i a l  c o n v e n t io n  o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g .  W i t h o u t  i t ,  any
person  w i l l  be worse o f f .  He w r i t e s  ( i b i d : 245 )
. . . a  prom ise  would no t  be i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  b e f o r e  human 
c o n v e n t io n s  had e s t a b l i s h e d  i t ;  a n d . . . e v e n  i f  i t  
were i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  i t  would n o t  be a t te n d e d  by any  
moral o b l i g a t i o n .
The b e l i e f  we s h a re  t h a t  a promise ought  t o  be k e p t ,  Hume
s a y s ,  can be e x p l a i n e d  and j u s t i f i e d  in  te rm s o f  a m u t u a l l y
ad van tageou s  s o c i a l  c o n v e n t io n .
Why sho u ld  anyone invoke  such a c o n v e n t io n  and f e e l
com m it ted  t o  i t ?  The s h o r t  answer i s ,  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t s  and
mutual  ad v an tag es  which r e s u l t  f rom keep in g  i t .  E x p e r ie n c e
l e a d s  each o f  us t o  see t h a t  i t  i s  in  each i n d i v i d u a l ’ s own
i n t e r e s t  t o  a c c e p t  c e r t a i n  c o n v e n t io n s ,  such as each h e l p i n g
t h e  o t h e r  h a r v e s t  h i s  c o rn ,  o r  p u l l i n g  t o g e t h e r  in  t h e  same
d i r e c t i o n  when we a r e  in  a rowing b o a t .  S i m i l a r l y  i t  i s  th e
mutual  adv an tage  which leads  us t o  a c c e p t  a c o n v e n t io n  l i k e
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g .  There  i s  a r e c o g n i t i o n  by both p a r t i e s ,
t h e  p r o m is e r  and th e  prom isee ,  o f  t h e  d e s i r a b l e  consequences
when such a c o n v e n t io n  i s  k e p t .  Hume ( i b i d : 250 )  w r i t e s :
. . . w h e n  each i n d i v i d u a l  p e r c e i v e s  t h e  same sense o f  
i n t e r e s t  in  a l l  h i s  f e l l o w s  he im m e d ia te ly  pe r fo rm s
h i s  p a r t  in  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  as be ing  assured  o f  t h a t
t h e y  w i l l  no t  be w an t in g  in  t h e i r s .
We can e x p l a i n  t h e  judgement  'S m i th  ought  t o  keep h i s  
p rom ise  t o  r e t u r n  t h e  borrowed money t o  J o n e s ’ in  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  way. When Smith  made t h e  prom ise  t o  repay  t h e  
l o a n ,  by s a y in g  " I  promise" o r  some e q u i v a l e n t  p h ra s e ,  he 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  he was making use o f  a c o n v e n t io n .  And th e  
r a t i o n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  why t h i s  promise sho u ld  be k e p t  i s  
t h e  mutual  advantages  which r e s u l t ,  f o r  S m i th ,  Jones,  and 
f o r  s o c i e t y  as a who le ,  where th e  c o n v e n t io n  o f  p ro m is e -
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k e e p in g  i s  adhered  t o .  Thus we m ig h t  e x p l a i n  o u r  b e l i e f  in  
t h e  v i r t u e  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t io n  o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g  as r e s u l t i n g  
f ro m  mutual  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
I s  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  p ro m is in g  s a t i s f a c t o r y ?  I  t h i n k  
n o t .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  s t i l l  w i l l  n o t  do as an a d e q u a te  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  why we would want t o  say t h a t  Smith  ought  t o  
keep t h i s  prom ise  t o  Jones. I f  Smith  s im p ly  f o l l o w s  th e  
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g  c o n v e n t io n  because he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  
w hole  i n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  c o l l a p s e  (and a l l  o f  t h e  ad v an tag es  
t h a t  go w i t h  i t )  i f  he does n o t  a lw ays  a c t  in  accordance  
w i t h  i t ,  th en  h i s  b e l i e f  i s  f a l s e .  T here  i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  
a c t  -  a t  l e a s t  t h e r e  i s  n o t  one t h a t  I  can t h i n k  o f  -  upon 
which  i t  c o u ld  be p l a u s i b l y  s a i d  t h a t  th e  c o n v e n t io n  o f  
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g  c r u c i a l l y  depends. C e r t a i n l y  i t  i s  no t  
S m i t h ’ s prom ise  t o  repay th e  loan t o  Jones.
Hume sees t h i s .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 7 5 1 : 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 )  ab o u t  a
s e n s i b l e  knave who, on a p a r t i c u l a r  o c c a s io n ,  t h i n k s  t h a t  an
a c t  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g
. . . w i l l  make a c o n s id e r a b l e  a d d i t i o n  t o  h i s  f o r t u n e ,  
w i t h o u t  cau s in g  any c o n s id e r a b l e  breach in  t h e  
s o c i a l  union o r  c o n f e d e r a c y . . . ( th e  knave)  obs erves  
t h e  g e n e ra l  r u l e  and ta k e s  advantage  o f  a l l  o f  th e  
e x c e p t i  o n s .
Sm ith  m ig h t  be j u s t  such a s e n s i b l e  knave.  A l though  i t  i s
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see ,  on th e  argument Hume has o f f e r e d ,  why t h e
man who in d u lg e s  i s  t h i s  l i n e  o f  re as o n in g  sho u ld  be c a l l e d
a knave .  I f  everyone  e l s e  observes  t h e  c o n v e n t io n  o f
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ,  Hume has not  g iven  ' t h e  k n a v e ’ a r a t i o n a l
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  reason why he should  keep t h i s  p rom ise .
However t h a t  seemed t o  be what Hume’ s argument was meant t o
do. Hume ad m i ts  ( i b i d ) t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  g i v e  an
answer t o ,  what  nowadays we would c a l l ,  a f r e e - r i d e r .
I  must con fess  t h a t ,  i f  a man t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  
re a s o n in g  much r e q u i r e s  an answer,  i t  would be a 
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  any which w i l l  t o  him 
app ear  s a t i s f a c t o r y  o r  c o n v in c in g .
But t h i s ,  I  su g g es t ,  i s  due t o  Hume’ s (and s i m i l a r )  
u n c o n v in c in g  accounts  o f  p ro m is in g .
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I  m ent ioned  e a r l i e r  two o t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  p r o m i s in g .  
One o f  t h e s e  ( b )  i s  J . S e a r l e ’ s c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an 
e n t a i l m e n t  between t h e  reason e . g .  'S m i th  promised t o  repay  
Jones t h e  money’ and th e  judgement  'S m i th  oug ht  t o  repay  t h e  
money’ . L e t  us c o n s id e r  t h i s .  S u i t a b l y  a d a p te d ,  S e a r l e ’ s 
( 1 9 6 7 : 1 0 2 )  argument runs:
( i )  I f  Smith  u t t e r e d  t h e  words,  ' I  he reb y  prom ise  t o  
repay  you, Jones,  th e  money’
( i i )  Smith  promised t o  repay Jones t h e  money.
( i i i )  Smith  p la c e d  h i m s e l f  under an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  repay  
Jones.
( i v )  Smith  i s  under an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  repay  t h e  money.  
Thus
( v )  Smith  ought  t o  keep h i s  promise  t o  repay  Jones.
Each o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  ( i i ) - ( v )  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
one.  However t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e m e n t  ( i )  i s  f a c t u a l  whereas  
( v )  i s  a v a l u e  judgem ent .
S e a r l e  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ( i )  and ( v )
can be shown t o  be one o f  e n t a i l m e n t .  He w r i t e s  (op c i t )
. . . t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a te m e n ts  n e c essa ry  t o  make t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  one o f  e n t a i l m e n t  do no t  need t o  
i n v o l v e  any e v a l u a t i v e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  moral p r i n c i p l e s  
o r  a n y th in g  o f  th e  s o r t .
The k in d  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  s ta te m e n ts  he appears  t o  have in  mind
a r e  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  f a c t u a l  ones l i k e  e . g .  Jones has no t
r e l e a s e d  Smith  from h i s  o b l i g a t i o n .  In  o t h e r  words,  f rom
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  someone promised t o  do someth ing ( i ) ,  i t
f o l l o w s  t h a t ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , ( v )  he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do
i t .  To make a promise e n t a i l s  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  keep i t .
Someone who does n o t  r e c o g n iz e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  does not
u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p r o m is in g .
However R .M .H a re  ( 1 9 6 4 ( b ) )  and o t h e r s 159 c l a i m  t o  
u n d e rs ta n d  t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  y e t  th e y  deny t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
between ( i )  and ( v )  i s  one o f  e n t a i l m e n t .  They a rgue  t h a t  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  between ( i )  and ( v )  w i l l  have a d i f f e r e n t  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  depending on w hether  a person v iew s i t  f rom  
i n s i d e  o r  o u t s i d e  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p r o m is in g .  As we s h a l l
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s e e ,  I  a g re e  w i t h  t h i s  v ie w .  However,  I  w i l l  a rg u e  t h a t
t h i s  does n o t  im p ly  what Hare  and t h e  o t h e r s  t a k e  i t  t o
im p ly .  A c c o rd in g  t o  H a re ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  i s  a m a t t e r  o f
c h o ic e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  one i s  committed t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f
p r o m is in g  and t h e r e b y  acc e p ts  th e  p r i n c i p l e  'One oug ht  t o
keep p r o m i s e s ’ . He w r i t e s  ( i b i d : 124)
Un less  a s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  p e o p le  were p r e p a re d  
t o  a s s e n t  t o  th e  moral p r i n c i p l e s  which a r e  
c o n s t i t u t i v e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p r o m is in g ,  
t h e  word ' p r o m i s e ’ cou ld  n o t  have a use .
O n ly  i f  one chooses t o  be committed t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f
p r o m is in g  does one a c c e p t  t h e  argument ( i ) - ( v )  above.
We a r e  fa c e d  a g a in  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  what  does ' b e i n g  
p r e p a r e d  t o  a s s e n t  t o  p r i n c i p l e s  which a r e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n *  in v o lv e ?  How does a chooser  so ass en t?  I  can 
choose w h e th er  o r  n o t  t o  keep t h i s  o r  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
p ro m is e ;  in  moral  c o n f l i c t s ,  I  can re g a rd  p r o m is e - k e e p in g  as 
more im p o r t a n t  than  o t h e r  c o n f l i c t i n g  moral b e l i e f s ,  and so 
on. But  how e x a c t l y  does an i n d i v i d u a l  commit h i m s e l f  t o  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p ro m is e -k e e p in g ?  Can one s t a n d ,  as i t  
w e r e ,  o u t s i d e  such i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t a k e  o n e ’ s p ic k ?  I f  so,  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  suggested i s  no t  a f a m i l i a r  one t o  
me. I f  i t  i s  a genuine  c h o ic e ,  p resum ably ,  one m ig h t  choose  
t o  r e g a r d  p r o m is e -k e e p in g  w i t h  moral i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  o r  as a 
v i c e .  C o n s id e r  th e  l a t t e r :  a person chooses t o  a s s e n t  t o  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  'One ought  never  t o  keep p r o m i s e s ’ . T h is  
would be a c u r i o u s  moral d e c i s i o n  f o r  someone t o  make. For  
a s t a r t ,  o b v i o u s l y ,  a promise l i k e  t h a t  made t o  o n e s e l f  
would be s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . And even i f  t h e  c h o ic e  i s  
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  promises made t o  o t h e r s ,  c ou ld  a person e v e r  
d e ta c h  h i m s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f rom a l l  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  which prom ise-m aking  o c c u r s ,  in  o r d e r  t o  
make a ( r a t i o n a l )  moral c h o ic e  in  f a v o u r  o f  n ev er  keep in g  
h i s  promises? I  t h i n k  n o t .  As I  s a i d  e a r l i e r ,  though one 
can in  p r i n c i p l e  c r i t i c i z e  any e s t a b l i s h e d  moral b e l i e f ,  I  
j u s t  do n o t  see how one cou ld  make t h e  unencumbered  
autonomous c h o ic e  n o t  t o  keep any prom ises .  So i t  i s  by no
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means c l e a r  what  H a r e ’ s ‘ a s s e n t in g  t o  t h e  moral  p r i n c i p l e s  
which a r e  c o n s t i t u t i v e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
p r o m i s i n g ’ amounts t o .
However t h e  p o i n t  m ig h t  be p ressed  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  we can  
im a g in e  t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  be a n o th e r  s o c i e t y  where what  we 
c a l l  p r o m is e - k e e p in g  i s  regarde d  w i t h  moral  i n d i f f e r e n c e  o r  
as a v i c e .  T h i s  b r i n g  us t o  our  t h i r d  a cc ount  o f  p r o m is in g  
( c ) .
C o n s id e r  t h e  moral p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  C r e t a n s  -  w h ic h ,  f o r  
reasons  t o  be g iv e n  s h o r t l y ,  a r e  members o f  a rogue s p e c ie s  
t h a t  a r e  a human l o o k - a l i k e  -  in  which t h e  c o n cep t  o f  
p r o m is in g  does n o t  have th e  p la c e  w i t h i n  i t  t h a t  i t  has f o r  
members o f  our  s o c i e t y .  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce ( 1 9 7 0 : 1 5 )  t e l l  
us:
For such a person ,  (a  C r e t a n ) ,  who does n o t  be long  
t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  promise k e e p in g ,  s a y in g  t h a t  one 
w i l l  repay money has no r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  judgem ent  
t h a t  one ought  t o  repay i t .
P h i l l i p s  and Mounce conc lude  t h a t  t h i s  i s  p e r f e c t l y
i n t e l l i g i b l e  and i t  shows t h a t  t h e  con cep t  o f  a prom ise  need
n o t  have t h e  p la c e  w i t h i n  one moral p r a c t i c e  t h a t  i t  has
w i t h i n  a n o t h e r .  S e a r l e ’ s ac c o u n t ,  i t  seems, needs t o  be
l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  th e  broad er  account  o f  t h e  moral  p r a c t i c e s  o f
a g i v e n  s o c i e t y .  For  th e  way we respond t o  t h e  a l l e g e d
e n t a i l m e n t  in  th e  argument ( i ) - ( v )  w i l l  depend,  in  t h i s
sen se ,  on w h e th er  we v iew  i t  from th e  i n s i d e  o r  t h e  o u t s i d e
o f  a c e r t a i n  ty p e  o f  p r a c t i c e .
P h i l l i p s  and Mounce suggest  t h a t  t h i s  means t h a t  our  
l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t s  m ight  d i f f e r  f rom t h e  C r e t a n s ’ . T h is
seems t o  me t o  be an odd c l a i m . 160 I  f a i l  t o  see how anyone
can say  "A l o g i c a l l y  e n t a i l s  B" and, in  t h e  same b r e a t h ,  
" I t  i s  n o t  t h e  case t h a t  th e  same A l o g i c a l l y  e n t a i l s  t h e  
same B".  I f  t h e y  m a i n t a in  t h a t  f o r  us t h e r e  i s  a l o g i c a l  
e n t a i l m e n t  between ( i ) - ( v ) ,  th e y  have t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  when 
t h e  C r e t a n  says " I  promise" he must mean someth ing q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  f rom what we mean and, t h e r e b y ,  t h e  moral b e l i e f s  
which a r e  ( o r  a r e  n o t )  e n t a i l e d ,  d i f f e r .
However,  l e t  us assume t h a t  both  C r e t a n s  and you and I  
mean t h e  same t h i n g  when we say ' I  p rom ise  t o  re p ay  th e  
money* and l e t  us suppose t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  e n t a i l m e n t ,  t h e r e  
i s  a d i f f e r e n t  r e l a t i o n  ( l i k e  s t r o n g  p re s u m p t io n )  t h a t  h o ld s  
between ( i ) - ( v ) .  Are we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no a 
P r i  o r i  l i m i t  t o  th e  forms t h a t  C r e t a n  and o u r  moral  
p r a c t i c e s  can then  ta k e ?
Our example i s  s l i g h t l y  more c o m p l i c a t e d ,  o f  c o u rs e .  
When Smith  promised t o  repay  Jones,  he was l y i n g ;  he was 
l y i n g  n o t  m e re ly  about  h i s  p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n  b u t  he was 
making an i n t e n t i o n a l l y  f a l s e  s t a t e m e n t  abo u t  h i s  f u t u r e  
b e h a v i o u r .  There  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h i s  and a 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  case o f  p r o m i s e - b r e a k i n g . I n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  
where someone makes a promise which a t  t h e  t im e  he in te n d s  
t o  keep b u t  he does n o t  do so,  we d is a p p r o v e  -  though ex 
h y p o th e s i  t h e  C r e ta n s  do no t  -  o f  h i s  no t  do ing  what  he s a i d  
he would  do. Our o b l i g a t i o n  in  th e  case o f  prom ises  i s  t o  
keep them. I n  th e  case o f  a l y i n g  promise  we d i s a p p r o v e ,  
a l s o ,  o f  h i s  n o t  t e l l i n g  th e  t r u t h .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  an o b l i g a t i o n  n o t  t o  promise  what one does n o t  i n t e n d .  
The C r e t a n s ,  we a r e  t o l d ,  do n o t .
Are  we a b l e  t o  say t h a t  w h i l e  t o  make a f a l s e  prom ise  i s  
wrong in  our  moral p r a c t i c e ,  C r e ta n s  m ig h t  d i f f e r  in  t h e i r  
moral  a t t i t u d e  towards  i t ?  Could t h e i r  s o c i e t y  be one in  
which t h e r e  i s . a  moral p r a c t i c e  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g ?
L y in g  and f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g
I  want  t o  argue t h a t  a moral p r a c t i c e  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g ,  
re g a rd e d  as a norm, i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e .  To see t h i s  
c o n s i d e r ,  f i r s t ,  th e  case o f  a s o c i e t y  in  which f a l s e  
s t a t e m e n t -m a k in g  i s  th e  norm and t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  th e  
e x c e p t i o n .  Accord ing  t o  most p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  t h i s  would  
r e s u l t  in  t h e  breakdown o f  language .  I  a g r e e .  F a ls e  
s ta t e m e n t -m a k in g  must be e x c e p t i o n a l  f o r  a language t o  
c o n t i n u e  t o  e x i s t .  But why i s  t h i s  so? Some w r i t e r s  
m a i n t a i n  i t  i s  because a norm o f  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s  i s  a
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l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .  An exponent  o f  t h i s  v iew  i s  P .W in c h .  
He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 7 2 : 6 1 - 6 2 )
. . . o n e  can say t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a s o c i e t y  i n  which  
t h e r e  i s  a language bu t  in  which t r u t h - t e l  1 ing  i s  
n o t  reg a rd e d  as t h e  norm i s  a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
o n e .
Any n a t u r a l  language ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  C r e t a n s ’ langua ge ,  w i l l  
c o n t a i n  w i t h i n  i t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t r u e  and f a l s e  
s t a t e m e n t s ;  and f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t r u e  and f a l s e  
s t a t e m e n t s  t o  be p o s s i b l e ,  t h e r e  must be t h e  g e n e r a l  
ad h erence  t o  t h e  norm o f  making t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s .  However  
t h e s e  a r e  l o g i c a l  c l a i m s ,  Winch t e l l s  us ,  n o t  m e r e ly  
i n v a r i a b l e ,  though c o n t i n g e n t ,  e m p i r i c a l  c l a i m s .  A norm o f  
t r u t h - t e l  1 ing i s  a l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .
To see t h a t  t h i s  i s  so ,  he asks us t o  c o n s id e r  t h e  case
in  w h ic h ,  per  absurdum, what we now c a l l  f a l s e  s t a t e m e n t s
a r e  a lw ays  made as i f  t h e y  were t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s  and v i c e
v e r s a . So t h a t  eve ryone  a lways  s t a t e s  what  i s  f a l s e .  In
such a s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e ,  Winch ( i b i d : 6 2 )  c l a i m s :
A l l  t h a t  would happen i s  t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  would come 
t o  be ta k e n  in  t h e  o p p o s i t e  sense f rom t h a t  which  
t h e y  now c a r r y .
I f  t h e y  d id  no t  know t h a t  th e y  were a lw ays  making f a l s e  
s t a t e m e n t s ,  use rs  o f  t h e  language would d i s c r i m i n a t e  between  
t r u t h  and f a l s i t y  as we do but  t h e i r  and o u r  s t a t e m e n t s  
would s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  c o n t r a d i c t  each o t h e r .
But Winch i s  no t  c o n s id e r in g  h ere  t h e  case he says he i s  
c o n s i d e r i n g ,  which concerns a s o c i e t y  where f a l s e  s t a t e m e n t -  
making i s  m ere ly  t h e  usual  p r a c t i c e ,  i . e .  t h e  norm. I f  
making f a l s e  s t a te m e n ts  was t h e i r  norm, s inc e  t h e r e  would be 
no way o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  between t r u t h  and f a l s i t y ,  Winch i s  
com m it ted  t o  s a y in g  t h a t ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  l o g i c ,  t h e r e  c ou ld  
be no s t a te m e n t -m a k in g  and t h e r e  c o u ld  be no com m unicat ion .
L e t  us suppose t h a t  th e  C r e ta n s  u s u a l l y  s t a t e  what  i s  
f a l s e ;  i . e .  f a l s e  s ta te m e n t -m a k in g  i s  t h e i r  norm. Would 
t h i s  e n t a i l  a b reak  down o f  t h e i r  language? S u r e ly  in  th e  
C r e t a n  community,  q u e s t i o n s ,  g r e e t i n g s ,  c u r s e s ,  e t c .  m ig h t  
go on as u s u a l .  A ls o ,  as f a r  as I  can see ,  pace Winch,
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u s e rs  o f  t h e  language m ig h t  s t i l l  be a b l e  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  
t r u t h s  f rom  f a l s e h o o d s .  The s ta t e m e n t -m a k in g  f e a t u r e  o f  
t h e i r  language m ig h t  e v e n t u a l l y  b reak  down, b u t  n o t  f o r  a 
few g e n e r a t i o n s ,  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e r e  a r e  memories o f  a 
p r e v i o u s  ' t r u e  s t a te m e n t -m a k in g  norm’ t o  f a l l  back o n ) .  I t  
would e v e n t u a l l y  b reak  down however,  n o t  as Winch sa y s ,  
because t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a language in  which t r u t h - t e l l i n g  i s  
n o t  t h e  norm i s  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  b u t  because o f  p r a c t i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between th e  
words t h e y  use,  t h e i r  e n v i ro n m en t  and t h e i r  s t a t e m e n t -m a k in g  
p u rp o s e s ,  would be f r u s t r a t e d  more o f t e n  than  o u r s .  
F u r t h e r ,  when s t a te m e n ts  a r e  presumed t o  be t r u e  i t  i s  then  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  any s p e a k e r ’ s u t t e r a n c e  t o  be ta k e n  in  a 
c e r t a i n  way by o t h e r  p e o p le .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, i f  
u t t e r a n c e s  a r e  presumed t o  be f a l s e ,  i t  would be more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see how any bu t  t h e  most c l e v e r  1an g u a g e -u s e rs  
would keep a g r i p  on a n y th in g  b u t  a few f a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  
I  can t h i n k  o f  no a p r i o r i  reason ,  however,  why a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  a c u te  C r e ta n  c ou ld  n o t  m as te r  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  
t h e  language .
The argument above a p p l i e s ,  m u t a t i  s mutandi  s , t o  
t r u t h f u l n e s s .  L ik e  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t -m a k in g ,  t h e  p resu m p t ion  
o f  t r u t h f u l n e s s  i s  a l s o ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  a norm. We 
c an n o t  e q u a te  t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  however,  w i t h  making t r u e  
s t a t e m e n t s .  I  do no t  e x e m p l i f y  th e  v i r t u e  o f  t r u t h f u l n e s s  
e v e r y  t im e  I  say something t h a t  i s  t r u e .  When I  am be ing  
t r u t h f u l  I  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  s t a t e  'how I  b e l i e v e  t h i n g s  a r e ’ 
(so  t o  s p e a k ) ,  even though t h i s  m ight  no t  be welcome t o  
m y s e l f  o r  my a u d ie n c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, when I  am 
u n t r u t h f u l ,  I  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  make a s t a t e m e n t  as i f  t h i s  i s  
'how I  b e l i e v e  t h i n g s  a r e ’ when I  do n o t  a c t u a l l y  b e l i e v e  
t h i s  a t  a l l .  I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t o  use language  
i n c o r r e c t l y .  One has t o  use language c o r r e c t l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  
t e l l  a l i e .  Only  i f  Jones unders tood  S m i t h ’ s l i e  i s  he in  
a p o s i t i o n  t o  b e l i e v e  i t .
293
I s  t h e  norm o f  t r u t h f u l n e s s  a g e n e r a l  p resu m p t io n  o r  i s
i t  a l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y ?  F i r s t ,  t o  make W in ch ’ s p o i n t  a g a i n ,
i f  e v e ry o n e  a lw ays  i s  u n t r u t h f u l  and e v e ry o n e  knows t h a t
e v e r y o n e  a lw ays  i s  u n t r u t h f u l ,  t h e i r  l y i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  would
no dou bt  come t o  be ta k e n  in  t h e i r  o p p o s i t e  sense .  We a r e
n o t  co n cerned ,  however,  w i t h  a community where l y i n g  i s
u n i v e r s a l  b u t  where i t  i s  th e  norm. Now I  t h i n k  t h a t  Winch
i s  m is ta k e n  when he says ( i b i d :6 2 )
. . . t h e  s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t e l l i n g  l i e s  c o u ld  be t h e  
norm and t e l l i n g  th e  t r u t h  a d e v i a t i o n  f rom  i t  i s  
s e l f - c o n t r a d i  c t o r y .
T h in k  o f  t h e  C r e ta n  community as b e ing  one in  which p eo p le
know t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t r u t h f u l n e s s  and l y i n g ,  y e t  l i e s
a r e  t h e  norm and t r u t h f u l n e s s  i s  t h e  d e v i a t i o n .  T h is  does
seem p o s s i b l e .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  e v e r y
C r e t a n  i s  t o o  s t u p i d  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  most o f  t h e  t i m e ,  l i k e
h i m s e l f ,  eve ryo n e  e l s e  i s  u s u a l l y  l y i n g .  The norm o f  l y i n g
seems t o  be p o s s i b l e ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  in  a s o c i e t y  in  which
each member knows t h a t  he u s u a l l y  t e l l s  l i e s ,  y e t  he to o  i s
u s u a l l y  d e c e iv e d  by o t h e r s  bu t  he does n o t  know t h i s .
A c c o rd in g  t o  M .B lac k  (1 9 5 4 )  t h e  language o f  such a
community would d i e  o u t .  Taken t o  be a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  t h i s
c l a i m  seems t o  me t o  be c o r r e c t .  However B lack  says t h a t
t h i s  i s  because an adherence t o  t r u t h - t e l 1 ing  as a norm i s
l o g i c a l l y  n ec essa ry  f o r  a c h i l d  t o  l e a r n  t h e  langua ge .  He
w r i t e s  ( 1 9 5 4 : 4 5 )
A s o c i e t y  in  which p a r e n ts  c o n s t a n t l y  l i e d  t o  t h e i r  
c h i l d r e n  from th e  o u t s e t ,  and in  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  ways,  
would be one in  w h i c h . . . i t  would be im p o s s ib le  f o r  
t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  t o  l e a r n  a language .
I s  B lack  c o r r e c t ?
S u r e l y  i t  would be p o s s ib le  f o r  a c h i l d ,  born t o  C re ta n  
p a r e n t s ,  t o  l e a r n  some o f  t h e i r  language .  Once a g a i n ,  i t  
may l e a r n  C re ta n  g r e e t i n g s ,  q u e s t i o n s ,  c u r s e s ,  and q u i t e  an 
e x t e n s i v e  s e t  o f  o t h e r  forms o f  com m unicat ion .  He w ould ,  no 
do u b t ,  d e g e n e ra te  p r e t t y  q u i c k l y  as he grew o l d e r  and t r i e d  
t o  f u l l y  communicate w i t h  o t h e r  C r e t a n s .  The p o i n t  i s ,  
a g a i n ,  th e  presumpt ion  o f  a norm o f  l y i n g  i s  n o t  s e l f ­
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c o n t r a d i c t o r y . The n o t i o n  o f  a s o c i e t y  in  which  
t r u t h f u l n e s s  i s  n o t  regarded  as t h e  norm, I  m a i n t a i n ,  runs  
i n t o  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
I n c l u d e d  among t h e  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  C r e t a n  community would have t o  do w i t h o u t  many o f  
t h e  t h i n g s  which presuppose t r u t h f u l n e s s  and which we 
e n j o y ;  l i k e  p h i lo s o p h y ,  s c i e n c e ,  h i s t o r y ,  e t c .  Any book 
t h a t  p u r p o r t s  t o  be h i s t o r y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  
u n d e rs to o d  no t  t o  be t e l l i n g  l i e s .  N e i t h e r  would members o f  
t h i s  community have a n y th in g  l i k e  t h e  range o f  moral  t r a i t s  
o f  c h a r a c t e r  we e n j o y .  The C r e t a n ’ s c h a r a c t e r ,  as we s h a l l  
s e e ,  would have t o  la c k  i n t e g r i t y ,  honour,  s e l f - f i d e l i t y ,  
t r u s t ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and s i m i l a r  t r a i t s .  These a r e  q u i t e  
fu n d am en ta l  t h i n g s  t o  be w i t h o u t .  I  w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  
p o i n t  s h o r t l y .
How does a l l  o f  th e  above a p p ly  t o  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  case o f  
f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g ?  The answer,  I  hope, i s  o b v io u s .  I  can see  
no a p r i o r i  reason why f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g  shou ld  n o t  be th e  
norm i n  C r e t a n  s o c i e t y .  T h is  too  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
i f  e v e r y  C r e ta n  i s  to o  s t u p i d  no t  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  most o f  
t h e  t i m e ,  l i k e  h i m s e l f ,  eve ryone  e l s e  makes l y i n g  p ro m ises .  
As t h e r e  would be no way o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between t r u t h f u l  
and l y i n g  p rom ises ,  no doubt  t h i s  would lead  t o  a c e s s a t i o n  
o f  p ro m is e -m a k in g  in  g e n e r a l .  However t h i s  i s  n o t  a m a t t e r  
o f  l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s ,  S e a r l e  i s  wrong i f  he t h i n k s  t h a t  
h i s  argument  n e c e s s a r i l y  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  
p r a c t i c e s .  The r e l a t i o n  between ( t h e  C r e t a n )  Smith  s a y in g  
( i )  ' I  hereby  promise t o  repay you, Jones,  t h e  money’ and
( v )  t h e  judgement  'S m ith  ought  t o  keep h i s  prom ise  t o  repay  
J o n e s ’ w i l l  have a d i f f e r e n t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  depending on 
w h e th e r  a person v iews i t  f rom i n s i d e  o r  o u t s i d e  th e  
i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p r o m is in g .  In  C re ta n  s o c i e t y ,  where we know 
t h a t  i t  i s  th e  norm f o r  everyone  t o  make l y i n g  prom ises ,  i f  
Smith  says ( i )  we do not  need t o  u nd ers ta nd  by t h i s  t h a t  he 
has p u t  h i m s e l f  under an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  repay  t h e  money.
However I  do n o t  mean by t h i s  t h a t  we c o u ld  c o n te m p la t e  
t h e  C r e t a n  p r a c t i c e  and th en  choose t o  a d o p t  i t ,  h l a  H a re .  
And I  do n o t  want t o  say e i t h e r ,  w i t h  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce,  
t h a t  t h e  p resu m p t ion  o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g  happens t o  be a 
moral  p r a c t i c e  in  our  s o c i e t y ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  moral  
p r a c t i c e  in  a n o th e r  human s o c i e t y .  To u n d e rs ta n d  why t h i s  
i s  so ,  we f i r s t  have t o  see why we b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
p r a c t i c e s  o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g  and p r o m i s e - b r e a k i n g  a r e  
m o r a l l y  wrong.  I t  i s  t im e  now t o  c o n s id e r  my a cc o u n t  o f  
p r o m is in g  based upon needs.
P r o m is e - k e e p in g  based upon u n d e r l y i n g  needs
To see t h a t  an account  o f  t h e  moral b e l i e f  'One ought  t o  
keep p r o m i s e s ’ can be based upon needs,  we have t o  ask 
f i r s t l y :  what does t h e  a c t  o f  making a prom ise  t o  a n o th e r  
person i n v o l v e ?  There  a r e  c e r t a i n  t y p i c a l  assum pt ions  which  
someone makes when t h e y  g i v e  o r  r e c e i v e  a p ro m ise .  F i r s t  o f  
a l l ,
( i )  t h e  p ro m is e r  assumes t h a t  t h e  t h i n g  promised i s
wanted by th e  prom isee .
The t h i n g  prom ised ,  however,  may n o t  be someth ing t h a t  t h e
r e c i p i e n t  a c t u a l l y  w ants .  V . P e e t z  ( 1 9 7 7 : 5 7 9 )  m ent ions  such
a case where she does no t  want an u n s o l i c i t e d  i te m  her
n e ig h b o u r  promises  t o  g iv e  t o  her
. . . b u t  I  do no t  want  t o  o f f e n d  my n e ig h b o u r ;  so I  do 
n o t  r e j e c t  he r  prom ise .
T h i s  shows t h a t  th e  promisee does n o t  have t o  want t h e  i te m
pro m ised .  But i t  does n o t  a f f e c t  th e  p r o m i s e r ’ s assum pt ion;
h e r  n e ig h b o u r  assumes t h a t  Pe e tz  wants t h e  t h i n g  prom ised .
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  however,  t h a t  ( i )  i s  a nec essa ry  
c o n d i t i o n .  A f t e r  a l l ,  one can speak o f  'p r o m is i n g  t o  punish  
an o f f e n d e r ’ and, c l e a r l y ,  th e  p ro m is e r  knows t h i s  i s  no t  
wanted by th e  r e c i p i e n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  ( i )  i s . t h e  usual  
assum ption  when making a p r o m i s e . 161 I n  most cases we assume 
t h a t  th e  r e c i p i e n t  a c t u a l l y  w ants ,  o r  has an i n t e r e s t  i n ,  
th e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  th e  prom ise;  and t h a t  t h e  p ro m is e r  knows 
t h i s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t o  make a l y i n g  promise t o  someone i s  t o
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r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e  person w ants ,  o r  has an i n t e r e s t  i n ,  t h e
t h i n g  in  q u e s t i o n .  When Smith  prom ises  Jones t o  repay  th e
borrowed money, th e  repayment i s  someth ing t h a t  Smith  knows
t h a t  Jones w ants .
I n  p a s s in g ,  l e t  us no te  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  make a
prom ise  w i t h o u t  t h e r e  be ing  a n o th e r  person as p ro m is e e .  As
R .S .D o w n ie  ( 1 9 8 7 : 2 6 7 )  w r i t e s :
. . . p r o m i s i n g  i s  no t  e s s e n t i a l l y  a s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  
s in c e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  promise  w i t h o u t  t h e r e  be ing  
a p r o m i s e e . . .
One can make a promise t o  o n e s e l f ,  as when I  promised m y s e l f  
t o  g i v e  up smoking.  T h is  meets c o n d i t i o n  ( i ) ,  v i z .  th e  
t h i n g  promised was wanted.  I f  I  d id  n o t  c a r e  a f i g  w he ther  
o r  n o t  I  gave i t  up then  i t  would n o t  make sense t o  speak o f  
h a v in g  made such a promise t o  m y s e l f .
A second usual  assumption we make, when we g i v e  o r  
r e c e i v e  a prom ise ,  i s  t h a t
( i i )  t h e  u t t e r a n c e  o f  a l o c u t i o n  l i k e  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’
( a )  exp re sses  th e  p r o m i s e r ’ s p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n  and
( b )  i s  a s ta t e m e n t  about  h i s  f u t u r e  b e h a v io u r .
When Smith  says t o  Jones " I  promise t o  repay t h e  money" i t  
i s  usual  t o  r e g a rd  S m i t h ’ s u t t e r a n c e  as e x p r e s s in g  h is  
c u r r e n t  i n t e n t i o n s  about  h i s  f u t u r e  b e h a v io u r .  S m i t h ’ s 
s t a t e m e n t  o f  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  w i l l  s t r e n g t h e n  J o n e s ’ assurance  
t h a t  he w i l l  so behave in  th e  f u t u r e ,  i . e .  t h e  loan w i l l  
a c t u a l l y  be r e p a i d .  To make a l y i n g  p rom ise ,  on th e  o t h e r  
hand, i s  t o  speak w i t h  th e  appearance o f  e x p r e s s in g  such an 
i n t e n t i o n  but  w i t h o u t  a c t u a l l y  so i n t e n d i n g .
T h e re  a r e  p l e n t y  o f  ways o f  s t a t i n g  i n t e n t i o n s  w i t h o u t  
making a p rom ise .  So how do we r e c o g n is e  a promise  from th e  
w id e r  s e t  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l  s ta te m e n ts ?  One obv ious  way i s  by 
t h e  u t t e r a n c e  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ ( o r  a s i m i l a r  l o c u t i o n ) .  In  
u t t e r i n g  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ th e  sp e aker  emphasizes h i s  
commitment t o  do w hatever  he says he w i l l .  I n  u t t e r i n g  ' I  
p r o m i s e . . . ’ t o  Jones, Smith wants Jones t o  r e c o g n iz e  t h i s  
s o r t  o f  commitment.  J o n e s ’ assurance  w i l l  r e s t ,  in  p a r t ,  
on t h e  id e a  t h a t  Smith w i l l  f e e l  p r e t t y  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  hav ing
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prom ised  t o  repay  t h e  lo a n ,  he ought  a c t u a l l y  t o  do so .  So 
a t h i r d  usual  assumption when we make o r  r e c e i v e  a prom ise  
i s  t h a t
( i i i )  t h e  f o r c e  o f  a s p e a k e r ’ s commitment can be 
r e c o g n iz e d  by h i s  use o f  a l o c u t i o n  l i k e  ' I  
p r o m i s e . . . ’
The phras e  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ i s  n o t  c r u c i a l  h e r e .  Smith  m ig h t  
equ a l  1y w e l 1 have s a i d  ' I  a s s u re  you t h a t . . . ’ , ' I  w i l l . . . * ,  
e t c .  L e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  say t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  t h e  
s p e a k e r  t o  make an u t t e r a n c e  b e a r in g  a s i m i l a r  i 1 l o c u t i o n a r y  
f o r c e  t o  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ f o r  h i s  u t t e r a n c e  t o  have t h e  l e v e l  
o f  commitment we f i n d  in  p r o m i s i n g . 162
F i n a l l y ,  we assume t h a t  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  s p e a k e r  by 
making t h e  u t t e r a n c e  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ ( e t c )  i s
( i v )  t o  c r e a t e  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  r e l i a n c e  and t r u s t  
between h i m s e l f  and t h e  p rom isee .
The sp e a k e r  in te n d s  t o  show n o t  o n l y  t h a t  he i s  in  e a r n e s t  
b u t  t h a t  he d e s i r e s  t o  be r e l i e d  upon o r  t r u s t e d .  By s a y in g  
' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ th e  p ro m is e r  wants i t  t o  be und ers to od  t h a t  
he can be counted upon t o  keep h i s  word. He t h e r e b y  c r e a t e s  
a ( s e l f - i m p o s e d )  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t r u s t  w i t h  t h e  prom isee .  
The p rom isee  can count  upon him t o  do someth ing because th e  
he s a i d  he would .  A f a l s e  promise t r a d e s  upon such a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .
L e t  me p u t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  ( i ) —( i v )  above in  a d i f f e r e n t  
way. The repayment o f  th e  loan i s  someth ing t h a t  Jones  
wants  and from th e  f a c t  t h a t  Smith  s a i d  " I  p r o m i s e . . . "  ( i . e .  
f rom  h i s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  S m i t h ’ s p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n s ) ,  Jones  
e x p e c t s  t h a t  h i s  want w i l l  be met .  Should Smith  then  not  
r e t u r n  th e  money, Jones w i l l  be p u t  o u t ,  and j u s t i f i a b l y  so.  
What j u s t i f i e s  J o n e s ’ resentm ent?  You can say t h a t  you 
i n t e n d  t o  go t o  th e  t h e a t r e  tomorrow.  On h e a r i n g  t h i s ,  I  
may want  t o  come w i t h  you. I  m ight  even f e e l  res e n tm e n t  i f  
you r e f u s e  t o  l e t  me accompany you. I n  t h i s  ca s e ,  however,  
t h e  res e n tm e n t  i s  n o t  j u s t i f i e d . 163 For a l th o u g h  i t  i n v o l v e s  
my w ants ,  when you s t a t e d  your i n t e n t i o n  ( t o  go t o  th e
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t h e a t r e )  you d id  n o t  make a promise  t o  me and t h e r e b y  c r e a t e  
t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  in  my mind t h a t  you w i l l  l e t  me accompany  
you. I t  i s  a l o c u t i o n  l i k e  11 p r o m is e ’ which shows t h a t  th e  
s p e a k e r  i n t e n d s  t o  meet t h e  p r o m is e e ’ s w an ts ,  t h a t  he i s  in  
e a r n e s t  and t h a t  he d e s i r e s  t o  be r e l i e d  upon o r  t r u s t e d .  
I t  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  one breaks  t h i s  t r u s t  t h a t  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  
t h e  subsequent  re s e n tm e n t .
B e fo r e  we t u r n  t o  th e  m a t t e r  o f  needs,  I  have two f u r t h e r
p o i n t s  t o  make. F i r s t l y ,  I  am s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  ( i ) - ( i v )  a r e
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  we u s u a l l y  assume when making prom ises
t o  one a n o t h e r .  What a r e  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  when t h e r e  i s  no
prom isee  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  a r e  no e x p e c t a t i o n s  o r  t r u s t  o f
a n o t h e r  person in v o lv e d ?  I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  answer i s ,  as
Downie (op c i t : 2 6 9 )  sug gests :
By s t a t i n g  o n e ’ s i n t e n t i o n s  ( t o  o n e s e l f )  by means o f  
c e r t a i n  words, l i k e  ' I  p r o m i s e ’ . . . one i s  s i g n a l l i n g  
th e  p o i n t  t h a t  th e  p r o j e c t s  in  q u e s t i o n  a r e  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  o n e ’ s t o t a l  con cerns .
C a r r y i n g  them o u t  then  becomes a m a t t e r  o f  s e l f - f i d e l i t y  o r
p e r s o n a l  i n t e g r i t y .  One f e e l s  t h a t  one has l e t  o n e s e l f  down
i f  one breaks  a p ledge  t o  o n e s e l f .
S e c o n d ly ,  i f  t o  promise someone someth ing i s  t o  c r e a t e  an 
e x p e c t a t i o n  in  t h e i r  mind t h a t  one w i l l  keep t h e  p rom ise ,  
what  i f  t h e  o t h e r  person does no t  e x p e c t  t h i s ,  o r  does no t  
remember t h a t  a promise has been made? Does t h i s  e f f e c t  
o u r  normal b e l i e f  t h a t  one ought  t o  keep promises? I f  th e  
p o i n t  made e a r l i e r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  one cannot  n e c e s s a r i l y  re g a r d  
o n e s e l f  as excused.  The p r o m is e e ’ s e x p e c t a t i o n s  do n o t ,  in  
e v e r y  cas e ,  e x p l a i n  th e  b in d in g  f o r c e  o f  p r o m is in g .  N e i t h e r  
does t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p ro m iser  i s  r e l e a s e d  f rom  t h e  promise  
by t h e  prom isee .  Suppose t h a t  Jones sees t h a t  Smith  w i l l  be 
under  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r e s s u r e  t o  repay t h e  money on t im e  and 
Jones says :  "Don’ t  w o r ry .  F o r g e t  about  t h e  money". Smith  
may n o t  r e g a rd  h i m s e l f  as excused.  Any more than  he i s  
excused from r e t u r n i n g  th e  money i f  Smith  d is c o v e r s  t h a t  
Jones i s  a n o t o r i o u s  c h e a t .  C a r r y in g  o u t  a prom ise ,  as we 
have n o te d ,  i s  a l s o  a m a t t e r  o f  s e l f —f i d e l i t y .
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L e t  us t u r n  now t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a knowledge o f  th e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs i n v o l v e d  a l l o w s  us t o  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  
harm o f  f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g .  How does making a f a l s e  p ro m ise ,  
o r  b r e a k in g  a p rom ise ,  v i o l a t e  needs? F i r s t  o f  a l l  t h e r e  
i s  t h e  harm t o  th e  p r o m is e e ’ s m a t e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  due t o  h i s  
f a i l u r e  t o  r e c e i v e  w h a te v e r  was prom ised .  To make a f a l s e  
p ro m is e ,  o r  t o  break  a prom ise ,  i s  t o  p o s i t i v e l y  undermine  
h i s  j u s t i f i e d  b e l i e f s  about  c e r t a i n  f u t u r e  s t a t e s  and,  
t h e r e b y ,  i t  co u ld  w e l l  undermine h i s  c u r r e n t  o r  f u t u r e
p r o j e c t s .  T h is  i n d i c a t e s  a la c k  o f  concern  f o r  h i s  s e l f -  
d e te r m i  n a t i o n  and i t  shows d i s r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  r e c i p i e n t .  
S e c o n d ly ,  t o  make a f a l s e  prom ise ,  o r  t o  b reak  a p ro m ise ,  i s  
t o  b re a k  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t r u s t .  By s a y in g  ' I  p r o m i s e . . . ’ 
I  ass ured  th e  o t h e r  person t h a t  I  can be counted  upon t o  
keep my word, t h a t  he can p u t  h i s  t r u s t  in  me. By b r e a k in g
t h e  p ro m ise ,  I  weaken o r  d e s t r o y  t h i s  t r u s t .  And in  t h i s
way I  show a l s o  a la c k  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  th e  needs o f  
a n o t h e r  p e rso n .  T h i r d l y ,  t o  b reak  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t r u s t  
i s  n o t  m e re ly  t o  harm th e  o t h e r  perso n ,  i t  i s  t o  harm o n e ’ s 
own n e e d s ( b ) .  C a r r y in g  o u t  p rom ises ,  we noted  i s  a m a t t e r  
o f  s e l f - f i d e l i t y ,  pe rso na l  i n t e g r i t y ,  o r  honour.  P ro m ise -  
b r e a k in g  shows a la c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t .  I t  i s ,  so t o  speak,  
d e s t r o y i n g  o n e ’ s t r u s t  in  o n e s e l f .  The above, in  a
n u t s h e l l ,  i s  why p r o m is e - b r e a k in g  m a t t e r s  t o  us.
The c la im s  above become c l e a r e r ,  I  t h i n k ,  when we 
c o n s id e r  P h i l l i p s ’ and Mounce’ s s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  t h e r e  cou ld  
be a s o c i e t y  in  which p r o m is e -k e e p in g  i s  m o r a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t .  
What P h i l l i p s  and Mounce have t o  show i s  t h a t  t h e  same 
m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t ,  i . e .  ( i )  Jones wants t h e  money back,  ( i i )  
Smith  exp re ssed  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  r e p a y ,  by ( i i i )  u t t e r i n g  " I  
p r o m i s e . . . "  and t h a t  ( i v )  t h i s  s e t  up a r e l a t i o n  o f  t r u s t  
between them, cou ld  g iv e  r i s e  t o  ( t o t a l l y )  d i f f e r e n t  moral  
p r a c t i c e s .  G iven th e  c o n d i t i o n s  ( i ) - ( i v )  t h e  p resum pt ion  
f o l l o w s  in  our  s o c i e t y  t h a t  Smith ought  t o  repay  t h e  money 
b u t ,  what  th e y  must show i s ,  i t  does no t  f o r  C r e t a n s .
300
G iven  ( i ) - ( i v ) ,  i f  i n  C r e ta n  moral  p r a c t i c e s  Smith  i s  n o t  
m o r a l l y  o b l i g a t e d  t o  keep h i s  promise  t o  Jones t h e n ,  I  s a i d ,  
t h e  C r e t a n  w i l l  have t r a i t s  o f  c h a r a c t e r  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
f ro m  o u r  own. I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  p resu m a b ly ,  Jones ,  t h e  
C r e t a n ,  who has been m is le d  by th e  p rom ise ,  ( i . e .  he has 
been m is le d  i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  Smith  was t e l l i n g  t h e  t r u t h  
a b o u t  h i s  i n t e n t i o n s ) ,  w i l l  f e e l  no res e n tm e n t  a g a i n s t
S m i th .  T h is  would be abnormal bu t  a l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e
s t a t e  f o r  a human p e r s o n a l i t y .  But t h i s  i s  o n l y  th e
b e g in n in g  o f  th e  prob lem .  I t  i s  p a r t  o f  our  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f  p r o m is in g  t h a t  i t s  f u l f i l m e n t  i s  u s u a l l y  someth ing t h a t  
t h e  prom isee  w ants .  How can Jones be s a i d  ' t o  w a n t ’ i f  he 
i s  n e v e r  t r o u b l e d  by th e  n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  o f  a promise?  
Perhaps i t  i s  in  a C r e t a n ’ s n a t u r e  t o  be t r o u b l e d  b u t  t o  
f e e l  no resentm ent?  The C re ta n  n a t u r e  would have t o  la c k  
o t h e r  s e n t im e n t s  a l s o  t h a t  a r e  needs f o r  pe rso n s ,  such as 
r e l i a n c e  and t r u s t .  I t  would n ever  o ccur  t o  a C r e ta n  t h a t  
he m ig h t  depend upon a n o th e r  person t o  do som eth ing ,  when 
t h e  l a t t e r  promises  t h a t  he w i l l  do i t .  They would d i f f e r  
f rom  us a l s o  in  l a c k i n g  a sense o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
i n t e g r i t y ,  honour,  s e l f - f i d e l i t y .  These a r e  q u i t e
fun d am en ta l  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  t o  be w i t h o u t .  I f  what  I  
argued in  th e  e a r l i e r  c h a p te rs  i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l ,  
a t  t h e  end o f  a l l  o f  t h i s ,  t h a t  we a r e  s t i l l  t a l k i n g  about  
a p e rso n .
N e i t h e r  co u ld  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between C r e ta n  s o c i e t y  and
o u rs  be e x p l a i n e d ,  a l a  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce, as m e re ly  a
m a t t e r  o f  th e  fo rm e r  l a c k i n g  an i n s t i t u t i o n  which t h e  l a t t e r
possesses .  I t  would mean t h a t  a whole  range o f  s o c i a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  we e n j o y ,  based on t r u s t
and r e l i a n c e ,  do no t  occur  in  t h e  C r e t a n s ’ way o f  l i f e .  As
M .M id g le y  ( 1 9 7 9 : 3 0 3 )  says:
We want deep and l a s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  And because  
th e s e  a r e  o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t ,  we "b ind  o u r s e lv e s "  in  
a l l  s o r t s  o f  ways t o  go th rough  w i t h  w h a te v e r  we 
have s t a r t e d . . .
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M a r r i a g e  i s  one such a r ra n g e m e n t ,  so a r e  o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
t h a t  we f i n d  in  f a m i l y  l i f e ,  f r i e n d s h i p ,  c o - o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  
n e i g h b o u r s ,  p l a y i n g  games e t c . , in  f a c t  any fo rm  o f  
r e c i p r o c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  based on mutual  t r u s t  o r  r e l i a n c e .  
I n  such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  we b ind  o u r s e lv e s  w i t h  vows, p ro m is e s ,  
agre e m e n ts ,  u n d e r s ta n d in g s .  Presumably t h e  C r e t a n s  do n o t  
go in  f o r  deep, l a s t i n g ,  o r  even casua l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
I n  a w id e r  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  th e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  C r e ta n  s o c i e t y  
would be such t h a t ,  t o  pa ra p h ra s e  Hobbes (op c i t : 1 0 0 ) ,  t h e r e  
c o u ld  be no p la c e  f o r  i n d u s t r y ;  no c u l t u r e  o f  t h e  e a r t h ;  no 
n a v i g a t i o n ,  nor use o f  commodit ies  t h a t  may be im p o r ted  by 
s e a ,  and so on. A t  b e s t ,  th e  economic c o n d i t i o n  suggested
would be one in  which t h e r e  a r e  no s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s ,  an
abundance o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s t r e n g t h ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  e n e rg y ,  
s k i l l ,  so t h a t  peo p le  do no t  need t o  c o - o p e r a t e  o r  r e l y  upon 
each o t h e r  a t  a l l .  These a r e  n o t  m e re ly  s u p e r f i c i a l
d i f f e r e n c e s  between our  and t h e i r  p r a c t i c e s  and
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The C re ta n s  would have t o  do w i t h o u t  most  
t h i n g s  t h a t  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  s o c i e t y  as we know i t .  T h is  
may be an a p r i o r i  p o s s i b i l i t y  bu t  no t  an a c t u a l  c o n d i t i o n  
o f  a human s o c i e t y .
I n  o t h e r  words i f ,  as P h i l l i p s  and Mounce s u g g e s t ,  t h e  
C r e t a n s  a r e  peo p le  who have a language in  which th e y  can 
s t a t e  what  t h e y  want and what th e y  in t e n d  t o  do, and in  
which r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  t r u s t  and r e l i a n c e  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
t h e  u t t e r a n c e  o f  " I  p r o m i s e . . . "  ( o r  an e q u i v a l e n t  p h r a s e ) ;  
i f  t h e y  f e e l  r e s e n tm e n t ,  o r  g u i l t ,  when th e y  a r e  le t - d o w n  o r  
l e t  a n o t h e r  down, then  t o  meet t h e  needs d e s c r ib e d  th e  
C r e t a n s  w i l l  have a moral norm o f  p r o m is e - k e e p in g .  Or more 
c a u t i o u s l y ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine  what  c o n d i t i o n s  
P h i l l i p s  and Mounce have in  mind which m ig h t  sug gest  t h a t  
t h e y  do n o t .
I  have a n a ly z e d  th e  concept  o f  p ro m is in g  in  te rm s  o f  ( i ) -
( i v ) .  And I  have c la im e d  t h a t  when i t  i s  so a n a ly z e d ,  
' k e e p i n g  p r o m is e s ’ m a t te r s  t o  us m o r a l l y  because i t  meets  
t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  n ee d s (b )  t h a t  we have f o r  t r u s t  and mutual
r e l i a n c e  and t h e  n e e d (b )  f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy; whereas  
p r o m i s e - b r e a k i n g  m a t t e r s  t o  us,  si nc e  i t  f r u s t r a t e s  t h e s e  
needs.  A g a in ,  I  do no t  want  t o  say h e re  t h a t  i t  sho u ld  
m a t t e r  m o r a l l y  t o  us.  However I  do want t o  s ay ,  even in  t h e  
C r e t a n  moral  p r a c t i c e ,  t h a t  'Jones  t r u s t e d  Smith  t o  repay  
t h e  money’ i s  a p r im a f a c i e  good reason f o r  t h e  judgem ent  
'S m i t h  ought  t o  keep h i s  promise t o  repay  J o n e s ’ .
L e t  us now t u r n  t o  a commonly a cc ep ted  moral v a l u e  which  
t y p i c a l l y  f i g u r e s  in  our  l a r g e r  s c a l e  a t ta c h m e n t s ,  namely  
o u r  e v e ry d a y  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d u ty  t o  be j u s t ,  o r  
f a i r .  What e x a c t l y  does t h i s  in v o lv e ?  How can a commitment  
t o  t h i s  moral v a lu e  be e x p la i n e d  in  te rm s o f  needs?
Rawls on a sense o f  j u s t i c e
We do n o t  have t o  s t a r t  f rom s c r a t c h .  The i d e a  o f  
j u s t i c e ,  as f a i r n e s s ,  has been d iscus sed  in  d e t a i l  by 
J .R a w ls  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  He suggests  t h a t  our  commonsense p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  j u s t i c e  can be i d e n t i f i e d  and j u s t i f i e d ,  i f  we employ th e  
d e c i s i o n  p ro ce d u re  he c a l l s  ' t h e  v e i l  o f  i g n o r a n c e ’ . So l e t  
us look  a t  t h i s .
To use t h e  p r o c e d u re ,  Rawls t e l l s  us, each person must  
a t t e m p t  t o  make a d e c is i o n  about  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  
g o v e r n in g  t h e  s o c i a l  and economic system t h a t  he o r  she  
f a v o u r s ,  w h i l e  im a g in in g  them se lves  t o  be i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e i r  
p r e s e n t  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  ( c l a s s ,  p o s i t i o n ) ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  
t a l e n t s ,  w e a l t h ,  as w e l l  as assuming t h a t  th e y  la c k  any 
knowledge o f  t'he course  o f  h i s t o r y  and t h e  p r e s e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s o c i e t y .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  th e y  must imagine  
th e m s e lv e s  i g n o r a n t  o f  t h e i r  own p r o b a b le  s t a t u s  ( e t c . )  in  
t h e  s o c i e t y  a f t e r  th e  c h o ic e  has been made. They would  
choose,  in  o t h e r  words, in  ignoranc e  o f  t h e i r  own 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  once th e  v e i l  has been l i f t e d .  Each 
p a r t i c i p a n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  should  t a k e  s e r i o u s l y  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he or  she cou ld  end up a t  t h e  bottom o f  t h e  
heap,  w i t h o u t  any t a l e n t s ,  w e a l t h ,  s o c i a l  s t a t u s ,  in  th e  
w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y .  (A w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y ,  we a r e  t o l d ,
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i s  one in  which ( a )  eve ryone  a c c e p ts  t h e  same p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
j u s t i c e  and ( b )  t h e  b a s ic  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  known t o  
s a t i s f y  th e s e  p r i n c i p l e s . )
S in c e  no r a t i o n a l  person would want  h i m s e l f  t o  be 
d e p r i v e d  o f  s o c i a l  and economic a d v a n ta g e s ,  Rawls argues  
t h a t  each p a r t i c i p a n t  r a t i o n a l l y  would t a k e  c a r e  t o  see t h a t  
t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  such t h i n g s  as s o c i a l  goods, r i g h t s  and 
o b l i g a t i o n s ,  i s  as e q u i t a b l e  as p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  
e n v is a g e d .  I f  t h e r e  was a s o c i a l  o r  economic p o s i t i o n  
m a rk e d ly  worse than  o t h e r s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  chooser  
co u ld  f i n d  h i m s e l f  in  i t .  Being i g n o r a n t  -  o r  r a t h e r  
im a g in in g  th em se lves  t o  be i g n o r a n t  -  o f  t h e i r  own 
p r e j u d i c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  a l s o ,  th e y  would seek an o b j e c t i v e ,  
r a t i o n a l  way o f  a r r i v i n g  a t  d e c i s i o n s  in  s i t u a t i o n s  where  
t h e r e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s .  I n  f a c t ,  a l l  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  would seem t o  f a v o u r  th e  same p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  
g o v e r n in g  t h e  s o c i a l  and economic system.  T h is  i s  because  
each p a r t i c i p a n t  would be d e l i b e r a t i n g  in  t h e  same manner,  
w i t h  r o u g h ly  th e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  and th e y  would be us ing  
t h e  same d e c i s i o n  p ro c e d u re .  Rawls suggests  t h a t  t h i s  would  
le a d  t o  a u n i fo r m  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s . 164
He goes on t o  argue ( 1 9 7 2 : 6 0 )  t h a t  two p r i n c i p l e s  o f
j u s t i c e  t h a t  would be s e l e c t e d  from th e  s i t u a t i o n  d e s c r ib e d ,
which he c a l l s  th e  ' o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ’ , would be:
F i r s t :  each person i s  t o  have equal  r i g h t  t o  th e  
most e x t e n s i v e  b a s ic  l i b e r t y  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  s i m i l a r  
l i b e r t y  f o r  o t h e r s .
Second: s o c i a l  and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s  a r e  t o  be 
a r ra n g e d  so t h a t  they  a r e  both ( a )  r e a s o n a b ly  
ex p e c te d  t o  be t o  e v e r y o n e ’ s advan tage  and ( b )  
a t t a c h e d  t o  p o s i t i o n s  and o f f i c e s  open t o  a l l .
Rawls makes a number o f  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  v e r s i o n  above165
b u t  t h e y  need not  concern us.  N e i t h e r  w i l l  we examine here
t h e  reasons  why he t h i n k s  t h a t  th e  two p r i n c i p l e s  would be
chosen by persons in  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  as t h e i r  common
c o n c e p t io n  o f  j u s t i c e .  What does concern us ,  however,  a r e
R a w l s ’ p s y c h o lo g ic a l  assum ptions .
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He b e l i e v e s  t h a t  w i t h  h i s  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  he has 
d e s c r ib e d  a s i m p l i f i e d  s i t u a t i o n  demanding n o t h in g  more th a n  
t h e  c o n s id e r e d ,  though h y p o t h e t i c a l ,  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
o f  each o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  R a w ls ’ p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  
would be chosen by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  in  o t h e r  words,  who n e e d (a )  
n o t h i n g  more than  ( i )  reason ,  s i n c e  th e  c h o ic e s  in  q u e s t i o n  
a r e  t h e  c o n s id e r e d  judgements  made in  t h e  r e f l e c t i v e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  a v e i l  o f  ig n o r a n c e ,  and ( i i )  a re g a r d  f o r  
h i s  o r  h e r  own h y p o t h e t i c a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ;  ( e x t e n d i n g  o v e r ,  
p e rh a p s ,  a l a r g e r  s e l f ,  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a f a m i l y ) .
I  have two q u e s t io n  h e r e .  The f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  ( 1 )  i s :  has
Rawls ,  in  f a c t ,  r e s t r i c t e d  h i s  assum pt ions  m e r e ly  t o
h y p o t h e t i c a l  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ?  I  t h i n k  n o t .  I  hope
t o  show, b r i e f l y ,  t h a t  Rawls has in  f a c t  assumed a p r im a
f a c i e  v a l u e ,  namely,  s e l f - r e s p e c t .  However Rawls d e n ie s
t h i s .  He c la im s  ( i b i d : 586 )  t h a t
. . . t h e  n o t io n  o f  r e s p e c t  o r  o f  t h e  i n h e r e n t  w or th  o f  
persons i s  no t  a s u i t a b l e  b a s is  f o r  a r r i v i n g  a t  
t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s .
Y e t  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  Rawls b e l i e v e s  t h a t  a person who
chooses in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  seek t o  p r e s e r v e  h i s
' s e l f - r e s p e c t ’ in  th e  s o c i e t y ,  once t h e  v e i l  o f  ig n o ra n c e
has been removed.
To see t h i s  c o n s id e r  t h e  case o f  Sm ith ,  in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
p o s i t i o n ,  choosing p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e .  We noted  t h a t  t h e  
p ro c e d u re  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  Smith  t a k e s  s e r i o u s l y  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he w i l l  end up be ing  anyone,  in  any 
p o s i t i o n ,  once th e  v e i l  i s  removed. We a r e  t o l d  by Rawls  
t h a t  i f  Smith  i s  r a t i o n a l ,  he w i l l  choose t h e  F i r s t  
p r i n c i p l e .  Why should  Smith choose equal  l i b e r t y  f o r  
h i m s e l f ?  I t  i s  n o t  enough t o  say 'on t h e  b a s is  o f  r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ . Smith may t h i n k  t h a t  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  -  
econom ic ,  hous ing ,  e d u c a t io n ,  h e a l t h  -  would be b e t t e r  
s e r v e d ,  n o t  by h i s  be ing 'e q u a l  t o ’ bu t  by h i s  be ing  
dependent  upon o t h e r s  in  th e  w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y .  A f o o l  
s a t i s f i e d ,  r a t h e r  than  S o c ra te s  d i s s a t i s f i e d .  In  th e s e  
r e s p e c t s ,  i t  may be more r a t i o n a l  f o r  Smith  t o  choose a
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ben ign  o l i g a r c h y  in  which he i s  on l e s s  th a n  equa l  f o o t i n g  
w i t h  o t h e r s .  F o l lo w in g  from our  d i s c u s s io n  in  C h a p te r  F i v e ,  
what  Sm ith  would f o r f e i t  by h i s  be ing  dependent  on o t h e r s  in  
t h i s  way, i s  n o t  c a p tu r e d  by ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ b u t  by t h e  more 
p r e c i s e  e v a l u a t i v e  n o t i o n  o f  ' s e l f - r e s p e c t ’ . H is  s e l f -  
r e s p e c t ,  we n o te d ,  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  Smith  i s  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  
t h a t  he i s  n o t  o v e r l y  dependent  on o t h e r s  in  many o f  h i s  
p r o j e c t s  and in  o t h e r  i m p o r ta n t  c h o ic e s  he makes in  h i s  
l i f e .  A l l  r a t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  choosing  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  th e  
way t h a t  Rawls d e s c r i b e s ,  w i l l  choose in  a way which w i l l  
p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  own s e l f - r e s p e c t . 168
F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  a r e ,  in  e f f e c t ,
p r i n c i p l e s  which r e q u i r e  t h a t  one shows equal  r e s p e c t  t o  a l l
members in  t h e  w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y .  Rawls seems t o  a d m i t
t h i s .  He w r i t e s  ( i b i d : 4 78 )
. . . f o r  one who und ers ta nds  and a c c e p ts  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
d o c t r i n e ,  th e  s e n t im e n t  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  n o t  a 
d i f f e r e n t  d e s i r e  f rom t h a t  t o  a c t  on p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  
r a t i o n a l  i n d i v i d u a l s  would con sen t  t o  in  an i n i t i a l  
s i t u a t i o n  which g iv e s  eve ryone  equal  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
as a moral person.
Which seems t o  say t h a t  th e  whole c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e
o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  des igned t o  g u a ra n te e  t h a t  t h e  s e l f -
r e s p e c t  o f  e v e r y  p a r t i c i p a n t  i s  p r e s e r v e d .
A l l  o f  t h i s ,  o f  co u rs e ,  i s  q u i t e  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  my 
needs t h e s i s .  J u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s ,  as d e f i n e d  by t h e  o r i g i n a l  
p o s i t i o n ,  can be expressed  in  th e  v o c a b u la r y  o f  needs.  For  
i n s t a n c e ,  t o  choose on th e  grounds o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  i s  t o  choose,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  o n e ’ s n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  f o r  s u r v i v a l ,  avo ida nce  o f  i n j u r y ,  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and so on, w i l l  be met in  t h e  w e l l - o r d e r e d  
s o c i e t y .
T h i s  b r in g s  us t o  th e  second q u e s t io n  I  m ent ioned:  Given  
R a w l s ’ p s y c h o lo g ic a l  assum pt ions ,  why would anyone a c t  in  
t h e  ways demanded by th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  once th e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  have been removed? In  
o t h e r  words,  we want t o  ask ( 2 ) :  Are R a w ls ’ p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
assum ptions  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e x p l a i n  why a person has a m o t iv e
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f o r  com ply ing  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  once t h e  
w e l 1 - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  has been e s t a b l i s h e d ?  We need t o  d i g  
d e e p e r  t o  answer q u e s t i o n  ( 2 ) .  What I  hope t o  show i s  t h a t  
o u r  o r d i n a r y  sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  as f a i r n e s s ,  i n v o l v e s  t h e  
need f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy; which i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
f ro m  t h e  assum ptions Rawls d e fen d s .
L e t  me p u t  t h e  problem r a i s e d  in  ( 2 )  a n o th e r  way.  
A l th o u g h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  procedure  Rawls o f f e r s  -  a s k in g  what  
p r i n c i p l e s  we would choose,  i f  we had t o  choose f rom  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  -  i s  an in g e n io u s  way o f  d e f i n i n g  o r
u n d e r s ta n d in g  j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s ,  i t  does n o t  seem t o  g i v e  us 
a re a s o n ,  o r  m o t iv e ,  f o r  a c t i n g  in  a j u s t  o r  f a i r  way once 
t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  have been removed.  
An e g o i s t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  could  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  what  he would  
do i f  he were in  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  co u ld  be
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom what he would th en  do, once th e  
s o c i e t y  had been s e t  up. Rawls has t o  t e l l  us why anyone  
would a c t  in  th e  ways demanded by t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  
once t h e y  a r e  no t  c o n s t r a i n e d  by th e  p ro c e d u r a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n . 167
To answer t h i s  q u e s t io n  Rawls o f f e r s  a n o th e r  p la n k  o f  h i s  
t h e o r y ;  a p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p lan k  co n c e rn in g  moral m o t i v a t i o n .  
He r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  a t h e o r y  o f  j u s t i c e  must r e l a t e  t o  a c t u a l  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  laws about  human m o t i v a t i o n .  He says  
( i b i d : 4 5 5 )
However a t t r a c t i v e  a c o n c e p t io n  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  on 
o t h e r  grounds,  i t  i s  s e r i o u s l y  d e f e c t i v e  i f  th e
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  moral psychology a r e  such t h a t  i t
f a i l s  t o  engender  in  human be ings  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  
d e s i r e  t o  a c t  upon i t .
To s e r v e  t h i s  end, Rawls adds t o  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e
a p a r a l l e l  account  o f  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  m o t i v a t i o n  a person
needs i f  he i s  t o  have ' a  sense o f  j u s t i c e ’ ( v i z .  t o  c a r r y
on a c t i n g  in  a way t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  r e q u i r e ) .
I t  i s  h e re  t h a t  we f i n d  th e  r o o t  o f  R a w ls ’ d i f f i c u l t y .  
Having  argued t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  m ent ioned above  
would be t h e  ones chosen, on n o th in g  more than  th e  
assum ption  o f  th e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f
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j u d g e r s  in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  c l e a r l y  he c a n n o t  th en  
su g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  b a s ic  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  make-up o f  someone w i t h  
a sense o f  j u s t i c e  i s  c o m p le t e ly  d i f f e r e n t .  So d raw in g  on 
P i a g e t ,  K o h lb e rg ,  and o t h e r s ,  Rawls a t t e m p t s  t o  e x p l a i n  ' a  
sense o f  j u s t i c e ’ as th e  outcome o f  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  
He i d e n t i f i e s  a t h r e e - s t a g e  process o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
m a t u r a t i o n ,  w i t h  a co r re s p o n d in g  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  law t o  each  
o f  t h e  s t a g e s .  These s o - c a l l e d  laws a r e  in  f a c t  t e n d e n c ie s  
w h ic h ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  be ing  e q u a l ,  he c la im s  a c t u a l l y  a p p ly  t o  
t h e  way in  which peo p le  n o r m a l ly  dev e lo p  a sense o f  j u s t i c e .
The F i r s t  Law i s  based on th e  r e c i p r o c a l  lo ve  a c h i l d
w i l l  f e e l  f o r  i t s  l o v i n g  p a r e n t s ,  ( w i t h  th e  p a r e n t s  l a y i n g
down moral  p r e c e p ts  accepted  as a u t h o r i t a t i v e  by th e  c h i l d ) .
Rawls ( i b i d : 4 9 0 )  w r i t e s :
F i r s t  Law: g iven  t h a t  f a m i l y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  j u s t ,  
and t h a t  th e  p a r e n ts  lo ve  th e  c h i l d  and m a n i f e s t l y  
e x p re s s  t h e i r  lo ve  by c a r i n g  f o r  h i s  good, then  
t h e  c h i l d ,  r e c o g n is in g  t h e i r  e v i d e n t  lo ve  o f  him,  
comes t o  lo ve  them.
N e x t  comes a d e v e lo p in g  sense o f  m o r a l i t y ,  based upon mutual
t r u s t  and f r i e n d s h i p .  Given t h a t  t h e  c h i l d ’ s c a p a c i t y  f o r
f e l l o w - f e e l i n g  has been r e a l i z e d  by a c q u i r i n g  a t ta c h m e n ts  in
acc ordance  w i t h  th e  F i r s t  Law, and t h a t  s o c i a l  a r rangem ents
a r e  j u s t  and known by a l l  t o  be so, then  a person
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  deve lops  a long  th e  f o l l o w i n g  l i n e s ,  ( i b i d)
Second L a w : . . . t h i s  person d eve lo ps  t i e s  o f  f r i e n d l y  
f e e l i n g  and t r u s t  toward o t h e r s  in  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  
as t h e y  w i t h  e v i d e n t  i n t e n t i o n  comply w i t h  t h e i r  
d u t i e s  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  and l i v e  up t o  th e  i d e a l s  o f  
t h e i r  s t a t i o n .
A t  t h i s  s ta g e  o f  h i s  deve lopm ent ,  we a r e  t o l d ,  th e  
i n d i v i d u a l  appears  t o  unders tand  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  
b u t  t h e  m o t iv e  f o r  comply ing w i t h  them seems t o  be based on 
t i e s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,  f e l l o w - f e e l i n g  and th e  concern  f o r  
a p p r o b a t io n  from o t h e r  members o f  h i s  community.  The 
i n d i v i d u a l  s t i l l  l a c k s  a w id e r ,  moral sense o f  j u s t i c e .  He 
w i l l  la c k  a concern ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  f o r  th o se  w i t h  whom he 
has no a c q u a in ta n c e .
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F i n a l l y  t h e r e  i s  a t h i r d  s ta g e  w i t h  i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  law o f
moral  d ev e lo p m en t .  G iven t h a t  t h e  young p e r s o n ’ s c a p a c i t y
f o r  f e l l o w - f e e l i n g  has been r e a l i z e d  ( i n  accordance  w i t h  th e
f i r s t  two l a w s ) ,  and t h a t  a s o c i e t y ’ s i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  j u s t
and a r e  p u b l i c l y  known t o  be so, Rawls adds ( i b i d :491 ) t h a t
t h e  n e x t  s t a g e  o f  deve lopm ent  i s :
T h i r d  L a w : . . . t h i s  person a c q u i r e s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d in g  
sense o f  j u s t i c e  as he re c o g n is e s  t h a t  he and th o s e  
f o r  whom he c a r e s  a r e  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  th e s e  
a r r a n g e m e n t s . By s ta g e  t h r e e ,  a person has d eve lo ped  
a m ature  moral  o u t l o o k  and i s  m o t iv a te d  t o  comply
w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e .
One q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  i s  why th e  whole deve lo p m en ta l
p rocess  sho u ld  g e t  under way in  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  What,  in
a d d i t i o n  t o  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  i s  th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l
s o u rc e  o f  t h e  d e v e lo p in g  sense o f  j u s t i c e ?  R a w ls ’ answer i s
t h a t  a t  t h e  two e a r l i e r  s ta g e s  o f  m a t u r a t i o n  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l
p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  a p p l i e s .  Love, f r i e n d s h i p  and a
sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  a r i s e  in  us, so t o  speak ,  due t o  our
awareness o f  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  persons t o  a c t  f o r  our
good. We r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e y  w ish us w e l l  and, in  r e t u r n ,
we c a r e  f o r  t h e i r  w e l l - b e i n g .  Thus Rawls ( i b i d : 4 9 4 )  adds;
. . . w e  a c q u i r e  a t ta c h m e n ts  t o  persons and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a c c o r d in g  t o  how we p e r c e i v e  our  (own)  
good t o  be a f f e c t e d  by them. The b a s ic  id e a  i s  one 
o f  r e c i p r o c i t y ,  a tendency  t o  answer in  k i n d .
I n i t i a l l y ,  a c h i l d  r e c i p r o c a t e s  because i t  r e c e i v e s
b e n e f i t s .  I n  l a t e r  s t a g e s ,  as an a d u l t ,  i t s  responses t o
o t h e r  persons can be n o n - s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  However,  i t  must
be emphasized t h a t  t h e  o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  s e n t i m e n t  i s  brought
ab o u t  o n l y  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  a d u l t  once hav ing  r e c e iv e d
b e n e f i t s ;  f o r  a deve loped  sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  a t  t h e  e a r l i e r
s ta g e s  o f  moral deve lopm ent ,  we r e q u i r e  ' a  r e t u r n  in  k i n d ’ .
Our sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  a t  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e ,  i s  th u s  based upon
r e c i p r o c i t y .
I  want  t o  make t h r e e  s h o r t  p o i n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  we can see  
now t h e  two p a r t s  o f  R a w ls ’ t h e o r y .  On t h e  one hand, t h e r e  
i s  t h e  argument which shows us t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  a 
person w i l l  i d e n t i f y  m e re ly  by r a t i o n a l l y  r e f l e c t i n g  upon
h i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  when in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
p o s i t i o n ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  i s  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  
which p u r p o r t s  t o  t e l l  us how a person a c q u i r e s  t h e  m o t iv e  
t o  a c t  j u s t l y  once t h e  w e l1 - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  i s  under  way.  
Our concern  i s  w i t h  th e  l a t t e r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t h e s i s .  
S e c o n d ly ,  we shou ld  n o t i c e  t h a t  R a w ls ’ d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  i s  in  te rm s o f  t h e i r  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  h i s  
a c c o u n t  o f  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  b a s is  o f  a sense o f  j u s t i c e  i s  
concerned  w i t h  a c t u a l  m o t ive s  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  be found  
i n  i n f a n t s  and w h ich ,  when combined w i t h  r e c i p r o c i t y ,  
d e v e lo p s  i n t o  a sense o f  j u s t i c e .  E m p i r i c a l  c la im s  
c o n c e r n in g  t h e  m o t iv e  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a r e  d i s t i n c t  f rom  
th o s e  which p u r p o r t  t o  i d e n t i f y  what  a person would ju d g e  t o  
be in  h i s  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  The fo r m e r  t h e o r y  i s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  th e  l a t t e r .  A t h i r d  p o i n t  t h a t  sho u ld  be 
emphasized i s  t h a t  Rawls has o f f e r e d  a t h e o r y  o f  needs t h a t  
i s  s i m p l e r  th an  o u r s .  To have a deve lo ped  sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  
a l l  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  needs i s  r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and r e c i p r o c i t y .  He does n o t  n e e d (b )  ' a c t i v e  
s y m p a th y ’ . The n e x t  q u e s t io n  i s :  i s  R a w ls ’ a cc ount  o f  a 
sense o f  j u s t i c e  s a t i s f a c t o r y ?
J u s t i c e  and th e  n e e d (b )  f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy
R a w ls ’ laws o f  moral psychology p u r p o r t  t o  t e l l  us how 
members o f  a w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  come by a sense o f  
j u s t i c e .  They a p p ly ,  presumably ,  t o  c i t i z e n s  o f  much le s s  
w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t i e s  l i k e  our  own. For i f  t h e y  do n o t ,  
we have no reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  R a w ls ’ j u s t  s o c i e t y  i s  
p o s s i b l e .  I t  would mean t h a t  h i s  concept  o f  j u s t i c e  exceeds  
a n y t h i n g  t h a t  we a r e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  c a p a b le  o f  a t t a i n i n g .  
So we ought  t o  be a b l e  t o  t e s t  h i s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c l a i m s ,  
v i z .  t h a t  our  o r d i n a r y  sense o f  j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s  i s  based on 
n o t h i n g  more than  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y .  L e t  us 
c o n s id e r  t h e  e v id e n c e .
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A t  f i r s t  b lu s h ,  t h e r e  seem t o  be many c o n t e x t s  where a 
sense o f  j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s  i s  demanded, in  which s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y  ( i )  does n o t  have any p a r t  t o  p l a y  a t  
a l l  and ( i i )  where t h e  c o n t e x t  demands more th a n  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y .  I n  s u p p o r t  o f  ( i ) ,  t h e r e  a r e  some 
c o n t e x t s  in  which R a w ls ’ t h e o r y  o f  m o t i v a t i o n  f a c e s  
p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o r ,  in  some c as es ,  l o g i c a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  One p r a c t i c a l  prob lem  i s  t o  e x p l a i n  why we 
t h i n k ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  our  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  be f a i r  e x te n d s  
t o  t h e  w id e r  w o r ld  community.  I  m ent ioned e a r l i e r  th e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d r o u g h t ,  fam ine  and d i s e a s e ,  s u f f e r e d  by 
p e o p le  in  t h e  Horn o f  A f r i c a .  C o n f in ed  t o  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  
r e c i p r o c i t y  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  why we shou ld  e v e r  f e e l  
m o t iv a t e d  t o  be f a i r  t o  th e s e  u n f o r t u n a t e  p e o p le ,  when t h e r e  
i s  no p r a c t i c a l  chance o f  our  r e c e i v i n g  any b e n e f i t s  in  
r e t u r n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  appear  t o  be l o g i c a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  R a w ls ’ t h e o r y  when i t  comes t o  e x p l a i n i n g
why we should  t a k e  s e r i o u s l y  th e  u n f a i r n e s s  t o  f u t u r e  
g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  t o d a y ’ s s p o i l i n g  o f  th e  a i r ,  w a t e r ,  and 
c o u n t r y s i d e .  What cou ld  f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s  p o s s i b l y  do t o  
b e n e f i t  us? A n other  c o n t e x t  in  which a sense o f  j u s t i c e  i s  
r e q u i r e d  y e t  where i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  odd t o  suppose t h a t  t h i s  
i s  based upon r e c i p r o c a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  concerns th e  
f a i r n e s s  we demand in  th e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  a n im a ls .  Rawls
a c c e p t s ,  bu t  does not  d is c u s s ,  t h a t  we have d u t i e s  towards
a n im a ls  ( i b i d : 512)
. . . d u t i e s  o f  compassion and h um an ity .
He would  r e a d i l y  a g r e e ,  no dou bt ,  t h a t  th e s e  d u t i e s  need 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s u p p o r t .  The p s y c h o lo g ic a l  s u p p o r t ,  s u r e l y ,  
can n o t  be founded on th e  f a c t  t h a t  we have r e c e iv e d  b e n e f i t s  
f rom  them. I f  t h i s  i s  so, we must c a l l  on someth ing o t h e r  
th a n  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y .
A c o n t e x t  ( i i )  ( v i z .  where i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see t h a t  
Rawls account  would be a s u f f i c i e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  a sense  
Q-p Tq I r n e s s )  i s  when th e  l a t t e r  i s  d i r e c t e d  towards  c e r t a i n  
members o f  our  own community.  Even in  th e  w e l l - o r d e r e d
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s o c i e t y ,  I  presume t h e r e  w i l l  a lw ays  be th o s e  who have n o t  
done a n y t h i n g  t o  m e r i t  r e c i p r o c i t y .  I n  l e s s  w e l l - o r d e r e d  
s o c i e t i e s ,  l i k e  B r i t a i n ,  we know t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  some p e o p le  
who do n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f rom which t h e y  a r e  
b e n e f i t t i n g ,  e . g .  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ,,s c r o u n g e r s ,‘ in  a w e l f a r e  
s t a t e ,  who add t o  t h e  c o s t  o f  w e l f a r e  s e r v i c e s  and do 
n o t h in g  in  r e t u r n ,  o r  th o se  who c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  by c o m m it t in g  c r i m e s . 168 Given  
o n l y  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and t h e  tenden cy  t o  r e c i p r o c a t e ,  i t  i s  
n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  we -  th o se  o f  us in  more advantageous  
p o s i t i o n s  -  would f e e l  m o t iv a t e d  t o  e x te n d  j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s  
t o  t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s .  However many p eo p le  would say ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  as we l e a r n  more about  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
p o v e r t y ,  l i f e  in  h i g h - d e n s i t y  c i t y  d w e l l i n g s ,  th e  s o c i a l  
p r e s s u r e s  on c r i m i n a l s  (why t h e y  commit c r i m e s ) ,  and so on,  
we can see t h a t  t o  w i t h h o l d  b e n e f i t s  f rom  those  who have  
n e v e r  s u p p o r te d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  q u i t e  u n f a i r .  A sense o f  
j u s t i c e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  th e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  need do n o th in g  in  
r e t u r n . 169 The p o i n t  a g a in  i s  t h a t  a commonly acc e p te d  sense  
o f  j u s t i c e  appears  t o  be based on more than  t h e  m o t ive s  
which Rawls has i d e n t i f i e d .
The a d d i t i o n a l  e le m e n t  we a r e  lo o k in g  f o r ,  m oreover ,  i s  
p r e s e n t  even a t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  s t a g e s  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
dev e lo p m en t .  The o t h e r  day my t h r e e  y e a r  o l d  d a u g h te r  saw 
a dog chase a c a t  up a t r e e  and proceed t o  e a t  th e  c a t ’ s 
d i n n e r .  She was e v i d e n t l y  moved by t h e  c a t ’ s p r e d ic a m e n t .  
She a t te m p te d  t o  chase t h e  dog a w a y .170 How a r e  we t o  
e x p l a i n  h e r  m o t iv e  t o  do someth ing about  w hat ,  p resum ably ,  
seemed t o  her  t o  be an u n f a i r  s i t u a t i o n ?  She had no reason  
t o  t h i n k  t h a t  she had b e n e f i t t e d  f rom  th e  c a t  o r  e v e r  w i l l .  
R e c i p r o c i t y  i s  o u t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n .  What would R a w ls ’ 
t h e o r y  r e q u i r e  in  o r d e r  t o  d e s c r i b e  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
make-up o f  someone l i k e  my d au ghte r?  A p l a u s i b l e  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  i s  t h a t  her  conduct  was m o t iv a te d  
by h e r  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  t h e  c a t .  F u r th e rm o re ,  I  have  
e v e r y  reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  l i k e  most normal c h i l d r e n  even
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a t  t h a t  age ,  h e r  c a p a c i t y  f o r  sympathy e x te n d s  t o  most o t h e r  
s e n t i e n t  c r e a t u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  o t h e r  human b e in g s .
Where a r e  we t o  say t h a t  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  -  t o  show a c t i v e  
sympathy i n  t h e  absence o f  b e n e f i t s  r e c e i v e d  -  o r i g i n a t e s ?  
We m ig h t  a g re e  w i t h  Rawls t h a t  th e  c h i l d  would n o t  be 
s y m p a t h e t i c  tow ards  o t h e r s  u n le s s  h e r  p a r e n t s ,  o r  some o t h e r  
a d u l t s ,  showed her  s i m i l a r  sympathy. T h is  i s  t o  ad a p t  
R a w ls ’ F i r s t  Law. Supplemented w i t h  sympathy,  R a w ls ’ 
acc o u n t  o f  t h e  second s ta g e  o f  moral  deve lopm ent  co u ld  a l s o  
be d i f f e r e n t .  A c co rd in g  t o  Rawls ,  young peo p le  do n o t  have  
a sense o f  j u s t i c e  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  even though th e y  
u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  in  s o c i e t y .  
I t  seems more p l a u s i b l e  t o  argue t h a t  t h e r e  i s  q u i t e  a 
d ev e lo p ed  sense o f  f a i r n e s s  a t  t h i s  s ta g e  in  t h e  developm ent  
o f  most c h i l d r e n .  I t  can be seen,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  in  t h e i r  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  t u r n  in  games, o r  t o  s h a re  w i t h  
o t h e r s ,  o r  t o  p l a y  t h e i r  p a r t  in  a j o i n t  endeavour ,  w h i l e  
f a u l t i n g  o t h e r s  who a r e  n o t  do ing  so.
What p r e v e n t s  Rawls f rom r e c o g n is in g  such conduct  as 
s i g n s  o f  a d e v e lo p in g  sense o f  j u s t i c e ?  I  t h i n k  t h e  answer  
i s  t h a t  because such conduct  i s  u s u a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  c lo s e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i t  does no t  have t h e  b r e a d th  r e q u i r e d  by a 
sense o f  j u s t i c e .  My d a u g h t e r ’ s f r i e n d l y  f e e l i n g s  and t r u s t  
i s  u s u a l l y  t o  be seen in  her  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  her  f a m i l y  
and f r i e n d s .  T h is  i s  t r u e .  However i t  would be wrong to  
s u g g es t  t h a t  she can not  a p p ly  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  f a i r n e s s  t o  
o t h e r s  and e x te n d  t h i s  t o  unknown o t h e r s ,  when th e  o ccas ion  
a r i s e s .  G iven t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy, the  c h i l d  
need n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e s e  unknown o t h e r s  have promoted her  
good, o r  t h a t  t h e y  can be e x p e c te d  t o  do so in  t h e  f u t u r e .
I n t r o d u c i n g  sympathy a t  t h i s  e a r l i e r  s t a g e ,  moreover ,  
would a l l o w  f o r  a more g ra d u a l  deve lopm ent  o f  a sense o f  
j u s t i c e ,  w i t h  an i n c r e a s i n g  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  is s u e s ,  
r a t h e r  th an  s t a r t i n g - f r o m - s c r a t c h  a t  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e .  As 
i t  s t a n d s ,  R a w ls ’ account  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  seems too  
c o m p l ic a t e d  and s o p h i s t i c a t e d .  I t  presupposes an
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u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  q u i t e  
complex p r i n c i p l e s .  A more p l a u s i b l e  acc o u n t  would  
em phas ize  t h e  v a r y i n g  degree  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  b e g in n in g  
w i t h  p r e - r e f l e c t i v e  and p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  in  
young c h i l d r e n ,  and c o n c lu d in g  w i t h  something l i k e  th e  
t h e o r y - 1adened sense o f  j u s t i c e  found in  R a w ls ’ t h i r d  s t a g e .  
Because o f  th e  u n r e s t r i c t e d  g e n e r a l i t y  t o  unknown peo p le  
t h a t  we f i n d  a t  e v e r y  s t a g e ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  sympathy would  
ease t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from one s ta g e  t o  t h e  n e x t . 171
T here  i s  one o t h e r  c o n t e x t  w or th  m e n t io n in g  where a c t i v e
sympathy i s  c r u c i a l  t o  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  our  sense o f
j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s ;  namely ,  p l a y i n g  o n e ’ s p a r t  in  a j o i n t
e n d e a v o u r .  C o n s id e r  th e  s i t u a t i o n  in  which a number o f
p e o p le  s h a re  in  an e n t e r p r i s e ,  where th e  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e y
a l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  t o  overcome a common prob lem .  Or r a t h e r ,
c o n s i d e r  t h e  d i v i s i v e n e s s  t o  th e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  t h a t  we have
a l l  e x p e r ie n c e d ,  when someone then  f a i l s  t o  p u l l  t h e i r
w e i g h t .  The d i v i s i o n  i s  o n ly  h e a le d  by th e  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  by
e v e r y o n e ,  o f  th e  need t o  do t h e i r  f a i r  s h a re .  Are we a b l e
t o  a cc ount  f o r  t h i s  d i v i s i v e n e s s  on th e  R a w ls ian  account?
Rawls t h i n k s  so. He w r i t e s  ( i b i d : 3 4 2 - 3 )
. . . a  person i s  under  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  do h i s  p a r t  
as s p e c i f i e d  by th e  r u l e s  o f  an i n s t i t u t i o n  whenever  
he has v o l u n t a r i l y  acc ep ted  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  
scheme o r  has ta k e n  advantage  o f  th e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
i t  o f f e r s  t o  advance h i s  i n t e r e s t s . . .
I n  o t h e r  words, r e c i p r o c a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  an adequate
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  why we t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  wrong f o r  a person
n o t  t o  be doing h i s  f a i r  s h a re .
However t h e  id e a  o f  'd o in g  o n e ’ s f a i r  s h a r e ’ need not  be 
j u s t i f i e d  by an appeal  t o  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  r e c i p r o c i t y .  The 
k in d  o f  example I  have in  mind i s  where t h e  demand ' t o  do 
o n e ’ s f a i r  s h a r e ’ i s  an appeal  t o  i d e n t i f y  o n e s e l f  w i t h  th e  
common t a s k .  I t  m ight  be t o  h e lp  t o  nurse  a s i c k  r e l a t i v e ,  
o r  t o  g i v e  a i d  t o  peop le  in  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  when t h e y  a r e  
s u f f e r i n g  f rom a n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r ,  o r  t o  h e lp  them t o  r i g h t  
a s o c i a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  i n j u s t i c e . 172 One can make sense o f  
t h e  id e a  o f  do ing o n e ’ s f a i r  s h a re ,  in  such c o n t e x t s ,  where
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no r e c i p r o c a l  adv an tage  has been o r  w i l l  be e n jo y e d  by th e  
p a r t i c i p a n t .  The appeal  t o  f a i r n e s s  h e r e  i s  based upon th e  
s e n t i m e n t  o f  a c t i v e  sympathy, ( o r  t o  s o l i d a r i t y  o r  
f r a t e r n i t y ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a p l a u s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  
our  v iew  o f  t h e  u n f a i r n e s s  o f  someone n o t  ' p u l l i n g  t h e i r  
w e i g h t ’ i s  t h a t  we c o n s id e r  a sense o f  a c t i v e  sympathy t o  
be a b a s ic  c o n s t i t u e n t  o f  each p e r s o n ’ s make-up and we 
d i s a p p r o v e  when t h i s  i s  a lways  o v e r r i d d e n  by s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
E a r l i e r  I  asked t h e  q u e s t io n  ( 2 ) :  do R a w ls ’ p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
assum ptions  e x p l a i n  why a person has a m o t iv e  t o  comply w i t h  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e / f a i r n e s s ?  What t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
above show, I  t h i n k ,  i s  t h a t  R a w ls ’ account  i s  i n c o m p le t e .  
To have a sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  one needs a l s o  a c a p a c i t y  f o r  
a c t i v e  sympathy.  I f  t h i s  i s  so ,  m oreover ,  we can e x p l a i n  
t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  t o  a c t  j u s t l y  in  th e  hard  cas es ,  where th e  
j u d g e r ’ s own i n t e r e s t s ,  ( o r  th e  g e n e r a l  h a p p in e s s ) ,  
c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  th e  demands o f  f a i r n e s s .  An e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  
why p eo p le  choose t o  a c t  j u s t l y  in  th e s e  cases (when t h e y  
do) i s  t h e  need t h e y  have t o  show t h e  a c t i v e  sympathy th e y  
f e e l  f o r  a n o th e r  person w h ich ,  in  such cas es ,  o v e r r i d e s  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o r  th e  g e n e ra l  i n t e r e s t .
One g e n e r a l  p o i n t  in  th e  d is c u s s io n  above r e q u i r e s  
g r e a t e r  emphasis .  I f  what I  have argued i s  c o r r e c t ,  we can 
e x p l a i n  why we approve o f  f a i r n e s s  and d i s a p p ro v e  o f  
u n f a i r n e s s ;  why 'b e in g  f a i r ’ m a t t e r s  t o  us m o r a l l y .  T h i s  i s  
because i t  meets c e r t a i n  needs we have,  one o f  which i s  th e  
need t o  f e e l  and show sympathy. I  am no t  c l a i m i n g  by t h i s  
t h a t  a person m o r a l l y  ought  t o  have a sense o f  j u s t i c e  o r  
choose t o  be f a i r .  I  am c l a i m i n g ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  what  i s  
needed f o r  ' a  sense o f  j u s t i c e ’ , as i t  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  
u n d e r s to o d ,  i s  th e  k in d  o f  n a t u r a l  s e n t im e n t  exp ressed  when 
one person f e e l s  and shows a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  o t h e r s .  A 
person would no t  cease t o  f u n c t i o n  i f  he had no sense o f  
f a i r n e s s .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, a c t i n g  f a i r l y  o r  in  accordance  
w i t h  j u s t i c e  appears  t o  be meet th e  n ee d (b )  we have t o  f e e l  
and show sympathy.
By r e s t r i c t i n g  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  assum ptions  o f  r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and r e c i p r o c i t y ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  Rawls p r e s e n ts  
t o o  narrow  a v iew  o f  our  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs.  Along w i t h  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  needs,  we n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  and show sympathy  
f o r  o t h e r  pe rso n s ,  i f  we a r e  t o  have a sense o f  j u s t i c e /  
f a i r n e s s .  We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  in  C h a p te r  E i g h t .
T h a t  com ple tes  t h e  account  o f  some o f  our  more im p o r t a n t  
moral  b e l i e f s  t h a t  can be e x p l i c a t e d  in  te rm s o f  my needs  
t h e s i s .
C o n c lu s io n  o f  P a r t  Two
I  hope t o  have shown, in  P a r t  Two, t h a t  a l l  persons have  
c e r t a i n  b o d i l y  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs t h a t  must be met i f  
t h e y  t o  f u n c t i o n  o r  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I  have t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  
such needs a r e ,  by th e m s e lv e s ,  n e u t r a l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  moral  
b e l i e f s  y e t  th e y  a r e  th e  b a s is  o f  many o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  
co n c e p ts  in  m o r a l i t y .  Thus I  have argued t h a t  a range o f  
moral  and b r o a d ly  e v a l u a t i v e  n o t i o n s ,  ( e . g .  s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  
r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r s ,  s e l f - i n t e g r i t y , a happy l i f e ,  k i n d n e s s ) ,  
and our  commonsense moral b e l i e f s  r e g a r d i n g  g r a t i t u d e ,  
l o y a l t y ,  t r u t h - t e l l i n g ,  p r o m is e - k e e p in g ,  f a i r n e s s ,  can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  in  terms o f  m eet ing  th e s e  needs.
I t  m ig h t  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  th e  moral n e u t r a l i t y  o f  my 
ac c o u n t  o f  our  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs i s  n o t  c o n v in c in g .  
Presumably  t h i s  i s  because in  a m e t a - e t h i c a l  d i s c u s s io n  o f  
o u r  o r d i n a r y  moral b e l i e f s  and e v a l u a t i o n s ,  t h e  l a t t e r  c a r r y  
o v e r  an e v a l u a t i v e  tone  t o  th e  need in  q u e s t i o n .  Thus I  
have s u p p o r te d  th e  c la im s  above by s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  we 
n o r m a l ly  a p p ro v e /d is a p p r o v e  o f  an a c t i o n  o r  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t  
because i t  means t h a t  th e  need in  q u e s t i o n  i s / i s  n o t  met.  
F u r th e r m o r e  I  have t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a sense in  
which we r a t i o n a l l y  cou ld  no t  acknowledge t h e  same need and 
y e t  r e a c t  d i f f e r e n t l y ;  v i z .  n e e d -rea so n s  a r e  p r im a f a c i e  
good reas ons .  However th e  ty p e  o f  a n a l y s i s  o f f e r e d  so f a r  
does n o t  commit me t o  recommending t h e  moral b e l i e f s  o r  to  
p r e s c r i b i n g  c o n t e s t a b l e  e v a l u a t i v e  assum ptions .  I  have not
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been i n  t h e  bus iness  o f  recommending, b u t  o f  r e c o r d i n g ;  t h i s  
has n o t  been, in  o t h e r  words, an account  o f  t h e  judgem ents  
we o ug ht  t o  make.
W hether  o r  n o t  an a n a l y s i s  i s  moral in  t h i s  p r e s c r i p t i v e  
sense depends on th e  k in d  o f  re a s o n in g  w i t h  which i t  i s  
s u p p o r te d .  Does th e  a n a l y z e r  p r e s c r i b e  a judgem ent  which  
e n j o i n s  o r  f o r b i d s  a c e r t a i n  a c t i o n ?  Does he, h i m s e l f ,  
approve  o r  condemn a c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t  o r  a l i f e - s t y l e  in  h i s  
a n a l y s i s ?  So f a r ,  I  have n o t  been concerned w i t h  such 
q u e s t i o n s .  My t a s k ,  in  P a r t  One, was t o  d e s c r i b e  and 
e x p l a i n  how a r a t i o n a l  person does in  f a c t  make moral  
j u d g em en ts .  He must be w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  
p r o p r i a  persona judgements  c o n t a i n i n g  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
and e l u c i d a t i n g  reasons .  And I  have t r i e d ,  in  P a r t  Two, t o  
g i v e  an account  o f  th e  e m p i r i c a l  and r a t i o n a l  b a s is  o f  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reasons in  th e  moral judgem ents  we do 
i n  f a c t  make; a f o u n d a t i o n  which i s  no t  c o n t i n g e n t  upon a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  d e s i r e s ,  p r e f e r e n c e s  o r  i n c l i n a t i o n s ,  
which has t h e  s o r t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i t y  t h a t  meets th e  demand we 
f i n d  in  most o f  our  e ve ryd ay  moral judgem en ts ,  and which  
a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  reason why such moral b e l i e f s  m a t t e r  
t o  us.  I n  many cases th e  e m p i r i c a l  argument i s  o v e r ­
s i m p l i f i e d  and th e  accompanying r a t i o n a l  s u p p o r t  can not  
a lw a ys  be c la im e d  t o  have th e  f o r c e  o f  an a pr i o r i  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n .  But I  hope t h a t  enough has been s a i d  t o  show 
t h e  t y p e  o f  r e d u c t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  i s  a t  l e a s t  a p o s s i b l e  
one.
A l th o u g h  th e y  a r e  m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l ,  I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs above a r e  pr ima  
f a c i e  good reasons f o r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgem ents  th e y  
s u p p o r t .  L e t  me s t r e s s  t h i s  l a s t  p o i n t .  When th e  
autonomous j u d g e r  uses such a reason t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  s i n g u l a r  
moral  judgem en t ,  t h i s  i s  a pr im a f a c i e  good reason f o r  h is  
ju d g em en t .  I t  i s  a p r im a fac_ie good reason because ( i )  i t  
i s  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and w i l l  e l u c i d a t e  th e  judgem ent;
( i i )  i t  can not  e f f e c t i v e l y  be c o n te s te d .  T h is  l a s t  c l a i m
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can be s u p p o r te d  in  two ways. F i r s t l y ,  I  have t r i e d  t o  show 
t h a t  more p l a u s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  can be g iv e n  o f  t h e  
p u t a t i v e  counter  exam ples .  S econd ly ,  I  w i l l  a rgue  in  t h e  
n e x t  c h a p t e r  t h a t  such nee d -rea so n s  a r e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l ; v i z .  
a n e e d - re a s o n  ( o f  th e  s o r t  d is c u s s e d )  i s  such t h a t  any 
r a t i o n a l  person must a c c e p t  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral  
ju dgem en t  in  which i t  occurs  as p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t .
B e fo r e  we i n v e s t i g a t e  t h i s  l a s t  p o i n t  in  d e t a i l ,  I  want  
t o  m ent io n  f o u r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  my a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t l y ,  some 
p h i lo s o p h e r s  w i l l  o b j e c t  t h a t  my account  i s  based upon a 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  v iew  o f  human n a t u r e .  I  should  n o t  assume 
t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  o n ly  p o s s i b l e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  on 
moral  agency.  For i n s t a n c e ,  I  seem t o  have o v e r l o o k e d ,  w i t h  
a p p a r e n t  i n s o u c ia n c e ,  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t ’ s p o s i t i o n .  
He has a v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  v iew  o f  human needs. H is  account  
r e s t s  on t h e  h y p o th e s is  t h a t  human be ings  n e c e s s a r i l y  do 
what  i s  t o  t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  Our moral judgem ents  
a r e  r e d u c i b l e  t o  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ;  th e  moral p r a c t i c e s  and 
r u l e s  o f  a community,  though th e y  may be g e n e r a l l y  obeyed,  
a r e  obeyed due t o  th e  m o t iv e  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  What  
arguments  can I  g iv e  t o  a p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t  t o  show t h a t  
my a cc ount  should  be p r e f e r r e d ?
S e c o n d ly ,  I  have argued t h a t  a person has both s e l f -  
r e g a r d i n g  and o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  needs, e . g .  t o  f e e l  and show 
sympathy.  I t  m ight  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
a l o n e  i s  a l l  t h a t  has t o  be assumed t o  e x p l i c a t e  our  
commonsense moral b e l i e f s  and judgem ents .  I  must show, in  
a c o n v in c in g  way, t h a t  a s i m p le r  account  based upon r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  cannot  p r o v id e  an adequate  a n a l y s i s  and 
d e l i v e r  t h e  same r e s u l t s  as one t h a t  in c l u d e s  t h e  n e e d s (a )  
and ( b )  f o r  sympathy.
A t h i r d  problem i s  t o  say how we know when one n e e d (a )  o r  
( b )  i s  supposed t o  y i e l d  t o  a n o th e r?  As C . B a t t e r s b y  (1 9 8 0 :
273 )  p u ts  th e  m a t t e r :
. . . g i v e n  t h a t  some c e n t r a l  needs w i l l  c o n f l i c t  
. . . ( w h i c h  o f  t h e m ) . . .  should  be pandered to?
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Even i f  i t  i s  g r a n t e d  t h a t  c e r t a i n  c a p a c i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  
s e n t i m e n t s ,  a r e  u n i v e r s a l  and n ec essa ry  f o r  p e rs o n s ,  how can 
my acc o u n t  p r o v i d e  an answer t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w i t h o u t  
r e c o u r s e  t o  c o n t e s t a b l e  moral assumptions?
The f o u r t h  problem concerns s o - c a l l e d  ' d e s t r u c t i v e ’ 
needs.  A l though  t h i s  i s  no t  in te n d e d  t o  be a com prehens ive  
a c c o u n t  o f  a l l  o f  th e  non -vo l  i t i o n a l  needs t h a t  a person  
has ,  i t  w i l l  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  I  have drawn a t t e n t i o n  t o  o n l y  
one t y p e .  I  have r e s t r i c t e d  my account  t o  p o s i t i v e  needs  
and a v o id e d  ment ion o f  those  t h a t  a r e  d e s t r u c t i v e  o r  a r e ,  in  
o t h e r s  ways, an embarrassment t o  moral d i g n i t y .
S u r e l y ,  my a d v e r s a r y  cou ld  a rg u e ,  human b e ings  have 
h a rm fu l  and o t h e r w is e  d e s t r u c t i v e  n e e d s (a )  and ( b )  as w e l l  
as th o s e  o f  a r a t i o n a l ,  a l t r u i s t i c  o r  e m o t i o n a l l y  d i g n i f i e d  
n a t u r e .  For i n s t a n c e ,  I  have emphasized t h e  need t o  be 
s e l f - d e t e r m i  ni  ng but  no t  th e  need to  dom inate  o t h e r  pe rso ns ,  
w hich i s  th e  o v e r r i d i n g  human need a c c o r d in g  t o  N i e t z s c h e . 173 
I  have s t r e s s e d  th e  need t o  be r e c o g n iz e d  and be long;  I  have  
s a i d  n o th in g  about  th e  need t o  be a g g r e s s i v e ,  which i s  an 
i n s t i n c t u a l  d r i v e  t h a t  human be ings  need, a c c o r d in g  t o
F r e u d . 174 I  have t a l k e d  o f  th e  need f o r  sympathy but  s a id
n o t h i n g  about  t h e  need t o  h a te  o t h e r  p e o p le ,  o r  f o r  c o l d ­
b looded m a levo len ce  towards them, a v iew  we a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  
de S a d e , 175 and so on.
Why s h o u ld n ’ t  s o - c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs be in c lu d e d  in  
t h e  l i s t  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs? We a r e  t o l d  t h a t  th e y  a r e  
u n i v e r s a l ,  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs we have in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n  
o r  t o  f l o u r i s h .  And even i f  t h i s  i s  doubted ,  can we not  
t h i n k  o f  p o s s i b l e  w or lds  in  which th e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  needs  
a r e  o f  t h i s  type?  I s n ’ t  a w o r ld  p o s s ib le  in  w h ich ,  i f  th ey
a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  each person n e e d s (a )  t o  d e s p is e  h is
n e ig h b o u r s ,  t o  be a g g r e s s iv e  towards them, o r  t o  t r y  t o  
d o m ina te  them? The needs upon which moral b e l i e f s  and 
p r a c t i c e s  a r e  based in  such a w or ld  would s im p ly  be what we 
c a l l  ' d e s t r u c t i v e ’ . S i m i l a r l y ,  can we not  t h i n k  o f  o t h e r  
s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  in  our  w o r ld ,  in  which th e  v iew  o f  human
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f l o u r i s h i n g  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  one o r  o t h e r  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
d e s t r u c t i v e  n e e d s (b )  above i s  o v e r r i d i n g ?  And i f  I  r u l e  
them o u t  as gen u ine  needs -  say ,  by c a l l i n g  them ’ w a n t s ’ -  
d o e s n ’ t  t h i s  show t h a t  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  a r e  m e r e ly  a l i s t  o f  
c a p a c i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  e m ot io ns ,  t h a t  I  happen t o  adm ire  o r ,  
a t  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t ,  m ere ly  a c o n t i n g e n t  b a s is  f o r  one t y p e  o f  
moral  code?
One response t o  a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  by
c a l l i n g  them ' h a r m f u l ’ o r  ' d e s t r u c t i v e ’ we mean t h a t  t h e y
f r u s t r a t e  o t h e r  needs t h a t  a r e  r e q u i r e d  i f  a person i s  t o
f l o u r i s h  o r  t o  f u n c t i o n .  T h a t  seems t o  be t h e  p o i n t  o f
c a l l i n g  them ' d e s t r u c t i v e * .  I n  a w o r ld  in  which t h e r e  a r e
o n l y  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we have l o s t  our
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  l a b e l l i n g  them ' d e s t r u c t i v e * .  As K . N i e l s e n
( 1 9 6 9 : 2 0 0 )  w r i t e s :
I f  a l l  our  needs were d e s t r u c t i v e ,  d e s t r u c t i v e  would  
lo s e  i t s  n e g a t i v e  n o rm a t iv e  f o r c e ; . . .
I n  such a w o r ld ,  th e  meaning o f  th e  word ' d e s t r u c t i v e ’ would
change.
However t h e  o b j e c t i o n  i s  more w o r ry in g  than  t h i s .  I  have  
c la im e d  t o  use t h e  te rm  ' n e e d ’ in  such a way t h a t  no 
c o n t e s t a b l e  moral assumptions a r e  b u i l t  i n t o  i t .  By 
r e s t r i c t i n g  my account  t o  o n ly  p o s i t i v e  needs, i t  w i l l  be 
s a i d  t h a t  I  have put  a s u r r e p t i t i o u s  and i l l i c i t  r e s t r i c t i o n  
on what  counts  as a need. N e e d - re a s o n s , i t  m ight  be s a i d ,  
a r e  recommendations in  d i s g u i s e .  They a r e  s p e c i f i c  b e l i e f s  
ab o u t  human n a t u r e  which belong t o  th e  rea lm  o f  v a l u e s . 176 
A l l  o f  which i s  f o r f e i t ,  g iven  th e  d e s id e ra tu m  o f  t h e o r y  
n e u t r a l i t y  in  reasons .  To put  th e  o b j e c t i o n  s u c c i n c t l y :  a l l  
I  have succeeded in  doing i s  t o  d e r i v e  moral judgements  from
o t h e r  v a l u e  te rm s .
T h i s  i s  where I  must remind my opponent  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
s t r i n g  t o  my bow; th e  uni v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e ,  U . R . I I .  I f  
i t  was t h e  case t h a t  we o n ly  have one ty p e  o f  need, what  we
m ig h t  c a l l  ' p o s i t i v e  n ee d s ’ , and th e  o t h e r  d e s t r u c t i v e  o r
unwelcome cases t u r n  ou t  t o  be e r r o n e o u s l y  d e s c r ib e d  as
needs,  then  we would not  have a problem.  X m o r a l l y  ought
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t o  do F* would be p r e s u m p t iv e ly  i m p l i e d  by a reason R, where  
R d e s c r i b e s  a ( p o s i t i v e )  n e e d (a )  o r  ( b ) .  Our p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
a n a l y s i s  would be q u i c k l y  com ple ted .  However we have t o  
t a k e  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs s e r i o u s l y  i f  o n l y  because,  f rom  th e  
l i t e r a t u r e  on t h i s  s u b j e c t , 177 many harm fu l  o r  d e s t r u c t i v e  
c a p a c i t i e s ,  d r i v e s ,  e t c .  cou ld  be s a id  t o  s a t i s f y  my s k e tc h  
o f  a p e r s o n ’ s n e e d s (a )  and ( b ) .
The u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  comes in  a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  We 
have seen t h a t  a moral j u d g e r  must be both w i l l i n g  and a b l e  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgements  t h a t  he 
makes. Now even i f  we assume t h a t  th e  ( s o - c a l l e d )  needs t o  
d o m in a te ,  t o  be a g g r e s s i v e ,  t o  h a t e ,  a r e  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  and 
u n i v e r s a l  needs f o r  persons ,  and i f  we assume t h a t  a moral  
j u d g e r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  judgements  c o n t a i n i n g  
n e e d - r e a s o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  j_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a , we w i l l  f i n d  
n o n e t h e le s s  t h a t  he i s  no t  a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  them. For  
t h e  k in d  o f  b e h a v io u r  ( r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s ) ,  
i m p l i e d  by th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  such judgements  
d e s c r i b e s  a manner o f  e x i s t e n c e  which would be m a t e r i a l l y  
i m p o s s i b le  f o r  persons .  To see a l l  o f  t h i s ,  we must  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  way in  which u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  and needs  
t h e o r y  come t o g e t h e r .
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PART THREE




I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I  want  t o  show how t h e  two fundam en ta l  
f e a t u r e s  in  our  moral t h i n k i n g ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and 
needs ,  a p p ly  when making a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  judgem ents  ( v i z .  
u n i v e r s a l i  z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y ) .  I  w i l l  argue t h a t  t o g e t h e r  
t h e y  p r o v i d e  a way o f  t e s t i n g  t h e  r a t i o n a l  and moral a c c e p t ­
a b i l i t y  o f  our  s i n g u l a r  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  judgem en ts .  I n  o t h e r  
words,  o f  t h e  many p a r t i c u l a r  judgements  which may be made 
ab o u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t ,  those  based upon c e r t a i n  need-  
reasons  r a t i o n a l l y  can and should  be u n i v e r s a l l y  p r e s c r i b e d .
To show t h i s ,  I  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  f i r s t  ( 1 )  th e  c o n t e x t s  in  
which moral  judgem ent-m ak ing  u s u a l l y  o c c u rs .  I t  i s  an 
i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  -  though not  one t o  which th o se  who w r i t e  
m e t a - e t h i c s  g i v e  much a t t e n t i o n  -  t h a t  we make moral
ju d g e m e n ts ,  no t  in  a C a r t e s i a n  vacuum, bu t  in  c e r t a i n
d e s c r i b a b l e  c o n t e x t s .  I n  s e c t i o n  ( 2 )  I  w i l l  show t h a t  any 
judgem ent  t h a t  can be d e r i v e d  f rom a pr im a f a c i e c o r r e c t  
s i n g u l a r  moral judgem ent ,  based upon a n e e d - r e a s o n ,  by
U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n  i s  a l s o  pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t . 178 I  
w i l l  show, in  ( 3 ) ,  why d e s t r u c t i v e  needs can not  be 
s u b s t i t u t e d  i n t o  U . R . I I .  In  ( 4 )  I  w i l l  t r y  t o  i d e n t i f y
n e u t r a l  c r i t e r i a  which h e lp  us t o  d e c id e  which needs a re  
more c e n t r a l  and,  g iven  t h a t  needs w i l l  c o n f l i c t ,  how t o  
weigh d i f f e r e n t  n e e d - re a s o n s .  In  s e c t i o n  ( 5 )  I  w i l l  s t r e s s  
t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  j u d g in g  in  c o n t e x t s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral  
ju d g e m e n t .  In  ( 6 )  I  w i l l  show t h a t  n ee d - re a s o n s  can be th e  
u n d e r l y i n g  reasons w i t h  which we can and shou ld  s u p p o r t  
moral  judgem en ts .  F i n a l l y ,  in  ( 7 ) ,  I  w i l l  emphasize  some o f  
t h e  p o i n t s  t h a t  have been e s t a b l i s h e d  and some o f  th e
prob lem s t h a t  rem ain .
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  we must i d e n t i f y  more p r e c i s e l y  t h e  ty p e s  
o f  d is c o u r s e  in  which th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  
a p p l i  e s .
D e l i b e r a t i n g  and j u s t i f y i n g
Th e re  app ear  t o  be two g e n e r a l  c o n t e x t s ,  which we w i l l  
c a l l  d e l i b e r a t i o n  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  in  which t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  a p p l i e s .  T y p i c a l l y ,  t h e  f o r m e r  
i s  a t y p e  o f  rea s o n in g  which t a k e s  p l a c e  when, in  a 
s i t u a t i o n  o f  c h o ic e ,  someone t r i e s  t o  d e c id e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  
he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n ,  whereas t h e  
l a t t e r  t y p e  o f  re a s o n in g  occurs  in  c o n t e x t s  where someone 
t r i e s  t o  show t h a t  th e  conduct  o f  a n o t h e r ,  o r  h i s  own p a s t  
c o n d u c t ,  i s  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .
We can i d e n t i f y  o t h e r  l i m i t s ,  o f  a g e n e ra l  n a t u r e ,  t o  th e  
t y p e  o f  c o n t e x t  in  which th e  t h e s i s  a p p l i e s .  We have 
a l r e a d y  seen t h a t  i t  concerns moral judgem en ts .  And one 
f e a t u r e  f rom our  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n  t h a t  m e r i t s  emphasis  
h e re  i s  t h a t  any moral judgement  t h a t  one makes i s  th e  
r e s u l t  o f  r e f l e c t i o n .  To say t h a t  one has 'made a 
j u d g e m e n t ’ in  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i s  t o  i m p l i c i t l y  c l a i m  t h a t  one 
has a r r i v e d  a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  a f t e r  due c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  In  
c o n t r a s t ,  we may t a l k  o f  ' b e in g  f o r c e d  t o  make a snap 
d e c i s i o n ’ where what i s  meant by t h i s  i s  t h a t  one plumps f o r  
one a l t e r n a t i v e  r a t h e r  than a n o t h e r .  (As we s h a l l  see in  
t h e  n e x t  C h a p te r ,  t h i s  way o f  choosing i s  n o t  t h e  same as 
making a moral j u d g e m e n t . ) 179 Or we may t a l k  o f  ' c h o o s in g  on 
a mere r e f l e x ’ o r  ' s im p l y  r e a c t i n g ’ o r  o f  ' j u s t  con form ing  
t o  a c c e p te d  p r a c t i c e ’ , and so on. L e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  say  
t h a t  a moral judgement  w i l l  be th e  r e s u l t  o f  r e f l e c t i o n .
We can d i s c o v e r  more s p e c i f i c  l i m i t s  ( t o  t h e  c o n t e x t s  in  
which t h e  t h e s i s  a p p l i e s )  by exam in ing  th e  d e l i b e r a t i v e  and 
j u s t i f i c a t o r y  p rocesses in  a b i t  more d e t a i l .  We d e l i b e r a t e  
when we a r e  unsure how t o  answer th e  q u e s t i o n :
( 1 )  What m o r a l l y  ought  anyone t o  do?
( i . e .  'Which moral judgements ought  anyone t o  make?’ ) .  
Sometimes t h i s  i s  t o  ask no more th a n :  Which a c t s  a r e
m o r a l l y  p e r m i s s i b le ?  At  o t h e r  t im e s ,  by ( 1 )  we mean t o  ask 
t h e  s t r o n g e r  q u e s t io n :  Which a c t i o n  does anyone have a d u ty  
o r  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  do in  th ese  c i rcum stance s?  And s i n c e ,  in
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o r d i n a r y  d i s c o u r s e ,  t h e  words ' o u g h t ’ , ' r i g h t ’ and 'g o o d ’ 
a r e  n o t  a lw ays  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,  t o  ask ( 1 )  can be t o  
ask a q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  form:  ' I s  t h i s  o r  t h a t  goal w or th
s t r i v i n g  f o r ? ’ ; o r  'Which o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  g o a ls  i s  th e  
b e s t  t h i n g  t o  d o ? ’ D e l i b e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t y p e  a l s o  o c c u r s ,  
i n  e v e ry d a y  l i f e ,  when we a r e  u n c e r t a i n  abo u t  a t r a i t  o f  
c h a r a c t e r ,  o r  a m o t iv e ,  o r  more g e n e r a l l y  when we ask about  
a person o r  h i s  l i f e - s t y l e .  I s  modesty a good c h a r a c t e r  
t r a i t ?  I s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a lways  a bad m ot ive?  I s  Smith  a 
person one ought  t o - t r y - t o - b e c o m e - 1 i k e ? 180 and so on.
O f t e n  when q u e s t io n s  o f  t y p e  ( 1 )  a r i s e  in  a d i s c u s s i o n ,
p e o p le  a r e  unsure o f  t h e  answer.  I f  one o r  o t h e r  o f  th e
i n t e r l o c u t o r s  i s  n o t  unsure ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  in  th e
en s u in g  d i s c u s s io n  m ight  be t o  win  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r
p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  h i s  p o i n t  o f  v ie w ,  o r  t o  g e t  o t h e r s  t o
behave in  ways o f  which he approves .  Much more i m p o r t a n t l y
f o r  us,  q u e s t io n s  such as ( 1 )  can a r i s e  in  c i r c u m s ta n c e s
where t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  o r  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  t h e  d i s c u s s io n ,
h o ld  no f i r m  a n t e c e d e n t  v ie w s ,  o r  where th e y  a l r e a d y  ho ld
f i r m  v iew s  b u t  a r e  concerned t o  f i n d  th e  t r u t h  d e s p i t e  t h e i r
v ie w s .  As Downie and T e l f e r  ( 1 9 6 9 : 1 2 7 )  n o te :
. . . i f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  a d is c u s s io n  do n o t  have f i r m  
v ie w s ,  but  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  d e c id e  what t o  t h i n k ,  i t
seems v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  account  f o r  t h e  s e r io u s n e s s
w i t h  which t h i s  i s  done w i t h o u t  s e e in g  i t  as a j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a p roce dure  which aims a t  f i n d i n g  th e  
t r u t h  o f  some m a t t e r .
I n  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  no t  c o n t e n t
m ere1y t o  a r r i v e  a t  any c o n c lu s io n s  ( o f  th e  s o r t  “ i t  do e sn ’ t
m a t t e r  what  we s a y " ) .  I f  t h i s  i s  a l l  t h e r e  i s  t o  i t ,  why
s h o u ld  i t  m a t t e r  what  th e y  dec ide?  Why n o t  plump f o r  any
answer? They t h i n k  t h a t  a c o r r e c t  answer i s  p o s s i b l e  and
t h e y  a r e  i n t e n t  on f i n d i n g  i t .  The s e r io u s n e s s  w i t h  which
p e o p le  e n t e r  such d is c u s s io n s ,  as Downie and T e l f e r  say ,
le n d s  s u p p o r t  t o  t h i s  l a t t e r  c l a i m .
When t h e y  ask "what i s  th e  c o r r e c t  answer?" t o  a q u e s t io n  
o f  t y p e  ( 1 ) ,  I  t a k e  i t  th e y  mean "which judgement  i s  
su p p o r te d  by t h e  b es t  reasons?" .  They may q u e ry ,  o f  c o u rs e ,
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t h e  t r u t h  o f  one o r  more o f  t h e  reasons g i v e n ,  o r  t h e y  may 
d is c u s s  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  a p a r t i c u l a r  reason i s  a good reason  
f o r  t h e  c o n c lu s io n ,  o r  th e y  may c h a l l e n g e  t h e  c r i t e r i a  
employed f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  good reasons .  However ,  our  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  cannot  t h i n k  t h a t  th e  c o r r e c t  judgem ent  i s  
o t h e r  th a n  th e  one which has t h e  w e ig h t  o f  good reasons  
beh ind  i t .
S in c e  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  th e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  i s  t o  t r y  t o  
d i s c o v e r  t h i s ,  v i z .  t h e  judgement  which i s  s up por te d  by th e  
b e s t  re a s o n s ,  i d e a l l y  t h e i r  judgement  c o n c e rn in g  what ought  
t o  be done (what  i s  good, r i g h t ,  e t c . )  should  be postponed  
and made dependent  upon th e  outcome o f  th e  d e l i b e r a t i o n . 181 
T h e i r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  should  c o n s i s t  in  t h i n k i n g  about  t h e  
reasons  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  each o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s s i b l e  
answ ers ,  w i t h  a v iew  then  o f  a d o p t in g  th e  c o n c lu s io n  which  
has t h e  w e ig h t  o f  reasons behind i t .  The f a c t  t h a t  even 
a f t e r  c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  t r y i n g ,  sometimes we do n o t  know what  
t o  d e c i d e ,  does n o t  d e t r a c t  f rom th e  a b i l i t y  we have to  
d e l i b e r a t e  in  t h i s  way. One f u r t h e r  p o i n t  t o  be borne in  
mind h e r e :  we can say o f  any p i e c e  o f  moral d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  
t h a t  t h e  j u d g e r s  have reasoned w e l l  o r  p o o r l y .  S in c e ,  i f  
what I  have argued so f a r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h e r e  a r e  s t a n d a rd s  t o  
which t h e i r  rea s o n in g  e i t h e r  conforms o r  f a i l s  t o  conform.
M ora l  d e l i b e r a t i o n  i s  one c o n t e x t  in  which th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e - n e e d s  t h e s i s  a p p l i e s .  The o t h e r  c o n t e x t  i s  
t h a t  o f  moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  O f te n  we t r y  t o  show t h a t  our  
own p a s t  a c t i o n ,  o r  s u p p o r t  f o r  a p o l i c y ,  was j u s t i f i e d  by 
p o i n t i n g  t o  th e  soundness o f  th e  reasons on which i t  was 
based.  Even more o f t e n  -  i f  my e x p e r ie n c e  i s  a n y th i n g  t o  go 
by -  we c r i t i c i z e  an a c t i o n  o r  p o l i c y  o f  a n o th e r  person by 
t r y i n g  t o  show t h a t  i t  i s  u n j u s t i f i e d .  The te rm  ' j u s t i f ­
i c a t i o n ’ i s  used t o  cover  no t  o n ly  th e  judgements  one g iv e s  
i n  s u p p o r t  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n  but  a l s o  th o se  one g iv e s  
a g a i n s t  i t .  To show t h a t  an a c t i o n  i s  u n j u s t i f i e d ,  we t r y  
t o  g i v e  reasons which show t h a t  th e  a c t i o n  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong 
and t h a t  r e f r a i n i n g  from i t  would have been j u s t i f i e d .
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P eop le  make judgements  o f  t h i s  k in d  n o t  m e r e ly  abo u t  
t h e i r  own o r  a n o t h e r ’ s a c t i o n s ,  v a l u e s ,  i d e a l s ,  b u t  a l s o  
ab o u t  t h e i r  own o r ,  more u s u a l l y ,  a n o t h e r ’ s c h a r a c t e r .  
Moral  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t y p i c a l l y  t a k e s  p l a c e  when a c h a r a c t e r  
t r a i t  o r ,  more g e n e r a l l y ,  a p e r s o n ’ s l i f e - s t y l e  i s  
c r i t i c i z e d  o r  needs t o  be de fended .  "Smith i s  a d e s p i c a b l e  
ch a p " ,  Jones may remark ,  "He would no t  repay me th e  money 
he bor row ed" .  Someone e l s e  may d i s a g r e e .  Where t h e r e  i s  
d i s a g r e e m e n t ,  each p a r t y  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e  w i l l  t r y  t o  de fend  
what he has s a i d .  I n  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  each w i l l  t r y  
t o  produce reasons f o r  t h e i r  judgement  which a r e  a b l e  t o  
w i t h s t a n d  r a t i o n a l  c r i t i c i s m .  T h is  i s  t o  say ,  t h e y  t r y  t o  
show t h a t  t h e i r  judgement  i s  th e  one t h a t  i s  s u p p o r te d  by 
t h e  b e s t  reasons;  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  judgement  anyone ought  t o  
make ab o u t  such conduct .
The k in d  o f  c o n t e x t  w i t h  which we a r e  concerned ,  t h e n ,  i s  
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  where th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  i n t e n t  on 
f i n d i n g  t h e  c o r r e c t  answer in  t h e i r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  o r  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 182 They t h i n k  t h a t  a c o r r e c t  answer i s  
p o s s i b l e ;  one t h a t  i s  o b j e c t i v e  in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  
s a t i s f i e s  c e r t a i n  s ta n d a rd s  t h a t  a r e ,  a t  t h e  l e a s t ,  i n t e r -  
s u b j e c t i v e l y  v a l i d .  What a r e  th e s e  s ta n d a rd s ?
I  have argued t h a t  ( i )  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  
judgem ent  t o  be r a t i o n a l ,  th e  j u d g e r  must be w i l l i n g  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  j n  p r o p r i a  persona and ( i i )  he must be a b le  
t o  do so.  We have seen a l s o  t h a t ,  in  a c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,
( i i i )  t h e  reason he g iv e s  in  a moral judgement  must no t  
u n i q u e l y  name o r  be i d i o s y n c r a t i c  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  i t  must be 
im p e r s o n a l ;  which i s  t o  say ,  ( i v )  t h e  reason must be 
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t e  t h e  judgem ent .  In  
a c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  th e n ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  i s  used in  
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  th e  n o t io n  o f  r e l e v a n c e .  We have seen a l s o  
t h a t  i t  may be p o s s ib le  t o  g iv e  a g e n e ra l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  
l a t t e r  in  terms o f  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  needs. I  have argued t h a t  
a number o f  moral and e v a l u a t i v e  n o t io n s  and many o f  our  
p r e —t h e o r e t i c a 1 moral b e l i e f s  can be e x p l i c a t e d  in  terms o f
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c e r t a i n  b i o l o g i c a l  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs o f  p e rs o n s .  
T h i s  sug gests  an answer t o  t h e  problem o f  c o n t e x t u a l  
r e l e v a n c e ;  ( v )  we can d e te r m in e  w he ther  o r  n o t  a reason  
g i v e n  in  a s i n g u l a r  judgement  counts  as a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
reason by a s k in g  i f  i t  has t o  do w i t h  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
c e r t a i n  n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b ) .  The c o n d i t i o n s  ( i ) - ( v )  app ear  t o  
be a t  l e a s t  some o f  t h e  s ta n d a rd s  t h a t  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  
t h e  j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  seek .  I t  seems a l s o  t h a t  a l th o u g h  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  needs do n o t  commit one t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  
moral  t h e o r y ,  ( v i )  nee d -rea sons  can be pr im a f a c i e  good 
reasons  f o r  t h e  judgements th e y  s u p p o r t .
We co u ld  show ( v i )  c o n c l u s i v e l y  i f  we can e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  judgements t h a t  s a t i s f y  ( i ) - ( v )  
a r e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l ; i . e .  i f  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  judgem ent  i s  such t h a t  any r a t i o n a l  person must 
a c c e p t  i t .  I  want  t o  show, in  o t h e r  words, t h a t  i f  in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  case th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  ju d g e  t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  
t o  do F f o r  a nee d -rea son  R, then  any r a t i o n a l  person must  
j u d g e  t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F.  
T h i s  would n o t  be a t e s t  o f  t h e  moral w or th  o f  t h e i r  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  remember, but  a t e s t  o f  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i t y .
B e fo r e  we examine t h i s  I  want  t o  emphasize two r e l a t e d  
m a t t e r s .  F i r s t l y ,  i f  h i s  moral judgement  i s  t o  have any 
p o i n t ,  each ju d g e r  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  he i s  autonomous. He 
must t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f  as making h i s  own moral judgem en ts .  
A moral  j u d g e r  cannot  be, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  an u n t h i n k i n g  
a d h e r e n t  t o  a s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  l a i d  down by o t h e r s .  He cannot  
d e v o lv e  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  c h o ic e  on some e x t e r n a l  
p r o v i d e r  o f  moral p r i n c i p l e s .
We need t o  be a b i t  c a u t io u s  h e r e .  There  i s  an a m b ig u i ty  
i n  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a moral j u d g e r  cannot  d e v o lv e  h i s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  c h o ic e .  I t  r u l e s  o u t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
p a s s iv e  c o n f o r m i t y  t o  th e  code o f  b e h a v io u r  in  which one has 
been b ro u g h t  up, o r  th e  u n q u e s t io n in g  acc ep tance  o f  th e  
p r e v a i l i n g  moral assumptions o f  th e  community w i t h i n  which  
one p r e s e n t l y  l i v e s .  We would f a u l t  such an i n d i v i d u a l  f o r
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b e in g  m o r a l l y  c o m p la is a n t  o r  o f  m e r e ly  kowtowing t o  
a u t h o r i t y .  I f  one conforms w i t h  a g e n e r a l  moral  p r a c t i c e ,  
t h i s  i s  because one sees t h e  re a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  i t ,  no t  
s i m p ly  because i t  i s  ' t h e  done t h i n g * .
However t h e r e  i s  a sense in  which an autonomous j u d g e r  
can choose t o  f o l l o w  th e  a d v ic e  o f  a n o t h e r ,  a r e c e i v e d  code  
o f  b e h a v i o u r ,  o r  a r e l i g i o u s  e t h i c .  The C a t h o l i c  h o u s e w i fe ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  can autonomously choose t o  f o l l o w  t h e  moral  
a d v ic e  o f  h e r  p r i e s t ,  o r  h e r  Pope. (M ora l  autonomy i s  n o t  
c o - e x t e n s i v e  w i t h  moral w isdom .)  She remains  autonomous t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  she remains th e  u l t i m a t e  ju d g e  o f  what she 
w i l l  do and t h i n k ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  d e c i s i o n  t o  t r u s t  t o  th e  
a d v ic e  o f  her  p r i e s t  o r  Pope. I f  she d id  n o t ,  t h i s  would  
i n v o l v e  th e  s u r r e n d e r  o f  h e r s e l f  as a moral j u d g e r .
We a r e  r e q u i r e d  in  c o n te x ts  c a l l i n g  f o r  a moral judgem ent  
t o  choose f o r  o u r s e lv e s  what  we w i l l  do. But can we choose
what  we ought  t o  do? As we saw in  P a r t  One, j u d g e r -
r e l a t i v i s t s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we can . "Autonomous ju d g e r s "  th e y  
s ay ,  " c r e a t e  t h e i r  own v a l u e s " .  A p a r t  f rom t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
p r o v id e d  by th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  U . R . I ,  a lm o s t  
a n y t h i n g  goes in  th e  name o f  m o r a l i t y .  However i f  th e  
arguments in  P a r t  Two o f  t h i s  essay a r e  c o r r e c t ,  t h e r e  a r e  
s t r o n g  grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  w h i l e  a person may choose  
w h e th e r  o r  no t  t o  a p p ly  them, h i s  moral b e l i e f s  and v a lu e s  
depend upon c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which a r e  n o t  c r e a t e d  by th e  
j u d g e r  h i m s e l f .  We a r e  no t  f r e e  t o  choose c o r r e c t  moral  
p r i n c i p l e s  where th e s e  a re  in c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  c e r t a i n  human 
needs.  (Any more than  we a r e  f r e e  t o  choose,  in  t h i s  sense,  
b e l i e f s  about  m a t t e r s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t . 183) S i m i l a r l y ,  we 
may make s i n g u l a r  moral judgements which we may be w i l l i n g  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  in  p r o p r i a  persona but  we may n o t  be a b l e  t o  
do so ( t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  th e  judgem ent)  where t h e  reasons
g iv e n  a r e  in c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  th e  s o r t  o f  needs we have
i d e n t i f i e d .  In  which case,  our  s i n g u l a r  judgements  w i l l  no t  
be r a t i o n a l  moral judgem ents .  Thus in  th e  j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  our  ju d g e r s  must make t h e i r  own judgements
a b o u t  what  anyone m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do. However th e y  may be 
m is t a k e n .  We would f a u l t  them, p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  f o r  n o t  t a k i n g  
c e r t a i n  n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  And as we s h a l l  see  
s h o r t l y ,  t h e y  w i l l  be unab le  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i f ,  i n  th e  
s u p p o r t i n g  reasons ,  t h e y  f a i l  t o  t a k e  account  o f  th e  c e r t a i n  
u n d e r l y i n g  needs o f  those  i n v o l v e d .  N o n e th e le s s  i t  s t i l l  
makes sense t o  say t h a t  each p a r t i c i p a n t  must choose f o r  
h i m s e l f  what judgement  he w i l l  make.
The second m a t t e r  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  emphasis concerns  th e  
s t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  n e x t  two s e c t i o n s .  For p r e s e n t  purposes ,  i t  
w i l l  be h e l p f u l  t o  c o n s id e r  th e  s i m p l i f i e d ,  i f  a r t i f i c i a l ,  
case o f  judgem ents  in  which a s i n g l e  n e e d - re a s o n  a p p l i e s .  
However we should  n o t  f o r g e t  t h a t  in  t y p i c a l  cas es ,  one 
n e e d - r e a s o n  can c o n f l i c t  w i t h  and be o v e r r i d d e n  by a n o t h e r .  
I  w i 11 say more about  t h i s  in  S e c t io n  Four .  For  th e  moment 
we want  t o  see i f  moral judgem ents ,  when th e s e  a r e  based  
upon s i n g l e  n e e d - r e a s o n s , a r e  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l l y  b i n d i n g .  
I n  o t h e r  words:  i s  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
judgem en t  such t h a t  any autonomous r a t i o n a l  person must  
a c c e p t  i t  as m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t ?
How a r e  we t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s ?  One way would be t o  see i f  
t h e  d e n i a l  o f  some u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  which a r e  c l e a r l y  sup por te d  by n e e d s (a )  o r  ( b )  
re a s o n s ,  goes beyond th e  l i m i t s  o f  what  any autonomous  
j u d g e r  can r a t i o n a l l y  a c c e p t .  We want t o  see ,  in  o t h e r  
words,  i f  t h e  d e n ia l  o f  a u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgements  based on 
n e e d - r e a s o n s ,  can be r a t i o n a l l y  f a u l t e d .
U n i v e r s a l i z a b i e  need -reasons
L e t  us beg in  w i t h  th e  n e e d (a )  t o  s u r v i v e .  We have seen,
f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  t h i s  need i s  non -vo l  i t i o n a l . I t  i s  a p r e ­
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  our  hav ing  any o t h e r  needs,  w ants ,  v a l u e s ,  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  e t c .  Secondly ,  th e  need i s  u n i v e r s a l .  
Someone e l s e ’ s need t o  s u r v i v e  i s  n o t  d i f f e r e n t  f rom y o u r ’ s 
o r  mine,  m ere ly  because i t  i s  h i s .  T h i r d l y  we n e e d (a )  t o
be a l i v e  and remain a l i v e  i f  we a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  as persons
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a t  a l l .  We have seen ,  f o u r t h l y ,  t h a t  reasons o f  t h e  ty p e  
' . . . b e c a u s e  F keeps me a l i v e ’ , ' . . . b e c a u s e  F w i l l  k i l l  me’ 
a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t ;  t o  g i v e  ' . . . b e c a u s e  F w i 11 
k i l l  me’ as t h e  t r u e  s u p p o r t i n g  reason i s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t o  
u n d e rs ta n d  t h e  judgem ent  *F ought  n o t / o u g h t  t o  be d o n e ’ . 
Thus,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  when Smith d e l i b e r a t e s  w he ther  o r  n o t  t o  
sh o o t  Jones,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  in  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h i s  w i l l  k i l l  
Jones,  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  S m i t h ’ s n e g a t i v e  
ju d g e m e n t .
We want  t o  see now w hether  o r  n o t  any autonomous j u d g e r  
must a c c e p t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  a judgem ent  l i k e
( 2 )  I t  i s  p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  wrong t o  do F t o  X because  
F w i l l  k i l l  X
(Remember t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t  t o  say t h a t  k i l l i n g  a n o th e r  
person i s  n ev er  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d ;  t h e r e  may be o t h e r  needs  
t o  which an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s s u r v i v a l  sometimes must y i e l d . )
To s u p p o r t  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  ( 2 )  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  U . R . I I  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e ,  l e t  us see w h e th e r  t h e  d e n i a l  o f  ( 2 )  lead s  
t o  a l o g i c a l  a b s u r d i t y .  L e t  us suppose per  absurdum t h a t  in  
o ur  j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  someone sug gests  t h a t  g r a t u i t o u s  
k i l l i n g  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t ;
( 2 ’ ) ( X ) ( F m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be done t o  X because F w i l l
k i l l  X)
c o u ld  be a moral p r i n c i p l e .  C o n s id e r  t h e  case t o  be one 
where Smith  i s  d e l i b e r a t i n g  w he ther  o r  n o t  he m o r a l l y  ought  
t o  k i l l  Jones.  Ex h y p o th e s i ( 2 ’ ) i s  a c o r r e c t  u n i v e r s a l  
moral  judg em en t .  So Smith w i l l  a c c e p t  both t h a t  he i s  
a c t i n g  m o r a l l y  in  t r y i n g  t o  k i l l  Jones and v i c e  v e r s a . At  
t h e  same t i m e ,  presum ably ,  he w i l l  t a k e  s te p s  t o  f o i l  J o n e s ’ 
endeavour  o t h e r w is e  Smith w i l l  be in  no p o s i t i o n  t o  k i l l  
Jones.  Thus Smith w i l l  t r y  t o  t h w a r t  Jones w h i l e  a t  th e  
same t im e  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  Jones i s  do ing  something m o r a l l y  
r i g h t  in  t r y i n g  t o  k i l l  him. I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i f  Smith
p r e v e n t s  Jones from k i l l i n g  him, h i s  a c t  must be s a i d  t o  be 
' w r o n g ’ and ' n o t - w r o n g ’ . S m i t h ’ s d e f e n s i v e  a c t  i s  wrong 
because i t  p r e v e n ts  Jones from doing  what he ought  t o  do.
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And i t  18 n o t -w ro n g  because i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  Smith  t o  
rem ain  a l i v e  t o  do what  he,  S m i th ,  oug ht  t o  do.  C l e a r l y ,  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ent  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t .  For t h i s  
reason a l o n e ,  i f  we a c c e p t  t h e  somewhat a r t i f i c i a l  and 
h i g h l y  s i m p l i f i e d  ( 2 ’ ) ,  we w i l l  be f o r c e d  i n t o  a l o g i c a l  
a b s u r d i t y .  I t  comes as no s u r p r i s e  th e n  t h a t  a s t r o n g  sense  
o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  a p p l i e s  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ents  o f  typ e
( 2 ) .  They a r e  judgem ents  which any in fo rm e d ,  c a r e f u l  and 
r e f l e c t i v e  person -  who i s  g iv e n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  reason and 
c o n c lu s io n  -  must a c c e p t ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  h i s  a n t e c e d e n t  
v i e w s .
L e t  us c o n s id e r  an example  more in  keep in g  w i t h  o r d i n a r y  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  where t h e  case i s  no t  one o f  k i l l i n g  a n o th e r  
person b u t  o f  n o t  a s s i s t i n g  them in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  
s u r v i v e .  L e t  us suppose a g a in ,  t h a t  on my way t o  work I  see  
t h a t  a c h i l d  has f a l l e n  i n t o  th e  u n i v e r s i t y  pond and i s  in  
danger  o f  drow ning .  The c h i l d  n e e d s ( a )  t o  s u r v i v e  and most  
o f  us would a g ree  t h a t  I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  wade in  and p u l l  
t h e  ch i  Id  o u t ;  i . e .
( 3 )  I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  h e lp  t h e  c h i l d  because o t h e r w is e  
i t  w i l l  no t  s u r v i v e .
However ,  l e t  us suppose t h a t  someone does n o t  a c c e p t  ( 3 ) .  
We would have t o  ask him, f i r s t l y ,  does he n o t  see t h a t  our  
judgem ent  ( 3 )  i s  a moral judgement?  I f  h e lp  i s  no t  
f o r th c o m in g  t h e  c h i l d  w i l l  no t  s u r v i v e  and t h i s  i s  a pr j jna  
f a c i e  good reason f o r  e n t e r i n g  t h e  course  o f  a c t i o n  
c o n te m p la t e d .  We cou ld  ask him, n e x t ,  does he n o t  see t h a t
( 3 )  i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e  j n  p r o p r i  a persona? Does our
a d v e r s a r y  n o t  see t h a t  ( 3 )  has w id e r  re fe r e n c e  than  t o  t h i s  
c h i l d  and moment? T h is  i s  t o  say t h a t  ( 3 )  a p p l i e s  t o  o t h e r  
a d u l t s  and c h i l d r e n  in  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  and t o  p o t e n t i a l  
s i t u a t i o n s  in  t h e  j u d g e r ’ s ,  o r  h i s  c h i l d ’ s ,  own l i f e ?  He 
i s  l o g i c a l l y  committed  by ( 3 )  t o  th e  judgement  t h a t  i f  he 
o r  h i s  c h i l d  were drowning th e n  t h i s  i s  a pr im a  f a c i e  good 
reason why t h e y  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be rescued .  Perhaps our  
a d v e r s a r y  sees a l l  o f  t h i s .
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We m ig h t  th e n  ask him: cou ld  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ent
( 3 ’ ) ( X ) ( X  m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  t o  h e lp  a c h i l d  because  
o t h e r w i s e  i t  w i l l  n o t  s u r v i v e )
(when t h i s  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  a t  s t a k e ) ,  be t h e  moral  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  a r a t i o n a l  person? At  f i r s t  g la n c e ,  someone who is  
w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  ( 3 ’ ) l a c k s  any sympathy f o r  o t h e r s .  To 
c o n s id e r  such a person as a n y th in g  b u t  d e f e c t i v e  would be 
i n c o m p a t i b le  w i t h  our  c la im s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
needs o f  perso ns .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i f  p re s s e d ,  we have t o  c o n s id e r  ( 3 ’ ) in  
te rm s  o f  someone’ s u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral judgem en t .  Our  
s t r a t e g y  would be t o  s k e tc h  t h e  k in d  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  i m p l i e d  
by t h e  judgem en t .  Could t h e r e  be a (human) s o c i e t y  in  which  
no one sees th e  reason t h a t  a c h i l d  w i l l  drown i s  a p r im a 
f a c i e  good reason f o r  th e  judgement  t h a t  i t  ought  t o  be 
he lped?  I t  would be a s o c i e t y  which has no use w hatsoeve r  
f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy. Presum ably ,  i t  would never  e n t e r  
a n y o n e ’ s head t h a t ,  a t  l i t t l e  o r  no c o s t  t o  h i m s e l f ,  he 
m ig h t  h e lp  a c h i l d  when t h e  l a t t e r  i s  in  obv ious  danger  o r  
ex t rem e  d i s t r e s s .  S ince  i t  i s  e m p i r i c a l l y  t r u e  t h a t  w i t h o u t  
a d u l t  h e lp  most c h i l d r e n ’ s l i v e s  sometimes a r e  s i m i l a r l y  
endangered ,  t o  t r e a t  ( 3 ’ ) as an a c c e p t a b l e  moral s ta n d a rd  
would seem t o  be in c o m p a t i b le  w i t h  th e  c o n t in u e d  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  t h a t  s o c i e t y .
I  do no t  know w hether  such s o c i e t i e s  a r e  p o s s i b l e ,  o r  
indeed  w hether  th e  s u p p o s i t i o n  i s  c o h e r e n t .  But in  any case  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between such a s o c i e t y  and our  own would no t  
m e r e ly  be t h a t  in  th e  fo rm e r  th e y  l e a v e  c h i l d r e n  t o  drown 
whereas we do n o t .  Any person in  such a s o c i e t y  would not  
m e r e ly  la c k  a c t i v e  sympathy, he would be w i t h o u t  c a p a c i t i e s  
l i k e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  w i t h o u t  s e n t im e n t s  l i k e  p i t y ,  he would  
l a c k  moral b e l i e f s  l i k e  those  in  f a v o u r  o f  p rom ot ing  th e  
w e l l - b e i n g  o f  o t h e r s ,  and so on, a l l  o f  which depend upon 
t h e  need f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy. These a r e  q u i t e  fundam enta l  
c a p a c i t i e s ,  s e n t im e n ts  and concepts  f o r  e v e r y  person t o  be 
w i t h o u t .  So much so t h a t  i t  would p u t  a maximum s t r a i n  on
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t h e  i d e a  t h a t  we a r e  s t i l l  t a l k i n g  abo ut  a human s o c i e t y .  
O r,  more c a u t i o u s l y ,  a judgem ent  l i k e  ( 3 ’ ) c o u ld  be 
canvassed as a r a t i o n a l  o p t i o n  o n ly  by someone who i s  
p r e p a re d  t o  g i v e  a f u l l  account  o f  t h e  k in d  o f  human b e in g ,  
o r  moral  p r a c t i c e s ,  he has in  mind.  (We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  
p o i n t  s h o r t l y .  )
W h i le  most would g r a n t  t h a t  we can d e t e c t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  
o r  u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  in  a t te m p ts  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  judgements  
l i k e  ( 3 ’ ) i t  m ig h t  be argued t h a t  no c o n t r a d i c t i o n  emerges  
when we t r y  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  more c i r c u m s p e c t  judgem en ts ,  
such as ' I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  h e lp  th e  c h i l d  on ly  when I  am 
re  1a t e d  t o  h e r ’ , o r  1 . . . when I  know h e r ’ o r  ' . . . when i t  w i l l  
h e l p  t o  f o s t e r  my good r e p u t a t i o n ’ . However t h e  f o r c e  o f  
t h i s  response may be u n d e rc u t  when we remember t h a t  
i n d e x i c a l s ,  names, u n i q u e l y  s p e c i f y i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  a r e  
r u l e d  o u t  by U . R . I I .  Le t  us remind o u r s e lv e s  o f  t h i s  
r e s t r i c t i o n  by c o n s id e r in g  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  b o d i l y  needs.
A l l  human b e in g s ,  we n o te d ,  a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  in  
t h e i r  b o d i l y  n e e d s (a )  and ( b )  f o r  fo o d ,  s h e l t e r ,  c l o t h i n g ,  
a l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g  e n v i ro n m e n t ,  e t c .  T h is  i s  n o t  t o  deny,  we 
s a i d ,  t h a t  w i t h i n  t h e  b a s ic  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h e s e  needs t h e r e  
i s  immense v a r i e t y .  People  l i k e  d i f f e r e n t  foods  and 
d i f f e r e n t  amounts o f  th e  same food ;  w i t h i n  t h e  s u r v i v a b l e  
range o f  t e m p e r a t u r e s , some l i k e  i t  h o t ,  o t h e r s  l i k e  i t  
c o l d ,  and so on. We have e s t a b l i s h e d  a l s o  t h a t  where a 
p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgement  i s  based upon a reason which  
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  need o f  one i n d i v i d u a l  o r  group,  f o r ,  say ,  
f o o d , e . g .
( 4 )  C h i l d r e n  in  Glasgow ought  n o t  t o  be u n d e r fe d ,
because th e y  n e e d (b )  an adequate  amount o f  food t o  
e a t ,
t h e  n ee d - re a s o n  i s  a pr im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  th e  
p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgem ent .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  ( 4 )  i s  U.R.  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .  A r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  moral judgement  
a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  human be in g s .
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L e t  us assume t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  a c c e p t e d .  Our a d v e r s a r y  
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  reason in  ( 4 )  r e f e r s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  
G lasw eg ian  c h i l d r e n ,  n o t  t o  a l l  human b e in g s .  On t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  we can f a u l t  ( 4 )  s i n c e ,  in  t h e  reason g iv e n ,  
' t h e y ’ u n i q u e l y  names one group o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Why i s  t h i s  
u n a c c e p ta b le ?  We have seen t h a t  in  i t s  a c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e  i s  used in  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a 
n o t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n c e .  At  l e a s t  one c o n d i t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n c e  i s  
t h a t  t h e  reason must be impersonal  ; t h e  reason must be 
c a p a b le  o f  be ing  unders tood  as r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  by 
o t h e r  pe rso ns .  And any judgement  in  which t h e  reason
depends upon t h e  o c c u r re n c e  o f  an i r r e p l a c e a b l e  pronoun,  
p r o p e r  name, o r  a mere num er ica l  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i s  no t
im p e r s o n a l .  In  o t h e r  words, most o f  us cannot  see why th e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  'G la s w e g ia n  c h i l d r e n ’ i s  a r e l e v a n t  
reason why th e y  ought  n o t  t o  be und er fed ?  Why n o t  say  
because th e  c h i l d r e n  are  c a l l e d  Tom S m ith ,  Mary Brown, e t c . ?  
A l l  such u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  e x p r e s s io n s  o f f e n d  t h e  n o t io n  
o f  r e l e v a n c e  b u i l t  i n t o  reasons ( i n  th e  judgements  t h a t  we 
a r e  a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ) .  So g iv e n  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
( 4 )  i s  n o t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e .
The p o i n t  here  i s  about  p ro p e r  names o r  u n i q u e l y
r e f e r r i n g  te rm s .  We found t h a t  something more can be s a id  
ab o u t  t h e  g e n e r a l  n o t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t u a l  r e le v a n c e  in  our  
o r d i n a r y  moral judgem en ts ,  so t h a t  n o t  any g e n e ra l  p r o p e r t y
can be used as t h e  b a s is  f o r  a r e l e v a n t  reason f o r
d i f f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  t o  those  possess ing  i t .  Thus suppose 
one o f  our  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  suggests
( 4 ’ ) C h i l d r e n  in  Glasgow ought  n o t  t o  be u n d e r fe d ,  
because t h e y  (G lasw eg ian  c h i l d r e n )  a r e  w h i t e .
A p a r t  f rom  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  e x p r e s s i o n ,  ( 4 ’ ) 
i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  in  a n o th e r  way. The reason i s  no t  a 
n e u t r a l  reason ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  ' n e u t r a l ’ i s  e q u i v a l e n t  
t o  n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e .  Why p ic k  on c o l o u r  o r  race? Such
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  p r im a  f a c i  e i r r e l e v a n t  t o  a moral
judgem ent  t h a t  r e s t s  on th e  b i o l o g i c a l  n e e d (b )  f o r  fo o d .  We
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can go f u r t h e r . We can say why a reason l i k e  'becau se  th e y  
a r e  w h i t e *  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  w he ther  c h i l d r e n  n e e d (b )  enough  
and s u i t a b l e  food t o  e a t .  When a judgem ent  i s  based upon a 
reason  t h a t  d e s c r ib e s  such a need i t  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  l i k e  
ca s e s .  We have seen t h a t  th e  same n ee d - re a s o n  a p p l i e s  t o  
a l l  human b e in g s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  s k i n - c o l o u r ,  sex ,  
o t h e r  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  e t c .  D i s c r i m i n a t o r y  moral
judgem ents  r e s t i n g  on assumed d i f f e r e n c e s  in  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  
n e e d (a )  o r  ( b )  f o r  food  a re  i r r a t i o n a l .  T h is  shows why a 
most b l a t a n t  form o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  i l l - g r o u n d e d .  
( S i m i l a r  arguments  a p p ly ,  m u t a t i s  m utand is  t o  t h e  need f o r  
a s u r v i v a b l e  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  s h e l t e r ,  warmth,  c l o t h i n g ,  e t c . )
A n o th e r  reason why judgements  l i k e  ( 4 5) a r e  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i s  t h a t  t h e y  cannot  be u n i v e r s a l i z e d  in  
p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . To see t h i s  p o i n t  however,  l e t  us c o n s id e r  
a n o t h e r  o f  th e  needs we ment ioned e a r l i e r .
A perso n ,  I  a rgued ,  n e e d s (b )  t o  a v o id  damage t o  h i s  o r  
h e r  l im bs  and o rg an s ,  and n e e d s (b )  t o  a v o id  o t h e r  forms o f  
u n n ecessary  s u f f e r i n g .  We a r e  a l l  a l i k e  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  
T h i s  i s  n o t  an a n a l y t i c  t r u t h ,  though,  as we saw, i t  would  
be d i f f i c u l t  t o  und ers tand  what i s  in  t h e  mind o f  anyone who 
c h a l l e n g e d  th e  c l a i m .  (We cou ld  u n d e rs ta n d ,  however,  
someone who s a i d  t h a t  though he needs t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g  
p a in  o r  p h y s ic a l  damage, sometimes o t h e r  needs t a k e  
p r i o r i t y . )  I n  o t h e r  words,  in  commonsense m o r a l i t y ,  
' b ecau se  F causes X t o  s u f f e r  unnecessary  p a i n ’ i s  a p r ima 
f a c i e  good reason and
( 5 )  F m o r a l l y  ought  no t  t o  be done t o  X because i t  
causes X unnecessary  s u f f e r i n g  
i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgem en t .  I s  i t  
U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ?
What i f  someone says t h a t  he does n o t  a g ree  t h a t  ( 5 )  i s  
c o r r e c t ?  L e t  us suppose t h a t  th e  case i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  c h i l d  
und ergo in g  an o p e r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  an a n a e s t h e t i c .  Our 
a d v e r s a r y  says t h a t  he does not  see t h a t  'because t h i s  w i l l  
cause her  unnecessary  s u f f e r i n g ’ i s  a &r±ma f a c i e  good
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reason f o r  m o r a l l y  condemning th e  a c t .  We would f a u l t  him,  
f i r s t l y ,  i f  he i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  t h e  d e n i a l  o f
( 5 )  i n  p r o p r i a  persona o r  i f  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  r e s u l t  f rom  h i s  
d e n i a l .  When he i s  about  t o  undergo what would o t h e r w i s e  be 
p a i n f u l  s u r g e r y  w i t h o u t  be ing  g iven  an a n a e s t h e t i c ,  our  
a d v e r s a r y  can not  sudden ly  u nd ers tand  t h e  n e e d (b )  t o  a v o id  
such p a i n .  When he i s  s u f f e r i n g ,  he ( r a t i o n a l l y )  can not  use 
t h e  reason in  ( 5 )  t o  exp re ss  h i s  moral re s e n tm e n t .  I f  he 
d i d ,  we would accuse him o f  in c o n s is t e n c y  o r  double  
s t a n d a r d s .  No d o u bt ,  i f  th ese  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d ,  our  opponent  would f i n d  h i m s e l f  so 
s e v e r e l y  i n c a p a c i t a t e d  t h a t  he would no t  c o n t i n u e  t o  argue  
so.
However what  i f  he d id  s t i c k  t o  h i s  guns? E a r l i e r  I  
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  my response t o  t h i s  i s  t h a t  he has f a i l e d  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .  To see t h i s ,  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  f o r  t h e  
moment t o  d w e l l  on t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which have t o  be f u l f i l l e d  
f o r  him ' t o  know what  i t  i s  l i k e  t o  s u f f e r  p h y s ic a l  p a i n 5 . 
I t  w i l l  n o t  do f o r  him t o  t h i n k  t h a t  he cou ld  know what  th e  
g i r l  i s  s u f f e r i n g ,  say ,  by lo o k in g  a t  her  b r a i n - s t a t e s  
th ro u g h  an e l e c t r o e n c e p h a l o g r a p h  machine.  He w i l l  no t  know 
what i t  i s  l i k e  f o r  her  t o  s u f f e r  ( i f  th e  o p e r a t i o n  i s  
per fo rm ed  in  th e  way d e s c r ib e d )  un less  he knows what i t  i s  
l i k e  t o  s u f f e r  ' l i k e  t h a t ’ . I n  o t h e r  words,  he has t o  know 
n o t  t h a t  th e  c h i l d  s u f f e r s  but  what t h i s  s u f f e r i n g  would be 
l i k e .  I n  which case ,  when he u n i v e r s a l i z e s ,  he w i l l  have t o  
keep c a r e f u l l y  in  mind th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between m ere ly  
'knowing  t h a t  someone i s  s u f f e r i n g  p a i n ’ and 'knowing what  
i t  i s  l i k e  t o  s u f f e r  p a i n ’ . I t  i s  th e  l a t t e r  k in d  o f  
knowledge which i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  a f u l l  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  
n e e d (b )  in v o lv e d  and which u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  ( 5 )  in  p r o p r i a  
persona  demands.
Now c o n s id e r  our  a d v e r s a r y ’ s c l a i m  t o  know what i t  i s  
l i k e  t o  s u f f e r  as th e  c h i l d  does and y e t  he t h i n k s  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  m o r a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e .  (He cannot  j u s t i f y  t h i s  as ,  say ,  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  a l a  B ren tan o ,  w i t h o u t
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i n t r o d u c i n g  an e x t r a n e o u s  need which f o r  t h e  moment we have  
r u l e d  o u t . )  L e t  us suppose p e r  absurdum t h a t  he says " I  do 
know how she f e e l s  bu t  I  would no t  t h i n k  i t  m o r a l l y  wrong i f  
somebody were t o  do t h a t  t o  me". He co u ld  n o t  r e a l l y  know 
o r  b e l i e v e  t h i s .  For i f  we a r e  a l i k e  in  our  n e e d (b )  t o  
a v o id  ( o r  t o  end)  s u f f e r i n g ,  then  l i k e  any o t h e r  p e rso n ,  he 
has an equal  a v e r s io n  t o  h av ing  something s i m i l a r  done t o  
him. What such an o f f e r  would expose i s  h i s  la c k  o f  
knowledge o r ,  more l i k e l y ,  h i s  i n s i n c e r i t y .  E i t h e r  one o r  
both  would be r e v e a l e d ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  i f  somebody responded  
" A l l  r i g h t ,  i f  you t h i n k  i t ’ s u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e ,  l e t  us t r y  
t h e  same a c t  on you" .
I  must emphasize  t h a t  th e  imagined s i t u a t i o n  must be one 
in  which he does a c t u a l l y  s u f f e r .  I f  by some q u i r k  o f  
n a t u r e  our  a d v e r s a r y  i s  a person who knew t h a t  he can f e e l  
e x t re m e  p a in  bu t  f o r  some reason  he does no t  s u f f e r ,  then  he 
m ig h t  indeed say t h a t  he does no t  mind be ing  s u b je c t e d  t o  
t h e  e x p e r i e n c e .  But t h i s  would be i r r e l e v a n t .  For  he i s  t o  
im ag ine  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  which he p h y s i c a l l y  s u f f e r s  and I  
have shown t h a t  human be ings  n ee d (b )  t o  a v o id  t h i s .  The 
p o i n t  i s ,  a person cou ld  n o t  e x p e r ie n c e  a l i k e  case o f  
i n t e n s e  p h y s ic a l  s u f f e r i n g  w i t h o u t  h av ing  an equal  a v e r s io n  
t o  i t .  S in ce  ex hyp o th es i  he has an equal  a v e r s io n  t o  
s u f f e r i n g ,  he cannot  r e a l l y  know o r  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i f  he were  
i n  a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  t o  th e  c h i l d ’ s ,  he would no t  mind 
b e in g  t r e a t e d  l i k e  t h a t .  I n  which case ,  t h i s  o r  any s i m i l a r  
d e n i a l  o f  ( 5 )  i s  e r ro n e o u s ;  ( 5 )  i s  a U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
j u d g e m e n t .
The account  so f a r  i s  w e ig h te d  tow ards  b o d i l y  needs and 
what a human be ing  needs t o  s u r v i v e .  So l e t  us t u r n  now t o  
some o f  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs we d iscu s sed  e a r l i e r ,  such 
as t h e  need t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  L e t  us c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as a n e e d (b )  f o r  pe rso ns .  I  c la im e d  t h a t  
where a reason in  a judgement i s  based upon th e  n ee d (b )  to  
be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  i t  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  th e  
ju dgem en t .  Does th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  p r o v id e  us w i t h
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a way o f  t e s t i n g  what any r a t i o n a l ,  m o r a l l y  autonomous  
person must ju d g e  here?
To answer t h i s ,  we m ig h t  c o n s id e r  t h e  f o r b e a r a n c e  t h a t  
any person e x p e c t s ,  o r  t h e  rese n tm en t  t h a t  he f e e l s ,  when 
h i s  need t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  i s  no t  re c o g n is e d  by o t h e r s .  
L e t  us suppose t h a t  Smith de c id e s  t o  grow some sp in ac h  and 
t h a t  u n i n v i t e d ,  Jones s t a r t s  t o  i n t e r f e r e .  No doubt  Smith  
w i l l  r e s e n t  t h i s .  He m ight  t e l l  Jones:
( 6 )  "You ought  no t  i n t e r f e r e  because t h i s  i s  my p r o j e c t ”. 
I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  th e  n ee d (b )  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a t  th e  
r o o t  o f  t h e  reason ' t h i s  i s  my p r o j e c t ’ . ( I t  i s  th e  
u n d e r l y i n g ,  i f  n o t  t h e  s u r f a c e ,  reason;  see p p . 3 7 0 -3 7 4  
a h e a d . )  I f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  t h e  ne e d - re a s o n  i s  m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  f o r  S m i t h ’ s p a r t i c u l a r  judgement  and i t  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  th o s e  t o  whom i t  i s  addressed a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  l i k e  
cases  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  L e t  us see t h i s .
Smith  re g a rd s  h i m s e l f  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  He sees  
t h e  p r o j e c t  as something which he has c o n s c io u s ly  chosen t o  
do and w i t h  which Jones i s  i n t e r f e r i n g .  H is  c o m p la in t  -  o r  
any e x p r e s s io n  o f  moral i n d i g n a t i o n  o r  rese n tm en t  -  can be 
f o r m u l a t e d ,  moreover ,  because he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  he i s  owed 
some c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in  r e s p e c t  o f  t h i s  need. He reg ard s  the  
n e e d -re a s o n  as m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  Smith  would 
n o t  f e e l  resen tm en t  a t  J o n e s ’ i n t e r f e r e n c e  u n le s s  he 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  Jones is  c o n c e p t u a l l y  equ ipped t o  grasp  what  
i t  i s  t o  have p r o j e c t s  and what i t  i s  t o  e x p e c t  f o r o e a r a n c e  
f ro m  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  He would not  f e e l  o r  e x p re ss  th e  same 
k in d  o f  rese n tm en t  i f  h i s  p r o j e c t  was d i s r u p t e d  by a non­
perso n ;  e . g .  r a i n ,  o r  a s i x  month o l d  baby. By f e e l i n g  and 
e x p r e s s i n g  re s e n tm e n t ,  th e n ,  Smith r e c o g n iz e s  a l s o  th e  
n e e d (b )  o f  o t h e r  persons t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  and he 
assumes a l s o  t h a t  th e y  can r e c o g n iz e  h i s  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  
n e e d .
The g e n e ra l  p o i n t  here -  t h a t  we presuppose t h a t  o t h e r  
persons n ee d (b )  to  be s e l f —d e t e r m in in g  — has i m p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  both my p r o t a g o n i s t  and I  in  th e  j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
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When d e l i b e r a t i n g  abo ut  what  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be done,  I  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  I  am c a p a b le  o f  making my own jud g em en ts .  I  
am, a f t e r  a l l ,  t r y i n g  t o  d e c id e  what m o r a l l y  t o  do, o r  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  an a c t  i s  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  I n  a j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  what  f o r  me a r e  nec essa ry  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ,  I  
must t a k e  t o  be e q u a l l y  t r u e  o f  my i n t e r l o c u t o r s . I  must  
r e c o g n iz e  t h a t ,  l i k e  me, o t h e r s  to o  have th e  a b i l i t y  t o  
r e f l e c t  on r u l e s ,  d i v e r s e  codes and a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t o  s u b j e c t  
them t o  c r i t i c i s m ,  and so f o r t h .  In  such c o n t e x t s ,  no 
m a t t e r  how opposed my a d v e r s a r y  and I  a r e  in  our  v ie w s ,  f o r  
t h e  con cep t  o f  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o  a p p ly ,  each must  
assume t h i s  much o f  h i s  a d v e r s a r y .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
someone who v i o l a t e s  h i s  i n t e r l o c u t o r ’ s a b i l i t y  t o  reason o r  
t o  make c h o ic e s ,  by be ing d o m ineer ing  o r  o v e r - b e a r i n g , i s  
i n v o l v e d  in  a form o f  i n c o n s is t e n c y .  He n e c e s s a r i l y  c la im s  
needs f o r  h i m s e l f ,  qua r a t i o n a l  ju d g e m e n t -m a k e r , but  d e n ie s  
them t o  o t h e r s  even though he a c c e p ts  t h a t  t h e y  to o  a r e  
p r o s p e c t i v e  ju d g e m e n t -m a k e rs , in  t h a t  t h e y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  
d i s c u s s i o n .  I f  he t h i n k s  t h a t  h i s  b e h a v io u r  i s  m o r a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d ,  he i s  co m m it t in g  h i m s e l f  t o  a n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
ju d g em en t .
T h i s  i s  a f a m i l i a r  argument in  m e t a - e t h i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n . 184 
A p a r a l l e l  may be found in  s c i e n t i f i c  d i s c o u r s e .  I n s o f a r  as 
i t  t h i s  d is c o u r s e  i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  t h e o r i e s  o r  s ta t e m e n t s  must  
be d e a l t  w i t h  on t h e i r  m e r i t s  and no t  in  terms o f  th e  
w i l f u l n e s s  o r  th e  s t a t u s  o f  whoever pu ts  them f o r w a r d .  
O th e rw is e  we a r e  no t  engaged in  an o b j e c t i v e  j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  but  a s o r t  o f  game, th e  p o i n t  o f  which i s  not  
t o  a r r i v e  a t  th e  t r u e  or  c o r r e c t  c o n c lu s io n ,  but  t o  w in .
Does t h i s  show t h a t  we ought  t o  r e s p e c t  th e  n e e d (b )  t o  be
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  o f  a l l  o f  those  who do n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o
t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ?  To adapt  an argument due t o  R .S .Downie
and E . T e l f e r  ( 1 9 6 9 : 1 5 4 )  c o u ld n ’ t
. . . a  group d is c u s s in g  m o r a l i t y . . .  1 i m i t  t h e i r  
d e b a t in g  c i r c l e  t o  those  seen as hav ing  i m a g in a t i o n ,  
i n t e g r i t y  and e x p e r ie n c e .
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I f  what  I  have argued e a r l i e r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  what  t h e  members 
o f  t h e  r a t i o n a l  d e b a t in g  c i r c l e  can not  do, w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  i s  f a i l  t o  r e c o g n iz e  th e  n e e d (a )  and ( b )  o f  th e  
n o n - d e b a t e r s  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  R a t i o n a l  d e b a t e r s  must  
r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  non-members to o  a r e  equ ipped w i t h  th e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r  c h o ic e ;  t h a t  th e y  to o  have p r o j e c t s  t h e y  v a l u e ,  
th e y  to o  have e n t e r p r i s e s  as i m p o r ta n t  t o  them as each o f  
t h e  member’ s a r e  f o r  h i m s e l f .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  e x c e p t i o n a l  
cases t h i s  must be shown.
On t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  any person can m o r a l l y  j u s t i f y  h i s  
c l a i m  t o  f reedom from i n t e r f e r e n c e . However,  purposes and 
p r o j e c t s ,  as we have seen,  can be moral a b o m in a t io n s .  H is  
p r o j e c t  co u ld  be th e  d o m in a t io n  o f  one i n d i v i d u a l ,  o r  group,  
by a n o t h e r .  Freedom i s  a need f o r  a N a z i ,  j u s t  as i t  i s  f o r  
a K a n t i a n .  E a r l i e r  we saw H a r e ’ s i n a b i l i t y  t o  c o n v i c t  th e  
f a n a t i c a l  Nazi  o f  i n c o n s is t e n c y ,  when th e  Nazi  would be 
w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  judgement  j n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a : 
t h e  Naz i  would h i m s e l f  be w i l l i n g  t o  be p e r s e c u te d  shou ld  i t  
t u r n  o u t  t h a t  he is  Jew ish .  We m ight  ment ion here  a l s o  
M . S i n g e r ’ s i n a b i l i t y  t o  dea l  w i t h  t h i s  t y p e  o f  f a n a t i c ,  i f  
t h e  l a t t e r  reg a rd s  th e  s e r v in g  o f  h i s  i d e a l  as a ' d e s i r a b l e  
consequence ’ which can be o f f - s e t  a g a i n s t  any qualms he may 
have had a t  p e r s e c u t in g  members o f  a n o th e r  r a c e .  Does our  
a cc ount  f a r e  any b e t t e r ?
I  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  does. I f  we c o n t i n u e  t o  r e s t r i c t  
o u r s e l v e s  t o  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and s im p ly  t o  th e  need t o  
be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  we can c o n v i c t  t h e  Nazi  o f  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  Suppose h i s  monstrous judgement  t o  be
( 7 )  Jews ought  t o  be p e rs e c u te d  because t h i s  i s  my 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d  c o n v i c t i o n .
On my a c c o u n t ,  t h e  Nazi  cannot  argue t h i s  and th en  deny th e  
same n ee d - re a s o n  t o  h i s  v i c t i m s .  L ik e  eve ryone  e l s e ,  th e  
Nazi  n e e d s (b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  in  pursuance o f  h is  
c o n v i c t i o n s .  However h i s  p o l i t i c a l  c o n v i c t i o n  in v o l v e s  th e  
d e n i a l  o f  t h i s  same need t o  Jewish p e o p le .  I n  s h o r t ,  ( 7 )
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f a i l s  r a t i o n a l l y  because th e  n ee d - re a s o n  i s  n o t  be ing  
a p p l i e d  t o  c e r t a i n  p r im a f a c i e  l i k e  cases .
I f  he does a g ree  t h a t  a l l  persons a r e  a l i k e  in  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  we can c o n v i c t  t h e  Nazi  o f  a n o t h e r  form  
o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  Only  in  t h i s  case h i s  r a t i o n a l  f a u l t  
would concern  a u n i v e r s a l  judgement he a c c e p ts  -  perhaps t o  
j u s t i f y  h i s  own r i g h t  t o  f o l l o w  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n  -  bu t  t h a t  he 
i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  a p p ly  t o  a l l  l i k e  cases ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  
c o n s is t e n c y  B (p .  22 a b o v e ) .  I t  i s  more l i k e l y  however,  t h a t  
t h e  a c t u a l  reason th e  Nazi  would g iv e  i s  someth ing l i k e  
' . . . o n l y  Aryans a re  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  me in  r e s p e c t  o f  
t h e i r  c o n v i c t i o n s  c o u n t i n g ’ . I f  t h i s  i s  so,  he has 
u n i l a t e r a l l y  dec ided  th e  reason f o r  h i s  judgem ent .  I n  terms  
o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  h i s  reason t r a n s l a t e s  t o  a 
s e c o n d - o r d e r  reason l i k e  ' . . . I  need t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
i n  d e c i d i n g  my own r e le v a n c e  c r i t e r i a ’ . I  have argued t h a t  
t h i s  w i l l  no t  do. F i r s t l y ,  w h i l e  a person may choose 
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t o  a p p ly  them, a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason i s  
n o t  someth ing c r e a t e d  s im p ly  by th e  j u d g e r  h i m s e l f .  At  
l e a s t  he cannot  make m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  r u l e s  by s e l f ­
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  when th e s e  a r e  i n c o m p a t i b le  w i t h  n e e d s (a )  o r  
( b ) .  A lo n g s id e  t h i s  we can p o i n t  o u t ,  s e c o n d ly ,  t h a t  once 
a g a in  he d e n ie s  th e  same reason ' . . . t h e  need t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g  in  d e c id in g  r e le v a n c e  c r i t e r i a ’ t o  o t h e r  p r ima 
f a c i e  l i k e  cases ,  n o t a b ly  h i s  v i c t i m s .  S ince  th e y  too  a re  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  agents  and so a r e  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  th e  
N a z i ,  t h e  l a t t e r  c o n t r a d i c t s  h i m s e l f  by r e f u s i n g  to  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  h i s  s e c o n d -o rd e r  judgem ent.
Presumably  he w i l l  concede th e  l a t t e r  o n ly  i f  he concedes  
a l r e a d y  t h a t  th e  human be ings in  q u e s t io n  a r e  persons .  L e t  
us suppose t h a t  th e  p e r s i s t e n t  Nazi  r e p l i e s  t h a t  he and th e  
human be ings  he p e r s e c u te s  a r e  no t  p r im a fac_je l i k e  cases .  
Our a c c o u n t ,  he a s s e r t s ,  goes beyond what  he i s  p repared  t o  
a d m i t  as persons ,  f o r  he does not  reg a rd  non-Aryans as 
p e rs o n s .  We might  remember here  t h a t  c u l t u r e s  as d i s p a r a t e  
as th o se  o f  a n c i e n t  China and Greece a l s o  regarded  c e r t a i n
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human b e ings  as non-persons  (s e e  endnote  1 0 5 ) .  I t  shou ld  
be added a l s o  t h a t  I  am n o t  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  s e l f -
l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a u n i v e r s a l  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  human b e in g s .  
Th e re  a r e ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  d e v i a n t  cases .
However th e  c l a i m  t h a t  a n o th e r  human be ing  i s  n o t  a 
person r e q u i r e s  a g r e a t  dea l  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  
I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  my e a r l i e r  s k e tc h  r e s t s  on a 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  n o t io n  o f  perso ns .  On my a c c o u n t ,  among th e  
n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  something be ing  a person a r e  
c e r t a i n  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  b o d i l y  needs e . g .  we a l l  need a i r ,  
f o o d ,  r e s t ;  and c e r t a i n  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs,  
e . g .  a sense o f  o n e ’ s own i d e n t i t y ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  
p e rs o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  f o r  sympathy w i t h  o t h e r s ,  e t c . ,  and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  To 
f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l ,  o r  f o r  any human l i f e  t o  be f u l l y  
s a t i s f a c t o r y , needs such as th e s e  must be m e t . 185
Any a l t e r n a t i v e  account  o f  persons w i l l  need t o  be 
n e u t r a l .  What we r e q u i r e  e s p e c i a l l y  i s  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  
d e m o n s t r a t io n  t h a t  c e r t a i n  cases a r e  an e x c e p t io n  t o  th e  
n e e d ( a )  f o r  persons t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  And i t  seems 
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  the  N a z i ’ s p o s i t i o n  would meet t h i s  c o n d i t i o n .  
For t h e r e  can be no doubt  t h a t  t h e i r  v i c t i m ’ s a n te c e d e n t  
c o n v i c t i o n  ( l i k e  o u r s )  a re  u t t e r l y  d i f f e r e n t  t o  th e  N a z i ’ s .  
I n  t h e  absence o f  such an account  we may conc lude  t h a t  by 
making t h i s  e x c e p t io n  th e  Nazi  has gone beyond th e  maximum 
s t r a i n  which can be put  upon a d e f e n s i b l e  concept  o f  
p e rso n s .  We w i l l  l e a v e  our  opponent t h e r e  f o r  t h e  moment 
( b u t  see examples ( 9 ) —( 1 1 )  b e lo w ) .
A c l a i m  a g a i n s t  th e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by a n o t h e r ,  th e n ,  i s  
a n o t h e r  example o f  a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  nee d -rea so n  in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  judgement which can be c o n s i s t e n t l y  made f o r  a l l  
l i k e  cas es .  In  o t h e r  words, o f  th e  many p a r t i c u l a r  
judgem ents  which may be made about  a p a r t i c u l a r  a c t ,  those  
based upon th e  need-reason  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  where  
t h i s  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  a t  s t a k e ,  can and should  be u n i v e r s a l l y  
p r e s c r i b e d .  I f  our  p a r t i c i p a n t s  judge  X m o r a l l y  ought  to
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do F because X needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ’ , (where  a l l  
t h a t  has t o  be c o n s id e r e d  i s  t h e  need t o  be s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n i n g ) ,  th e y  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z e  such 
a ju d g em en t .  T h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgement  w i l l  be j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  .
L e t  us d is c u s s  now one o f  t h e  n e e d s (b )  t h a t  we a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  i d e n t i t y ,  namely s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n .  We have e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h a t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h i s  need i s  a r e l e v a n t ,  e l u c i d a t i n g  
and p r im a  f a c i e  good reason.  Does t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  
r u l e  p r o v i d e  a way o f  t e s t i n g  th e  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  
what  a m o r a l l y  autonomous person can propose t o  do in  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ?  Are we a b l e  t o  say ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i f  Smith  
d e c id e s  not  to  d ev e lo p  any o f  h i s  t a l e n t s ,  w h i l e  t h i s  i s  
im p ru d e n t ,  h i s  judgement c o n t a i n s  no i n c o n s is t e n c y ?
L e t  us suppose per  absurdum t h a t  he d e c id e s  t h a t  he w i l l  
n o t  d ev e lo p  in  h i m s e l f  w h a te v e r  min imal  l e v e l  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  
i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  a t  l e a s t  one s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  judgem ent .  He 
i n t e n d s  both t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  him t o  make a s e l f ­
d e t e r m in in g  judgement and a t  t h e  same t im e  und ercu ts  t h i s  by 
n e g l e c t i n g  t o  f o s t e r  a min imal  range o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  which  
would l e a v e  open th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h i s  one ( o r  more) s e l f ­
d e t e r m in in g  judgem ent .  S m i t h ’ s i n i t i a l  d e c i s i o n  i s  s e l f -  
d e f e a t i n g .  A p a r t  f rom th e  n e e d (a )  f o r  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  t h i s  
argument  shows n o th in g  about  th e  development  o f  t a l e n t s  
which may be needed f o r  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t s ,  bu t  o n ly  p o i n t s  
t o  t h e  i n c o n s is t e n c y  o f  f a i l i n g  t o  dev e lo p  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and 
such o t h e r  t a l e n t s  t h a t  a re  needed and s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  
judgem ent  in  q u e s t io n .
S m i t h ’ s judgement would be i n c o h e r e n t  f o r  a n o t h e r ,  more 
i n t e r e s t i n g ,  reason.  Any a t te m p t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  a 
judgem ent  o f  t h i s  s o r t  commits Smith  t o  a w o r ld  in  which  
t h e r e  i s  no r a t i o n a l i t y  o r  t a l e n t s  t h a t  have been developed  
and so t o  a s i t u a t i o n  in  which t h e  n ec essa ry  means a r e  
l a c k i n g  n o t  f o r  some but  f o r  a l l  s e l f —d eterm i  ni  ng 
judgem en ts .  I  do no t  t h i n k  t h a t  we need t o  say more here
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th a n  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a w o r ld  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who do n o t  
d e v e lo p  t h e i r  t a l e n t s  i m p l i e s  a c o n cep tu a l  i n c o h e re n c e .
F i n a l l y  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  l e t  us c o n s id e r  t h e  needs f o r  
a c t i v e  and p a s s iv e  sympathy. There  a r e  two cases t o  be 
c o n s id e r e d .  F i r s t l y ,  I  argued t h a t  our  concept  o f  a person  
i n c l u d e s  ( i )  th e  n e e d (a )  and (b )  t o  be moved by o t h e r  
p e o p l e ’ s needs, by t h e i r  j o y s ,  by t h e i r  d i s t r e s s .  A person  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  t o  be p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  equ ipped t o  r e a c t  in  
t h i s  way. Thus where one person can a s s i s t  a n o th e r  who i s  
i n  ex t rem e d i s t r e s s ,  w i t h o u t  th e  person g i v i n g  t h e  h e lp  
t h e r e b y  s a c r i f i c i n g  a comparable  need o f  h i s  own, then  t h e r e  
i s  a p resum pt ion  t h a t  he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do i t .  The second  
more obv ious  case i s  th e  assumption t h a t  he should  show 
sympathy n o t  because o f  h is  n ee d (b )  t o  show i t  bu t  because  
o f  ( i i )  th e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s n e e d (b )  to  g e t  i t .  We have seen 
t h a t  in  e i t h e r  case ,  where t h e  reason i s  based upon t h e i r  
n e e d (b )  f o r  a c t i v e  o r  p a s s iv e  sympathy, t h i s  i s  a pr ima  
f a c i e  good reason f o r  a moral judgem ent .  We have t o  see i f  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  r u l e  p r o v id e s  a way o f  t e s t i n g  th e  
r a t i o n a l  l i m i t s  o f  what any autonomous person can ju d g e  in  
e i t h e r  o f  th e s e  cases .
C o n s id e r  th e  case ( i i )  v i z .  th e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s n e e d (b )  t o  
g e t  sympathy.  I f  we judge;
( 8 )  Smith m o r a l l y  ought  t o  a s s i s t  Jones in  he r  d i s t r e s s  
because she ne e d s (b )  t o  r e c e i v e  h i s  a c t i v e  sympathy,  
when t h i s  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  i n v o l v e d ,  i s  a judgement  o f  t h i s  
t y p e  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e ?  To answer t h i s ,  l e t  us
c o n s id e r  t h e  c o n t r a r y  judgement:
( 8 ’ ) I t  i s  no t  th e  case t h a t  Smith m o r a l l y  ought  t o
a s s i s t  Jones in  her  d i s t r e s s  because she n e e d s (b )  t o  
r e c e i v e  h i s  a c t i v e  sympathy.
L e t  us suppose t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t  a m a t t e r  o f  m a l e f i c e n c e  on 
o u r  o p p o n e n t ’ s p a r t .  Perhaps he i s  th e  s t u r d y  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 0 1 )  m ent ions ,  who b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  k ind  
o f  person who a i l s  w i t h o u t  th e  s y m p a th e t ic  a s s is t a n c e  o f  
o t h e r s  i s  too  c o n te m p t ib le  t o  deserve  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Thus
345
he a rgues  A l though  Smith  may f e e l  p a s s iv e  sympathy f o r  h e r ,  
Sm ith  ought  t o  ig n o r e  Jo n e s ’ needs" ( i . e .  t h i s  i s  t h e  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t  t h i n g  t o  d o ) .
W i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  we m ig h t  t h i n k  a 
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 8 5) e m p i r i c a l l y  odd. As we noted  
e a r l i e r , persons ,  as we know them, have a t  l e a s t  some 
p r o j e c t s  which th e y  cannot  r e a l i z e  una ided  and so t h e y  must  
draw upon t h e  a s s is t a n c e  o f  o t h e r s .  However a u n i v e r s a l  
r u l e  o f  s t u r d y  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  would r e q u i r e  eve ryone  t o  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  d i s r e g a r d  an im p o r ta n t  means o f  e n s u r in g  t h a t  
h e lp  i s  fo r th c o m in g  when th e y  need h e lp .
W i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  our  opponents argument i s  no t  
m e r e ly  odd, but  suggests  an i n c o n s is t e n c y .  He i s  a r g u in g  
t h a t  a r a t i o n a l  person m o r a l l y  ought  n o t  a c t  o u t  o f  sympathy  
he f e e l s  f o r  th e  n e e d s (b )  o f  o t h e r s  y e t  a t  t h e  same t im e  ex 
h y p o th e s i  he i s  w i l l i n g  t o  argue w i t h  o t h e r s  f o r  such a 
v ie w ,  in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  As I  have s a i d ,  t h i s  
i m p l i e s  some concern f o r  h i s  i n t e r l o c u t o r ’ s autonomy,  
w i t t i n g n e s s ,  e t c .  T h is  shows t h a t  some l e v e l  o f  a c t i v e  
sympathy must be shown f o r  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s  s in c e  t h i s  i s  
presupposed by th e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  argument.  In  
which case ,  i t s  d e n ia l  cannot  be i n t e l l i g e n t l y  argued .
L e t  us assume, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  in  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
judgem ent  my opponent dec id e s  t h a t  Smith  should  no t  show th e  
sympathy he f e e l s  f o r  th e  n ee d (b )  o f  Jones.  T h is  commits 
him t o  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  c o u n t e r p a r t  t h a t  nobody ought  to  
a c t i v e l y  show th e  concern th ey  f e e l  when o t h e r  persons need 
t o  g e t  i t .  The p i c t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  l i f e  i m p l i e d  by th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  t h i s  judgem ent ,  i s  one o f  
d i s c o n n e c t e d ,  s e l f - i n d u l g e n t  b e ings ;  t h e  k in d  o f  b e h a v io u r  
t h a t  i s  t o  be found ,  i f  anywhere,  in  th e  e a r l i e s t  s ta g e s  o f  
c h i l d h o o d .  An a d u l t  group d i s p l a y i n g  such s e l f - c e n t r e d n e s s  
would be c o n s id e re d  p a t h o l o g i c a l l y  d e f e c t i v e  o r  anyway, no t  
a t  a l l  l i k e  persons as I  have d e s c r ib e d  them. B e fo re  I  
d is c u s s  t h i s  p o i n t  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l ,  l e t  me say a b i t  more 
abo ut  th e  j u d g e r ’ s need t o  be moved by o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s needs.
C o n s id e r  now case ( i ) .  A t  f i r s t  b lush  i t  m ig h t  seem a 
l i t t l e  odd t o  say t h a t  one ought  t o  h e lp  someone i n  t r o u b l e  
n o t  m e r e ly  because o f  t h e i r  need t o  r e c e i v e  i t  bu t  because  
o f  o n e ’ s own need t o  f e e l  and show sympathy. However ,  we 
d is c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  th e  grounds f o r  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  an 
i n d i v i d u a l  n e e d s (a )  and ( b )  th e  c a p a c i t y  t o  f e e l  and t o  show 
sympathy f o r  th e  d i s t r e s s  o f  a n o t h e r .  Thus we may ju d g e  
a l s o  t h a t
( 8 ’ ’ ) Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  a s s i s t  Jones because o f  h i s  
n e e d (b )  t o  f e e l  sympathy f o r  her  d i s t r e s s .
Are  judgem ents  o f  t y p e  ( 8 ’ ’ ) ,  which p la c e  an emphasis upon 
t h e  j u d g e r ’ s need f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy, U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b le ?
The most ex t rem e a n t i t h e s i s  o f  ( 8 ’ ’ ) would be s u p p o r t  f o r  
reasons  in  f a v o u r  o f  m a le v o le n c e ,  e . g .  where Smith  d r i v e s  
h i s  c a r  o v e r  Jones,  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  m o r a l l y  
p e r m i s s i b l e ,  o r  th e  s o r t  o f  t h i n g  one m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do.  
I  c la im e d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  th e  s u f f e r i n g  caused t o  a n o th e r  
person c ou ld  n o t  be o f  'no concern w h a t s o e v e r ’ in  our  moral  
code.  However,  g iven  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , cou ld  ( 8 ’ ’ ) be a 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgement in  a d e f e n s i b l e  account  o f  a moral  
p r a c t i c e  in  some o t h e r  p o s s ib le  code?
D o m in a t io n ,  a g g re s s io n ,  and m a levo lence
L e t  us suppose t h a t  someone argues t h a t  human be ings  need 
t o  dom inate  one a n o th e r ,  o r  t h a t  th ey  need t o  be a g g r e s s i v e ,  
o r  t o  be s a d i s t i c a l l y  m a le v o le n t .  One o r  a l l  o f  th ese  
needs,  he says ,  a re  endemic in  human n a t u r e .  In  l i n e  w i t h  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  I  am s k e t c h i n g ,  he goes on 
t o  a rgue  t h a t  t o  meet these  needs we o u g ht ,  ( m o r a l l y  o u g h t ) ,  
t o  b u l l y ,  b e a t  o r  t o r t u r e ,  o t h e r  perso ns ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  he 
sees n o th in g  m o r a l l y  wrong w i t h  t h i s .  He ac c e p ts  as moral
jud g em en ts ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,
( 9 )  Smith ought  t o  b u l l y  Jones, because human be ings
need t o  be dominant
( 1 0 )  Smith ought  t o  f i g h t  Jones because human be ings need
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t o  be a g g r e s s iv e
( 1 1 )  Smith  ought  t o  t o r t u r e  Jones because human b e ings  
need t o  be m a l e v o l e n t .
Under t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  N i e t z s c h e ,  Freud o r ,  p e rh a p s ,  de 
S a d e ’ s p h i lo s o p h y ,  my opponent  a rgues  t h a t  human be ings  need 
such d r i v e s .  Under th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  my needs t h e o r y ,  he 
says t h a t  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  th e s e  needs a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  good 
reasons  f o r  moral judgements  l i k e  ( 9 ) —( 1 1 ) .
To s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  c l a i m ,  l e t  us suppose t h a t  psycho­
l o g i s t s  o r  s o c i o b i o l o g i s t s  have e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  
o f  d o m in a t io n ,  o r  a g g r e s s io n ,  o r  sadism, as u n i v e r s a l  and 
n e c e s s a ry  human needs. L e t  us be c l e a r :  t h i s  i s  no t  t o  
d i s c o v e r  t h a t  human be ings a re  n o r m a l ly  d o m in a t in g ,  
a g g r e s s i v e  o r  s a d i s t i c .  I f  t h i s  was t h e  argument,  e . g .  t h a t  
we n o r m a l ly  t r y  t o  dominate  o t h e r s ,  t h e  p o i n t  in  p r e s c r i b i n g  
n o n -d o m in a t in g  b e h a v io u r  would be q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Smith  
does n o t  need t o  correspond t o  t h e  norm in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n  
o r  t o  f l o u r i s h .  There  i s  something he can do about  i t .  I t  
must be argued e i t h e r  t h a t  a l l  human be ings  need t o  b u l l y ,  
b e a t  o r  t o r t u r e  o t h e r s ,  i f  th e y  a r e  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  o r  t h a t  
t h e s e  needs must be met i f  th e y  a r e  t o  f u n c t i o n  a t  a l l  as 
human b e in g s .
I f  ou r  a d v e r s a r y  t h i n k s  t h a t  peo p le  f l o u r i s h  when th e y  
b u l l y ,  b e a t  o r  t o r t u r e  o t h e r s  and so,  in  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e ,  Smith  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  behave in  t h i s  way, we would 
have t o  ask him w hether  he w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  h is  
judgem ents  i_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . Does he b e l i e v e  in  t u r n  t h a t  
he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be s u b j e c t  t o  such t r e a t m e n t ?  Would he 
s t i l l  f l o u r i s h  i f  he were t o  be b u l l i e d ,  e t c . ?  I f  what I  
have argued e a r l i e r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  i s  h i g h l y  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
anyone co u ld  answer th e  t a b l e s - t u r n e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in  th e  
a f f i r m a t i v e .  And i f  he c o u ld  n o t ,  then  he w i l l  not  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  th e  judgement i_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o na and, by 
a r g u in g  so, he would be g u i l t y  o f  i n c o n s is t e n c y .
We may add t h a t  th e  s t a t u s  o f  d o m in a t io n ,  a g g re s s io n  
m a le v o le n c e  -  as t h in g s  we need in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h  -  is
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f u r t h e r  weakened, s i n c e  our a d v e r s a r y  appears  t o  deny them 
when he i s  p re p a re d  t o  argue w i t h  us in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i ­
g a t i o n .  He i s  p rep a re d  t o  d iscuss  w i t h  us h i s  c l a i m  t h a t  
a l l  human b e ings  need t o  dominate in  o r d e r  t o  f l o u r i s h  y e t  
t h i s  i s  a t  l e a s t  one c o n te x t  in  which,  i f  he i s  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  
he must no t  dom inate .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  regarde d  as 
c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  needed in  o r d e r  f o r  a person t o  f l o u r i s h ,  
d o m i n a t io n ,  ag g re s s io n  or  sadism a r e  f o r f e i t  in  a t h e o r y  
which p u r p o r t s  t o  be f r e e  o f  c o n t e s t a b l e  moral assum pt ions .  
For  v e r y  few peop le  would acc e p t  th e  v iew  o f  f l o u r i s h i n g  
im p ! i e d  by ( 9 ) —( 1 1 ) .
L e t  us suppose i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  ( 9 ) ,  ( 1 0 )  and ( 1 1 )  a r e
c l a i m s  based upon th e  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  t o  dom ina te ,  t o  be 
a g g r e s s i v e ,  o r  s a d i s t i c ,  a re  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  n e e d s (a )  o f  a l l  
human b e in g s .  T h is  i s  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  i s  u s u a l l y  made f o r  
s o - c a l l e d  ' d e s t r u c t i v e  n ee d s ’ . The q u e s t io n  we need t o  ask  
i s  can such judgements  be u n i v e r s a l i z e d ?  And one c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n  t h a t  i s  c r u c i a l  here  i s  what p i c t u r e  o f  human s o c i a l  
l i f e  i s  i m p l ie d  by the  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  such 
judgem ents?
On t h e  p r e s e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  ex hypothes i  an i n d i v i d u a l
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  needs t o  dominate o t h e r s  i f  he t o  f u n c t i o n
as a p erso n .  The Hobbesian man in  th e  s t a t e - o f - n a t u r e  m ight
be th o u g h t  t o  be a p l a u s i b l e  example o f  t h i s .  Each human
b e in g  i s  n a t u r a l l y  m o t iv a te d  by needs which touch o n ly  h is
own power o r  s e c u r i t y ;  o t h e r  persons a r e  o f  consequence t o
him o n l y  i n s o f a r  as they  a f f e c t  t h i s .  As a r e s u l t  t h e r e  is
a u n i v e r s a l  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power over  o t h e r s  and e v e ry  person
t r i e s  t o  r e s i s t  th e  power o f  o t h e r s  ove r  him. Everyone in
a s t a t e —o f —n a t u r e , t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  i s  c o n s t a n t l y  p u l l e d  i n t o
a c o m p e t i t i v e  s t r u g g l e .  Hobbes ( 1 6 5 1 : 8 0 )  w r i t e s :
So t h a t  in  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  I  p u t  f o r  a g e n era l  
i n c l i n a t i o n  o f  a l l  mankind, a p e r p e tu a l  and r e s t l e s s  
d e s i r e  f o r  power a f t e r  power,  t h a t  c ea se th  o n ly  in  
d e a t h .
The q u e s t io n  t h a t  t h i s  poses i s  as f o l l o w s :  i f  Hobbes is
c o r r e c t  about  th e  needs o f  mankind, how can I  r e j e c t  th e
349
uni v e r s a ! i z a b i l i t y  o f  ( 9 )  w i t h o u t  s a c r i f i c i n g  t h e  moral  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  needs t h e s i s ?
We sho u ld  n o t  o v e r l o o k  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  Hobbesian man 
i s  a l s o  r a t i o n a l .  G iven t h e  f a c t  t h a t  human b e in g s  a r e  
r o u g h ly  equal  in  s t r e n g t h  and i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  
some o f  t h e i r  o t h e r  needs and i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  be s a fe g u a rd e d ,  
r a t i o n a l  be in g s  w i l l  d e v e lo p  some form o f  s o c i a l  d e v ic e  w i t h  
which t h e y  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  e q u i t a b l y  a d j u d i c a t e  between  
t h e i r  c o n f l i c t i n g  needs.  For Hobbes, t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  the  
man in  a s t a t e - o f - n a t u r e  w i l l  t e l l  him t h a t  he ought  t o  curb  
h i s  need t o  dom inate  and e n t e r  i n t o  agreements w i t h  o t h e r s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  s u r v i v e .  H is  need t o  dom inate  o t h e r s  can y i e l d  
t o  h i s  needs f o r  peace and s e c u r i t y .  Even a u n i v e r s a l  and 
n e c e s s a ry  need can y i e l d  t o  o t h e r s .
T h i s  m ig h t  e x p l a i n  why t o  dom ina te ,  t o  be a g g r e s s i v e ,  or  
our  s a d i s t i c  p r o p e n s i t i e s  ( i f ,  in  f a c t ,  any o r  a l l  o f  them 
a r e  u n i v e r s a l  and ne c e s s a ry  f e a t u r e s  o f  human n a t u r e )  a re  
n o t  n e e d - re a s o n s  in  our  e v e r y d a y  m o r a l i t y .  A c e n t r a l  
f u n c t i o n  o f  m o r a l i t y  i s  t o  curb  such im pu lses .  W ithout  
t h i s ,  i t  would be im p o s s ib le  f o r  us t o  pursue a l l  o f  those  
o t h e r  t h i n g s  we re g a r d  w or th  l i v i n g  our  l i v e s  f o r .  I f  we 
were no t  p r e t e n d i n g  t o  do any more th an  g i v e  an a n a l y s i s  o f  
our  e v e ry d a y  moral r e a s o n in g ,  t h i s  m ig h t  be a re a s o n a b le  
r e s p o n s e .
However even i f  th e y  a r e  n o t  n e e d - re a s o n s  in  our  moral  
code,  th e  c h a l l e n g e  m ig h t  be t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  t r u e  o f  a l l  e x t a n t  m o r a l i t i e s ,  t o  say n o th in g  o f  a p r i o r i  
p o s s i b l e  moral codes.  An account  o f  a s o c i e t y  does appear  
t o  be p o s s i b l e  in  w h ich ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  need t o  dominate  
o t h e r s  i s  th e  o v e r r i d i n g  d i s p o s i t i o n ;  e v e n t u a l l y  a person  
a lw a ys  succumbs t o  i t .  And we can c o n c e iv e  o f  p o s s ib le  
w o r ld s  in  which t h e  o n ly  d i s p o s i t i o n  i s  t o  judge  and t o  a c t  
in  ways t h a t  we c a l l  d o m in e e r in g ,  and no one cou ld  make 
a l t e r n a t i v e  judgem en ts .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  w o u ld n ’ t  
d o m in a t io n  be a n ee d - re a s o n  and w o u ld n ’ t  i t  be p^rima f a c i e  
good reasons f o r  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  moral judgements? Can I
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r e j e c t  ( 9 ) ,  so u n d ers to o d ,  w i t h o u t  s a c r i f i c i n g  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  needs t h e s i s ?
I  w i l l  ment ion  two obv ious  reasons f o r  d en y in g  t h a t  ( 9 )  
can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  judgem ent  
would be s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g .  For  i f  we a l l  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  
dom ina te  o t h e r s ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be no one l e f t  t o  be dom ina ted .  
S in c e  ' o u g h t ’ i m p l i e s  ' c a n ’ ( o r  a t  l e a s t  c o u l d ) ,  ( 9 )  i s  n o t  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . S econd ly ,  ex h y p o t h e s i . in  ( 9 )  ' t o  
dom inate  o t h e r s ’ i s  S m i t h ’ s o n l y ,  o r  o v e r r i d i n g  need. But  
i f  he can not  do o t h e r w i s e ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be no p o i n t  in  
t e l l i n g  Smith t h a t  he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do one t h i n g  r a t h e r  
th a n  a n o t h e r .  There  would be no o u g h t - ju d g e m e n t  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  (and we m ight  add, t h e r e  would be no p o i n t  t o  
d e l i b e r a t i o n  o r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) .
However i t  seems t o  me t h a t  in  d e a l i n g  w i t h  my o p p o n e n t ’ s 
argument in  t h i s  way, I  have a l r e a d y  conceded to o  much t o  
him. For  th e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t  a d e f e n s i b l e  
v iew  o f  th e  p o s s i b l e  moral p r a c t i c e s  o f  a human s o c i e t y .  
To keep th e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n  i n t a c t ,  i f  th e  u n i v e r s a l ­
i z e d  form o f  ( 9 )  were t o  a p p ly ,  eve ryone  must have an 
o v e r r i d i n g  need t o  dominate  o t h e r s .  They would la c k  th e  
a b i l i t y  o r  r a t i o n a l i t y  t o  suppress t h i s  need. T h e i r  m ot ive s  
would be s i n g l e  p o i n t e d .  They would n ever  f e e l  s e n t im e n ts  
l i k e  g o o d - w i l l ,  l o v e ,  f r i e n d s h i p  o r  g r a t i t u d e  towards each  
o t h e r ,  o r  c o n s id e r  th e  conven ience  and w e l f a r e  o f  o t h e r s .  
Presum ably ,  th e y  would t o l e r a t e  no f r u s t r a t i o n ,  no r i v a l r y .  
They would a l s o  la c k  concepts  l i k e  e q u a l i t y ,  f a i r n e s s ,  and 
so on. The p i c t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  l i f e  i m p l i e d  by th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 9 )  i s  one o f  d is c o n n e c te d ,  s e l f -  
c e n t r e d  and impetuous i n d i v i d u a l s .
I t  i s  n o t  m ere ly  t h a t  we would t h i n k  such i n d i v i d u a l s  to  
be s e r i o u s l y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  d e f e c t i v e .  I n  a s o c i e t y  in  
which t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 9 )  i s  t h e i r  o n ly  ’’moral  
p r i n c i p l e "  ( s i c ) ,  th e  s t y l e  o f  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  would make 
i t  d o u b t f u l  w hether  we were s t i l l  t a l k i n g  about  a human
351
s o c i e t y .  No s o c i e t y  would ho ld  t o g e t h e r  f o r  long based on 
t h i s  "need" ( s i c )  a l o n e .
Do s i m i l a r  arguments a p p ly ,  m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s , t o  example
( 1 0 ) ?  The f i r s t  c e r t a i n l y  does n o t .  When we a p p ly  t h e
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  t o  ( 1 0 ) ,  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  judgem ent  i s
n o t  s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g , n e i t h e r  does i t  i n f r i n g e  some o f  th e
o t h e r  l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( s e l f - d e f e a t i n g ,  i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,
e t c . )  p r o v id e d  by t h e  r u l e .  I s  t h e r e  a p l a u s i b l e  in t e r —
p r e t a t i o n  o f  a g g re s s io n  as a n e e d (a )?  C o u ld n ’ t  we say ,
f o l l o w i n g  Freud e t  aj_, t h a t  ( t o g e t h e r  w i t h  sex )  a g g re s s io n
i s  t h e  p r im a ry  i n s t i n c t u a l  d r i v e .  Moreover  th e s e  two
i n s t i n c t s  can account  f o r  a l l  o f  a p e r s o n ’ s o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r
t r a i t s  and b e h a v io u r .  W h i le  i t  i s  rep re s s e d  as s o c i a l i z a t i o n
o c c u r s ,  a l l  t h e  subsequent  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o f  an a d u l t ,  h i s
a l t r u i s m ,  h i s  i d e a l s ,  h i s  o u g h t - ju d g e m e n t s , a r e  t r a n s p a r e n t
s u b l i m a t i o n s  o f  th e  id  p roce sses .  Our i n s t i n c t s ,  Freud
s a y s ,  may form a t ta c h m e n ts  t o  new o b j e c t s ,  bu t  th e  same
i n s t i n c t u a l  f o r c e  rem ains ,  o v e r l a i d ,  c a t h e c t e d ,  bu t  not
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  changed. He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 7 1 )
. . . t h e s e  i n s t i n c t s  f i l l  th e  id :  a l l  th e  energy  o f  
th e  i d ,  as we may put  i t  b r i e f l y ,  o r i g i n a t e s  from 
them. Nor have the  f o r c e s  in  th e  ego any o t h e r  
o r i g i n . . .  What,  th e n ,  do th e s e  i n s t i n c t s  want? 
S a t i s f a c t i o n  -  t h a t  i s ,  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  in  which th e  b o d i l y  needs can be 
e x t i  ngui s h e d .
C o u ld n ’ t  a g g re s s io n  be a r e l e n t l e s s  need o f  t h e  group which  
our  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t  have d is c o v e re d ?
We need now t o  c o n s id e r  th e  p i c t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  l i f e  
im p l i e d  by th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 1 0 ) .  The h y p o th e s iz e d  
p i c t u r e  i s  o f  a s o c i a l  l i f e  in  which a g g re s s io n  e x e r t s  a 
d e c i s i v e  i n f l u e n c e  on each persons c h a r a c t e r  and t h e  k ind  
o f  conduct  th e y  engage i n .  We need t o  know how t h i s  i s  so.  
For exam ple ,  how a r e  th e  books th e s e  peo p le  w r i t e  and read  
and d is c u s s ,  a l l  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  
a g g re s s io n ?  How is  the  music th ey  compose and p l a y  and 
l i s t e n  t o ,  th e  p i c t u r e s  th e y  p a i n t  and a p p r e c i a t e ,  th e  p la y s  
t h e y  watch and e n j o y ,  the  c i t i e s  th e y  b u i l d  and l i v e  i n ,  th e
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laws t h e y  pass and obey,  th e  languages t h e y  l e a r n  and te a c h  
and speak ,  th e  games th e y  m aster  and p l a y ,  and t h e  h o s t  o f  
o t h e r  t h i n g s  f i g u r i n g  in  our  d a i l y  l i v e s  -  t h e  k in d  o f  
t h i n g s  t h a t  in fo rm  th e  l i v e s  o f  persons as we know them -  
how a r e  such t h in g s  t o  be e x p la i n e d  in  terms o f  ag g re s s io n ?
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  we need t o  know: c ou ld  we r e c o g n is e  
t h e s e  c r e a t u r e s  ( o r  o u r s e l v e s )  as persons whose conduct  and 
c h a r a c t e r s  a r e  m edia ted  by moral v a lu e s ?  The moral  
judgem ents  t h e y  make, t h e i r  mutual r e s p e c t  f o r  each o t h e r s  
autonomy, t h e i r  sense o f  a c t i v e  o r  p a s s iv e  sympathy, th e  
range o f  moral r u l e s  which th ey  und ers tand  and f o l l o w ,  a l l  
have t o  be understood in  terms o f  u n d e r ly i n g  a g g r e s s io n .  
What, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  do th e s e  c r e a t u r e s  do when th e y  a r e  
f a c e d  by c i r c u m s ta n c e s  o f  a v e r y  p r a c t i c a l  n a t u r e  r e q u i r i n g  
them t o  p e r fo rm  an a l t r u i s t i c  a c t  l i k e ,  say ,  s a v in g  a 
drowning c h i l d ?  What do th e y  do when th e y  e n t e r  i n t o  s o c i a l  
arrangem ents  which f o r  us, p la c e  a premium on our  a b i l i t y  
t o  communicate n o n - a g g r e s s i v e l y  w i t h  o th e r s ?  Could th e y  
n u r t u r e  t h e i r  o f f s p r i n g ,  teach  them, c o m fo r t  them? Could  
t h e y  c a r e  f o r  t h e i r  o l d ,  o r  s i c k ,  o r  i n f i r m ?  How is  t h e i r  
a g g re s s io n  s u b l im a te d  in  t h e i r  more complex s o c i a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t s , l i k e  m a r r ia g e ,  f a m i l y  l i f e  and e d u c a t io n ?  How 
does i t  m a n i f e s t  i t s e l f  in  th e  m u l t i t u d e  o f  o t h e r  moral  
b e l i e f s ,  l i k e  showing g r a t i t u d e ,  p r o m is e - k e e p in g ,  be ing  
f a i r ,  and so on, which r e g u l a t e  th e  ways in  which we and,  
presu m ab ly ,  th ese  c r e a t u r e s  communicate and i n t e r a c t ?  And 
o b v i o u s l y  t h i s  need n o t  be th e  end t o  our  q u e s t io n s .
On t h e  fa c e  o f  t h i n g s ,  th e  account  suggested by th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 1 0 ) ,  l i k e  ( 9 ) ,  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
because i t  f a i l s  t o  come t o  g r i p s  w i t h  a l l  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  
goes on in  human s o c ia l  l i f e .  The problem i s  no t  t h a t  the  
l a t t e r  i s  so complex t h a t  i t  d e f i e s  our  a b i l i t y  t o  d e s c r ib e  
i t .  R a th e r  i t  i s  t h a t  th e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n  i m p l ie d  by 
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  ( 1 0 )  i s  too  s i m p l i s t i c .  We cannot  
comprehend th e  hy p o th e s iz e d  human s o c i a l  a r rangem ents  or  th e  
ways in  which i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  e n c o u n te r  one a n o t h e r .  I t  i s
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d o u b t f u l  t h a t  t h e y  have th e  arrangem ents  o r  e n c o u n te r s  t h e y  
would have,  i f  th e y  were persons .
A l s o ,  f o r  t h e  purposes o f  example ( 1 0 ) ,  i t  shou ld  n o t  be 
f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  o t h e r  an im a ls  have s o c i a l  a r range m ents  and 
l i v e  in  e n v i ro n m en ts  s i m i l a r  t o  those  t h a t  we do. Y e t  we 
b e l i e v e  th e y  la c k  something we have.  To say t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
n o t  ' p e r s o n s ’ i s  o n ly  t o  o f f e r  a word where an e x p l a n a t i o n  
i s  needed.  However i t  i n d i c a t e s  something t h a t  we have but  
t h e y  do n o t ;  autonomy, a sense o f  our  own i d e n t i t y ,  a c t i v e  
sympathy,  an a b i l i t y  t o  f o r m u l a t e  our  own moral judgem ents ,  
and so on.
L a s t l y ,  in  a r g u in g  th u s ,  we m ight  even a c c e p t  th e  a 
p r i o r i  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  concept  o f  m o r a l i t y  cou ld  be 
s t r e t c h e d ,  so t h a t  ( 9 )  o r  ( 1 0 )  m ig h t  ho ld  as b e l i e f s  in  a 
(human) moral code.  However such an e x t e n s io n  would have t o  
be made. I  do n o t  know what i t  would be l i k e  f o r  a m o r a l i t y  
o f  t h i s  k in d  t o  e x i s t .  The q u e s t io n  we would then  need t o  
ask i s :  what  i s  th e  p i c t u r e  o f  human s o c i a l  l i f e  i m p l i e d  by 
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  t h e i r  judgements? What a r e  th e  
c la im s  f o r  i t ?  I f  persons s a t i s f y  t h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  does i t  
a l s o  do j u s t i c e  t o  them? I f  i t  appears  t o  be in c o m p le te  and 
c a l l s  f o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o r  s u p p le m e n t a t i o n , what i s  l e f t  out?
The arguments above app ly  a f o r t i o r i  t o  ( 1 1 ) .  The v iew  
t h a t  t h e  o n l y ,  o r  dominant ,  human needs a r e  s a d i s t i c  o r  in  
o t h e r  ways depraved ,  i s  a co n c e p t io n  o f  human n a t u r e  t h a t  i s  
p r e p o s t e r o u s . Considered  as a b a s is  f o r  m o r a l i t y ,  i t  i s  
f i l l e d  w i t h  r a t i o n a l  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  f a u l t s .  For  
i n s t a n c e ,  t o  t o r t u r e  someone i s  t o  do something t o  h i s  body 
o r  mind which th e  t o r t u r e r  b e l i e v e s  h i s  v i c t i m  does not  
l i k e .  I f  he th o u g h t  th e  v i c t i m  l i k e d  i t ,  w h i l e  i t  m ight  be 
e x c r u c i a t i n g l y  p a i n f u l  t h i s  i s  no t  t o r t u r e .  W i th o u t  
i n t r o d u c i n g  e x t ra n e o u s  reasons how, th e n ,  cou ld  anyone 
u n i v e r s a l i z e  ( 1 1 )  i n  p r o p r i a  p erso na? How cou ld  Smith be 
s a i d  t o  be w i l l i n g  t o  accep t  th e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case where h is  
and J o n e s ’ p o s i t i o n  a re  re v e rs ed  when ex hypo t h e s i  he t h i n k s  
t h a t  t o  s u f f e r  t o r t u r e  i s  d r e a d f u l ?
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C o n s id e r  b r i e f l y  t h e  v iew o f  human n a t u r e  i m p l i e d  by
( 1 1 ) .  I n  our  w o r ld ,  such an a d u l t  group would be th o u g h t  t o  
be p s y c h o p a th ic  c r i m i n a l s .  They would be d e s t r u c t i v e ,  
a p p a r e n t l y  devo id  o f  consc ience  and, as f a r  as I  can see ,  
t h e y  would need t o  l i v e  t h e i r  l i v e s  w h o l ly  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  
one a n o t h e r . When co n s id e red  in  i t s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  fo rm ,  a 
s o c i e t y  in  which th e  moral p r a c t i c e s  a r e  based upon th e  
( p u t a t i v e )  n e e d (a )  t o  be s a d i s t i c  would seem t o  r e q u i r e  
c r e a t u r e s  w i t h  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  powers,  modes o f  
com m unicat ion ,  and g en era l  s t y l e  o f  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h a t ,  
i f  i t  p r e v a i l s  anywhere, we f i n d ,  no t  in  a human s o c i e t y ,  
b u t  amongst c e r t a i n  w i l d  a n im a ls ;  (and t h i s  i s  u n f a i r  t o  
w i l d  a n i m a l s ) .  We would say t h a t  th e  c r e a t u r e s  th e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  have d i s c o v e r e d ,  w h i l e  th e y  may n o t  be 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom o u r s e l v e s ,  a r e  
n o t  persons as we know them. Again  th e  burden i s  on anyone  
who wants t o  say t h a t  th ey  a r e ,  o r  t o  show us t h a t  t h e i r  
p r a c t i c e s  c o n s t i t u t e  a p l a u s i b l e  account  o f  a moral code.
I  hope I  have s a id  enough to  suggest  t h a t  where reasons  
i n  moral judgements a re  based on th e  s o - c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e  
needs -  when th e  h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  -  th e  k inds  o f  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  d e s c r ib e d  by 
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  such judgements  a r e  n o t  th e  
a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a d e f e n s i b l e  v iew  o f  a human 
s o c i e t y .  Or,  a t  l e a s t ,  I  hope t o  have shown t h a t  i f  we 
assume th e  r u l e  'ough t  im p l i e s  c a n ’ , th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  
o f  judgements  based on th e  needs t o  dom ina te ,  t o  be 
a g g r e s s i v e ,  (and o t h e r  embarrassments t o  moral d i g n i t y ) ,  
d e s c r i b e  p r a c t i c e s  and a manner o f  e x i s t e n c e  t o  which i t  
would be e m p i r i c a l l y  im p o s s ib le  f o r  a l l  persons t o  
d e g e n e r a t e .  D e s t r u c t i v e  needs o f  t h i s  k in d  a r e  not  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b 1e —need reasons;  v i z .  t h e y  cannot  occur  as 
reasons  in  r a t i o n a l  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgem ents .  And so they  
pose no t h r e a t  t o  a moral t h e o r y  based upon needs ( a )  and
( b ) .
The argument in  th e  p r e v io u s  two s e c t i o n s  has been 
p r e d i c a t e d  upon th e  s i m p l i f i e d  case o f  judgements  in  which  
a s i n g l e  n e e d -rea so n  a p p l i e s .  The q u e s t i o n  now p r e s e n ts  
i t s e l f :  how do we d e c id e  which needs a r e  more c e n t r a l ,  and 
g iv e n  t h a t  two o r  more c e n t r a l  needs w i l l  c o n f l i c t ,  which  
need th e n  ta k e s  p r i o r i t y ?  And how do we d e c id e  th e s e  t h in g s  
w i t h o u t  s a c r i f i c i n g  th e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e -  
needs account?
W eigh ing  nee d -rea sons
Again  we do not  have t o  s t a r t  f rom s c r a t c h .  In  eve ryday  
r e a s o n in g ,  we can and do weigh nee d -rea sons  f o r  and a g a i n s t  
d i f f e r e n t  courses  o f  a c t i o n ,  ra n k in g  and making comparisons  
between t h e m . 186 We r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  someone’ s need f o r  
som eth ing  i s  g r e a t e r  o r  le s s  than  a n o t h e r ’ s f o r  th e  same
t h i n g ;  o r  t h a t  someone’ s need f o r  t h i s  i s  g r e a t e r  o r  le s s
th an  a n o t h e r ’ s need f o r  t h a t .  I n  o t h e r  words,  in  th e  moral  
re a s o n in g  t h a t  we p r a c t i s e  e v e ry d a y ,  w i t h  f a i r  success ,  we 
weigh n e e d - re a s o n s .  What c r i t e r i a  do we use here?
L e t  me i l l u s t r a t e ,  f i r s t ,  th e  n o t io n  o f  a ' w e i g h t i e r ’ 
re a s o n .  Le t  us assume t h a t  Smith i s  t r y i n g  t o  d e c id e  
w h eth er  o r  no t  t o  g iv e  up smoking.  When d e l i b e r a t i n g ,  he 
w i l l  c o n s id e r  v a r i o u s  f a c t o r s  r e l e v a n t  t o  h i s  making th e  
d e c i s i o n ;  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  e v id e n c e  which
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  in  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  he w i l l  d i e  i f  he 
c o n t i n u e s  t o  smoke a c e r t a i n  number o f  c i g a r e t t e s  each day.  
He w i l l  c o n s id e r  to o ,  perhaps,  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  t o  h i s  w i f e  and 
f a m i l y  caused by h is  e a r l y  d e a th ;  th e  e v id e n c e  which
i n d i c a t e s  th e  d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t s  t h a t  smoking has f o r  h is  
h e a l t h ;  t h e  h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  o f  o t h e r s  who s u f f e r  f rom the  
e f f e c t s  o f  h i s  smoking, and so on. A lso  in  h is  
d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  no doubt  Smith w i l l  t r y  t o  assess th e  p o s s ib le  
bad consequences o f  h i s  g i v i n g  up smoking; l i k e  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  he f i n d s  smoking a p l e a s u r e ,  th e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  t h a t  
g i v i n g  i t  up w i l l  have on o t h e r  asp ec ts  o f  h i s  l i f e  such as 
compensatory  e a t i n g  o r  h is  r e s u l t i n g  i11 -hum our ,  th e  le s s
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c e r t a i n  e f f e c t s  o f  h i s  i11-humour on h i s  f a m i l y  and f r i e n d s ,  
and so f o r t h .  To s i m p l i f y  m a t te r s  l e t  us suppose t h a t  a t  
t h e  end o f  t h i s  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  Smith ju d g e s  t h a t  he ought  t o  
g i v e  up smoking because i t  cou ld  e v e n t u a l l y  k i l l  him. To 
say t h i s ,  i s  t o  say t h a t  h is  p o s s ib le  e a r l y  dea th  ou tw e igh s  
a l l  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  those  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  h i s  c o n t i n u i n g  t o  smoke. I f  th e  needs in  q u e s t io n  a r e  
t h i s  s im p le  and i f  one need-reason  dominates a l l  o f  th e  
o t h e r s ,  then  t h a t  reason i s  th e  w e i g h t i e s t  and, a f o r t i o r i , 
i s  t h e  one on which t o  base a r a t i o n a l  ju d g e m e n t .187
A t  l e a s t  in  th e  most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  b i l a t e r a l  cases t h a t  
c a l l  f o r  a moral judgem ent,  a l s o  we can say which o f  
d i f f e r e n t  n e e d s ( a ) ,  o r  co m bina t ions  o f  n e e d s (a )  and ( b ) ,  a re  
t h e  w e i g h t i e s t .  C ons ider  a ga in  th e  example where I  observe  
t h a t  a c h i l d  has f a l l e n  i n t o  th e  u n i v e r s i t y  pond. We would 
a g re e  t h a t  i f  I  can,  I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  p u l l  her  o u t  o f  th e  
pond, o t h e r w is e  she w i l l  drown. T h is  w i l l  mean g e t t i n g  my 
c l o t h e s  muddy and my going home t o  change them; I  w i l l  
a r r i v e  l a t e  a t  my l e c t u r e ;  maybe I  w i 11 c a tc h  a c o l d ,  and so 
on. N o n e th e le s s  compared w i t h  th e  a v o id a b le  dea th  o f  a 
c h i l d ,  th e  inco n v en ie n ce  t o  me i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  T h is  i s  
som eth ing  we a l l  b e l i e v e .  I f  one person can a s s i s t  a n o th e r  
who i s  in  danger o f  lo s in g  her  l i f e ,  w i t h o u t  th e  person  
g i v i n g  t h e  h e lp  t h e r e b y  s a c r i f i c i n g  a comparable  need o f  h is  
own, th en  t h e r e  i s  a presumption t h a t  he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  
do i t .
How do we t e l l ,  th e n ,  which proposed course  o f  a c t i o n  has 
t h e  w e ig h t  o f  reasons behind i t ?  I f  we were t o  t r e a t  the  
m a t t e r  s c h e m a t i c a l l y ,  i t  seems we would go through  a 
p r e l i m i n a r y  s ta g e  o f  s e t t i n g  o u t  those  needs which suggest  
a c e r t a i n  l i n e  o f  a c t i o n  and those  which suggest  a n o th e r .  
On t h e  one hand, th e  needs o f  th e  drowning c h i l d ,  e . g .  her  
need t o  s u r v i v e ;  on th e  o t h e r ,  th e  in c o n v e n ie n c e  t o  my 
p r o j e c t s  o r  i n t e r e s t s .  Every need which i s  a p ro -n eed  s e t s  
up a p resum pt ion  t h a t  I  ought;  ' t h e  c h i l d  may d i e ’ , ' t h e  
c h i l d ’ s h e a l t h  may be s e r i o u s l y  i m p a i r e d ’ , and e v e ry  f a c t
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which i s  a con s e t s  up a presumption t h a t  I  ought  n o t  do t h e  
t h i n g  in  q u e s t i o n ;  ' I  w i l l  g e t  my c l o t h e s  muddy’ , ' I  w i l l  
have t o  go home t o  change them ’ , ' I  w i l l  a r r i v e  l a t e  a t  my 
l e c t u r e ’ , f I  m ig h t  c a tc h  a c o l d ’ . I f  t h e  needs a r e  as 
c l e a r - c u t  as th e y  a r e  in  t h i s  example ,  then  one n ee d -rea so n  
dom ina tes  a l l  o f  t h e  o t h e r s  and t h a t  reason i s  t h e  one on 
which t o  base th e  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgem ent .  The 
need o f  a c h i l d  t o  s u r v i v e  outweighs a l l  o t h e r s .  But why do 
we t h i n k  t h i s  i s  so?
The answer appears  t o  be t h a t  we u s u a l l y  use non-  
n o r m a t iv e  c r i t e r i a  t o  a r b i t r a t e  between d i f f e r e n t  needs  
c l a i m s .  One such c r i t e r i o n  i s  th e  bas icn ess  o f  t h e  need in  
q u e s t i o n .  By ' b a s i c ’ we mean t h a t  m eet ing  t h i s  need i s  a 
n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  needs t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  
has .  I n  th e  example ,  i f  th e  c h i l d ’ s need i s  no t  met t h i s  
u n a l t e r a b l y  exc lu d e s  a l l  o f  her  p o s s ib le  f u t u r e s .  To put  
t h e  p o i n t  a n o th e r  way: i t s  bas icness  i s  due t o  th e  f e c u n d i t y  
o f  t h e  need in  q u e s t io n .  Her death  d e s t r o y s  a necessary  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a l l  o f  her  o t h e r  needs.  The c h i l d ’ s p h y s ic a l  
growth  and developm ent ,  her  f u t u r e  purposes and p r o j e c t s ,  
s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  persona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  p l e a s u r e s ,  e t c .  
a r e  f o r f e i t .  Another  f e a t u r e  which g iv e s  w e ig h t  t o  a need 
i s  t h e  urgency r e q u i r e d  in  m eet ing  i t .  She w i l l  d i e ,  o r  her  
h e a l t h  w i l l  be s e r i o u s l y  im p a i r e d ,  i f  her  need i s  no t  met  
im m e d ia t e l y .  Weight  i s  g iven  a l s o  t o  th e  c e r t a i n t y  o f  one 
need as opposed t o  a n o th e r .  There  i s  l i t t l e  doubt  t h a t  she
w i l l  drown, i f  her  need i s  no t  met.  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e r e  is
doubt  c o n c e rn in g  some o f  th e  o t h e r  needs in v o l v e d .  W i l l  my 
h e a l t h  be im paired?  Another  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  the  
p r o p i n q u i t y  o f  th e  need, by which we w i l l  mean i t s  nearness  
i n  t im e  o r  p l a c e ,  o r  as we s h a l l  see ,  in  k i n s h i p .  O ther  
needs be ing  e q u a l ,  i t  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  c h i l d  is
drowning  here  and now t h a t  makes i t  w e i g h t i e r  than  the
e q u a l l y  b a s ic ,  u r g e n t ,  and c e r t a i n  needs o f  o t h e r s ,  in  f a r -  
o f f  p l a c e s ,  o r  a t  some d i s t a n t  t im e  in th e  f u t u r e .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e  w e ig h t  g iven  i s  sometimes d e te rm in ed  by th e  e x t e n t ,  or
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t h e  number o f  needs which can be met.  I f  I  can save t h i s  
c h i l d  and a v o id  damage t o  my own h e a l t h ,  and n o t  b reak  my 
prom ise  t o  g i v e  t h e  l e c t u r e ,  t h i s  course  o f  a c t i o n  i s  
re g a r d e d  as sup por te d  by w e i g h t i e r  reasons th an  one which  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  few er  needs, o r  none. L e t  us 
lo o k  a t  th e s e  c la im s  in more d e t a i l .
The bas icn ess  o f  th e  need i s  a pr ima f a c i e  good reason  
f o r  t a k i n g  i t ,  r a t h e r  than  o t h e r  c o n f l i c t i n g  needs,  i n t o  
a c c o u n t ,  in  a moral judgement.  C o ns ider  a g a in  th e
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  example concern ing  n u c le a r  war .  Most o f  us,  
as I  have s a i d ,  t h i n k  t h a t  n u c le a r  war would be a d i s a s t e r .  
However,  some peop le  say t h a t  i t  would be b e t t e r  t h a t  we a l l
p e r i s h  in  a n u c le a r  war than t h a t  we be made t o  l i v e  in  a
communist s t a t e .  For  a d e fe n d e r  o f  t h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  l e t  us 
s a y ,  l i v i n g  in  such a s t a t e  i m p l i e s  th e  long term suspension  
o f  h i s  needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  f o r  j u s t i c e ,  and so on.  
T h i s  i s  t h e  w ors t  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  e v i l s .  A n u c le a r
h o l o c a u s t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e .
S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and j u s t i c e ,  however,  do not  t r ium ph  
i f  t h e  w o r ld  p e r is h e s  and, on c u r r e n t  e s t i m a t e s  o f  th e  
m a t t e r ,  a n u c le a r  war would p ro b a b ly  mean th e  a n n i h i l a t i o n  
o f  human l i f e  on our  p l a n e t .  I t  would mean th e  end o f  a l l  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  p r o j e c t s  and j u s t  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  In  o t h e r  
words,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  needs a r e  no t  on a p a r .  Our need to  
s u r v i v e  i s  more ba s ic  and fecund when compared t o  o t h e r  
needs in  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  T h is  is  an argument,  we should  
n o t i c e ,  no t  a g a i n s t  th e  importance o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  o r  
j u s t i c e ,  bu t  a g a i n s t  th e  n o n - s u r v iv a l  o f  th e  w o r ld .  J u s t  as 
S o c r a t e s ’ argument  (see  p . 376 ahead) a g a i n s t  keep ing  o n e ’ s 
prom ise  t o  g iv e  th e  k n i f e  back t o  a madman is  an argument  
a g a i n s t  madmen w i t h  k n iv e s ,  no t  a g a i n s t  p rom is in g  ( o r  
k n i v e s ) .
L e t  me make th e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y .  We s a i d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  
we owe a d r ima f a c i e  a l l e g i a n c e  t o  freedom; i f  they  a r e  t o  
f l o u r i s h ,  people  must be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  But i t  i s  
e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  we are  not  p repared  t o  l e t  people  f r e e l y
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do w h a te v e r  t h e y  l i k e .  What i s  i t  abo u t  such t h i n g s  as 
murder o r  t o r t u r e  t h a t  makes us g e n e r a l l y  ag re e  t h a t  peo p le  
sho u ld  n ev er  be f r e e  t o  do them? The answer I  am p ropo s ing  
i s  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  r e s t  on needs t h a t  a r e  reg ard e d  as -  
t h a t  a r e  a c t u a l l y  -  more b a s ic  and fe c u n d .  Thus i t  i s  
sometimes t r u e  t h a t  arguments  based on p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  
n e e d ( a ) - r e a s o n s , y i e l d  t o  o t h e r s  because t h e  fo r m e r ,  
r a t i o n a l l y ,  weigh le s s  w i t h  us. I  should  s t r e s s ,  however,  
t h a t  no n ee d - re a s o n  i s  such t h a t  i t  r a t i o n a l l y  ought  never  
t o  be s u r r e n d e r e d .  No doubt  some f a n t a s t i c  examples cou ld  
be t h o u g h t  up in  which i t  cou ld  be shown t o  be n e u t r a l  and 
r a t i o n a l  t o  p r e f e r  th e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e  w o r ld  t o  th e  
imagined s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s . We have ta k e n  c a r e  o f  t h i s  
p o i n t .  N e ed - re ason s  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  good, no t  a b s o l u t e ,  
r e a s o n s .
The urgency o f  some needs make them weigh more h e a v i l y  
th a n  o t h e r s .  The g e n e r a l  p o i n t s  t o  be remembered h e re  a r e ,  
f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  o n e ’ s need f o r  a n y th in g  i s  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  some 
end o r  o b j e c t i v e  and,  s e c o n d ly ,  we u n i v e r s a l l y  and non-  
v o l i t i o n a l l y  need c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n  or 
f l o u r i s h .  W ith  t h i s  in  mind, some needs can be more u r g e n t  
th an  o t h e r s .  For exam ple ,  o r d i n a r i l y  we would say t h a t  
Smith  ought  t o  t a k e  h i s  c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l  because she is  
v e r y  s i c k ,  even though he has booked s e a ts  a t  th e  t h e a t r e  
f o r  a p l a y  t h a t  he p a r t i c u l a r  wanted t o  see .  Why do we say 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  d u ty  on a p a r e n t  t o  g e t  the  
c h i l d  t o  h o s p i t a l ?  We c o n s id e r  t h a t  m edica l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  a 
s e v e r e  i n j u r y  i s  u r g e n t  when compared w i t h  m eet ing  th e  need 
f o r  p l e a s u r e  o r  en joym en t .  Why i s  t h i s ?  No doubt  the  
b as ic n e s s  and f e c u n d i t y  o f  th e  need co n c e rn in g  an i n j u r y  to  
her  body d e te r m in e s  th e  urgency h e r e .  However sometimes we 
have t o  choose between two o t h e r w is e  e q u a l l y  w e ig h ted  needs 
and we r a t i o n a l l y  p r e f e r  t o  meet th e  more u r g e n t  one. (For  
f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  see ' t h e  t r i a g e  
a r g u m e n t ’ , p p . 4 2 3 -4 2 5  a h e a d . )
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The c e r t a i n t y  o f  some needs compared w i t h  o t h e r s  i s  
a n o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e  ground on which t o  d e c id e  which needs a r e  
t o  be met .  O th e r  t h i n g s  be ing equal  between a need t h a t  i s  
more and one t h a t  i s  le s s  c e r t a i n ,  we r a t i o n a l l y  p r e f e r  th e  
f o r m e r ;  s i m i l a r l y ,  th e  more p r o b a b le  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  
l e s s  p r o b a b le .  We noted above t h a t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a person  
d e r i v e s  p le a s u r e  from doing something i s  a p r im a  f a c i e  good 
reason f o r  h i s  doing i t ;  on th e  o t h e r  hand, i f  t h i s  i s  
c e r t a i n  t o  l e a d ,  say ,  t o  s e r i o u s  damage t o  h i s  h e a l t h ,  th e  
c e r t a i n t y  o f  th e  s u f f e r i n g  l a t e r  ou tw eighs  th e  p o s s ib le  
en jo ym en t  now. For  example ,  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a d r u g - t a k e r  w i l l  
p r o b a b ly  d e r i v e  p l e a s u r e  from t h i s  a c t i v i t y  g iv e s  him a 
pr im a  f a c i e  good reason f o r  engaging in  i t ;  however t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  i t  i s  c e r t a i n  t o  lead  t o  s e r i o u s  damage t o  h i s  h e a l t h  
and perhaps an e a r l y  d e a th ,  i s  a w e i g h t i e r  reason a g a i n s t  
i t .  The p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  one need i s  more c e r t a i n  than  
a n o th e r  i s  n o t  upse t  because someone shu ts  h i s  eyes t o  i t  o r  
i s  to o  f o o l i s h  to  see i t .  (F o r  f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  
c r i t e r i o n  see ' t h e  Nauras I n d i a n  a rg u m e n t ’ , p p . 4 2 1 -4 2 3  
a h e a d . )
We d e te r m in e  o r  j u s t i f y  w e i g h t i e r  needs, a l s o ,  in  terms  
o f  t h e i r  p r o p i n q u i t y .  I t  m ight  be th o u g h t  t h a t  i f  th e  
c e r t a i n t y  o f  a need i s  a l lo w e d  f o r ,  i t s  p r o p i n q u i t y  is  
i r r e l e v a n t .  Remoteness in  t im e  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  as 
a reason f o r  u n c e r t a i n t y . 188 Our c r i t e r i o n ,  however,  a l s o  
i n c l u d e s  nearness in  p la c e  and in  k i n s h i p .  T h is  he lps  to  
e x p l a i n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  why we f e e l  we have d u t i e s  t o  meet  
t h e  needs o f  those  who a r e  c lo s e  t o  us, l i k e  members o f  our  
own f a m i l y ,  b e f o r e  t r y i n g  to  meet th e  same needs o f  o t h e r s .  
C o n s id e r  a g a in  th e  p a r e n t  whose c h i l d  i s  i l l .  One t h in g  
t h a t  i s  im p o r ta n t  here  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  h i s  c h i l d .  He s tands  
in  a q u i t e  s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c h i l d  and 
t h e  c lo s e n e s s  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  h e lp s  t o  e x p l a i n  the  
w e ig h t  g iven  t o  her  needs r a t h e r  than  t o  th e  same needs o f  
o t h e r s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  ( t o  invoke a commonplace s e n t i m e n t ) ,  
'Which p a r e n t  would g iv e  t h e i r  l a s t  c r u s t  t o  a s t r a n g e r ,  i f
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t h e i r  own c h i l d r e n  were s t a r v i n g ? ’ To do so would seem t o  
be c o n t r a r y  t o  our  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  n a t u r e .  A ls o  th e  adage  
app ears  t o  be sound from a r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  v ie w .  I t  i s  
odd t o  suppose t h a t  we should  g i v e  th e  same w e ig h t  t o  
o t h e r w i s e  comparable  competing needs; e . g .  th e  same w e ig h t  
t o  t h e  need f o r  food o f  those who a r e  d i s t a n t  f rom us, as we 
do t o  our  f a m i l y  o r  loved ones. I t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  someone who de c id e s  t o  keep h i s  own c h i l d r e n  
on t h e  b r e a d l i n e  in  o r d e r  t o  g iv e  b o u n t i f u l l y  t o  fam ine  
r e l i e f ,  i s  a s h i n i n g  example o f  a r a t i o n a l  person .  Indeed  
t h e r e  a r e  grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  him t o  be d e f e c t i v e .  One 
reason i s  t h a t  i f  he accorded everyone  th e  same s o r t  o f  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  as he g iv e s  t o  h i s  own f a m i l y  t h i s  would mean 
t h a t  t h e  ' s p e c i a l n e s s ’ o f  h i s  l e v e l  o f  commitment t o  th e  
l a t t e r  no lo n g e r  e x i s t e d .  By a p a r a l l e l  argument i f ,  
u n i v e r s a l l y ,  th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  a f f e c t i o n  peop le  u s u a l l y  f e e l  
f o r  th o s e  c l o s e  t o  them no lo n g e r  e x i s t e d ,  i t  would mean 
t h a t  something which has a l o t  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  t h e  l i v e s  
o f  most p e o p le ,  v i z .  th e  s p e c ia l  ness o f  th e  a t ta c h m e n ts  in  
which t h e y  be long ,  would be m is s in g .  O th e r  reasons f o r  
r e g a r d i n g  such conduct  as pr ima f a c i e  d e f e c t i v e  in c lu d e  the  
f a c t  t h a t  when he has c h i l d r e n  a p a r e n t  i s  t a k e n  t o  have 
a c c e p te d  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p r o v i d i n g  food f o r  them; t h a t  
u s u a l l y  t h e r e  i s  something a p a r e n t  can do d i r e c t l y  about  
h i s  own s t a r v i n g  c h i l d r e n  ( f e e d  them ) ,  and so on. A l l  I  
want t o  n o t i c e  h e r e ,  however,  i s  th e  unrem arkab le  p o i n t  t h a t  
t h e  s p e c i a l  n a t u r e  o f  some o f  our  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can be 
accounted  f o r  in  terms o f  t h e i r  p r o p i n q u i t y .  And where t h i s  
i s  so,  o t h e r  t h in g s  being e q u a l ,  i t  i s  r a t i o n a l  t o  g i v e  more 
w e ig h t  t o  such needs.
A s i m i l a r  argument a p p l i e s  t o  th e  needs o f  our  
n e ig h b o u rs .  Few o f  us would s tand  by and watch our  
n e ig h b o u rs  s t a r v e  t o  d e a th .  T h is  too  m ight  be accounted f o r  
a l s o  by th e  nearness o f  those in v o l v e d .  Along th ese  l i n e s ,  
a l s o ,  we might  e x p l a i n  why we g iv e  w e ig h t  t o  th e  needs o f  
members o f  our  own community b e f o r e  we spend money on
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o v e rs e a s  a i d .  O th e r  t h in g s  be ing  e q u a l ,  th e  p r o p i n q u i t y  o f  
one o f  two c o n f l i c t i n g  needs i s  th e  b a s is  f o r  a r a t i o n a l  
judgem en t  in  i t s  f a v o u r .
A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  we a r e  ( i n c r e a s i n g l y ) aware o f  t h e  need 
f o r  fo o d ,  c l o t h i n g ,  e d u c a t io n ,  e t c . ,  o f  p eo p le  in  T h i r d  
World  c o u n t r i e s .  Why do we t h i n k  t h a t  m o r a l l y  we ought  t o  
a s s i s t ,  when we have f a m i l i e s  and n e ighbo urs  o f  our  own who 
need f e e d i n g ,  c l o t h i n g ,  t o  be educated? One answer i s  t h a t ,  
in  p r a c t i c e ,  in  F i r s t  World c o u n t r i e s  most p eo p le  a r e  w e l l -  
f e d ,  c l o t h e d ,  e d u ca ted .  We do not  f e e l  t h e  p u l l  o f  
p r o p i n q u i t o u s  competing needs t h a t  a r e  c a p a b le  o f  o v e r r i d i n g  
t h e  need f o r  food ,  e t c .  o f  peo p le  in  th e  T h i r d  W or ld .  To 
p u t  t h e  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  when any s p e c ia l  o b l i g a t i o n  we 
have t o  our  own k i t h  and k in  has been f u l f i l l e d ,  we presume  
t h a t  t h e  s i m i l a r  needs o f  s t r a n g e r s ,  t h e i r  need t o  s u r v i v e ,  
f o r  food  e t c . ,  makes a moral c l a i m  upon us. We can e x p l a i n  
our  response h e r e ,  o f  g i v i n g  w e ig h t  t o  t h e i r  needs, in  terms  
o f  our  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  them.
F i n a l l y ,  w e i g h t i e r  reasons a r e  sometimes i d e n t i f i e d  as 
th o s e  which maximise more needs than  a l t e r n a t i v e  reasons .  
A p o l i c y  which r e s u l t s  in  le s s  k i l l i n g ,  o r  in  fe w e r  peop le  
s u f f e r i n g ,  a law t h a t  produces more freedom , more h ap p iness ,  
th an  some a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  o r  a c t i o n ,  we would n o r m a l ly  
say ,  r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  be p r e f e r r e d .  T h is  i s  t o  suggest  
t h a t  w e i g h t i e r  need -reasons  can be re c o g n is e d ,  c e t e r i s  
p a r i  b u s , as those  which would make f o r  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  number o f  needs. In  s a y in g  t h i s ,  I  seem t o  be 
h ead ing  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .
T h i s  i s  no t  th e  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  expressed  by th e  ' g e n e r a l  
g ood ’ o r  th e  e q u a l l y  nebulous 'g e n e r a l  h a p p in e s s ’ . M eet ing  
n e e d s ( a )  and ( b )  in  some cases may lead  t o  consequences t h a t  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  gen era l  good. In  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  we 
u s u a l l y  reg ard  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  nee d -rea son  as pr ima f a c i e 
more w e ig h ty  than  th e  g en era l  good. To t a k e  a s im p le  
example:  i t  m ight  be t o  the  g en era l  good ( e . g .  e c o n o m ic a l l y )  
f o r  th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  community no t  t o  p r o v id e  food f o r  a
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m i n o r i t y  group,  say ,  l o n g - te r m  p r i s o n e r s .  However l i k e
ev e ryo n e  e l s e ,  t h e  c o n v i c t ’ s need f o r  food  i s  non-  
v o l i t i o n a l ,  b a s ic ,  c e r t a i n ,  p r o p i n q u i t o u s .  D e s p i t e  th e  
( p u t a t i v e )  in c r e a s e  in  g e n era l  good, d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  between  
persons  in  t h i s  way is  n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  and, t h e r e b y ,  
i n c o n s i s t e n t .  We m ight  say ,  however,  t h a t  a w e i g h t i e r  
reason in  a p r im a f a c i e  c o r r e c t  moral judgement  can r e f e r  t o  
' t h e  g e n e ra l  h a p p in e s s ’ when t h e  l a t t e r  i s  unders tood  as a 
s t a t e m e n t  about  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  or  harm t o  th e  n e e d (b )  f o r  
h ap p iness  o f  each and e v e ry  member o f  th e  community.
S i m i l a r l y ,  when I  say t h a t  w e i g h t i e r  reasons a r e  
sometimes those  which maximise more needs, t h i s  i s  no t  th e  
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  o f  Hare w i t h  h i s  emphasis on judgements o f  
n e t  p r e f e r e n c e .  Needs, I  have argued ,  make a c l a i m  on us 
f a r  more c o m p e l l in g  than  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Someone’ s judgement  
would be pr im a f a c i e  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  i t  
n e g a te s  t h e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a n o th e r  person in  t h e  name 
o f  ' t h e  n e t  p r e f e r e n c e ’ , e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  he acknowledges  
h i s  own n ee d (b )  f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  by making t h i s  
j u d g e m e n t .
T here  i s  a l i n k ,  however,  between th e  way we o r d i n a r i l y  
g i v e  w e ig h t  t o  needs and M . S i n g e r ’ s v e r s io n  o f  
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  We saw t h a t  he r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
a c t i o n s  o r  ev e n ts  r e s u l t  in  u n d e n ia b le  d i s a s t e r s ;  an 
e a r t h q u a k e ,  t o r n a d o ,  s h ipw reck ,  p la n e  c ra s h ,  a r e  d i s a s t r o u s  
on an y o n e ’ s p o i n t  o f  v iew .  Why t h i s  i s  so, S in g e r  does not  
s ay .  Our 'needs c a l c u l u s ’ ( f o r  want o f  a b e t t e r  phras e )  
g i v e s  c o n t e n t  t o  S i n g e r ’ s c l a i m .  We t h i n k  t h a t  something  
i s  a d i s a s t e r  when, due t o  a b e r r a n t  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  people  
can no lo n g e r  f u n c t i o n  o r  a re  dan gerous ly  a i l i n g .  And these  
l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s  occur  when c e r t a i n  o f  t h e i r  n e e d s (a )  and 
( b ) ,  regarded  as being th e  w e i g h t i e s t ,  a r e  d es t ro y e d  or  go
un m et .
Using a c a l c u l u s  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  th e n ,  we can and do weigh  
d i f f e r e n t  needs.  We can see a l s o  how, though th e y  a re  
u n i v e r s a l  and th ey  a re  necessary  f o r  a person,  one n e e d (a )
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can y i e l d  t o  a n o t h e r . We can see ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  t h e  
b e g in n in g  o f  an answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  g iv e n  t h a t  some
c e n t r a l  needs w i l l  c o n f l i c t ,  which o f  them sho u ld  be g iv e n  
p r i o r i t y ?  I n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  we r e c o g n iz e  one 
k in d  o f  need t o  be more b a s ic ,  u r g e n t ,  c e r t a i n ,  o r  more 
w id e s p r e a d ,  than o t h e r s .  ( I  w i l l  dea l  w i t h  t h e  is s u e  o f  
w e ig h in g  c o n f l i c t i n g  needs in  more d e t a i l  in  t h e  n e x t  
c h a p t e r . )
B e fo r e  we l e a v e  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  I  want  t o  make two 
a d d i t i o n a l  p o i n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  I  am no t  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  
b a s ic n e s s ,  urgency ,  e t c . ,  a r e  c r i t e r i a  on which t h e  
w e i g h t i n g  o f  n eed -reasons  m o r a l l y  should  be b a s e d . 189 I  am 
m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c r i t e r i a  by which w e ig h t  i s  
n o r m a l ly  a t t a c h e d  t o  v a r i o u s  n e e d - re a s o n s .  The t h e s i s  i s  
d e s c r i p t i v e ;  i t  i s  a t h e o r y  which d e s c r ib e s  t h e  a c t u a l  
method used in  r a t i o n a l  a d j u d i c a t i o n .  We may, o f  c o u rs e ,  
g e t  p a r t i c u l a r  answers wrong. Sometimes when w e ig h in g  needs 
we make m is ta k e s .  We m is unders tand  o r  misweigh th e  needs o f  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s ;  o r  when w e ig h ing  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s 
need a g a i n s t  th e  community good, we can f a i l  t o  r e a l i s e  t h a t  
we a r e  a c t u a l l y  w e igh ing  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s needs a g a i n s t  th e  
needs o f  o t h e r s .  No nethe less  they  a r e  some o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  
which r a t i o n a l  ju d g e r s  a c t u a l l y  do employ, p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  
s e t t l i n g  hard cases.
By i d e n t i f y i n g  them, t h e r e f o r e ,  I  have n o t  j e o p a r d i z e d  
t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  my t h e s i s .  For suppose someone were to  
d i s a g r e e  w i t h  me h e re .  Presumably o u r  d is a g re e m e n t  would  
c o n c e rn ,  say ,  whether  o r  not  we do n o r m a l ly  do use these  
c r i t e r i a ,  w hether  o r  n o t  we do g iv e  t h e  p r i o r i t y  t o  them in  
t h e  ways I  have suggested;  o r  we may d i s a g r e e  about  t h e i r  
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  as r a t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  f o r  w e ig h in g  reasons  
one a g a i n s t  th e  o t h e r .  We would no t  need t o  argue as i f  
th e s e  a r e  issu es  which cou ld  o n ly  be s e t t l e d  by a p r i n c i p l e  
p r o v id e d  by m o r a l i t y .  In  o t h e r  words, I  do no t  in te n d  these  
c r i t e r i a ,  o r  t h e i r  o r d e r i n g ,  t o  be s u b s t a n t i v e  moral c la im s .
S e c o n d ly ,  judgements based upon them a r e  not  exa c t
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c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The bas icn ess  o f  a need, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  cannot  
be measured. One m ight  say ,  as we saw, t h a t  t h i s  need i s  
more b a s ic  than  t h a t  because i t  i s  more fecund in  te rm s  o f  
t h e  o t h e r  needs t h a t  presuppose i t ;  bu t  t h a t  i s  ab o u t  a l l  
one can say .  S i m i l a r l y ,  we can say t h a t  one need i s  more 
u r g e n t  than  a n o t h e r ,  but  not  t w e n t y - n i n e  t im e s  more u r g e n t  
o r  even t w i c e  as u r g e n t .  Degrees o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  ( c e r t a i n t y )  
a r e  a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c a l c u l a t e .  We can say t h a t  i f  a c h i l d  
who can not  swim is  l e f t  in  a deep pond, i t  i s  h i g h l y  
p r o b a b le  she w i l l  drown. Needless  t o  say ,  t h e r e  a r e  no t  
many s i t u a t i o n s  where we can be t h i s  p r e c i s e .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand, t h e  p r o p i n q u i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  needs can be measured.  
My d a u g h te r  i s  n e a r e r  t o  me in  k i n s h i p  than  my cous in
t w e n t y - n i n e  t im es  removed; an e v e n t  due t o  happen in  Umtata  
to d a y  i s  n e a r e r  t o  me than one due t o  happen in  Glasgow,  
tom orrow.  However we have t o  choose here  between,  say ,  
m e e t in g  a p r e s e n t  need t h a t  i s  le s s  b a s ic  and u r g e n t ,  and
m eet in g  a need t h a t  i t  i s  h i g h l y  p r o b a b le  w i l l  have t o  be
met ,  b u t  o n ly  in  th e  long run.  For i n s t a n c e ,  Smith has t o  
weigh t h e  c u r r e n t  p le a s u r e  he ta k e s  in  smoking a g a i n s t  th e  
f u t u r e  damage t o  h is  h e a l t h  o r  h is  l o n g - te r m  demise t h a t  
c o u ld  r e s u l t .  F i n a l l y  th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  needs in v o lv e d  
m ig h t  be c a l c u l a t e d  by c o u n t in g  heads. However,  here  a g a in  
t h i s  f a c t o r  has t o  be weighed a g a i n s t  a l l  o f  th e  o t h e r
c o n d i t i o n s  which may app ly  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  case .  Judgements 
based upon such c r i t e r i a  a re  not  e x a c t .
I t  seems then  t h a t  when i t  comes t o  w e ig h ing  th e  needs o f  
th o s e  i n v o l v e d ,  few judgements cou ld  be made w i t h  g r e a t  
p r e c i s i o n  us ing  these  c r i t e r i a .  However th e y  must not  
w r i t t e n - o f f  on t h i s  account .  As J . Bentham ( 1 7 8 9 : 6 6 )  says o f
h i s  hedon ic  c a l c u l u s :
I t  i s  no t  expected  t h a t  t h i s  process should  be 
pursued p r e v i o u s ly  t o  e v e ry  moral ju d g e m e n t . . .  I t  
may, however,  be a lways kep t  in  v iew :  and as near  as 
t h e ’ process a c t u a l l y  pursued on th ese  occas ions  
approaches t o  i t ,  so near  w i l l  such process approach  
t o  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  an e x a c t  one.
I n  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  e v e ry  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d  reason  
s e t s  up a p resum pt ion  t h a t  one ought  o r  o u g h t - n o t  t o  do th e  
t h i n g  i n  q u e s t i o n .  Any one o f  th e s e  presum pt ions  can be 
c o n f i r m e d  o r  r e b u t t e d  i f  some o t h e r  n e e d - r e a s o n ,  o r  
c o m b in a t io n  o f  n e e d -rea so n s ,  i s  found t o  be w e i g h t i e r .  What 
we have t o  d e c id e  i s  which a re  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  n e e d - r e a s o n s ,  
and th e n  r e l a t e  them t o  each o t h e r ,  g i v i n g  them w e ig h t  a long  
t h e  l i n e s  o f  t h e  c a l c u l u s  above.  O c c a s i o n a l l y ,  as in  some 
o f  t h e  exam ples ,  th e  m a t t e r  i s  f a i r l y  c l e a r - c u t .  However,  
t h i s  i s  no t  u s u a l l y  th e  case.
The c o m p l e x i t y  o f  moral judgements
M a t t e r s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgement  a r e  
o f t e n  complex.  U s u a l l y  we have t o  d is c o v e r  which u n d e r ly i n g  
needs a p p ly  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  case .  T h is  i s  seldom an easy  
m a t t e r .  As we saw e a r l i e r  (p .  106)  th e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  case may 
be u n c e r t a i n  o r  v e ry  c o m p l ic a te d .  As c o n d i t i o n s  change,  
d i f f e r e n t  need -reasons  may become paramount,  (one need 
becomes more u r g e n t ,  p r o p i n q u i t o u s ,  e t c ) .  So t h a t  th e  
judgem ent  t h a t  he e v e n t u a l l y  makes, c a l l s  f o r  th e  j u d g e r ’ s 
r e f l e c t i v e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n ,  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  
t h e  needs o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o lv e d .
T h is  ' r e f l e c t i v e  a p p r e c i a t i o n ’ r e q u i r e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  he has an und ers ta n d in g  o f  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  and em ot io na l  
s t a t e s  o f  h i m s e l f  and o t h e r s .  W e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  e m p i r i c a l  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  in  t h i s  regard  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  and t o  meet the  
d e s id e r a tu m  our  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  would have t o  be s u i t a b l y  
i n fo rm e d .  They would r e q u i r e ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  knowledge o f  
such d i v e r s e  t h in g s  as th e  n u t r i t i o n a l  n ee d s (b )  o f  the  
e l d e r l y  o r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  em ot iona l  nee ds (b )  o f  c h i l d r e n  a t  
d i f f e r e n t  s ta g e s  o f  t h e i r  development .  A p a r e n t  may be w e l l  
d isp o s ed  towards h i s  c h i l d r e n  y e t  do harm t o  them by 
m is u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  l e v e l  o f  t h e i r  em ot iona l  deve lopm ent ,  
he may be w e l l - d i s p o s e d  towards them y e t  r u i n  h i s  c h i l d r e n  s 
h e a l t h  by o v e r f e e d in g  them.
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We a l l  n ee d (b )  p le a s u r e  and t o  a v o id  mental  s u f f e r i n g .  
However t h e  same e v e n t  can make d i f f e r e n t  peo p le  p le a s e d ,  
e x c i t e d ,  a n g ry ,  j e a l o u s ,  h u r t ,  w o r r i e d ,  and so on. I f  I  had 
no i d e a  about  what s o r t  o f  t h in g s  p lease d  o r  d i s p l e a s e d  
a n o t h e r  person ,  ( o r  what made them h u r t ,  a n g ry ,  j e a l o u s ,  
e t c ) ,  how cou ld  I  p o s s ib ly  c la im  t o  be w e ig h in g  th e  needs 
o f  th o s e  in v o lv e d ?  T h is  does not  have t o  be as vague a 
m a t t e r  as i t  m ight  a t  f i r s t  seem. There  a r e  w e l l -  
e s t a b l i s h e d  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  con cern ing  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
symptoms which accompany human f e e l i n g s .  O f te n  we a r e  a b l e  
t o  r e c o g n iz e  th e  em ot iona l  s t a t e  a person i s  e x p e r ie n c in g  by 
i d e n t i f y i n g  th e  symptom. We a re  a b le  t o  c o r r e c t l y  say "She 
i s  e m b a r r a s s e d " , "He i s  a f r a i d ” and so on. To g i v e  some 
o b v io u s  examples ,  th e  embarrassed person i s  l i k e l y  t o  go red  
in  t h e  f a c e ,  th e  f r i g h t e n e d  person i s  l i k e l y  t o  t e n s e  h is  
m u sc les .  Many em ot iona l  s t a t e s  a re  t y p i c a l l y  expressed  in  
c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s ;  th e  bored person f i d g e t s ,  th e  d is g u s te d  
person moves away. There  a re  t y p i c a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  o r  
o b j e c t s ,  which g iv e  r i s e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  t y p e  o f  em ot ion ;  a 
gun p o i n t i n g  a t  one i n s p i r e s  f e a r ,  a verbose l e c t u r e r  b r in g s  
on boredom.
The g e n era l  p o i n t  I  am t r y i n g  t o  make i s  t h a t  t o  
r e c o g n iz e  what a person f e e l s  e m o t i o n a l l y  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  and th e re b y  w hether  o r  no t  th e y  a i l  o r  
f l o u r i s h ,  in v o l v e s  q u i t e  a range o f  s k i l l s  and knowledge.  
I t  i n v o l v e s  n o t i c i n g  f a c i a l  e x p re s s io n s  o r  b o d i l y  p o s tu r e ,  
o r  o b s e r v in g  in  which c i rcum stances  a c e r t a i n  ty p e  o f  
e m o t io n a l  s t a t e  t y p i c a l l y  o ccurs .  Knowledge o f  t h i s  k ind  i s  
r e q u i r e d ,  i f  our  ju d g e r s  a re  to  t a k e  account  o f  th e  
e m o t io n a l  needs o f  themselves and o t h e r s  when making a 
p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgement.  A j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  can 
f a l t e r  s im p ly  through lack  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  due t o  f a c t u a l
i g n o r a n c e .
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  have t o  be a d e q u a te ly  in form ed a l s o  
a b o u t  th e  laws,  s o c ia l  norms, c o n v e n t io n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  o f  
a s o c i e t y  a t  l a r g e  and o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  groups w i t h i n
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i t .  The form t h a t  any s o c i a l  l i f e  t a k e s  in c l u d e s  th e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  laws ,  r u l e s ,  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
c o n v e n t io n s ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  e t c .  And d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  have 
d i f f e r e n t  laws,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  e t c .  But no 
s o c i e t y  i s  w i t h o u t  them. F u r t h e r ,  we a l l  have been 
s o c i a l i z e d ,  e a r l y  in  l i f e ,  i n t o  some such 'way o f  l i f e ’ , 
w i t h  i t s  p r e f e r r e d  b e l i e f s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  p r a c t i c e s . 190 A 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  m ight  r e q u i r e  t h a t  we r e f l e c t  on 
such b e l i e f s ,  d i v e r s e  codes and a u t h o r i t i e s ,  s u b j e c t i n g  them 
t o  c r i t i c i s m  from t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  unmet needs; o r  t h a t  
we assess th e  a p p r o p r ia t e n e s s  o f  th e  w e ig h t  g iven  t o  one o r  
o t h e r  need, in  judgements  con cern ing  what ought  t o  be done.
I f  t h e  m a t t e r  i s  pressed and I  am asked how e x a c t l y  
anyone can t e l l  which needs a p p ly  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  cas e ,  o r  
how t h e y  can t e l l  which need i s  more b a s ic ,  u r g e n t ,  c e r t a i n ,  
e t c . ,  I  hope t h a t  i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  say t h a t  we know how t o  
a p p ly  such c r i t e r i a  by e x p e r ie n c e .  The bas icn ess  or  
c e r t a i n t y  o f  one need ove r  a n o th e r  can be a s c e r t a i n e d  by 
anyone who has sense f a c u l t i e s  and uses them, who has 
ad e q u a te  knowledge and w i t s  and uses them, and who has 
become through  p r a c t i c e  and e x p e r ie n c e  e x p e r t  enough to  
c o n s id e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and t o  e l i m i n a t e  them.
F i n a l l y  how we d e c id e  between one nee d -rea son  and a n o th e r  
may u l t i m a t e l y  be a m a t t e r  o f  d i s c o v e r y .  One can d i s c o v e r ,  
say ,  t h a t  a moral b e l i e f  w i t h  which one was c o n f i d e n t  as one 
grew up, has changed; a moral r u l e ,  which one b e l i e v e d  t o  be 
s e r i o u s  and w e ig h ty ,  i s  now empty. We can f i n d ,  as S.Benn  
( 1 9 7 6 : 1 2 7 )  w r i t e s :
. . . t h a t  a p r i n c i p l e  o r  a t t i t u d e ,  t h a t  once was taken  
t o  be c o n s t i t u t i v e  o f  our  c h a r a c t e r s , as making  
c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  judgements  ' u n t h i n k a b l e ’ , has been 
e r o d e d . . .
U s u a l l y  i t  w i l l  have been eroded by th e  changes in  our  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  Such d i s c o v e r i e s  a r e  p o s s ib le  because we a re  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g ,  as Benn suggests  ( i b i d ) . However t h i s  
does n o t  mean, pace Benn, t h a t  we can choose any reason we 
l i k e ,  as i f  t h e r e  a r e  no l i m i t s  t o  what can be u n i v e r s a l l y
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p r e s c r i b e d .  I  have argued t h a t  th e  l i m i t s  a r e  s e t  by th e  
uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e  n e e d s (a )  and ( b )  which a p p ly  in  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  case .  What we d i s c o v e r  i s  t h a t  because o f  th e  
chang ing  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  c e r t a i n  n e e d - re a s o n s  have become 
w e i g h t i e r .
One o t h e r  p o i n t  t h a t  i t  i s  i m p o r ta n t  t o  see i s  t h a t  when 
making a judgem ent ,  t h e r e  i s  no way o f  s p e c i f y i n g  how 
w e ig h ty  a nee d -rea so n  i s ,  o t h e r  than  s p e c i f y i n g  which o t h e r  
needs i t  w i l l  outw e igh  in  p r a c t i c e .  I  cannot  say how 
im p o r t a n t  my n e e d (b )  f o r  'b e lo n g in g  t o  my f a m i l y ’ i s  e x c e p t  
by s a y in g  something l i k e  " I t  i s  so im p o r ta n t  t o  me t h a t  i t  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  I  g iv e  le s s  t im e  t o  p h i lo s o p h y " .  What t h i s  
example  b r in g s  o u t  a l s o  is  th e  perso na l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  c e r t a i n  
d e c i s i o n s .  When I  d i s c o v e r  th e  im portance  o f  a c e r t a i n  
n e e d -re a s o n  I  may d i s c o v e r  something about  m y s e l f .  The 
r e l a t i v e  im por tance  o f  my work and my f a m i l y  a r e  t h e i r  
im p o r tan ce  t o  me. For someone e l s e ,  Bren tano f o r  in s t a n c e ,  
th e y  m ig h t  have a d i f f e r e n t  w e ig h t i n g .  However d e s p i t e  t h i s  
p e rs o n a l  e le m e n t ,  no t  j u s t  a n y th in g  goes. We do not  d e c id e  
what i s  t o  count  as a n e e d - re a s o n .  And when needs c o n f l i c t ,  
t h e  w e ig h t  g iven  t o  them is  d e te rm in e d ,  in  a r a t i o n a l  
ju dgem en t ,  by c r i t e r i a  such as those  we have d is c u s s e d .
N o n e th e le s s  th e  r e l a t i v e  im portance  o f ,  f o r  example ,  
' w o r k ’ and ' f a m i l y ’ may be d i f f e r e n t  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p e o p le .  
The c o n f l i c t  here  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  j u s t  because o f  the  
com parab le  importance  o f  both u n d e r ly i n g  needs. In  such 
c a s e s ,  our  d e c is i o n s  a re  l i k e l y  t o  be d e te rm in ed  more by 
' t h e  p u l l ’ o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  needs,  than  by r a t i o n a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  ( I  w i l l  have more t o  say about  t h i s  in  th e  
n e x t  c h a p t e r . )
Moral  judgem ent-m ak ing ,  th e n ,  i s  seldom a s im p le  o r  easy  
m a t t e r .  However t h i s  does not  d i s t u r b  my argument t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  b a s ic  need-reasons  on which a r a t i o n a l  moral  
judgem ent  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  based. Uni v e r s a ! i z a b l e  need-  
reas o n s ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  a re  th e  u n d e r ly in g  reasons by which we 
can and do r a t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f y  our moral judgements .
U n d e r l y i n g  nee d -rea sons
A n ee d - re a s o n  f o r  a pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t  moral  judgement  
may n o t  be t h e  a c t u a l  reason g iv e n ,  o r  s u r f a c e  reason .  A 
n e e d - r e a s o n ,  however,  w i l l  be th e  u n d e r ly i n g  reas o n .  Thus 
I  may ju d g e
( 1 3 )  Smith  i s  no t  doing as he m o r a l l y  ought  because he 
r e g u l a r l y  o v e r fe e d s  h is  c h i l d r e n .
I f  i t  i s  t o  count  as a r a t i o n a l  judgement  th en  I  must  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  ( 1 3 )  i s  a p p l i c a b l e ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , t o  anyone  
who o v e r f e e d s  h i s  c h i l d r e n .  T h i s ,  we have seen,  i s  r e q u i r e d  
by t h e  uni v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  U.R.  Thus 
( 1 3 ’ ) I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  Smith i s  no t  doing as he m o r a l l y
ought  because he o v e r fe e d s  h i s  c h i l d r e n  then  I  must  
ju d g e  t h a t  anyone who r e g u l a r l y  o v e r f e e d s  h i s  
c h i l d r e n  ought  no t  t o  do so.
I f  e x a c t l y  th e  same o r  a r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  
o c c u r s ,  I  must be a b le  t o  make th e  same judgem ent .  On th e  
o t h e r  hand, i f  th e  reason in  ( 1 3 )  i s  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , we can 
d i s c o v e r  an u n d e r ly i n g  need-reason  i . e .  ' . . . b e c a u s e  a person  
a i l s  i f  he o r  she i s  r e g u l a r l y  o v e r f e d ’ ( i . e .  we n ee d (b )  t o  
a v o id  o v e r - f e e d i n g ) .
How do we recog n is e  an u n d e r ly in g  need-reason?  One o f  
t h e  p ro ce d u res  we have used f o r  t e s t i n g  w hether  o r  n o t  a 
reason R i s  based upon a nee d (a )  i s  t o  ask t h e  j u d g e r :  
"Could  a person be R / n o t - b e  R and c o n t in u e  t o  fu n c t io n ? " .  
Thus we ask th e  ju d g e r  "Could a c h i l d  be r e g u l a r l y  o v e r f e d  
and n o t  f u n c t i o n ? " .  And the  answer in  t h i s  case seems to  
be t h a t  t h i s  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s ib le .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, a 
p ro c e d u re  we have f o r  t e s t i n g  whether  a reason d e s c r ib e s  a 
n e e d (b )  i s  t o  ask:  "Could a person be R / n o t - b e  R and g iven  
t h e  w o r ld  as we know i t  t o  be, f l o u r i s h ? " .  Thus we ask the  
j u d g e r  in  th e  case o f  ( 1 3 ) :  "Could a c h i l d  be c o n s t a n t l y
o v e r f e d ,  ( u n d e r f e d ,  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  f e d )  and g iven  th e  w or ld  
as we know i t ,  f l o u r i s h ?  . And th e  answer i s  No, as a 
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  i t  cou ld  no t " .  T h is  response cou ld  be 
s u p p o r te d  by numerous e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  showing th e  b o d i l y ,
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p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and o t h e r  problems fa c e d  by obese c h i l d r e n .
A n o th er  p rocedure  o f  t e s t i n g  f o r  e i t h e r  n e e d s ( a )  o r  ( b )  
i s  t o  show t h a t  th e  reason in  such a judgement  i s  j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  ; (by which we mean t h a t  th e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  th e  
judgem en t  in  which i t  occurs cannot  be den ied  by any c l e a r  
t h i n k i n g  p e r s o n ) .  I f  th e  reason in  ( 1 3 )  i s  based upon an 
u n d e r l y i n g  n e e d - re a s o n ,  we may r e s t a t e  ( 1 3 )  th u s :
( 1 3 ’ ’ ) I f  Smith m o r a l l y  ought not  t o  have r e g u l a r l y  o v e r f e d  
h i s  c h i l d r e n  because human be ings n e e d (b )  t o  a v o id  
o v e r - f e e d i n g , then any r a t i o n a l  person must ju d g e  
t h a t  anyone who o v e r fe e d s  h i s  c h i l d r e n  ought  no t  to  
do so.
Our s t r a t e g y  then  would be t o  ske tch  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  i m p l ie d  
by t h e  d e n i a l  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l  in  ( 1 3 ’ ’ ) ;  v i z .  th e  w o r ld  as 
we know i t  -  w i t h  i t s  l i m i t e d  food re s o u rc e s ,  i n h a b i t e d  by 
c h i l d r e n  w i t h  a s i m i l a r  b u i l d ,  d i g e s t i v e  systems and b o d i l y  
m ake-up,  and so on -  in  which th e  ju d g e r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  c l a i m  
t h a t  a l l  c h i l d r e n  cou ld  be and m o r a l ly  ought  t o  be r e g u l a r l y  
o v e r f e d .  I  cannot  t h i n k  o f  a p l a u s i b l e  argument f a v o u r i n g  
t h i s  and t h e r e  a re  many obvious reasons f o r  dou b t in g  t h a t  
i t  co u ld  be so. Unless my opponent can c o n v in c in g ly  s t a t e  
what  he has in  mind by denying ( 1 3 ’ ’ ) ,  th e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  
( 1 3 ’ ) t o  ( 1 3 ’ ’ ) i s  l e g i t i m a t e .  ( 1 3 )  i s  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e .
U s u a l l y  th e  process w i l l  be more c o m p l ic a te d  than  t h e  way 
I  have re p r e s e n te d  i t .  O f ten  when making a moral judgement  
a v a r i e t y  o f  needs come i n t o  p l a y .  For in s t a n c e ,  in  most 
c u l t u r e s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  one i s  m arr ie d  i s  h e ld  t o  be a reason  
f o r  r e f r a i n i n g  from sexual  i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  someone who is  
n o t  o n e ’ s spouse. Thus we may judge:
( 1 4 )  Jones ought  not  t o  have sexual i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  Mary 
Smith because she i s  m a r r ie d .
But  why i s  ' . . . b e c a u s e  she i s  m a r r i e d ’ a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
reason? On my t h e s i s  i t  could  be argued t h a t  t h i s  is  
because sexua l  i n f i d e l i t y  i s  i n i m i c a l  t o  our  n e e d s (b )  f o r  
t r u s t  and a sense o f  be long ing;  i t  t h w a r t s  t h e  n ee d (b )  f o r
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u n i t y  we f i n d  in  f a m i l y  l i f e ,  th e  n ee d (b )  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  have 
f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  p a r e n t a l  c a re  and concern ,  and so on.  By 
p a r a l l e l  reasons ,  th e  moral p r i n c i p l e  'One ought  n o t  t o  
commit a d u l t e r y ’ would be regarded as based upon th e s e  
u n d e r l y i n g  needs.
The process o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  u n d e r ly i n g  needs, o f  c o u rs e ,  
can be even more c o m p l ic a te d .  But however complex i t  i s ,  a 
r a t i o n a l  moral judgement may be shown t o  e v e n t u a l l y  
t e r m i n a t e  in  nee d - re a s o n s .  However,  n o t  a l l  o f  our  ev e ry d a y  
moral  judgements a r e  complex. For example ,  we m ig h t  judge
( 1 5 )  Smith ought  t o  F because he nee ds (b )  t o  lead  a happy 
l i f e ,
and t h a t  m ight  be a l l  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  t o  say on th e  m a t t e r .
By t a k i n g  th e  fundamental  o r  u n d e r ly i n g  needs in v o lv e d  
as t h e  p o i n t  a t  which th e  uni v e r s a ! i z a b i 1 i t y  t e s t  a p p l i e s ,  
we a v o id  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  we r a i s e d  in  Ch apter  One (see  
p p . 60-61  a b o v e ) ,  namely t h a t  e v e ry  human s i t u a t i o n  i s  
e x t r e m e l y  c o m p l ic a te d  so t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  a lways be a 
r e l e v a n t  f e a t u r e  t h a t  one can p ic k  o u t  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  case ,  
t h a t  can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  C ons ider  aga in  th e  Nazi war  
c r i m i n a l  who c la im ed  t h a t  he was o n ly  'o b ey in g  o r d e r s ’ o r  
' d o in g  h i s  j o b ’ , ( n e i t h e r  o f  which a r e  o b v io u s ly  m o r a l l y  
unworthy  r e a s o n s ) .  The d e c e p t iv e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  c l a i m  l i e s  
i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  most Nazi war c r i m i n a l s  were no t  o n ly  doing  
t h i s ;  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t i o n s  were a n c i l l a r y  t o  more 
fundam en ta l  need-reasons  which,  when th ey  a r e  r e v e a le d ,  a ls o  
exposes th e  r a t i o n a l  i n e l i g i b i l i t y  o f  th e  N a z i ’ s judgement.  
T h e i r  u n d e r ly i n g  reasons seem to  have v a r i e d  from th e  
n e g a t i o n  o f  some o t h e r  p e r s o n ’ s n e e d (a )  t o  s u r v i v e  ( e . g  
" I ’ l l  k i l l  whomever I ’ m t o l d  t o  k i l l " ) ,  t o  th e  even more 
a p p a l l i n g ,  n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgement  about  genoc ide .  
The f a c t  t h a t  we can U.R. I  u n i v e r s a l i z e  most s u r f a c e  
i n t e n t i o n s  i s  no embarrassment t o  a U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l  
i z a b i l i t y  t e s t ,  which is  in tended  t o  a p p ly  t o  th e  u n d e r ly i n g  
n e e d s ( a )  and (b )  o f  those i n v o lv e d .
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I t  i s  e q u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  a n o th e r  problem we ment ioned in  
P a r t  One. I f ,  in  drawing up h i s  w i l l ,  Smith d e c id e s  t o  g iv e  
a f a v o u r i t e  p i c t u r e  t o  h i s  i n v a l i d  c h i l d ,  we noted  t h a t  here  
i s  a s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t i o n  t h a t  cannot  be u n i v e r s a l l y  a c te d  
upon. S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  d u t i e s  o f  p a r e n ts  t o  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  
t h e  d o c t o r ’ s H i p p o c r a t i c  o a th ,  th e  p r i n c i p l e  e n j o i n i n g  
p r i e s t s  no t  t o  d i v u l g e  what i s  t o l d  t o  them in  th e
c o n f e s s i o n a l ,  we s a i d ,  a r e  v e r y  s p e c i f i c  and s i t u a t i o n a l .  
C l e a r l y  th e y  a r e  no t  u n i v e r s a l  in  th e  sense t h a t  th e y  a p p ly  
t o  e v e ry b o d y .  Y e t  t h e r e  can be no doubt  t h a t  th e y  a r e  
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and t h a t  we a r e  w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o
u n i v e r s a l i z e  them in th e  sense o f  a p p ly in g  them t o  everyone  
who f a l l s  w i t h i n  th e  range o f  t h e i r  scope.
However our  t e s t  a p p l i e s  no t  t o  th e  j u d g e r ’ s s u r f a c e  
reasons  bu t  t o  th e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  th e  u n d e r ly i n g  need-  
reasons  o f  th e  cases i n v o l v e d .  Thus S m i t h ’ s reason f o r  h is  
judgem ent  can be couched in terms o f  th e  u n d e r ly i n g  a c t i v e  
sympathy he f e e l s  f o r  th e  need(b )  f o r  p h y s ic a l  w e l l - b e i n g  o f  
h i s  c h i l d ;  th e  d o c t o r ’ s H i p p o c r a t i c  o a th ,  th e  p r i n c i p l e  
d i r e c t i n g  p r i e s t s  t o  keep c o n f id e n c e s ,  can be seen as 
s u r f a c e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  nee ds (b )  t h a t  those  
i n v o l v e d  have f o r  s e l f - f i d e l i t y  and i n t e g r i t y ,  o r  t h e i r  
p a t i e n t s ’ o r  p a r i s h i o n e r s ’ needs to  be a b le  t o  r e l y  upon 
them and t o  t r u s t  them in  such c o n t e x t s .
I t  m ig h t  be asked:  "Do you want t o  say t h a t  th e  m ot ive  
f o r  keep ing  moral r u l e s  o f  t h i s  k ind  i s  t h a t  keep ing  them 
e n a b le s  us t o  s a t i s f y  u n d e r ly in g  b o d i l y  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l
needs?" .  My answer i s  a q u a l i f i e d  yes . My h e s i t a t i o n  is
due, in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  not  always  
easy t o  t e l l  what th e  m ot ive  i s  f o r  a g iven  judgem ent .  For  
exam ple ,  i f  Smith he lps  th e  drowning c h i l d  he may have th e  
u n d e r l y i n g  m ot ive  o f  showing a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  th e  c h i l d  
o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  may have been s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  e . g .  he 
wanted t o  f o s t e r  a c e r t a i n  s o r t  o f  p u b l i c  r e p u t a t i o n .  S ince  
t h e  l i f e - s a v i n g  a c t  may e q u a l l y  w e l l  be done in  f u r t h e r a n c e  
o f  e i t h e r ,  t h e r e  may be doubt as t o  S m i t h ’ s m o t iv e .  M ere ly
a s k in g  him may no t  s e t t l e  th e  is s u e .  We may ask ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  
i f  he i s  w i l l i n g  t o  U.R.  u n i v e r s a l i z e  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  m ot ive s  
in  q u e s t i o n .  He can work t h i s  o u t  by as k in g  h i m s e l f  i f  he 
can and would a c c e p t  anyone doing t h e  same a c t  jjjn p r o p r i a  
perso na  in  r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  However th e  
answer m ight  be t h a t  he does not  know, o r  he i s  no t  su re  o f  
h i s  u n d e r l y i n g  m o t iv e .  He i s  unsure w hether  h i s  m o t iv e  was 
j u s t  t o  be h e l p f u l ,  f o r  s e l f - r e p u t a t i o n ,  o r  bo th .
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  th e  answer I  would g iv e  t o  t h i s  m a t t e r  i s  
p l a i n .  My t e s t  a p p l i e s  not  t o  th e  a g e n t ’ s m o t ive s  but  t o  a 
j u d g e r ’ s r e f l e c t i v e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  th e  ( u n d e r l y i n g )  needs 
o f  th o se  i n v o l v e d ,  which w i l l  be a p p a re n t  in  th e  s i n g u l a r  
moral  judgements  he makes in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  S ince  
t h e  ( u n d e r l y i n g )  need-reason  f o r  h i s  judgements  w i l l  be th e  
w e i g h t i e s t  reason,  then  h is  judgements  w i l l  be pr ima f a c i e  
c o r r e c t  and any f u r t h e r  judgements  t h a t  can be d e r i v e d  from  
them by U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n  w i l l  be pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t .  
Now i f  S m i t h ’ s m ot ive  i s  t o  guide  h is  a c t i o n  by need -reasons  
in  t h e  way suggested ,  h is  m ot ives  w i l l  conform t o  th e  
judgem ents  t h a t  any r a t i o n a l  person would judge  ought  t o  be 
d o n e .
L e t  me, f i n a l l y ,  underscore  some o f  t h e  p o i n t s  in  the  
argument  above which w a r r a n t  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  t o g e t h e r ,  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and needs p ro v id e  a way o f  t e s t i n g  th e  
r a t i o n a l  and moral a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  judgem ents .
U n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t v .  needs and moral judgement
To beg in  w i t h ,  we assumed t h a t  th e  q u e s t io n  'Which moral  
judgem ents  ought  anyone t o  make?’ must be answered by each 
person f o r  h i m s e l f .  A moral ju d g e r  i s  an autonomous a g e n t .  
T h i s ,  I  m a i n ta in e d ,  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  c o n n o t a t io n  o f  th e  word 
' m o r a l * .  I t  i s  o n ly  when he makes a judgement  e n j o i n i n g  or  
f o r b i d d i n g  a c e r t a i n  course o f  a c t i o n ,  app ro v in g  or  
condemning a c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t  o r  l i f e - s t y l e ,  e t c . ,  t h a t  h is  
judgem ent  i s  a moral one.
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We have seen,  however,  t h a t  f o r  h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
judgem ent  t o  be r a t i o n a l ,  f i r s t l y ,  th e  j u d g e r  must be 
w i l l i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t .  Thus when Smith ju d g e s  
( 1 6 )  I  ought  t o  make a l y i n g  promise t o  repay  Jones,  
because he w i l l  not  loan th e  money t o  me un less  
I  do,
i f  Sm ith  t h i n k s  t h a t  ( 1 6 )  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  he must be w i l l i n g  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  ( 1 6 )  i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . I f  Smith w i l l  not  
a c c e p t  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  case then he cannot  c o n s i s t e n t l y  reg ard  
h i m s e l f  as j u s t i f i e d  in  th e  p r e s e n t  case.
S e co n d ly ,  we have e s t a b l i s h e d  a l s o  t h a t  f o r  i t  t o  be 
r a t i o n a l ,  Smith must be a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  ( 1 6 ) .  I t  must 
f u l f i l  c e r t a i n  l o g i c a l  and m a t e r i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  imposed by 
c o n s is t e n c y  A. And (as  i t  s ta n d s )  Smith cannot  u n i v e r s a l i z e
( 1 6 )  because in  t r y i n g  t o  do so he would be i n v o lv e d  in  a 
s e l f - f r u s t r a t i n g  judgement,  which i s  no t  l o g i c a l l y  
a d m i s s i b l e .  For he would be t r y i n g  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  a 
judgem ent  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  i t  be p o s s ib le  t o  make promises  
and t o  have them ac ted  on and, a t  th e  same t im e ,  he would be 
w i l l i n g  t h a t  everyone m o r a l ly  should  break t h e i r  promise  
when t h e y  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  s i t u a t e d .  In  o t h e r  words, i f  
S m i t h ’ s s i n g u l a r  judgement were to  be u n i v e r s a l l y  adopted ,  
th e n  t h e  p o i n t  o f  b re a k in g  th e  promise would be l o s t  s in c e  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p ro m is e -k e e p in g ,  which th e  d e c e i t f u l  
prom ise  presupposes,  would not  app ly  in  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  Th is  
I  t a k e  t o  be K a n t ’ s ( 1 7 8 5 : 6 7 - 6 8 )  p o s i t i o n  when he c la im s  
t h a t  t h e  c a t e g o r i c a l  im p e r a t i v e  a lo n e ,  (a  v e r s io n  o f  U . R . ) ,  
would f o r c e  th e  ju d g e r  i n t o  some form o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
So why do we have t o  b o th er  w i t h  a l l  o f  th e  e x t r a  baggage  
o f  a needs th e o ry ?  We found t h a t  th e  main reason f o r  t h i s  
t h e o r y  i s  t h a t ,  in  a c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  U.R.  has t o  be used 
in  c o n ju n c t i o n  w i t h  a n o t io n  o f  c o n te x tu a l  r e l e v a n c e .  And 
where a reason in  a s i n g u l a r  moral judgement d e s c r ib e s  a 
n e e d (a )  o r  (b )  o f  persons then t h i s  is  a pr ima f a c j e  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason f o r  th e  accompanying moral  
ju d g em en t .  The importance o f  t h i s  p o i n t  can be seen i f  we
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compare my own w i t h  a K a n t ian  p o s i t i o n  in  t h i s  r e g a r d .  With  
o n l y  t h e  r e s o u rc e s  o f  U.R.  ( t h e  c a t e g o r i c a l  i m p e r a t i v e )  to  
hand,  we do no t  know how t o  e x p l a i n  why, a t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  
' p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ’ i s  o f  moral i n t e r e s t  t o  us. Why would 
S m i th ,  o r  anyone,  p ic k  on f a l s e - p r o m i s i n g  as a pr ima f a c i e  
m o r a l l y  wrong t h i n g  t o  do whereas, say ,  lo o k in g  a t  hedgehogs 
i n  t h e  m o o n l ig h t  i s  no t  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  us m o r a l ly ?  Why does 
t h e  f o r m e r ,  bu t  no t  th e  l a t t e r ,  m a t te r?
I  have shown t h a t  an adequate  account  o f  ( 1 6 )  r e q u i r e s  
n o t  o n l y  an account  o f  th e  l o g i c a l  i n a b i l i t y  f o r  anyone t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  a judgement o f  t h i s  k in d ,  but  a l s o  an account  
which shows why an autonomous ju d g e r  would p ic k  upon f a l s e -  
p r o m is in g  as be ing o f  moral concern in  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  My 
argument  has been t h a t  when someone makes a f a l s e  promise he 
v i o l a t e s  a number o f  u n d e r ly in g  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs; ( v i z .  
o u r  n e e d (b )  t o  t r u s t  o t h e r  persons,  f o r  s e l f - f i d e l i t y  and 
i n t e g r i t y ,  e t c . ) .  Thus, l i k e  Kant ,  I  m a in ta in  t h a t  when he 
makes a judgement  l i k e  ( 1 6 )  th e  autonomous j u d g e r  must be 
w i l l i n g  and a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t .  I  too  can say t h a t  
Smith  i s  no t  l o g i c a l l y  a b le  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  ( 1 6 ) .  However 
by i d e n t i f y i n g  th e  u n d e r ly in g  needs in v o l v e d ,  u n l i k e  Kant ,  
I  can say why p r o m is e - b r e a k in g ,  but  not  n o c tu r n a l  hedgehog-  
w a tc h in g ,  m a t t e r s .  Given i t s  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form ,  we cou ld  
n o t  have an i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p rom ise -m ak ing ,  based on 
u n d e r l y i n g  needs o f  t r u s t  and r e l i a n c e ,  which th e  d e c e i t f u l  
prom ise  presupposes.  F ur therm ore ,  I  hope t o  have shown t h a t  
t h i s  i s  an example o f  the  n o t io n  o f  r e le v a n c e  which is  
a c t u a l l y  b u i l t  i n t o  the  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral judgements  
( p r i n c i p l e s )  o f  everyday  moral d is c o u r s e .
We should  n o t i c e ,  in  p ass in g ,  t h a t  f rom th e  s t a n d p o in t  o f  
o u r  o r d i n a r y  moral b e l i e f s  th e  K a n t ian  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  is  
weak in  a n o th e r  way. Sometimes our  du ty  t o  keep promises  
c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  o t h e r  d u t i e s  we have.  As S o c ra te s  argued  
( s e e  P l a t o  ( 1 9 4 1 : 7 ) ) ,  i f  th e  o n ly  way t o  s top  a maniac 
i n t e n t  on k i l l i n g  someone is  by making a f a l s e  promise to  
him, commonsense m o r a l i t y  would say t h a t  I  should  make the
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f a l s e  p ro m ise .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  would be q u i t e  usual  and 
r e a s o n a b le  t o  a rgue  t h a t  i f  t h e  o n ly  way Smith  can save h i s  
c h i l d r e n  f rom s t a r v a t i o n  i s  by making a f a l s e  promise  -  i f  
i t  i s  t h e  o n l y  way -  he should  l i e  t o  Jones. G iven o n l y  th e  
r e s o u rc e s  o f  U.R.  we would not  be a b le  t o  hand le  cases such 
as t h e s e .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  r a t h e r  than  g i v i n g  us c a t e g o r i c a l  
r u l e s ,  I  am i n t e r p r e t i n g  need-reasons  as p resu m p t ions ,  and 
t h e  s i n g u l a r  moral judgements in  which th ey  o ccur  as being  
p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t  ( n o t  ' a b s o l u t e ’ ) judgem ents .  We should  
make promises  which we in te n d  t o  keep f o r  th e  need -reasons  
g i v e n .  There  a r e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  however,  where we m ight  
in v o k e  needs which weigh more than  t r u s t ,  s e l f - f i d e l i t y ,  
e t c .  and t h a t  maybe would j u s t i f y  a f a l s e  prom ise .  T h is  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  s t i l l  a l lo w s  room f o r  th e  advantages o f  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  r u l e ,  in  o t h e r  words, w i t h o u t  a d h e r in g  t o  
judgem ents  which run c o n t r a r y  t o  commonsense m o r a l i t y .  (We 
w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  k ind  o f  di lemma in  th e  n e x t  c h a p t e r . )
The i m p o r ta n t  p o i n t  a g a in s t  Kant here  i s  t h a t  when making 
a moral  judgem ent ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  has t o  be c o n jo in e d  
w i t h  a m a t e r i a l  ( n o n - f o r m a l ) c o n d i t i o n .  And my proposal  i s  
t h a t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  c e r t a i n  u n d e r ly i n g  needs p ro v id e  
such a c o n d i t i o n .  They a re  th e  b a s is  o f  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  
b e l i e f s  and, a t  th e  same t im e ,  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgements  
in  which such d e s c r i p t i o n s  occur  as reasons ,  a r e  j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  ( v i z .  n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e ) .
L e t  me emphasize a ls o  th e  o t h e r  s id e  o f  my argument.  By 
i t s e l f ,  th e  t h e o r y  concern ing  needs p r o v id e s  a necessary  but  
n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a r a t i o n a l  moral judgement.  
An autonomous ju d g e r  i s  a b l e  t o  use d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  n ee d s (a )  
and ( b )  as r e l e v a n t  reasons in  h is  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
ju d g em en ts .  Y e t  i t  i s  o n ly  i f  and when he uses such a 
d e s c r i p t i o n  t h a t  i t  becomes a need -reason  f o r  th e  moral  
judgem en t  t h a t  he makes. When he does so, then  p r o v i d i n g  he 
i s  w i l l i n g  and he i s  a b le  to  u n i v e r s a l i z e  th e  judgement he 
makes ( e . g .  th e  reason does not  d e s c r ib e  a s o - c a l l e d
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d e s t r u c t i v e  need)  then  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form  o f  th e  
judgem ent  i s  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , v i z .  n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e .
T h i s  i s  b e s t  seen in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  where we 
a t t e m p t  t o  answer t h e  'which moral ju d g em en ts? ’ q u e s t i o n .  I  
am a r g u in g  t h a t ,  j o i n t l y ,  U.R.  and needs t h e o r y  p r o v id e  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t e s t i n g  th e  r a t i o n a l  and moral  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  s i n g u l a r  judgem ents .  Thus ( i )  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  judgement we make based upon a 
n e e d - r e a s o n ( a )  o r  ( b )  i s  pr ima f a c i e  m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  and 
( i i )  any f u r t h e r  judgement t h a t  can be g e n u in e ly  d e r i v e d  by 
u n i v e r s a l i  z a t i o n  from ( i ) i s  pr ima f a c i e  r a t i o n a l l y  c o r r e c t .  
T h i s  i s  t o  say ,  so i n t e r p r e t e d ,  U.R.  can be g iven  a m a t e r i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , v i z .  U . R . I I .  And, so i n t e r p r e t e d ,  U . R . I I  
has a d i r e c t  b e a r in g  on moral judgements;  i t  can be used t o  
d e t e r m in e  r a t i o n a l  and m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  judgem ents .
L e t  us t a k e  a c o n c r e te  example.  C ons ider  a g a in  th e  case  
o f  Sm ith  whose c h i l d  i s  s e r i o u s l y  i l l .  O r d i n a r i l y  we would 
j u d g e
( 1 7 )  Smith ought  to  ta k e  h is  c h i l d  to  h o s p i t a l  because  
she i s  v e ry  s i c k .
I  have argued t h a t  we can show t h a t  th e  reason g iven  in  ( 1 7 )  
c o u n ts  as a m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason by showing t h a t  i t  has 
t o  do w i t h  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  needs.  Thus f i r s t l y  
and most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  we can i d e n t i f y  th e  c h i l d ’ s n ee d (b )  
t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g .  Secondly ,  we can d i s c o v e r  an u n d e r ly i n g  
n e e d -re a s o n  im p l ie d  in  ( 1 7 ) ,  S m i t h ’ s n ee d (b )  f o r  sympathy.  
On t h e  b a s is  o f  t h i s ,  Smith w i l l  f e e l  in te n s e  p i t y  f o r  her  
( p a s s i v e  sympathy) and he w i l l  want t o  do a l l  t h a t  he can do 
h e l p  her  r e c o v e r  ( a c t i v e  sympathy) .  A n other  t h i n g  t h a t  is  
i m p o r t a n t  h e r e ,  we noted ,  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  Smith s c h i l d .  He 
s ta n d s  in  a q u i t e  s p e c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h i s  c h i l d  and th e  
p r o p i n q u i t y  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  he lps  t o  e x p l a i n  th e  l e v e l  
o f  commitment t h a t  Smith i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  show. But the  
commitment as such can be e x p la in e d  by Smith s u n d e r ly in g  
n e e d (b )  f o r  sympathy. And i t  i s  th e  need f o r  sympathy f o r  
her  s u f f e r i n g  -  as w e l l  as th e  s p e c ia ln e s s  o f  the
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r e l a t i o n s h i p  -  t h a t  can and should  r a t i o n a l l y  weigh w i t h  
him. Thus we may judge
( 1 7 ’ ) Smith  ought  t o  do something f o r  t h i s  s i c k  c h i l d  
because she needs(b )  t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g  and he 
n e e d s ( b )  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  th e  c h i l d ’ s s u f f e r i n g .  Now 
s i n c e  t h i s  i s  a moral judgement based upon n e e d - re a s o n s ,  th e  
u n i v e r s a l  moral judgement in  which th e y  occur  w i l l  be th e  
s o r t  o f  judgement  t h a t  any in fo rm ed ,  r e f l e c t i v e  person -  who 
i s  g iv e n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  reasons and c o n c lu s io n  -  must 
a c c e p t  as th e  judgement t h a t  anyone m o r a l l y  ought  t o  make.  
T h i s  i s  t o  say t h a t  we should be a b l e  t o  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z e  
( 1 7 ’ ) ,  thus
( 1 7 ’ ’ ) I f  Smith ought  to  do something f o r  t h i s  s i c k  c h i l d  
because she needs(b )  t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g  and he 
ne e d s (b )  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  her  s u f f e r i n g ,  then  
any r a t i o n a l  person must judge  t h a t  anyone who i s  in  
a p o s i t i o n  t o  he lp  a s i c k  c h i l d ,  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do 
so because o f  th e  c h i l d ’ s need (b )  t o  a v o id  s u f f e r i n g  
and because o f  t h e i r  need(b )  f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy.
I f  ( 1 7 )  i s  p r im a f a c i e  c o r r e c t  then t h i s  is  because o f  the  
u n d e r l y i n g  n e e d - rea so n s .  Thus ( 1 7 ’ ) and th e  judgement  
d e r i v e d  by U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n  ( 1 7 ’ ’ ) a r e  a ls o  pr ima  
f a c i e  c o r r e c t .  L a s t l y ,  any f u r t h e r  judgement t h a t  can be 
d e r i v e d  from ( 1 7 ’ ’ ) i s  a ls o  pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t .  The 
u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgement a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  o f  th e  r e l e v a n t  cases  
w i t h i n  i t s  scope (see  p . 21 ab o ve) .
L e t  me make th e  p o i n t  in  a d i f f e r e n t  way. As I  have 
s a i d ,  th e  p r o p i n q u i t y  o f  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  a reason f o r  
h i s  c h i l d ’ s s u f f e r i n g  w eigh ing  more w i t h  Smith than  th e  
s u f f e r i n g  o f  o t h e r s .  Now we cou ld  p o i n t  o u t  t o  the  
j u d g e m e n t -m a k e r : "There a re  o t h e r  s i c k  c h i l d r e n ,  s u f f e r i n g  
i n  j u s t  t h e  same way t h a t  S m i th ’ s c h i l d  s u f f e r s  . And we 
c o u ld  ask him: "Don’ t  th ey  too deserve  p i t y  and i f  Smith can 
do something t o  he lp  them, should he not  do so? . For we 
can argue by th e  needs t h e s i s  t h a t  a l l  c h i l d r e n  are  
r e l e v a n t l y  a l i k e  in  t h e i r  need(b )  t o  avo id  s u f f e r i n g ,  and
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t h a t  a l l  persons a re  a l i k e  in  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  n e e d (b )  f o r  
a c t i v e  sympathy in  such cases .  We can go on t o  show by th e  
U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  t h a t  r a t i o n a l l y  Smith o r  any 
person  shou ld  g i v e  some w e ig h t  in  t h e i r  moral judgements  t o  
t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  any c h i l d  whom they  a re  in  a p o s i t i o n  t o  
h e l p ,  j u s t  on th e  grounds t h a t  t h i s  c h i l d  n e e d s (b )  t o  a v o id  
s u f f e r i n g  and i t  i s  someone f o r  whom he n ee d s (b )  a c t i v e  
sympathy.  I f  my t h e s i s  is  c o r r e c t ,  t h i s  i s  s t i l l  a t e s t  o f  
t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  such judgements r a t h e r  than  t h e i r  moral  
w o r t h .
We have seen a l s o  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  how a number o f  o t h e r  
u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s i n g u l a r  moral judgements  conform t o  U . R . I I .  
U sing  r e d u c t i o  ad absurdum arguments I  f a u l t e d  t h e i r  d e n i a l s  
as b e in g  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g ,  u n iq u e ly  naming, o r  
I  showed t h a t  th e  h yp o th es iz ed  s i t u a t i o n  i m p l ie d  by th e  
d e n i a l  o f  th e  uni v e r s a l  i zed form o f  th e  judgem ent ,  i s  
i n c o m p a t i b le  w i t h  a d e f e n s i b l e  v iew o f  a moral p r a c t i c e .
Of c o u rs e ,  none o f  t h i s  i s  t o  deny t h a t  t h e r e  a re  moral  
p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom our  own and which suggest  
t h a t  our  own might  have been o t h e r w is e .  (Any moral th e o r y  
w o r th  t h e  name w i l l  adm it  t h i s . )  O bv ious ly  moral p r a c t i c e s  
v a r y  from one s o c i e t y  t o  an o th e r ;  p r a c t i c e s  such as a b o r t i o n  
o r  i n f a n t i c i d e  we noted e a r l i e r ,  a re  approved o f  in  one 
s o c i e t y  and not  a n o th e r .  And no doubt  t h e r e  a re  e t h i c a l  
commitments t h a t  we t a k e  f o r  g ra n te d ,  l i k e  those  t o  be found  
in  m a r r ia g e  o r  paren thood,  which do not  occur  in  o t h e r  
s o c i e t i e s .  Y e t  t h e r e  are  l i m i t s  t o  such v a r i a t i o n s .  
E n q u i r e r s  from d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s  a re  p e r f e c t l y  a b l e  to  
r e c o g n iz e  th e  d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s  as d i v e r s e  ways o f  meet ing  
sh a re d  needs. And in  many cases,  as we s h a l l  see ,  we may 
u n h e s i t a t i n g l y  r e f e r  to  u n d e r ly in g  needs as th e  b a s is  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  moral r u l e s .  There i s  no a r b i t r a r y  d e p a r tu r e  from  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e - n e e d s  t h e s i s  he re .
S i m i l a r l y  th e  t h e s i s  is  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  an a b i l i t y  to  
u n d e rs ta n d  o r  imagine d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  l i v e a b l e  s o c ia l  
ar range m ents  in  any one s o c i e t y .  Where t h e r e  a re  d i f f e r e n c e s
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o f t e n  t h i s  w i l l  be due t o  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  emphasis ,  o r  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  w e ig h t  o r  importance g iven  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
need.  One way o f  l i f e  w i l l  encourage th e  need f o r  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a n o th e r  w i l l  s t r e s s  th e  need f o r  a c t i v e  
sympathy ,  w h i l e  a n o th e r  may p r o v id e  g r e a t e r  scope f o r  
p l e a s u r e ,  o r  p h y s ic a l  w e l l - b e i n g ,  and so on. There  can be 
s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  and o v e r la p s ;  a l l  o f  which can be 
t r a c e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  m i n i s t e r i n g  t o  t h i n g s  a person  
needs t o  f u n c t i o n  or  t o  f l o u r i s h .
A l l  o f  t h i s  i m p l i e s  th e  c u r io u s  r e s u l t  t h a t  a t h e o r y  I  
c la im e d  t o  be n e u t r a l  ( v i z .  n o n - c o n t e s t a b le )  leads  
i n e l u c t a b l y  t o  c e r t a i n  c o n c r e te  moral p r i n c i p l e s .  For ,  i f  
I  have argued c o r r e c t l y ,  u n d e r ly in g  need -reasons  ( a )  o r  (b )  
a r e  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  in  pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  
moral  judgem ents .  The u n i v e r s a l  moral judgements  in  which  
t h e y  o c c u r ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say,  a r e  th e  s o r t  o f  judgements t h a t
any r a t i o n a l  person -  who is  g iven  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  reason
and c o n c lu s io n  -  must accep t  as th e  judgement t h a t  anyone 
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  make. To put  the  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  such 
s i n g u l a r  moral judgements w i l l  s a t i s f y  th e  r u l e  U . R . I I ,  v i z .
I f  i t  i s  judged t h a t  X m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F f o r  the  
n eed -reason  R, then any r a t i o n a l  person must judge
t h a t  anyone t o  whom R a p p l i e s  ought  t o  do F.
When we b r in g  th e s e  two aspects  o f  moral t h i n k i n g  t o g e t h e r ,  
i n  o t h e r  words, we o b t a i n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .  We w i l l  d iscuss  t h i s  r e s u l t  in
more d e t a i l  s h o r t l y .
We must f i r s t  c o n s id e r  some o f  th e  rem a in in g  problems
t h a t  I  ment ioned e a r l i e r .  The f i r s t  problem i s :  does the
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e —needs account  above a p p ly  t o  a l l  moral
judgem ents?  As we noted e a r l i e r ,  we a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  faced
by m u t u a l l y  in c o m p a t ib le  needs ( i . e .  ' f a m i l y ’ and ' w o r k ’ )
both o f  which appear t o  be c om pe l l ing  but  o n ly  one o f  which
can be met .  P.Winch expresses the  bew i lderm en t  o f  someone
who i s  in  such a di lemma, when he w r i t e s  ( 1 9 7 2 .1 6 1 )
'On th e  one hand I  should do t h i s ,  on th e  o t h e r  I  
ought t o  do t h a t .  So what r e a l l y  ought I  t o  do? ’
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The rub h e re  i s ,  o f  co u rse ,  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  an uncommon 
s i t u a t i o n .  Where two needs c o n f l i c t  in  a p a r t i c u l a r
s i t u a t i o n  one o f  them has t o  g iv e  way. Both Winch and 
A . M a c I n t y r e  c l a i m  t h a t  moral judgem ents ,  in  t h e s e  c o n t e x t s ,  
do n o t  t o  r e q u i r e  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g ,  ( a l t h o u g h  M a c I n t y r e ,
u n l i k e  Winch, does not  r e s t r i c t  h i m s e l f  t o  moral d i le m m as ) .  
I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e y  say ,  f o r  me t o  ju d g e  'X 
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F ’ w i t h o u t  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  anybody e l s e  in  
a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  i s ,  o r  would be, o b l ig e d  t o  do F.
A second problem i s  t o  say why e x a c t l y  anyone ’ s moral
judgem ents  should  conform t o  a u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s
a c c o u n t .  Even i f  U . R . I I  i s ,  as I  c l a i m  i t  i s ,  a n e u t r a l  
c r i t e r i o n  w i t h  which we can d e te rm in e  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  and 
wrong judgem ents ,  th e  q u e s t io n  s t i l l  remains:  why should  
anyone ju d g e  in  accordance w i t h  i t ?
A t h i r d  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t o  show why my account  should  be 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  opposing v iews o f  human needs. We n o te d ,  in  
t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r ,  t h a t  my a n a l y s i s  i s  based upon a d is p u te d  
v iew  o f  human n a t u r e .  What arguments can I  g iv e  t o  a 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t  t o  show why my account  should  be 
p r e f e r r e d ?
A f o u r t h  rem a in in g  problem i s  t o  show, in  a c o n c lu s iv e  
way, t h a t  a s i m p le r  th e o r y  based upon h y p o t h e t i c a l  o r  a c t u a l  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  cannot  p r o v id e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
a n a l y s i s  and d e l i v e r  th e  same r e s u l t s  as one,  l i k e  ours ,
t h a t  i n c l u d e s  th e  o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  need f o r  sympathy.
A f i f t h  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t o  say how my account  w i l l  handle  
t h e  problems p re s e n te d  by moral d e a d lo c k .  By t h e  l a t t e r  we 
mean t h e  no t  unusual s i t u a t i o n  when two o r  more ju d g e r s  each 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  own judgem en t ,  b u t  no t  t h e i r  o p p o n e n t ’ s,  
i s  c o r r e c t .  How does my account  p r o v id e  an answer t o  th e  
d e a d lo c k ,  say ,  between t h e  C a t h o l i c  housew ife  and her  
d o c to r ?  Both b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  own judgement  i s  c o r r e c t  
and t h a t  t h e i r  opponent  i s  wrong. Most o f  our  i n t r a c t a b l e




I n  t h i s  f i n a l  c h a p te r  I  w i l l  defend th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e -  
needs t h e s i s  in  more d e t a i l .  I  have ment ioned s i x  gen era l  
prob lem s.  In  s e c t i o n  ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  I  w i l l  a t t e m p t  t o  answer  
t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  U.R.  i s  not  a necessary  c o n d i t i o n  o f  
moral  judgements  and t h a t  by making i t  so, I  am no t  be ing  
n e u t r a l  bu t  t a k i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral  
s t a n d .  Using an example from A . M a c I n t y r e  ( 1 9 5 7 ) ,  I  w i l l  
show in  ( 1 )  t h a t  no t  any r e s o l u t i o n  t o  a moral di lemma  
c ou nts  as ' a  moral ju d g e m e n t ’ . And us ing  an example drawn 
f rom  P.Winch ( 1 9 7 2 )  I  w i l l  show in  ( 2 )  t h a t  i f ,  t o  r e s o l v e  
a moral d i lemma, you and I  judge  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i t  i s  not  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  hold  t h a t  both judgements  a r e  m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t .  In  s e c t i o n  ( 3 )  I  w i l l  a t t e m p t  t o  answer th e  
q u e s t i o n :  Even i f  U . R . I I  i s  a c r i t e r i o n  w i t h  which we can 
d e t e r m in e  r a t i o n a l  moral judgem ents ,  why should  anyone be 
r a t i o n a l  in  t h e i r  moral judgements  anyway? In  s e c t i o n  ( 4 )  
I  w i l l  suggest  some d e f e c t s  in  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t ’ s 
opposing v iew  o f  human p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs.  I n  s e c t i o n  ( 5 )  
I  w i l l  dea l  w i t h  th e  c la im  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a lone  
i s  a l l  t h a t  has t o  be assumed t o  e x p l i c a t e  our  commonsense 
moral b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s .  In  s e c t i o n  ( 6 )  I  w i l l  show how 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e o r y  p r o v id e s  a s o l u t i o n  t o  some o f  
t h e  moral c o n f l i c t s  r a i s e d  e a r l i e r  in  th e  essay .  I  w i l l  
f i n i s h ,  in  ( 7 ) ,  w i t h  a summary o f  th e  m ajor  c o n c lu s io n s  o f  
my t h e s i s .
L e t  us begin  w i t h  M a c I n t y r e ’ s o b j e c t i o n  t o  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .
1 . Judging  and plumping
A . M a c I n t y r e  (1 9 5 7 )  argues t h a t  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  
r u l e  i s  no t  a necessary  c o n d i t i o n  o f  moral judgem ents .  He 
g i v e s  as an i n s t a n c e  o f  a n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  judgement
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S a r t r e ’ s example o f  a young man t o r n  between j o i n i n g  th e
R e s is t a n c e  and c a r i n g  f o r  h i s  e l d e r l y  m other .  The p o i n t  o f
t h e  exam ple ,  f o r  M a c I n t y r e , 191 i s  w hether  in  d e c i d i n g  t h a t  he
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do one t h i n g  r a t h e r  than  t h e  o t h e r ,  th e
s t u d e n t  i s  making a judgement which he l o g i c a l l y  must
uni v e r s a l  i z e . Or i s  he m ere ly  d e c id in g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  what he
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do? M a c In ty r e  c la im s  t h a t  i t  i s  the
l a t t e r .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 5 7 : 3 2 6 )  t h a t  th e  young man
. . .  m ight  d e c id e  what t o  do w i t h o u t  be ing  w i l l i n g  t o  
a l lo w  t h a t  anyone e l s e  who chose d i f f e r e n t l y  was 
b la m e w o r th y .
The young man m ight  d ec ide  t h a t  m a t te r s  a r e  so e v e n ly  
b a la n c e d  t h a t  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  t o  say which o f  th e  two i s  
t h e  r i g h t  d e c i s i o n .  Y e t  he m ight  be f o r c e d  by th e
c i  rcumstances -  as o f t e n  happens -  t o  make a c h o ic e ,
w i t h o u t  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  h is  ch o ice  has th e  w e ig h t  o f  
n e e d -re a s o n s  behind i t .  In  which case,  M a c In ty r e  ( i b i d : 328)  
o b s e r v e s :
. . . ( h e )  m ight  on moral grounds r e f u s e  t o  l e g i s l a t e  
f o r  anyone o t h e r  than h i m s e l f ,  (perhaps  on th e  
grounds t h a t  t o  do so would be moral a r r o g a n c e ) .
In  a moral  d i lemma,  t o  say o f  o n e ’ s own c h o ic e  -  about  which
one i s  u n c e r t a i n  y e t  which one i s  f o r c e d  t o  make -  t h a t
anyone e l s e  must choose th e  same, would be moral a r ro g a n c e .
However,  i f  he is  f o r c e d  by th e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  t o  choose 
one a l t e r n a t i v e  (s a y ,  t o  s t a y  w i t h  h i s  m o t h e r ) ,  i t  i s
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see why M a c In ty r e  should  reg a rd  such a ch o ice  
as * a moral ju d g e m e n t ’ . I t  i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  moral judgements  
t o  which th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  r u l e  a p p l i e s .  We would say,  
r a t h e r ,  t h a t  h i s  u n c e r t a i n  ch o ice  i s  a case o f  plumping f o r  
one cou rse  r a t h e r  than th e  o t h e r ,  not  j u d g in g  between them.  
The s t u d e n t  i s  a m b iv a le n t  about  th e  d e c is i o n  t o  be made.19’ 
Presum ably ,  he t h i n k s  t h a t  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  course o f  a c t i o n  
i s  s up por te d  by e q u a l l y  c o m p e l l in g  reasons e . g .  h is  
p a t r i o t i c  du ty  t o  j o i n  t h e  R e s is ta n c e .  I f  t h i s  i s  so, ± 
t h i n k  t h a t  th e  more a c c u r a t e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  h is  i n t e n t i o n ^  
would be t o  say " I  have dec ided  I  w i l l  s t a y  w i t h  my mother  
r a t h e r  than " I  have dec ided t h a t  I  m o r a l l y  ought t o  stav
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w i t h  my m o th e r" .  I n  o t h e r  words,  " I  cannot  ju d g e  what  I  
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do, but  t h i s  i s  what  I  w i l l  do" .  I n  which  
c a s e ,  he m ig h t  go on t o  say "But no t  o n ly  would I  n o t  blame  
someone e l s e  who, in  my shoes,  a c te d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  I  would  
n o t  even say he i s  m is ta k e n " .
I f  M a c I n t y r e  were t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  n o t io n  o f  
' j u d g e m e n t ’ i s  a p p l i c a b l e  in  th e  example then  th e  d e c is i o n  
must be based upon reasons,  e . g .  h i s  m o t h e r ’ s dependence  
upon him. The p o i n t  i s  o n ly  where we judge  t h a t  a course  o f  
a c t i o n  has th e  w e ig h t  o f  reasons behind i t ,  can we p r o p e r l y  
d e c id e  " I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F r a t h e r  than G". I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  then  t o  see how i t  can be m a in ta in e d  t h a t  th e  
judgem ent  i s  n o t ,  i m p l i c i t l y ,  about  what anyone m o r a l l y  
ought  t o  do, in  a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  where th e  reason  
o b t a i n s .  For  t o  make such a c l a i m ,  as we have seen, i s  t o  
say t h a t  o n e ’ s moral judgement has th e  w e ig h t  o f  reasons  
beh ind  i t .  T h is  i s  c o n s is te n c y  not  a r ro g a n c e .
O th e rw is e  he m ight  judge  t h a t  any person in  s i m i l a r  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  must conclude t h a t  th e  moral reasons f o r  
e i t h e r  course  a re  o f  equal  w e ig h t .  Hence, by U . R . ,  f o r  
anyone in  such a s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  no t  a s u f f i c i e n t  reason  
t o  make a moral judgement one way o r  th e  o t h e r .  However,  
a g a in  t h i s  commits him to  say in g  t h a t  anyone who judges  
d i f f e r e n t l y  i s  m is ta k e n .  For he concludes t h a t  a judgement  
can n o t  be made in  these  c i rcum stances  whereas h i s  opponent  
t h i n k s  t h a t  a g iven  l i n e  o f  conduct  i s  suppor ted  by the  
w e i g h t i e s t  reasons.
I  want t o  make two f u r t h e r  p o i n t s .  The f i r s t  concerns  
moral  a r r o g a n c e .  I f  I  r e a l l y  do no t  know what t o  do but  
have t o  plump f o r  one a l t e r n a t i v e ,  then  t o  blame you f o r  not  
do ing  l i k e w i s e ,  i s  no t  a r ro g a n c e ,  but  s t u p i d i t y .  I  blame 
you when I  do no t  t h i n k  you a re  m is taken !  However even when 
I  t h i n k  t h a t  you a re  m is taken  t h i s  i s  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  an 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  blame you. I  do no t  blame people  who hold  
d i f f e r e n t ,  and I  b e l i e v e  m is tak en ,  moral v iews from me on 
such u n c e r t a i n  m a t te r s  as a b o r t i o n .  Aga in ,  t o  blame them
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when I  am so u n c e r t a i n ,  would be s t u p i d  r a t h e r  than  
a r r o g a n t .  ( A l th o u g h ,  as we s h a l l  see ,  I  may n o t  say t h a t  a 
person  who d e c id e s  d i f f e r e n t l y  i s  a l s o  " m o r a l l y  r i g h t " . )  
U .R .  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  th e  o c c a s io n a l  r e f u s a l  t o  blame 
th o s e  w i t h  whom we d i s a g r e e .
So what i s  moral arrogance? One m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  i t  
m ig h t  be where one person passes a judgement t h a t  i s  
d i s d a i n f u l  o f  th e  conduct  o f  a n o th e r ,  when th e  j u d g e r  does 
n o t  know a l l  o f  th e  f a c t s .  I t  may be s ig n  o f  a r r o g a n c e ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t o  condemn th e  mother who b a t t e r s  her  c h i l d  when 
I  l a c k  th e  knowledge o f  some m i t i g a t i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  her  
s i t u a t i o n .  I  can t h i n k  t h a t  she behaved w ro n g ly ,  w i t h o u t  
r e g a r d i n g  her  as a moral d e l i n q u e n t .  Perhaps a c l e a r e r  case  
o f  moral  a r rogan ce  i s  when I  d e c l a r e  t h a t  my b e h a v io u r  o r  
c h a r a c t e r  i s  o b v io u s ly  m o r a l l y  s u p e r i o r  to  th e  b e h a v io u r  o r  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  o t h e r s .  I  t h i n k  we would say t h a t  my a r rogan ce  
i n c r e a s e s  i f ,  a t  th e  same t im e ,  I  am contemptuous o f  the  
conduct  o r  moral d e f e c t s  o f  o t h e r s ;  and i t  i n c r e a s e s  even 
more when I  t u r n  a b l i n d - e y e  t o  s i m i l a r  weaknesses o f  my 
own. The p o i n t  i s ,  w hatever  i t s  c o r r e c t  d e f i n i t i o n , I  
can n o t  see t h a t  M a c I n t y r e ’ s c la im  -  v i z .  t h a t  some 
judgem ents  a r e  n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  -  can draw sustenance  
f rom  t h e  w arn ing  t h a t  where th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  is  
a p p l i e d ,  t h i s  m ight  appear  t o  be m o r a l l y  a r r o g a n t . 193
The second p o i n t  i s  t o  see how th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  
t h e o r y  h e lp s  h e re .  Le t  us suppose t h a t  our j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t o r s  t r y  t o  dec ide  whether  o r  no t  th e  s tu d e n t  
sho u ld  s t a y  w i t h  h i s  mother o r  j o i n  th e  R e s is ta n c e .  I  hope 
I  have e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t o  be r a t i o n a l  th e y  must be w i l l i n g  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  any judgement they  make. But i t  w i l l  no t  do 
m e r e ly  t o  say t h i s .  They must a ls o  be a b l e  t o  do so. To be 
a b l e  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  th e  reason f o r  t h e i r  judgement must be 
r e l e v a n t .  And i f  i t  i s  based upon needs then  i t  w i l l  be 
p r im a  f a c i e  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  However o n ly  when i t  has the  
w e ig h t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  need-reasons  behind i t ,  w i l l  t h i s  
be t h e  r a t i o n a l ,  m o r a l ly  c o r r e c t  judgement t o  make. In
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which cas e ,  anyone in  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  who 
makes t h e  same judgement a l s o  makes a m o r a l l y  r i g h t  
ju d g em en t .
I n  t h e  exam ple ,  however,  a l l  o f  t h i s  w i l l  no t  be o f  much 
h e l p .  For e>< hypothes i  the  s tu d e n t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  p u z z le d  
o v e r  which a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  supported  by t h e  w e i g h t i e s t  
r e a s o n s .  We s a i d  t h a t  he may be f o r c e d  by th e  c i  rcumstances  
t o  plump f o r  one o r  o t h e r  o f  them. But I  hope t o  have shown 
t h a t  t o  c a l l  t h i s  plumping a 'mora l  ju d g e m e n t ’ i s  t o  use th e  
l a t t e r  te rm  d e v i a n t l y .  So how does th e  uni v e r s a l  i z a b l e -  
needs t h e o r y  h e lp  us here?
One t h i n g  t h a t  my t h e s i s  does h e lp  us t o  see i s  the  
n a t u r e  o f  th e  dilemma as a di lemma. In  o r d e r  t o  see th e  
m a t t e r  as a moral di lemma, i t  i s  necessary  t o  see why i t  
m a t t e r s ,  v i z .  t h a t  some f a i r l y  c e n t r a l  needs a r e  a t  s t a k e .  
Someone who d id  not  see ,  on th e  one hand, t h a t  a son should  
t r y  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  mother  in  such c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  r a t h e r  than  
l e t  h e r  s t a r v e  t o  d e a th ,  o r  g r i e v e  t o  d ea th ;  o r  who d id  not  
se e ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand, t h a t  Nazi t y r a n n y  had t o  be 
r e s i s t e d ,  ( o r  who f a i l e d  to  see the  moral f o r c e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
needs i n v o l v e d ) ,  would not  understand  th e  example as a 
di lemma.  The source o f  th e  c o n f l i c t ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  i s  t o  be 
found in  human needs. S a r t r e  has i m p l i c i t l y  appea led  to  
them t o  pu t  th e  s t u d e n t ’ s p l i g h t  b e f o r e  us as a di lemma.  
I t  i s  because th e  needs a re  so e v e n ly  ba lanced on e i t h e r  
s i d e ,  i t  does not  seem t h a t  one need-reason  can outweigh  the  
o t h e r s .
I n i t i a l l y  we may be drawn t o  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  t h e r e  is  
no r i g h t  answer here ;  a l l  th e  s t u d e n t  can do i s  t o  plump in  
a n o n - r a t i o n a l  f a s h i o n .  However such a c o n c lu s io n  i s ,  I  
t h i n k ,  to o  h a s ty .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  o v e r lo o k s  th e  p o i n t  t h a t  
o f t e n  moral puzz lem ent  can r e s u l t  due t o  la c k  o f  knowledge  
o r  due t o  th e  c o m p le x i ty  o f  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  case.  
Sometimes t h e r e  i s  a f a c t u a l  di lemma, so t o  speak,  r a t h e r  
th an  a moral one. W i l l  th e  s t u d e n t  e v e r  reach th e  Free  
French h e a d q u a r te rs ?  And i f  he does, what w i l l  he ach iev e
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t h e r e ?  W i l l  he spend th e  r e s t  o f  th e  war f i l l i n g  in  forms  
i n  an o f f i c e  somewhere f a r  from th e  f r o n t ?  S econd ly ,  i t  
f a i l s  t o  do j u s t i c e  t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  o f t e n ,  in  such 
c o n f l i c t s ,  we a r e  s e r i o u s  in  our search  f o r  t h e  w e i g h t i e s t  
re a s o n s .  T h i r d l y ,  i t  o v e r lo o k s  th e  p o i n t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  u n d e r ly i n g  needs t h a t  have t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  and 
w eig h ed ,  in  o r d e r  t o  make the  judgement.  The r e s o l u t i o n  o f  
t h e  moral  di lemma can be a m a t te r  o f  d e t e r m in in g  t h a t  one 
n e e d - re a s o n  i s  more b a s ic ,  u r g e n t ,  c e r t a i n ,  e t c . ,  than  
a n o t h e r .  For  in s t a n c e ,  the  c e r t a i n t y  o f  h is  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  
m e e t in g  h i s  m o t h e r ’ s needs ( e . g .  f o r  food ,  t o  be cared  f o r )  
when compared w i t h  th e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  
t h e  R e s is t a n c e ,  may be th e  d e c i s i v e  reason.  And f o u r t h l y ,  
t h e r e  i s  th e  p o i n t  t h a t  th e  process o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n  can be 
a p rocess  o f  d i s c o v e r y  f o r  th e  j u d g e r .  L e t  us c o n s id e r  th e  
1a t t e r .
Suppose t h a t  a f t e r  s e r io u s  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  f aced  w i t h  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  l e a v i n g  h e r ,  he r e a l i z e s  t h a t  she means more 
t o  him than  a n y th in g  e l s e  in  th e  w o r ld .  The im por tance  t o  
t h e  s t u d e n t  o f  h is  f e e l i n g s  f o r  h is  mother r e l a t i v e  t o  th e  
R e s i s t a n c e ,  may be t h e i r  importance ' f o r  h im ’ . Someone e l s e  
w i t h  a d i f f e r e n t  k ind  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  m ight  g iv e  t h i s  a 
d i f f e r e n t  w e ig h t i n g .  However, t o g e t h e r  w i t h  h i s  m o t h e r ’ s 
need t o  be cared  f o r ,  th e  d is c o v e ry  f o r  t h i s  s tu d e n t  i s  th e  
c e r t a i n t y  o f  h i s  own need t o  express  h is  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  
h e r .  These a re  pr ima f a c i e  good reasons f o r  th e  judgement  
t h a t  he m o r a l l y  ought  t o  s t a y .  I f  t h i s  i s  so, th e  s tu d e n t  
may U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z e  a long the  l i n e s :  'Anyone whose
m o t h e r ’ s nee ds (b )  a re  t h i s  b a s ic ,  c e r t a i n ,  u r g e n t ,  and whose 
own need t o  a c t i v e l y  express  th e  love  he f e e l s  f o r  her  i s  
t h i s  c e r t a i n ,  ought  t o  s t a y  w i t h  t h e i r  mother in  s i m i l a r
c i  r c u m s ta n c e s ’ .
I  have two o t h e r  p o in t s  t o  make h e r e .  F i r s t l y ,  we have 
seen t h a t  when two needs conf  1 i c t  one o f  them has t o  g iv e  
way. S ince  t h i s  can happen t o  any need -rea so n ,  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  t h e r e  is  no a b s o lu te  moral p r i n c i p l e ,  in  th e  sense t h a t
i t  i s  a paramount du ty  t o  f o l l o w  i t  on a l l  o cc as ions  when i t  
a p p l i e s .  Second ly ,  w hatever  d e c is i o n  we make in  a moral  
di lemma,  th e  p re s s u re  o f  th e  u n s a t i s f i e d  needs remains as a 
moral  f o r c e .  Some r e l e v a n t  needs a r e  be ing f o r f e i t e d .  In  
my v e r s i o n  o f  S a r t r e ’ s example, th e  m o t h e r ’ s needs a r e  
ju d g ed  t o  be paramount.  T h is  does not  mean t h a t  th e  need -  
and, t h e r e b y ,  th e  pr ima f a c i e  moral o b l i g a t i o n  -  t o  r e s i s t  
t h e  Naz i  t y r a n n y  has no f o r c e  a t  a l l ,  (see  p . 3 7 2 ) .  A lso  
t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  u n d e r ly in g  needs, o f  b e lo n g in g ,  t r u s t ,  s e l f ­
f i d e l i t y ,  expressed  in a p r i n c i p l e  l i k e  'One ought  t o  be 
l o y a l  t o  o n e ’ s companions in  th e  R e s i s t a n c e ’ . To meet these  
o t h e r  needs, i f  he can,  he ought  t o  s e rv e  th e  cause in  some 
o t h e r  way. I f  t h i s  i s  no t  p o s s ib le  he i s  bound t o  f e e l  some 
remorse a t  th e  knowledge t h a t  he i s  l e t t i n g  peop le  down.
Even a f t e r  c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  d e l i b e r a t i n g ,  in  these  
d i f f i c u l t  m a t t e r s ,  o f t e n  d i f f e r e n t  peop le  w i l l  draw 
d i f f e r e n t  judgem ents .  When t h i s  i s  so, though we judged  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  can we say t h a t  the  o t h e r  person i s  no t  m ere ly  
unblameworthy but  t h a t  th ey  too  a r e  ' m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t ’ ? 
P.Winch ( 1972)  t h in k s  s o . 194
Judg ing  in  a moral di lemma
Winch says t h a t  he accepts  th e  uni v e r s a l  i zabi  1 i t y  r u l e  
f o r  some s p e c t a t o r  judgements.  He does so ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 5 4 )  on th e  
grounds t h a t
. . . c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  c o n s is te n c y ,  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y
and r a t i o n a l i t y  do app ly  in  moral m a t t e r s ; . . .
However Winch c la im s  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  o f  moral  
judgem ents  which a re  not  s u b je c t  to  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  
r u l e ,  namely,  o n e ’ s own and a n o t h e r ’ s judgement  when d e a l in g
w i t h  a moral di lemma.
Winch uses as h is  example o f  a moral di lemma,  the  
p r e d ic a m e n t  o f  C a p ta in  Vere in  Herman M e l v i l l e ’ s s t o r y  B i l l y  
Budd. A t  sea on a c t i v e  s e r v i c e ,  th e  m a s t e r - a t - a r m s  o f  
H-M .f i .  Tndomi t a b l e , C l a g g a r t ,  b u l l i e d  and provoked one o f  th e
s h i p ’ s crew,  th e  goo d-hear ted  B i l l y  Budd. T h is  c u lm in a te d  
in  C l a g g a r t  f a l s e l y  accusing Budd, b e f o r e  V e re ,  o f  p l o t t i n g
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a m u t in y .  In  th e  s t r e s s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  Budd i s  a f f l i c t e d
w i t h  a speech impediment  which p r e v e n ts  him f rom  answer ing
t h e  ch a rg e .  F r u s t r a t e d ,  Budd s t r i k e s  C l a g g a r t  and
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  k i l l s  th e  mastei—a t - a r m s .  The c a p t a i n  o f
t h e  I n d o m i t a b l e  suspected t h a t  th e  a c c u s a t io n  a g a i n s t  Budd,
o f  m u t in y ,  was f a l s e  and saw how i t  provoked Budd. Y e t  Budd
k i l l e d  a s e n i o r  o f f i c e r .  The hap less  c a p t a i n  has t o  d e c id e
between th e  death  p e n a l t y  ( t h e  re q u i re m e n t  under  th e
p r e v a i l i n g  naval  law f o r  k i l l i n g  a s u p e r i o r  o f f i c e r )  and th e
demands o f  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e .  In  th e  s t o r y ,  Vere  jud g es  t h a t
he ought  t o  f o l l o w  naval law, t o  which -  Winch t e l l s  us -  he
i s  m o r a l l y  committed ,  and Budd i s  condemned t o  hang.
Winch t h i n k s  t h a t  had he been in  th e  c a p t a i n ’ s p o s i t i o n  he
would have judged d i f f e r e n t l y ,  and c o r r e c t l y .  Winch
( i b i d : 1 6 3 )  no tes:
I  should  have found i t  m o r a l l y  im p o s s ib le  t o  condemn 
a man ' in n o c e n t  b e fo r e  God’ under such 
c i  rcum stances .
I n  re a c h in g  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  Winch adds t h a t  he would not  
appea l  t o  any f a c t u a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  ove r  and above those  to  
which Vere  ap p e a ls .
Winch goes on t o  c l a i m ,  however,  t h a t  V e r e ’ s judgement is  
a l s o  m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t .  Winch’ s p o i n t  i s  t h a t  th e  same f a c t u a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  cou ld  s t r i k e  d i f f e r e n t  peop le  d i f f e r e n t l y .  
I f  what  one m o r a l ly  ought  t o  do is  u l t i m a t e l y  a m a t te r  o f  
a c t i n g  on those  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  which s t r i k e  one t o  be the  
w e i g h t i e s t ,  then one must a l lo w  t h a t  V e r e ’ s c o n v i c t i n g  B i l l y  
Budd and W inch ’ s a c q u i t t i n g  him can both be m o r a l l y  r i g h t .
Winch ( i b i d : 164) w r i t e s :
I  am h o ld in g  t h a t  i f  A says 'X i s  th e  r i g h t  t h i n g  
f o r  me t o  d o ’ and i f  B, in  a s i t u a t i o n  not  
r e l e v a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  says 'X i s  th e  wrong t h in g  
f o r  me t o  d o ’ , i t  can be t h a t  both a r e  c o r r e c t .
Winch t h i n k s  t h a t  t h i s  shows t h a t  not  a l l  moral judgements
a r e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e . When someone ju d g e s ,  a f t e r  s e r io u s  and
s i n c e r e  thought  'T h is  i s  what I  ought  m o r a l l y  to  d o ’ , he is
n o t  th e r e b y  l o g i c a l l y  committed t o  th e  c o r o l l a r y  'And anyone
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e l s e  in  a s i t u a t i o n  l i k e  t h i s  ought  t o  do th e  same’ . Thus 
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  breaks down in  such s i t u a t i o n s .
I  t h i n k  t h a t  Winch is  wrong. And so,  f o r  q u i t e  a
d i f f e r e n t  reason ,  would C a p ta in  V e re .  He und ers tands  and t o
some e x t e n t  shares  th e  s c r u p le s  o f  h i s  f e l l o w  o f f i c e r s  (and
W in c h ) ,  who f e e l  th e  p u l l  o f  th e  c la im  f o r  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e .
A f t e r  a l l ,  he suspected t h a t  th e  a c c u s a t io n  o f  m ut iny  was
f a l s e ;  he saw how Budd had been g r e a t l y  provoked by i t ;  he
w i t n e s s e d  th e  absence o f  i n t e n t i o n  in  th e  e v e n t  t h a t  caused
C l a g g a r t ’ s d e a th .  A l though t h i s  does not  p r e v e n t  Vere  from
a r g u i n g  h i s  f e l l o w  o f f i c e r s  o u t  o f  t h e i r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o
a c q u i t  Budd. Vere  (op c i t :1 57 )  says:
. . . t h e  e x c e p t io n a l  in  th e  m a t t e r  moves th e  h e a r t  
w i t h i n  you. Even so too  i s  m i n e . . .  But t e l l  me 
whether  o r  n o t ,  occupying the  p o s i t i o n  we do p r i v a t e  
consc ience  should  not  y i e l d  t o  t h a t  i m p e r ia l  one 
f o r m u la t e d  in  code under which a lo n e  we o f f i c i a l l y  
proceed?
For  Vere  t h e r e  i s  no doubt what m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be done.  
H is  judgement  t h a t  Budd should  be found g u i l t y  i s  based upon 
t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  th e  demand f o r  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e  must g iv e  
way t o  th e  demands o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  code. V e r e ’ s concern
th r o u g h o u t  i s  how a naval  o f f i c e r  -  any naval  o f f i c e r  -
s h o u ld  a c t  in  th e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s .  I t  was h is  du ty  as a naval  
o f f i c e r  t o  c o n v ic t  and hang Budd. Any o f f i c e r  who d id  not  
c o n v i c t  would have f a i l e d  in  h is  duty  as a naval  o f f i c e r .  
I t  i s  n o t ,  th e n ,  t h a t  Vere does not  have com plete  c o n f id e n c e  
t h a t  h i s  i s  th e  m o r a l ly  r i g h t  judgment .
S i m i l a r l y ,  l e t  us assume t h a t  Winch ho lds  h i s  c o n f l i c t i n g  
judgem ent  w i t h  equal  c o n v i c t i o n .  I f  h i s  i s  no t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t ro n g  c o n v i c t i o n ,  then  th e  m e r i t  Winch f i n d s  
in  V e r e ’ s b e l i e f  i s  a good reason f o r  Winch r e f r a i n i n g  from  
making h i s  own c o n t r a r y  judgement.  I t  w i l l  a lways be 
p o s s i b l e  f o r  someone t o  q u e s t io n  Winch why th e  reasons f o r  
a c q u i t t i n g  Budd t i l t  th e  b a lan c e .  He cannot  answer " In  the  
absence o f  a reason I  tossed a mental  c o i n " .  ( L i k e  the  
m a g i s t r a t e  in  Chapter  Two, P r o fe s s o r  Winch must have a good
reason f o r  h is  c o n c lu s io n ,  i f  h is  c la im  i s  t o  count  as a
392
ju d g e m e n t ’ ) .  Looking over  V e r e ’ s s h o u ld e r ,  as i t  were ,  
Winch ju d g es  t h a t  had he been th e  c a p t a i n ,  in  e x a c t l y  th e  
same c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  he would have found B i l l y  Budd not  
g u i l t y .  The m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  judgement,  f o r  anyone concerned  
w i t h  t h e  issue  o f  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e ,  i s  t h a t  Budd i s  not  
g u i l t y  and must no t  hang. Hence Winch b e l i e v e s  t h a t ,  l i k e  
V e r e ,  he too  would have been m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t .  However,  t h i s  
seems a v e r y  odd c o n c lu s io n .
What e x a c t l y  cou ld  Winch mean by su g g e s t in g  t h a t  he 
re g a r d s  both h i s  own and V e r e ’ s judgement t o  be m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t ? 195 Does Winch mean ( i )  t h a t  th e  d i c t a t e s  o f  h is  
own, V e r e ’ s,  o r  any s i n c e r e l y  made judgement a re  a lways  
r i g h t ?  C l e a r l y  t h i s  v iew leads  t o  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  I t  
su g g es ts  t h a t  any s i n c e r e l y  made judgem ent,  a N a z i ’ s ,  an 
a n t i - N a z i ’ s ,  e t c . ,  must be judged t o  be m o r a l l y  r i g h t .  In  
t h e  case o f  moral judgem ents ,  moreover,  t o  say t h a t  th e y  a re  
c o r r e c t  i s  t o  endorse them (see  p p . 1 1 3 ) .  Winch cannot  say  
" T h is  i s  a c o r r e c t  judgement though I  t h i n k  i t  i s  f a l s e " .  
And t o  endorse s im u l t a n e o u s ly ,  m u t u a l ly  in c o m p a t ib le  
judgem ents  i s  s e l f - n u l l i f y i n g  and i n c o h e r e n t .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  does Winch want t o  say ( i i )  t h a t  in  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  p red icam en t ,  i t  would have been m o r a l l y  wrong f o r  
V e re  t o  a c t  a g a in s t  h is  conscience? A l l  t h a t  Vere  o r  
anybody can do in  t h i s  type  o f  di lemma, i s  t o  complete  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  ta s k  o f  a r r i v i n g  a t  a judgement and then  a c t  in  
accordance  w i t h  i t .  A f t e r  s e r io u s  and s i n c e r e  t h o u g h t ,  what  
a p e r s o n ’ s consc ience  then d i c t a t e s  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t ,  i s  
r i g h t  f o r  him.
Again  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w i l l  no t  do. F i r s t l y ,  i f  what  
I  have argued in  Chapter  One i s  c o r r e c t ,  th e  id e a  o f  a moral  
judgem ent  has a b read th  o f  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  b u i l t  i n t o  i t .  I t  
must be f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  ( i . e .  u n i v e r s a l  i z a b l e  j_n p r o p r i a 
p e r s o n a ) . The q u e s t io n  'What m o r a l l y  ought  I  t o  d o ? ’
commits one t o  ask ing  'What m o r a l l y  ought  anyone t o  do? ’ . 
S e co n d ly ,  w h i l e  i t  would be a d m i t te d  t h a t  o n ly  w i t h  extreme  
r e l u c t a n c e  should  anyone be r e q u i r e d  t o  a c t  a g a in s t  h is  own
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c o n s c ie n c e ,  t h i s  must,  in  t h e  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  depend upon what  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s co n s c ie n c e  d i c t a t e s  t o  him. F o l lo w i n g  h i s  
own c o n s c ie n c e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  cannot  e x o n e r a t e  a Naz i  f rom  
making th e  wrong d e c i s i o n  o r  exempt him f rom  moral  
c o n d e m n a t io n .
I s  Winch s a y in g  ( i i i )  t h a t  he sees t h e  c a p t a i n ’ s 
judgem ent  f o l l o w s  f rom V e r e ’ s b e l i e f  in  th e  supremacy o f  
nava l  code and t h a t  h i s  own (W in c h ’ s )  judgement  f o l l o w s  from  
th e  b e l i e f  in  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e ?  I n  o t h e r  words,  does Winch 
want t o  say t h a t  both d e c i s i o n s  a r e  e q u a l l y  c o r r e c t  m o r a l l y ,  
in  t h e  sense t h a t  he can see t h a t  each f o l l o w s  from t h e i r  
d i f f e r e n t  assumptions? I f  t h i s  i s  so, i t  i s  a f e e b l e  
e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  what i s  meant by c a l l i n g  a judgement  ' m o r a l l y  
c o r r e c t ’ . P resum ably ,  in  t h i s  sense,  Winch would have t o  
say t h a t  th e  N a z i ’ s v iews a r e  ' c o r r e c t ’ in  t h a t  th e y  f o l l o w  
f rom c e r t a i n  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  Aryanism.
I s  he s a y in g  ( i v )  t h a t  both answers a r e  e q u a l l y  c o r r e c t ,  
so t h a t  when i t  comes t o  making a r a t i o n a l  moral judgement  
he can not  d e c id e  between th e  two? However he p r e f e r s  one,  
f o r  some u n s p e c i f i e d ,  n o n - r a t i o n a l  reason;  e . g .  ' I t  i s  j u s t  
a f e e l i n g  I  h a v e ’ . (We w i l l  c o n s id e r  t h i s  l a t t e r  p o i n t  in  
more d e t a i l  in  s e c t i o n  6 . )  I f  so ,  Winch would have t o  say  
t h a t  th e  moral di lemma i s  such t h a t  he cannot  a r r i v e  a t  a 
r a t i o n a l  judgement  and f o r  t h i s  reason u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  cannot  
o c c u r .  However,  s i n c e  ex h yp o th es i  t h e r e  a r e  no r a t i o n a l  
grounds f o r  j u d g i n g  between e i t h e r  A o r  B then  t h i s  does 
im p ly  a u n i v e r s a l  i z a b l e  judgem ent ,  v i z .  ' I n  t h i s  case no one 
sho u ld  ju d g e  between courses  A o r  B ’ . What Winch cannot  
mean by ' c o r r e c t ’ , o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  ( v )  t h a t  he endorses both
h i s  own and V e r e ’ s o p p o s i t e  v ie w .
So where does Winch go wrong? There seem t o  me t o  be two 
p o s s i b l e  answers t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n . 196 F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  Winch has m is d e s c r ib e d  h is  own response t o  th e  example.  
I n  M e l v i l l e ’ s s t o r y ,  Vere  i s  p re s e n te d  as a man o f
conspicuous i n t e g r i t y ,  concerned above a l l  t o  do h i s  duty
however u n p le a s a n t  th e  du ty  may prove t o  be. I t  is
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u n d e r s ta n d a b le  t h a t  Winch r e s p e c t s  Vere  f o r  t h i s  and f e e l s  
sympathy f o r  h i s  p r e d ic a m e n t .  A person in  such a 
p r e d ic a m e n t ,  who has worked o u t  what  he ought  t o  do as 
c a r e f u l l y  and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  as can be e x p e c te d ,  should  no t  
be rebuked f o r  a c t i n g  on th e  r e s u l t s .  However a good 
p erso n ,  f a c e d  w i t h  a di lemma as d i f f i c u l t  as V e r e ’ s ,  may 
w e l l  make th e  wrong d e c i s i o n .  A s p e c t a t o r  can see and say  
t h i s ,  w h i l e  f e e l i n g  sympathy f o r  th e  j u d g e r ’ s p re d ic a m e n t .  
Winch need not  co n c lu d e ,  in  o t h e r  words,  t h a t  Ve re  i s  
b lam eab le  f o r  ju d g in g  as he d id ;  o r  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  judgement  
o f  a bad man o r  o f  a person d e s e r v in g  cen su re .  The 
t e m p t a t i o n  i s  t o  conclude from t h i s ,  as Winch seems t o ,  t h a t  
we can not  t h e r e f o r e  say t h a t  Vere  made th e  wrong d e c i s i o n .  
The t e m p t a t i o n  i s  no t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  und ers tand  but  
( r a t i o n a l l y )  should  be r e s i s t e d .
The o t h e r  p o s s ib le  answer i s  t h a t  Winch i s  making th e  
same m is ta k e  as M a c I n t y r e .  To put  th e  m a t t e r  as s u c c i n c t l y  
as I  can , o f t e n  a moral di lemma i s  such t h a t  we c a n n o t ,  o r  
do n o t ,  a r r i v e  a t  a ' j u d g e m e n t ’ . Hence u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  
can not  o c c u r .  In  such a c o n f 1 i c t - r i d d e n  c o n t e x t ,  i f  a 
j u d g e r  conc ludes  ' I  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do F f o r  th e  reason R ’ , 
w i t h o u t  im p ly in g  t h a t  a n o th e r  person in  t h e  same s i t u a t i o n  
a l s o  ought  t o  do F, th e  fo r c e  o f  th e  s o - c a l l e d  non­
uni v e r s a !  i zab l  e judgement  (which supposed ly  r e s o l v e s  th e  
di lemma between two c o n f l i c t i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s )  i s  no more than  
' I  am i n c l i n e d  to  do X ’ o r  ' I  w i 11 do X ’ . We can c a l l  such 
a r e s o l u t i o n  ' a  moral ju d g e m e n t ’ i f  we must,  but  t h i s  is  
o n l y  because i t  occurs  in  a moral c o n t e x t  and not  because  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  i t s e l f  a moral judgem ent .  In  o t h e r  words,  
in  th e  cases where o s t e n s i b l y  moral judgements a r e  c la im ed  
n o t  t o  be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , th e  term 'mora l  ju d g e m e n t ’ i s
b e ing  used d e v i a n t ! y .
I  have argued t h a t  n o t  j u s t  any r e s o l u t i o n  t o  a moral  
di lemma counts  as a ' ju d g e m e n t ’ and t o  r e s o l v e  a moral  
di lemma, where you and I  judge  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i t  i s  not  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  ho ld  t h a t  both judgements  a re  m o r a l l y  r i g h t .
R a t h e r , when we end some d e l i b e r a t i o n s  i t  i s  s e n s i b l e  t o  
a c c e p t  t h a t  we a r e  s t i l l  f a c e d  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  none o f  
which i s  o b v io u s ly  w e i g h t i e r  th an  t h e  o t h e r s .  We may be 
f o r c e d ,  by t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a d e c i s i o n .  
There  can come a p o i n t  a t  which th e  j u d g e r  runs o u t  o f  t im e ,  
o r  a b i l i t y ,  and he i s  l e f t  t o  h i s  own p r e f e r e n c e s ,  hunches,  
s e n s i b i l i t i e s ,  o r  some o t h e r  b a s is  f o r  making a n o n - r a t i o n a l  
c h o ic e .  But then  t h i s  must be seen as a p r e f e r e n c e ,  hunch,  
o r  a s t a b  a t  an answer,  n o t  a moral judgem ent .
Why should  anyone ju d g e  in  accordance  w i t h  U . R . I I ?
A n o th e r  d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  my t h e s i s  i s  t o  e x p l a i n  why 
e x a c t l y  any autonomous moral j u d g e r  should  adopt  th e  
uni v e r s a ! i z a b l e - n e e d s  ac c o u n t .  There  a r e  two p o i n t s  he re ;  
( i )  'Why should  an y o n e ’ s s i n g u l a r  moral judgements be 
uni v e r s a ! i z a b l e  in  p r o p r i a  p e rs o n a ? ’ and ( i i )  'Why should  he 
g i v e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  n ee d -rea so n s  in  s u p p o r t  o f  h is  
p a r t i c u l a r  moral ju d g e m e n ts ? ’ . The q u ic k  answer t o  ( i )  i s  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t  a m a t t e r  o f  c h o ic e .  U.R. i s  a necessary  
c o n d i t i o n  t o  be met i f  o n e ’ s s i n g u l a r  judgement i s  t o  be 
c o n s i s t e n t .  I f  he i s  no t  w i l l i n g  o r  a b l e  t o  U.R.  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  then  h i s  judgement  i s  r a t i o n a l l y  f a u l t y .
My response t o  q u e s t io n  ( i i )  r e q u i r e s  me t o  be a l i t t l e  
more c i r c u m s p e c t .  I n  our  e a r l i e r  d is c u s s io n  we found t h a t  
one answer i s  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  nee d -rea so n s  a r e  the  
b a s is  o f  r e l e v a n t  reasons t h a t  we do g iv e  in  o r d i n a r y  moral  
d i s c o u r s e .  Anyone who seeks t o  und ers tand  e x i s t i n g  moral  
b e l i e f s  can do so on th e  grounds o f  m eet ing  u n d e r ly in g  
needs; anyone who wants t o  c r i t i c i z e  a judgem ent ,  b e l i e f  or  
custom can do so on th e  grounds t h a t  t h e  judgem ent,  b e l i e f  
o r  custom f a i l s  t o  meet c e r t a i n  needs.
A second response t o  q u e s t io n  ( i i )  i s  t h a t  a r a t i o n a l  
person can not  h e lp  bu t  base h i s  moral judgements  on such 
reasons .  I t  i s  tan tam ount  to  a s k in g :  "Why am I  th e  k ind  o f  
c r e a t u r e  s u b j e c t  t o  th e  b o d i l y  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  needs t h a t  
I  have?" .  Only  i f  someone never  has purposes or  p r o j e c t s ,
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l a c k s  a sense o f  h i s  own i d e n t i t y ,  f e e l s  n o th in g  f o r  th e  
w e l l - b e i n g  o f  o t h e r s ,  and so on, i s  ( i i )  a t  i s s u e .  I f  t h i s  
i s  t h e  case however,  he i s ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  more than  a 
v e r y  p e c u l i a r  p erso n .  He r e a l l y  ceases t o  be a person a t  
a l l .  Which leads  us t o  a t h i r d  response t o  ( i i )  which i s  
t h a t  w h i l e  t h e r e  may be d i f f e r e n c e s  between one moral  
p r a c t i c e  and a n o th e r ,  t h e r e  a re  l i m i t s  t o  th e s e  v a r i a t i o n s .  
L i m i t s  s e t ,  I  m a i n t a i n ,  by th e  needs ( a )  o r  ( b )  o f  persons .  
The absence o f  th e  needs d iscussed would make i t  d o u b t f u l  i f  
we were s t i l l  t a l k i n g  about  th e  moral p r a c t i c e s  o f  a human 
s o c i e t y .  I f  th e s e  arguments a r e  c o r r e c t ,  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  
n e e d -re a s o n s  a r e  pr ima f a c i e  good reasons f o r  anyone,  in  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t e x t ,  t o  make th e  same judgem ents .
I  have shown, f o u r t h l y ,  t h a t  judgements  which have th e  
w e ig h t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  n eed -reasons  behind them a re  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  ; th e y  a re  th e  judgements  anyone,  in  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t e x t ,  would r a t i o n a l l y  make. So th e  s h o r t  
answer t o  th e  q u e s t io n :  'Why should  anyone ’ s moral
judgem ents  s a t i s f y  U . R . I I ? ’ i s  t h a t ,  in  moral c o n t e x t s ,  t h i s  
i s  an obv ious  way f o r  someone t o  judge  r a t i o n a l l y .
We can do even b e t t e r  than t h i s .  Another  answer t o  th e  
q u e s t i o n  'Why should  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  gu ide  an 
autonomous j u d g e r ? ’ i s  because th e  j u d g e r  we have been 
d i s c u s s in g  i s  engaged in  a s e r i o u s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  in  which he 
has dec ide d  o n ly  t o  acc ep t  judgements  which a r e  sup por ted  by 
t h e  b e s t  reasons .  We can show t o  anyone who i s  so d isposed  
t h a t ,  in  moral d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  a nee d -rea son  i s  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and g iv e s  r i s e  t o  th e  presumpt ion  t h a t  th e  s i n g u l a r  
judgem ent  in  which i t  occurs i s  m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  And t h a t  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgement i s  a judgement  anyone,  in  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t e x t ,  would r a t i o n a l l y  make.
Some c r i t i c s  might  t r y  t o  d ispose  o f  t h i s  l a t t e r  c la im  
by,  once a g a in ,  c o u n te r in g  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  g e n u in e ly  n e u t r a l . 
I t  seems t h a t  I  am p r e s c r i b i n g  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  o f  moral  
j u d g e m e n ts ; i . e .  we moral l y  ought  t o  be guided by those  
judgements  which have th e  w e ig h t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  need-
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reasons beh ind them. Thus, i t  m ight  be s a i d ,  U . R . I I  i s  a 
d i s g u i s e d  moral c l a i m .
As f a r  as I  can see I  am n o t  c o m m i t t in g  t h i s  s i n .  I  have 
argued t h a t  o n e ’ s s i n g u l a r  judgement  ought  t o  be U . R . I  o r  
U. R.  I I  u n i v e r s a l  i z a b l e .  I f  i t  i s  n o t ,  i t  i s  e i t h e r  
r a t i o n a l l y  o r  c o n t e x t u a l l y  f a u l t y .  The ' o u g h t ’ here  i s  no t  
w i t h i n  m o r a l i t y ;  i t  i s  moral o n ly  in  th e  sense o f  be ing  
abo ut  m o r a l i t y .  Next  I  went  back t o  some o f  our  fundam enta l  
moral b e l i e f s .  I  t r i e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  source  in  human 
needs.  I  d id  so, in  o r d e r  t o  p r o v id e  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  'mora l  
r e l e v a n c e ’ which seems t o  accord w i t h  th e  purposes f o r  which  
our  o r d i n a r y  n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral b e l i e f s  e x i s t ;  j u d g i n g  
and a c t i n g  in  accordance w i t h  such b e l i e f s  meets t h e  needs 
i d e n t i f i e d .  I  showed t h a t  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  can be sup por ted  by 
r a t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Need-reasons in  s i n g u l a r  moral  
judgem ents  a r e  pr ima f a c i e  good reasons;  th ey  do not  e n t a i l  
t h e  moral judgements  th e y  s u p p o r t ,  y e t  n e i t h e r  a r e  th ey  
m e r e ly  c o n t i n g e n t .  What we found i s  t h a t  where th e  r e l a t i o n  
between th e  two i s  d e n ie d ,  q u i t e  fundamenta l  concepts  l i k e
t h a t  o f  ' a  p e r s o n ’ and ' a  moral p r a c t i c e ’ a r e  thrown i n t o
d o u b t .  By c l a i m i n g  t h a t  a judgement ( r a t i o n a l l y )  ought  to
conform t o  U . R . I I ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  I  am committed o n ly  t o  th e
v iew  t h a t  t h i s  i s  an obvious way f o r  someone t o  judge  
r a t i o n a l l y .  I t  i s ,  so t o  speak,  a way o f  e x p re s s in g  o n e s e l f  
as a r a t i o n a l  j u d g e r .  We cannot  e x c lu d e  a l l  p r e s c r i p t i v e  
im p o r t  f rom such a c l a i m .  The ' o u g h t ’ h e r e ,  however,  i s  th e  
t y p e  which p r e s c r ib e s  p r a c t i c a l  c o n s is te n c y  and c o n te x tu a l  
r e l e v a n c e  in  th e  e x e c u t io n  o f  our  moral judgem ents .
I  have argued t h a t  when judgements a r e  suppor ted  by 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  need-reasons  th e  j u d g e r  i s  ad o p t in g  a 
r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  v i ew.  Even i f  th e  argument i s  c o r r e c t ,  a 
f u r t h e r  q u e s t io n  s t i l l  has t o  be answered:  ( i i i )  Why ought
anyone adopt  a r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  view?
I t  i s  worth  n o t i c i n g ,  in  p as s in g ,  t h a t  i t  i s  sometimes 
argued t h a t  ( i i i )  i s  not  a s e n s i b l e  q u e s t io n  because moral  
b e l i e f s  a r e  j u s t  those  b e l i e f s  we regard  as o v e r r i d i n g . 197
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O v e r r id i n g n e s s  se rv e s  as th e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  what  i s  m o r a l .  I t  
i s  th en  absurd t o  ask "Why r a t i o n a l l y  ought  anyone adopt  a 
moral  p o i n t  o f  v i ew?" .  Take,  f o r  example ,  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  
one sho u ld  keep prom ises .  S ince  t h i s  i s  your  moral  b e l i e f  
then  i t  i s  o v e r r i d i n g l y  im p o r ta n t  t o  you. You cannot  then  
ask "Why should  Smith keep h is  promise t o  repay Jones?"  
f o r ,  s in c e  you have made a moral d e c is i o n  which o v e r r i d e s  
e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e ,  no f u r t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  q u e s t io n  can a r i s e .
I  do n o t  a c c e p t  t h i s  v iew f o r  a number o f  reasons .  Most  
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  p la c e s  no r e s t r i c t i o n  on th e  c o n te n t  o f  
moral b e l i e f s .  M e re ly  t o  d e f i n e  them as ' th o s e  b e l i e f s  one 
t h i n k s  t o  be o v e r r i d i n g ’ a l lo w s  u n iq u e ly  naming, b i z a r r e  and 
o b v i o u s l y  non-moral  reasons t o  be moral b e l i e f s .  By 
i n s i s t i n g  upon th e  U.R.  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , U . R . I  o r  U . R . I I ,  
we r i d  our  t h e o r y  o f  reasons o f  t h i s  s o r t .  I n  th e  case o f  
t h e  l a t t e r ,  a t  th e  same t im e  we can e x p l a i n  th e  o v e r r i d i n g  
n a t u r e  o f  moral b e l i e f s  -  i . e .  why th e y  m a t t e r  t o  us -  by 
p o i n t i n g  t o  th e  r o l e  needs p la y  and th e  p r i o r i t y  we g iv e  t o  
one a n o t h e r ’ s needs in  our moral judgem ents .  Only now t h e i r  
o v e r r i d i n g n e s s  i s  a consequence o f  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  our  
moral  b e l i e f s  a r e  based upon u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  n ee d - re a s o n s .  
L e t  us r e t u r n  t o  th e  q u e s t io n  ( i i i ) :  v i z .  'Why ought  anyone  
ado pt  a r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  v iew ? ' .
An other  reason why some people  m ight  t h i n k  t h a t  ( i i i )  i s  
n o t  a s e n s i b l e  q u e s t io n  i s  t h a t  i t  seems t o  presuppose i t s  
answer .  They t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  l i k e  th e  q u e s t io n  'Why should  
I  be r a t i o n a l ? ’ i . e .  why not  g iv e  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  n o n - r a t i o n a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  r a t h e r  than r a t i o n a l  ones? There  i s  a 
s t a n d a r d  and I  t h i n k  a c o r r e c t  answer t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  As 
an answer,  th e  q u e s t io n e r  wants a ( r a t i o n a l )  reason.  So the  
q u e s t i o n e r  must accep t  t h a t  one should  be r a t i o n a l  because  
he asks th e  q u e s t io n .  As W.Frankena ( 1 9 6 3 : 9 8 )  w r i t e s :
. . . o n e  can o n ly  ask f o r  r a t i o n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i f
one i s  w i l l i n g  to  be r a t i o n a l .
T h i s  shows t h a t  being r a t i o n a l  r e a l l y  needs no j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  because i t  cannot  be i n t e l l i g e n t l y  q u e s t io n e d  un less  
i t  i s  presupposed.
However t h e  q u e s t io n  'Why ought  anyone adopt  t h e  r a t i o n a l  
p o i n t  o f  v iew  argued f o r  in  t h i s  essay ,  as opposed, sa y ,  t o  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ? ’ i s  a p e r f e c t l y  s e n s i b l e  q u e s t i o n .  We have 
met i t  b e f o r e .  We have seen t h a t  some p h i lo s o p h e r s  argue  
t h a t  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  needed to  
e s t a b l i s h  a moral p o i n t  o f  v i ew.  T h is  i s  a m e t a - e t h i c a l  
v iew  about  t h a t  l o g i c  o f  moral b e l i e f s  which i s  q u i t e  
c o n t r a r y  t o  my own. We w i l l  come back t o  i t  s h o r t l y .  There  
i s  a more p r e s s in g  problem.
Some peop le  t h i n k  t h a t  n e c e s s a r i l y  everyone  i s  a lways  
m o t iv a t e d  by s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  In  r e c e n t  t im es  t h i s  v iew  has 
been r e s u s c i t a t e d  by b e h a v io u r a l  p s y c h o l o g i s t s 198 and 
s o c i o b i o l o g i s t s . 199 In  e f f e c t  th e y  argue t h a t  u n le s s  i t  can 
be shown t h a t  i t  pays a person to  be m o ra l ,  m o r a l i t y  i s  
im p o s s i b le .  T h is  co n cep t io n  o f  our p s y c h o lo g ic a l  c h a r a c t e r  
i s  q u i t e  c o n t r a r y  t o  my own. Thus i t  m ight  be s a id  t h a t  my 
d is c u s s io n  o f  needs i s  based upon a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  v iew  o f  
human n a t u r e .  So b e f o r e  I  can e s t a b l i s h  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e s i s  i s  th e  b es t  way o f  e x p re s s in g  
o n e ’ s c h a r a c t e r  as a r a t i o n a l  be ing ( i n  moral c o n t e x t s ) ,  I  
must d ispose  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  egoism.
P s y c h o lo g ic a l  egoism and u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s
P s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t s  hold  t h a t  a l l  a c t i o n s  a r e  and must 
be s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ,  meaning by t h i s  t h a t  no person can 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  choose to  a c t  in  a way t h a t  he t h i n k s  i s  
c o n t r a r y  t o  h is  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  We a r e  t o l d  t h a t  human 
n a t u r e  i s  so c o n s t i t u t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a lways  t h e  m o t ive  o f  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  behind any judgement o r  a c t i o n ,  even one t h a t  
app ears  t o  be done from th e  d e s i r e  t o  f u r t h e r  th e  happiness  
o r  t o  lessen  th e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  a n o th e r .
I n  making t h i s  c l a i m ,  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t  does not  
need t o  p o r t r a y  human n a t u r e  as c o m p le te ly  s e l f - c e n t r e d . 200 
I n  Bentham’ s moral t h e o r y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a form o f  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  egoism is  th e  ba s is  f o r  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  He 
w r i t e s  ( 1 7 8 9 : 3 3 )
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N a tu r e  has p laced  mankind under  th e  governance o f  
two s o v e r e ig n  m asters  p a in  and p l e a s u r e . . .  They  
govern us in  a l l  we do, in  a l l  we say ,  in  a l l  we 
t h i n k :  e v e ry  e f f o r t  we make t o  throw  o f f  our  
s u b j e c t i o n  w i l l  se rve  bu t  t o  dem on stra te  and c o n f i r m  
i t .
As a m a t t e r  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  f a c t ,  t o  g e t  a person t o  choose  
t o  do som eth ing ,  you f i r s t  have t o  make sure  t h a t  he w i l l  
g a in  something o u t  o f  i t  -  money, p o s i t i o n ,  p r e s t i g e ,  
p e rs o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  o r  j u s t  a warm glow i n s i d e .  Bentham 
went on t o  say ,  o f  course ,  t h a t  people  can be encouraged t o  
g a in  maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  them se lves  by doing t h i n g s  f o r  
t h e  g e n e ra l  good.
Few o t h e r  p h i lo s o p h e rs  would deny th e  im por tance  o f  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  a c o h e re n t  account  o f  m o r a l i t y .  T h is  is  
n o t  a t  i s s u e .  The q u e s t io n  i s :  can an adequate  e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  t h e  m o t ive  t o  judge  and t o  a c t  on t r a d i t i o n a l  moral  
p r i n c i p l e s  be g iven  in  terms o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a lone?  How 
i s  our  commitment t o  moral p r i n c i p l e s  l i k e  f e e l i n g  and 
showing g r a t i t u d e ,  keeping promises and be ing  f a i r ,  t o  be 
e x p la i n e d ?  How a re  we t o  e x p l a i n  th e  r e s c u e r ’ s d e c is i o n  to  
h e lp  th e  drowning c h i l d ?
Some form o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  m ight  e x p l a i n  th e  l a t t e r  
a c t i o n .  By h e lp in g  th e  c h i l d ,  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t  
m ig h t  say ,  you w i l l  put  i t  o r  i t s  p a r e n ts  in  your deb t  and 
i n c r e a s e  th e  chances t h a t  th ey  w i l l  h e lp  you some day.  A lso  
you w i l l  improve your r e p u t a t i o n  in  th e  eyes o f  o t h e r s  so 
t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  be w e l l  d isposed towards you. O th e rw is e ,  we 
m ig h t  e x p l a i n  the  a c t i o n  in  terms o f  ' removing th e  immediate  
cause o f  your own ( t h e  r e s c u e r ’ s )  em ot io na l  u p s e t ’ , v i z .  th e  
d i s t r e s s  o f  see ing  a c h i l d  drowning (see  p . 2 5 3 ) .  I n  these  
and o t h e r s  ways, w h i l e  you may he lp  a n o th e r  person t h i s  is  
o n l y  because i t  i s  in  your own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 201
Our commitment t o  moral p r i n c i p l e s  l i k e  p ro m is e -k e e p in g  
and j u s t i c e ,  as we have seen, can be e x p la i n e d  in  a s i m i l a r  
way. For  example ,  i t  b e n e f i t s  a person when he keeps h is  
prom ises .  O thers  w i l l  t h i n k  him t o  be t r u s t w o r t h y  and 
r e l i a b l e ;  in  th e  long run,  i f  no t  s t r a i g h t  away. On the
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o t h e r  hand, i f  a person d id  no t  keep h i s  p rom ises ,  o t h e r s  
would no lo n g e r  t r u s t  him and would no t  e n t e r  i n t o  
agreem ents  w i t h  him. So s im p ly  ou t  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  we can 
e x p l a i n  why we ought  t o  keep prom ises .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  i s  in  
o n e ’ s s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  l i v e  in  a s t a b l e  s o c i e t y ;  i t  m ig h t  be 
supposed t h a t  th e  observance o f  Rawls ian  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
j u s t i c e  i s  a n ecessary  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  such a s o c i e t y .  Along  
t h e s e  l i n e s  we may d e f i n e  a moral code, e . g .  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ,  j u s t i c e ,  g r a t i t u d e ,  e t c . ,  as t h e  r u l e s  
ne c e s s a ry  t o  keep s o c i e t y  t o g e t h e r .  Then t o  say " I  m o r a l l y  
oug ht  t o  do F" i s  j u s t  t o  say t h a t  F i s a  s o c i a l  r u l e  and i t  
i s  in  my s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  obey th e s e  r u l e s  because i f  
s o c i e t y  c o l l a p s e s ,  I  s h a l l  have l i t t l e  chance o f  g r a t i f y i n g  
my o t h e r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  d e s i r e s .
I t  i s  worth  m e n t io n in g ,  f i n a l l y ,  an advantage  o f  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  egoism over  my own v iew .  I  hope t h a t  i t  i s  
o b v io u s  by now t h a t  th e  answer I  would g iv e  t o  th e  q u e s t io n :  
"Why should  I  h e lp  th e  drowning chi  id?" i s  "Because she 
needs ( a )  t o  s u r v i v e " ,  meaning by t h i s  t h a t  one can show 
a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s ,  even when t h i s  
means s a c r i f i c i n g  o n e ’ s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  The advantage o f  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  egoism is  t h i s .  I f  human be ings have 
u l t i m a t e l y  o n ly  one lo n g - te rm ,  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  goal and 
moral  r u l e s  t e l l  us how t o  a t t a i n  t h a t  g o a l ,  i t  i s  v e r y  easy  
t o  see why moral r u l e s  should  be obeyed. Being moral i s  
s im p ly  a m a t t e r  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o r  prudence.  Whereas i f  we 
have two o r  more d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  needs,  g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  
two s e t s  o f  p r i n c i p l e s ,  then how do we choose between them 
when t h e y  c o n f l i c t ?  The answer t h a t  I  have g iven  i s  t h a t  
i f  we a r e  r a t i o n a l ,  we weigh th e  needs o f  o u r s e lv e s  and 
o t h e r s  in  accordance w i t h  c r i t e r i a  l i k e  th e  bas icn ess ,  
u rg en cy ,  c e r t a i n t y ,  o f  th e  needs in  q u e s t io n .  In  comparison  
w i t h  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  t h i s  seems t o  be an u n n e c e s s a r i l y  
c o m p l ic a t e d  v iew o f  moral judgement.  We need t o  know 
t h e r e f o r e  i f  th e  a d m i t t e d l y  s im p le r  t h e o r y  p r o v id e s  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  account  o f  our p s y c h o lo g ic a l  make-up.
We m ig h t  beg in  by ask ing  f o r  ev iden ce  t o  s u p p o r t  th e  
c l a i m  t h a t  human be ings a r e  so c o n s t i t u t e d  t h a t  t h e y  cannot  
b u t  h e l p  choose what i s  in t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  S ince  
t h i s  i s  a p s y c h o lo g ic a l  c la im ,  presumably a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  
o f  t h e  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  th e o ry  would have to  be in  terms o f  
c o n f i  rm a to ry  o b s e rv a b le  ev id e n c e .  However i t  i s  th e  
e v id e n c e  t o  th e  c o n t r a r y  which i s  s t r i k i n g .  I f  we were to  
see a c h i l d  drowning,  I  s a id  t h a t  most o f  us would go t o  h is  
o r  h e r  a i d .  Le t  us suppose t h a t  we ask a re s c u e r  t o  j u s t i f y  
why he a c te d  so. He might  say t h a t ,  as f a r  as he i s  
c o n s c i o u s l y  aware o f  h is  reasons,  he d id  so because th e  
c h i l d  was drowning (he acted  out  o f  h is  a c t i v e  sympathy f o r  
t h e  c h i l d ’ s n e e d s ) .  He might  add t h a t  he expected  no p r a i s e  
o r  reward f o r  h is  a c t i o n .  He does not  t h i n k  about  i t  w i t h  
any p r i d e  a f t e r w a r d s .  In  f a c t ,  he f o r g o t  about  i t  as soon 
as i t  was done. And a l though  he p ro b a b ly  would have f e l t  
g u i l t  and em ot io na l  upset  i f  he had not  ac ted  so, n e i t h e r  
d i d  he save th e  c h i l d  because o th e r w is e  he would f e e l  
g u i l t y .  F i n a l l y ,  the  rescuer  cou ld  say t h a t  he d id  no t  a c t  
t o  f u r t h e r  h i s  own s h o r t - t e r m  o r  lo n g - te rm  advantage ,  o r  
even f o r  th e  b e n e f i t s  he r e c e iv e s  l i v i n g  in a s o c i e t y  where 
p e o p le  behave in t h i s  way. He made no c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  the  
p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  t o  h i m s e l f  t h a t  m ight  have r e s u l t e d  from  
s a v in g  h e r .  He chose to  a c t  s im ply  f o r  th e  sake o f  th e  
c h i l d .  I  can t h i n k  o f  no a p r i o r i  reason f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  
respo nse ,  nor do I  f i n d  i t  i m p la u s ib le  as an account  o f  
o r d i n a r y  e x p e r ie n c e .  In  o r d i n a r y  e x p e r ie n c e ,  we t h i n k  t h a t  
i n  t h e  c h o ic e s  we make we can be m o t iv a te d  by a sense o f  
concern  f o r  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s ,  even when t h i s  means
gen u ine  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  i f  our  o r d i n a r y  e x p e r ie n c e  i s  a n y th in g  t o  go 
by, we do seem t o  have any number o f  m o t ive s ,  o t h e r  than  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  in fo rm in g  our d i f f e r e n t  judgements:  l i k e
sympathy ,  l o y a l t y ,  f a i r n e s s ,  g e n e r o s i t y ,  t o l e r a n c e ,  h u m i l i t y  
and so on. W hi le  o f t e n  I  do choose t o  do t h in g s  o u t  o f  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  the  v a r i e t y  and e x t e n t  o f  th e  cho ices  I  make
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seems t o  be to o  complex t o  be accounted f o r  by bas ing  them 
a l l ,  u l t i m a t e l y  upon j u s t  one s i n g l e  m o t iv e .  In  o t h e r  
words,  t h e  e g o i s t  seems to  be t a k i n g  a o n e -s id e d  v iew  o f  
human n a t u r e .  He t a k e s  i n t o  account  o n ly  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  
o f  human needs: those ( l i k e  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , avo idance  o f  
i n j u r y  t o  o n e s e l f ,  e t c . )  which can be subsumed under  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  As a m a t te r  o f  f a c t ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be more 
t o  t h e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  make-up o f  persons than t h i s .
T h e re  a r e  a number o f  ways in  which the  e g o i s t  m ight  
respo nd .  A usual  response is  t o  suggest  t h a t  th e  person who 
went  t o  t h e  a i d  o f  the  drowning c h i l d  i s  not  aware o f  th e  
a c t u a l  m o t ive s  which governed h is  b eh av io u r .  In  seeming t o  
behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y ,  he i s  r e a l l y  seek ing  t o  f u r t h e r  h is  
own s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  though he may not  r e a l i z e  t h i s .
Now t h e r e  i s  something f i s h y  going on he re .  In  th e  f i r s t  
p l a c e ,  t h e  e g o i s t  i s  c la im in g  t h a t  he has i n s i g h t s  i n t o  the  
m o t iv e s  f o r  each i n d i v i d u a l ’ s conduct t h a t  a re  not  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  t h e  ag e n t  and f r e q u e n t l y  c o n t r a d i c t  th e  m ot ives  t h a t  th e  
a g e n t  would h i m s e l f  g i v e .  No doubt I  can be m is taken  about  
some o f  my own m ot ive s .  However can I  c o n s i s t e n t l y  be 
m is ta k e n  in  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  my motive  i s  s ym p a th e t ic  when 
r e a l l y  i t  i s  not? And when t h e r e  is  a d i f f e r e n c e  between 
an e g o i s t  and an honest  person about  the  m ot ives  o f  the  
l a t t e r ,  who i s  th e  l a s t  Court  o f  Appeal?
The e g o i s t ’ s c la im  is  suspect  f o r  a n o th e r  reason.  
P s y c h o l o g i c a l  c la im s  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  we s a i d ,  a re  m a in ly  
e m p i r i c a l .  However th e  e g o i s t  c la im s  to  know in  advance o f  
any v o l u n t a r y  a c t i o n ,  whatever  i t  i s ,  t h a t  he knows the  
a g e n t ’ s m o t iv e  f o r  doing i t .  I t  i s  n o t ,  th e n ,  a th e o r y  
based on observed ev idence  s in c e  no c o n c e iv a b le  ev idence  
c o u ld  r e f u t e  i t .  I t  i s ,  a t  b e s t ,  an a p r i o r i  c la im  about  
human n a t u r e .  C o u ld n ’ t  we e q u a l l y  i n s i s t  and w i t h  g r e a t e r  
c o n f i d e n c e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  sym pathe t ic  mot ives w i t h i n  the  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  make-up o f  persons? A f t e r  a l l ,  t h i s  view f i t s
t h e  f a c t s .
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The e g o i s t  may t r y  a d i f f e r e n t  d e fe n c e .  He may agree  
t h a t  by going i n t o  th e  w a te r  t o  save t h e  c h i l d ,  th e  r e s c u e r  
d i d  n o t  seem t o  a c t  f rom what most peop le  would c a l l  a 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  m o t iv e .  N e v e r t h e le s s  i t  can be assumed t h a t  
by choosing  t o  save th e  c h i l d ,  he was doing what  he most 
d e s i r e d  t o  do. So by doing th e  a c t  he chose t o  do, he was 
s a t i s f y i n g  h i s  own d e s i r e .  I s n ’ t  t h i s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ?
I  w i l l  r e s t r i c t  m y s e l f  t o  two comments in  r e p l y .  
F i r s t l y ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  a l l  o f  th e  j u d g e r ’ s v o l u n t a r y  
a c t s  a r e  s e l f - m o t i v a t e d ,  o f  course ,  does not  show t h a t  a l l  
o f  t h e  j u d g e r ’ s m ot ives  are  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  What i t  shows 
i s  t h a t  th e  ju d g e r  has a s p e c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  h i s  own 
m o t iv e s  because th e y  a re  h is  own. He chooses t o  do what  he 
chooses t o  do. I f  t h i s  i s  what th e  ev id e n c e  f o r  th e  
e x c l u s i v e  and necessary  m ot ive  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  amounts t o ,  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  egoism reduces t o  th e  u n i n f o r m a t i v e  t a u t o l o g y :  
"Everyone a lways chooses t o  do what he o r  she chooses t o  
do" .  I  cannot  see why such a t r i v i a l  t a u t o l o g y  i s  th o u g h t  
t o  be a m o r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n s i g h t  i n t o  human n a t u r e .
S e cond ly ,  by say ing  t h a t  a l l  m ot ives  a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  th e  e g o i s t  den ies  th e  d i f f e r e n c e - i n - k i n d  
between s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  m o t iv e s .  There  i s  
a p r i c e  t o  be p a id  h e re .  ' S e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ cou ld  no lo n g e r  be 
used t o  r e f e r  t o  those  cases we n o r m a l ly  r e q u i r e  i t  f o r .  I t  
can n o t  be used in  moral c o n t e x t s , f o r  in s t a n c e ,  t o  c o n t r a s t  
w i t h  t h e  a l t r u i s t i c  t y p e  o f  m o t iv e .  Sometimes, however,  we 
do want  t o  make t h i s  c o n t r a s t .  We c r i t i c i z e  someone, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  who can be in  no doubt about  what th e  needs o f  
o t h e r s ,  in  th e  c i rcu m stan ce s ,  r e q u i r e  him t o  do ( i . e .  due 
t o  t h e  b a s ic n e s s ,  e t c .  o f  the  needs in  q u e s t io n  when 
compared t o  h i s  own) y e t  under th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  t h e  r e p r o b a te  does something e l s e .  What can we say 
t o  him? I f  a l l  m ot ives  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ,  we 
c an not  f a u l t  him f o r  being i n o r d i n a t e l y  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  
' S e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ has been made a m o r a l l y  n e u t r a l  te rm .  I t s  
meaning has become so a t t e n u a t e d  t h a t  i t  can be no longer
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used in  cases where we n o rm a l ly  use i t .  We would no t  m ere ly  
have t o  c o in  a n o th e r  e x p re s s io n  f o r  those  m o t i v e s / a c t i o n s  
which a t  p r e s e n t  we r e f e r  t o  as s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  (as  opposed 
t o  s y m p a th e t ic  o r  a l t r u i s t i c  m o t i v e s / a c t s ) ,  we would r e q u i r e  
a l s o  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  marked by our p r e s e n t  
di  s t i  n c t i  o n .
My l a s t  o b j e c t i o n  i s  a ls o  o f  a l o g i c a l  k in d .  I t  concerns  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  and autonomy which I  
have shown a r e  necessary  f o r  any moral judgem ent.  F i r s t l y ,  
we have seen t h a t  I  cannot  r a t i o n a l l y  judge
( 1 )  I  a lo n e  m o r a l l y  ought to  do such-and-such  because I  
must a lways do w hatever  is  in  my s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
For ( 1 )  cannot  be U . R . I  o r  U . R . I I  u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  What makes 
a moral  judgement u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  i s  t h a t  th e  reason g iven  
f o r  i t  i s  im p erso n a l ,  and a reason i s  not  impersonal  i f  i t  
u n i q u e l y  r e f e r s  t o  j u s t  one i n d i v i d u a l ’ s i n t e r e s t s  or  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  Le t  us assume t h a t  th e  e g o i s t  acc ep ts  t h a t  our  
s u r f a c e  moral judgements  must be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  and cannot  
t a k e  t h i s  e g o i s t i c  form.  However,  he argues t h a t  the  
u n d e r l y i n g  reason in  any such judgement i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  The o b j e c t i o n  s t i l l  h o ld s .  The u n d e r ly in g  
reason f o r  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ( 1 )  would depend upon the  
o c c u r re n c e  o f  an i r r e p l a c e a b l e  pronoun, name, o r  some o t h e r  
u n i q u e l y  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  te rm .  So, a g a in ,  h is  judgement  
can not  be u n i v e r s a l i z e d .  Fu r th e rm o re ,  i f  h is  moral  
judgem ent  cannot  be g e n u in e ly  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  n e i t h e r  can 
anyone e l s e ’ s,  (even i f  we may a c t  as i f  our  c la im s  are  
v a l i d ) .  B r in g in g  o th e r s  i n t o  th e  p i c t u r e  does not  a l t e r  the  
l o g i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  ( 1 ) .  Even i f  i t  i s  th e  case t h a t  everyone  
makes s i m i l a r  s u r f a c e  c la im s ,  a l l  o f  our  u n d e r ly in g  reasons  
would a lways be u n iq u e ly  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  and so f a i l  as 
impersonal  reasons.  The s o - c a l l e d  moral judgements  
r e c o g n iz e d  would be something l i k e  a u n i v e r s a l  d e v ic e  f o r  
e n s u r in g  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
Second ly ,  and more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i f  a person cannot  help  
but  d e c id e  on th e  ba s is  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  t h e r e  can be no
p o i n t  t o  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  o n e ’ s moral judgements must be 
autonomous.  I f  we must d ec ide  on th e  b a s is  o f  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  then  th e  ' o u g h t ’ in  th e  judgement ' I  ought  t o  do F 
r a t h e r  th an  G’ i s ,  a t  b e s t ,  p r u d e n t i a l  no t  m o ra l .  A 
p r u d e n t i a l  judgement may be a c t i o n - g u i d i n g .  However i f  the  
need f o r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  p re c lu d e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  then th e  p r u d e n t i a l  j u d g e r  cannot  
be autonomous. He cannot  g e n u in e ly  choose f o r  h i m s e l f  what  
he w i l l  do. Again  i t  i s  p roper  t o  ask f o r  th e  ev id e n c e  upon 
which such an u n l i k e l y  c la im  is  based.
F i n a l l y ,  l e t  me s t a t e  my own p o s i t i o n  h e re .  On my view  
t h e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t  i s  c o r r e c t  in  a n a ly z i n g  moral terms  
as ,  u l t i m a t e l y ,  th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  d e e p -s e a te d  needs. But he 
i s  wrong t o  suppose th e  needs in  q u e s t io n  t o  be o f  one k ind  
a l o n e .  There  i s  a t  l e a s t  one o t h e r  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  typ e  o f  
need,  e q u a l l y  d e e p - r o o te d  in  human n a t u r e .  We can make a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between those needs we have which a r e  grouped  
under  th e  name o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and those I  have c a l l e d  
o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g  needs,  l i k e  a c t i v e  sympathy. Once t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  has been a d m i t te d  then  t h e r e  a r e  no grounds f o r  
t h e  e g o i s t ’ s o t h e r  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  a moral code is  m ere ly  a 
s e t  o f  r u l e s  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  ends which a re  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .  
For  me t o  say t h a t  'X m o r a l ly  ought  t o  do F ’ can mean t h a t  
F meets somebody e l s e ’ s needs.
L e t  us assume t h a t  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t ’ s c la im  has 
been s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e b u t t e d .  I  ment ioned e a r l i e r  a second 
argument based upon s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  To be a b l e  t o  show t h a t  
o n e ’ s s i n g u l a r  moral judgements  a re  based upon u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e —n e e d s , I  have argued,  i s  t o  adopt  a r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  
v ie w .  S u r e ly  t h i s  is  not  th e  o n ly  p e r s p e c t i v e  on r a t i o n a l  
moral  agency?
R a t i o n a l  egoism and u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e eds
Why not  say:  'Everyone  ought  t o  seek ,  e x c l u s i v e l y  or
p r i m a r i l y ,  h is  own r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ ? U n l i k e  the  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  e g o i s t ,  th e  advocate  o f  t h i s  v iew accep ts  t h a t
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we can choose t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  our  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t  but  
sug ges ts  t h a t  we ought  not  t o  do so. Each i n d i v i d u a l  ought  
t o  meet h i s  own w e i g h t i e s t  needs. There  i s  an immediate  
problem  f o r  us h e r e .  What does th e  e t h i c a l  e g o i s t  mean by 
' o u g h t 1?
One response ( i )  might  be an appeal t o  d i r e c t  moral  
i n s i g h t  o r  i n t u i t i o n .  When th e  e t h i c a l  e g o i s t  i s  asked:  
"Why ought  everyone  a c t  so as t o  s a t i s f y  h i s  o r  her  own 
needs?" ,  he r e p l i e s  "This  i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
n o r m a t iv e  e t h i c s " .  T h is  answer i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  One 
reason i s  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  c o n t e s t a b l e .  Very  few 
p e o p le  have c la im e d  t o  have th e  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  everyone  
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  promote s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a lo n e .  ( S u r e l y ,  an 
e t h i c a l  e g o i s t s  would not  deny t h i s . )  However when t h i s  
s e l f - e v i d e n c e  i s  den ied ,  th e  key assumption i s  undermined.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  th e  e t h i c a l  e g o i s t  might  say ( i i )  t h a t  i f  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  'Everyone  ought  t o  do what i s  in  h is  o r  her  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t s ’ were t o  be c o n s i s t e n t l y  f o l l o w e d  by 
e v e ry o n e ,  t h i s  would have th e  bes t  r e s u l t s .  What could  
' b e s t  r e s u l t s ’ mean here? The w or ld  would be a h a p p ie r
p l a c e  f o r  everyone? Each o f  us should  be f r e e  t o  do what  
we reg a rd  as in  our own s e l f - i n t e r e s t  in any s i t u a t i o n  
because t h i s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  th e  g en era l  happ iness .  T h is  too  
i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  For one t h i n g ,  someone who reasons thus  
i s  a u t i l i t a r i a n  not  an e g o i s t .  The u l t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  moral r u l e s  i s  the  gen era l  happ iness .  We a re  i n t e r e s t e d  
h e re  in  th e  arguments f o r  egoism as a r a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  
n o t  th e  g en era l  happiness .  In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s ,  the
p r i n c i p l e  i s  no t  n e u t r a l .  For some p e o p le ,  i t  i s  v e ry  odd 
t o  suppose t h a t  everyone would be happy o r  would b e n e f i t  by 
a p o l i c y  based o n ly  upon s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  They t h i n k  i t  is  
obv io u s  t h a t  those  w i t h  power o r  t a l e n t  would advance t h e i r  
own i n t e r e s t s  much more e f f e c t i v e l y  than  those w i t h o u t  i t ,  
b r i n g i n g  unhappiness and f r u s t r a t i o n  t o  th e  needs o f  the  
' h a v e - n o t s ’ .
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F i n a l l y ,  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t
m ig h t  be ( i i i )  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  b e s t  s u i t e d  t o  r a t i o n a l
c h o ic e  and t h e r e b y  t o  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  our  p r im a  f a c i e
c o r r e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgem ents  and o f  o u r  commonsense
moral b e l i e f s .  I t  i s  s u i t e d  t o  r a t i o n a l  c h o ic e  s i n c e ,  as
H .S id g w ic k  ( 1 9 0 7 : 4 9 8 )  says:
. . . " I "  am concerned w i t h  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  my e x i s t e n c e  
as an i n d i v i d u a l  in  a sense,  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t ,  in  which I  am no t  concerned w i t h  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and
t h i s  be ing  so,  I  do no t  see how i t  can be proved
t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  no t  t o  be ta k e n  as 
fundam enta l  in  d e t e r m in in g  th e  u l t i m a t e  end o f  
r a t i o n a l  a c t i o n  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l . 202
We may p u t  th e  p o i n t  here  in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way. A r a t i o n a l
person w i l l  seek t o  s a t i s f y  h i s  own needs f o r  s u r v i v a l ,
p h y s ic a l  w e l l - b e i n g ,  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  h ap p in e ss ,  e t c .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  he w i l l  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  h is
own needs i s  a p r im a f a c i e  good. I t  w i l l  be th e  o b j e c t  o f
most p r o j e c t s  o f  which he approves .  However,  as S idgw ick
( i b i d : 4 2 0 - 4 2 1 )  o b s erves :
. . . i t  then  becomes r e l e v a n t  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t o  him t h a t  
h i s  happ iness  cannot  be a more im p o r ta n t  p a r t  o f  
Good, ta k e n  u n i v e r s a l l y ,  than  th e  happiness  o f  any 
o t h e r  person .
The p ropo nent  o f  t h i s  v iew  must be a b l e  t o  say t h a t  i t  i s  
r a t i o n a l  f o r  e v e r y  person t o  reg a rd  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  h is  
o r  he r  own needs as a p r im a  f a c i e  good. He must be a b l e  to  
show, m oreover ,  t h a t  we cou ld  base a l l  o f  th e  pr ima f a c i e  
c o r r e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  moral judgements  t h a t  we make on n o th in g  
more than  t h i s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  judgements which i n v o l v e  
o t h e r  persons -  l i k e  ' I  ought  t o  go t o  th e  a i d  o f  a drowning  
c h i l d ’ -  must be shown t o  f o l l o w  from reasons con cern ing  th e  
j u d g e r ’ s own ( h y p o t h e t i c a l  o r  a c t u a l )  r a t i o n a l  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t .  And he must be a b le  t o  j u s t i f y ,  a l s o ,  our  
commonsense moral b e l i e f s  e . g .  i t  i s  m o r a l l y  r i g h t  t o  keep 
prom ises ,  in  terms o f  r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 203
I n i t i a l l y  we m ight  t h i n k  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  egoism does 
p r o v i d e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  account  o f  our  p a r t i c u l a r  moral  
judgem en ts .  A r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  can go t o  th e  c h i l d ’ s a i d .
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He m ig h t  j u s t i f y  do ing  so in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: " I  m o r a l l y  
ought  t o  h e lp  th e  c h i l d  because hav ing  s y m p a th e t ic  concern  
f o r  o t h e r s  i s  t h e  most rew ard in g  and f u l f i l l i n g  k in d  o f  l i f e  
I  can l e a d " .  He may t h i n k  a l s o  t h a t  a s o c i e t y  in  which  
p r o m i s e - k e e p i n g ,  be ing  f a i r ,  e t c . ,  a r e  commonplace, i s  b e s t  
s u i t e d  t o  h i s  own o v e r a l l  i n t e r e s t s .
However he would no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have a reason ,  say ,  f o r  
r e f r a i n i n g  from c h e a t i n g  o t h e r s ,  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  when everyone  
e l s e  observes  n o n -c h e a t in g  c o n v e n t i o n s ) ,  when a p a r t i c u l a r  
case o f  c h e a t i n g  g r e a t l y  improves h i s  own i n t e r e s t s  and when 
he i s  re a s o n a b ly  sure  t h a t  he would no t  be found o u t .  As we 
asked e a r l i e r ,  i f  th e  money Smith  borrows from Jones leads  
t o  an improvement in  S m i t h ’ s f o r t u n e ,  why should  i t  be in  
S m i t h ’ s r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  keep h is  promise t o  repay  
Jones,  as opposed t o  s im p ly  doing w h a te v e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
g e t  Jones t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  he w i l l  keep h i s  promise? S i m i l a r  
arguments  a p p ly  t o  j u s t i c e .  Why s h o u ld n ’ t  a r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  
-  who ex hypothes i  would be w e l l - d i s p o s e d  t o  choose R a w ls ’ 
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  as a way o f  m eet ing  h i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  when in  ' a  v e i l  o f  i g n o r a n c e ’ 
f r e e - r i d e  once th e  w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  has been 
e s t a b l i s h e d ?  A lso  I  cannot  see how a r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  cou ld  
f e e l  o r  exp re ss  genuine  g r a t i t u d e .  Accord ing  t o  our  e a r l i e r  
a n a l y s i s ,  t h i s  amounts t o  v a l u i n g  o n e ’ s b e n e f a c t o r  f o r  h is  
o r  h e r  own sake;  whereas t h e  r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  t h i n k s ,  
presum ably ,  t h a t  in  such an a c t  th e  r e c i p i e n t  ought  t o  
re g a r d  th e  b e n e f a c t o r  as be ing  in  some way an in s t r u m e n t  to  
h i s  ( t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s )  i n t e r e s t .  To p u t  th e  p o i n t s  r a i s e d  
above b l u n t l y ,  a t h e o r y  which a t te m p ts  t o  base a l l  o f  our  
moral judgements and b e l i e f s  upon r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
a l o n e ,  r e s u l t s  in  an im p o v e r is h e d ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a v e ry  narrow  
p i c t u r e  o f  our  moral l i f e .
There  i s  a more t e l l i n g  o b j e c t i o n .  The v iew  t h a t  ' e v e r y  
person i s  a b l e  and r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  seek h i s  own 
i n t e r e s t s ’ cannot  be c o n s i s t e n t l y  ad v o ca ted .  For  s u r e l y ,  my 
a d v i s i n g  you t o  look a f t e r  your own s e l f - i n t e r e s t  w i l l  not
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be in  my s e l f - i n t e r e s t  when your  and my i n t e r e s t s  c o n f l i c t .  
I t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  o f  course  t h a t  our  i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  
n e v e r  c o n f l i c t .  However in  t h e  a c t u a l  w o r ld ,  c o n f l i c t  o f  
t h i s  s o r t  happens a l l  o f  th e  t i m e .  In  which case t h e  t h e o r y  
e i t h e r  lead s  t o  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  o r  i s  one t h a t  can not  be 
a d v o c a t e d . 204
We can see t h i s  p o i n t ,  per  absurdum, by r e v e r t i n g  t o  an 
e a r l i e r  exam ple .  Suppose Sm ith ,  a s o l d i e r ,  endorses  
u n i v e r s a l  r a t i o n a l  egoism o f  t h i s  k in d .  Doing what  i s  in  
h i s  own i n t e r e s t s ,  Smith would t r y  t o  k i l l  h i s  enemy Jones.  
At  t h e  same t im e ,  Smith would a c c e p t  t h a t  Jones i s  j u s t  as 
r a t i o n a l  when t r y i n g  t o  k i l l  him. So our  u n i v e r s a l  e g o i s t  
s o l d i e r  r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  t r y  t o  t h w a r t  h i s  enemy and a t  
t h e  same t im e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  h i s  enemy is  doing something  
r a t i o n a l  in  t r y i n g  t o  k i l l  him. Now i f  moral judgements  
f o l l o w  from r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  we would have t o  say 
t h a t  i f  Smith p r e v e n ts  Jones from k i l l i n g  him, S m i t h ’ s 
d e f e n s i v e  a c t  i s  m o r a l l y  wrong because i t  p r e v e n ts  Jones 
f rom doing  what he ought  t o  do. (Jones m o r a l l y  ought  t o  
k i l l  S m i t h . )  And i t  i s  no t  wrong because i t  i s  what  Smith  
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  do. One and th e  same a c t  i s  both m o r a l l y  
wrong and not  wrong! Are we t o  say here  t h a t  a l th o u g h
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  may a p p ly ,  m o r a l i t y  ceases t o  a p p ly  
in  such cases ,  i . e .  in  a l l  cases where t h e r e  a r e  c o n f l i c t s  
o f  needs? O th e rw is e  t o  a v o id  such c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ,  r a t i o n a l  
egoism thus  c o n s t r u e d ,  cannot  be adv oca ted .
The argument above c a r r i e s  o v e r  t o  le s s  d r a m a t ic  
c o n f l i c t s .  As a r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t ,  I  m ight  say 'Each person  
r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  pursue t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t ’ b u t ,
when we c o n f l i c t ,  I  cannot  r e a l l y  a c c e p t  t h a t  persons o t h e r  
than  me m o r a l l y  ought  t o  g a in  t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  f o r  
o t h e r w i s e  t h i s  w i l l  d e f e a t  my own. A t  b es t  t h i s  seems to  
amount t o  s a y in g  t h a t  I  a c c e p t  a p o l i c y  o f  u n i v e r s a l
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  but  t h i n k  t h a t  when we c o n f l i c t ,
e i t h e r  my opponent  should  no t  r e a l l y  pursue h i s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  
t h a t  he should  not  a t t a i n  i t .  The t r o u b l e  i s  t h a t  the
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e g o i s t ’ s argument i s  p u t  fo r w a r d  as a parad igm  o f  
r a t i o n a l i t y .  ( T h i s  i s  why anybody should  ad o p t  i t . )  A t  th e  
same t i m e ,  he seems t o  suggest  t h a t  persons o t h e r  than  him,  
ought  t o  a c t  c o n t r a r y  t o  reason.  For i f  he a c c e p ts  t h a t  
some can not  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t h e n ,  presum ably ,  he 
i s  w i l l i n g  t h a t  th e y  engage in  i r r a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r . 205
G.Warnock ( 1 9 6 7 )  d e n ie s  th e  t h r u s t  o f  th e  argument above.
He h o ld s  t h a t  we can c o n s i s t e n t l y  m a i n t a in  t h a t  o t h e r s  ought
t o  do what  i s  in  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  w i t h o u t
en c o u ra g in g  them t o  do so. Warnock ( 1 9 6 7 : 4 5 - 4 6 )  w r i t e s :
In  o r d e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  t o  defend  as 
u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e  my n e g l e c t  o f  a n o t h e r ’ s i n t e r e s t s  
I  do no t  have to  go t o  th e  l e n g th  o f  p o s i t i v e l y  
w an t in g  my own i n t e r e s t s  t o  be n e g le c t e d ,  o r  o f  
somehow no t  d i s l i k i n g  i t  when th ey  a r e :  a l l  t h a t  I  
am r e q u i r e d  t o  do i s  t o  concede t h a t  n e g l e c t  o f  my 
i n t e r e s t s  by o t h e r s  would be u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e .
A l l  t h e  r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  must concede i s  t h a t  o t h e r s  a r e  not
m o r a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  a t t a c h  w e ig h t  t o  h i s  needs and
i n t e r e s t s ;  no m a t t e r  t h a t  he may i n t e n s e l y  d i s l i k e  i t  when
in  th e  c o m p e t i t i v e  f r e e - f o r - a l 1, i t  happens t h a t  he comes
o u t  on th e  l o s i n g  s i d e .
We can s t r e n g t h e n  Warnock’ s argument here  by draw ing  an 
an a lo g y  w i t h  a c o m p e t i t i v e  game.206 I  may see how by moving 
h i s  k n i g h t ,  my chess opponent can t a k e  my queen.  T h is  is  
how he r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  move. However b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  he 
ought  t o  move h i s  k n i g h t  and t a k e  my queen, does no t  commit 
me t o  showing him th e  move, o r  t o  w an t in g  him t o  make i t .  
What I  r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  do i s  t o  s i t  t h e r e ,  keep ing  my 
own c o u n s e l ,  hoping t h a t  he does not  move as he o u g ht .  A 
chess p l a y e r ,  o r  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  a p l a y e r  o f  any c o m p e t i t i v e  
game, can r e c o g n is e  t h a t  h i s  opponent  ought  t o  pursue h i s  or  
her  own r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  w i t h o u t  t r y i n g  t o  persuade  
them t o  do so. Could not  Warnock say t h a t  t o  unders tand  the  
a s y m m e tr ica l  use o f  ' o u g h t ’ in  th e  c o n t e x t  o f  a game a l lo w s  
us t o  see i t s  asym m etr ica l  use in  moral c o n f l i c t s ?
The a n a lo g y ,  a l a s ,  i s  f a l s e .  In  any game we g r a n t  our  
opponent  th e  r i g h t  t o  make a p p r o p r i a t e  moves w i t h o u t  t a k i n g
c e r t a i n  p r e v e n t a t i v e  a c t i o n s  o u r s e l v e s ,  l i k e  d i s t r a c t i n g  him 
and then  changing  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  p ie c e s  w h i l e  th e  
opponent  i s  d i s t r a c t e d .  By r e f r a i n i n g  from such a c t i o n s ,  
o f  c o u rs e ,  we may lo s e  th e  game. I f  t h e  ana lo g y  were sound,  
t h e  r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t  would be committed t o  r e f r a i n  from doing  
c e r t a i n  p r e v e n t i v e  a c t s  which a r e  n o n e th e le s s  in  h i s  o v e r a l l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  There  a r e  some t h i n g s  t h a t  s o l d i e r  Smith  
would n o t  do t o  k i l l  o r  t h w a r t  h i s  enemy Jones.  As a 
consequence,  however,  he would f a i l  t o  a c t  in  h i s  o v e r a l l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  I n  which case ,  he would r e f r a i n  f rom doing  
what i s  r a t i o n a l  and what he is  r e q u i r e d  m o r a l l y  t o  do.
L e t  us no te  one o t h e r  problem b e f o r e  moving on. A 
r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t ’ s t h e o r y  p la c e s  him in  an awkward p o s i t i o n  
i n  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Suppose t h a t  Smith and Jones ask  
me t o  a r b i t r a t e  in  a d i s p u t e  th e y  a r e  h a v in g .  The e g o i s t ’ s 
d o c t r i n e  would seem t o  p o i n t  i n  t h r e e  d i r e c t i o n s .  I  
r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  t e l l  Smith t o  s a t i s f y  h is  own needs and 
t o  t e l l  Jones t o  do t h e  same. However above a l l  e l s e ,  I  
r a t i o n a l l y  ought  t o  t o  s a t i s f y  my own needs which cou ld  be 
c o n t r a r y  t o  both o f  t h e i r s .  I n  which case I  cannot  see t h a t  
one co u ld  c l a i m  t o  be t a k i n g  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  someone 
who i s  g e n u in e ly  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ;  
someone who i s  se e k in g  ' t h e  c o r r e c t ’ answer.  I  hope t h a t  I  
have s a i d  enough t o  show why I  t h i n k  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  i s  s e r i o u s l y  f la w e d  as a r a t i o n a l  b a s is  f o r  moral  
j u d g e m e n t .
L e t  us now t u r n  t o  th e  is s u e  o f  moral d e a d lo c k .  Suppose 
t h a t  in  our  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  both p a r t i e s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  
own judgem ent  i s  c o r r e c t  and t h a t  t h e  o t h e r ’ s judgement is  
wrong.  Most o f  our  e ve ryd ay  moral d i s p u t e s  appear  t o  be o f  
t h i s  n a t u r e .  How e x a c t l y  does my u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  
account  p r o v i d e  a way o f  h a n d l i n g  t h i s  problem?
Moral  dead lock
O f te n  when peop le  make moral judgem ents ,  the  judgements  
th e y  make a r e  d i s p u t e d .  "S m i th " ,  Jones says ,  i s  a d r e a d fu l
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p e rs o n .  He promised t o  repay t h e  money he borrowed f rom me 
and he h a s n ’ t " .  Someone e l s e ,  Brown, may d i s a g r e e .  Brown 
may p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  Smith r e c e n t l y  l o s t  h i s  j o b  and i s  o u t  o f  
work,  o r  t h a t  Smith b e l i e v e d  t h a t  th e  o n ly  way he co u ld  feed  
h i s  c h i l d r e n  was by making th e  f a l s e  promise t o  Jones.  
Brown may add t h a t  in  h a p p ie r  t im e s ,  Smith a lways  p a id  h is  
d e b t s .
Sometimes such d i s p u t e s  a r e  s im p ly  a d i f f e r e n c e  about  th e  
f a c t s .  Jones may no t  have known t h a t  Smith i s  unemployed,  
o r  he may not  have r e a l i z e d  t h a t  S m i t h ’ s c h i l d r e n  were  
s t a r v i n g .  I f  t h e i r  d isag ree m e n t  i s  about  a f a c t u a l  m a t t e r ,  
we do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  in  p r i n c i p l e  th e  d is a g re e m e n t  i s  
in c a p a b le  o f  be ing r e s o lv e d .
O f t e n  th e  f a c t u a l  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  more s u b t l e  o r  
c o m p l i c a t e d .  I n  th e  p as t  i t  was b e l i e v e d  by many, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  a s h o r t  s t r e t c h  on th e  rack  i s  th e  o n ly  way 
t o  save a h e r e t i c  f rom e t e r n a l  dam nation .  Le t  us assume 
t h a t  c h a r i t y  m o t iv a te d  t h i s  p r a c t i c e .  We too  may agree  t h a t  
i f  t h e  rack  guaran teed  th e  h e r e t i c  e t e r n a l  s a l v a t i o n ,  
c h a r i t y  would r e q u i r e  t h a t  he should  be t o r t u r e d .  However  
we do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  rack  se rv e s  in  t h i s  way, o r  t h a t  
i t  e v e r  d i d .  Our d isagree m e nt  w i t h  th e  I n q u i s i t o r ,  which i s  
u s u a l l y  r e p r e s e n te d  by th e  moral s c e p t i c  as an i r r e s o l v a b l e  
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  moral p r i n c i p l e s ,  may be a d i f f e r e n c e  about  
t h e  t r u t h  o r  fa ls e h o o d  o f  a c o m p l ic a t e d ,  y e t  n o n -m o ra l ,  
p r o p o s i t i o n .
And sometimes what appears t o  be a moral dead lock  may be 
n o t h in g  more than  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  p h y s i c a l ,  demographic,  
o r  o t h e r  c i rcu m stan ce s  in  which a shared moral s tan d a rd  
a p p l i e s .  I t  i s  usual to  ment ion a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  in  th e  p a s t  Eskimos k i l l e d  t h e i r  aged o r  i n f i r m  
r e l a t i v e s  whereas we do n o t .  Perhaps we would r e - c o n s i d e r  
our  t r e a t m e n t  o f  th e  e l d e r l y  and i n f i r m ,  i f  we found t h a t  
c a r i n g  f o r  them in v o lv e d  f o r  us, th e  d i r e  consequences f o r  
t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  th e  group which i t  seems t o  have p rese n te d  
t o  t h e  Eskimo. S i m i l a r l y  in  Xhosa s o c i e t y ,  where u n t i l
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r e c e n t l y  women h e a v i l y  outnumbered men, f o r  women t o  have  
deep and l a s t i n g  perso na l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  polygamous m a r r ia g e  
ar range m ents  were regarded  as n e c e s s a ry .  I n  a more e v e n ly  
ba la n c e d  p o p u l a t i o n  l i k e  t h a t  o f  S c o t la n d ,  t o  meet t h e  same 
need,  such ar rangem ents  would have been i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
D e s p i t e  a s u p e r f i c i a l  appearance o f  an i n t r a c t a b l e  moral  
c o n f l i c t ,  th e n ,  a w ide d iv e r g e n c e  in  moral p r a c t i c e s  i s  
p e r f e c t l y  c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  our  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  account  
o f  moral  b e l i e f s .  L e t  i t  s u f f i c e  t o  say t h a t  many such 
a p p a r e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  t o  be e x p la i n e d  by th e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  t h a t  p r e v a i l  when i t  comes t o  m eet ing  
u n d e r l y i n g  needs.
Very  o f t e n ,  however,  moral d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  n o t  so 
o b v io u s ly  r e s o l v e d .  C o ns ide r  some o f  th e  d i s p u t e s  we have 
touched  upon in  e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s .  There  i s ,  f o r  example ,  
th e  w h i t e  s u p re m a c is t  in  South A f r i c a  who i s  conv inced  t h a t  
b la c k  p eo p le  ought  t o  be d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d  and in  many o t h e r  
ways d e p r i v e d .  For th e  r e s t  o f  us, th e  v iew  expressed  i s  an 
u n m i t i g a t e d  e v i l .  There  i s  th e  d i s p u t e  between th e  d o c to r  
and t h e  C a t h o l i c  h o u sew ife .  He urges her  t o  use some form  
o f  c o n t r a c e p t i o n  as she i s  a l r e a d y  overburdened by c h i l d r e n ,  
w h i l e  t h e  housew ife  r e j e c t s  th e  a d v ic e ,  s t r e s s i n g  l o y a l t y  t o  
h e r  f a i t h  and her  Pope. We ment ioned a l s o  how t h e  Naurus  
I n d i a n s  o f  New Grenada a t e  t h e i r  Spanish e n e m ie s ’ h e a r t s  in  
o r d e r  t o  a c q u i r e  th e  T a t t e r s ’ courage whereas we would say 
t h a t  such a p r a c t i c e  i s  m o r a l l y  r e p u l s i v e .  We noted th e  
d i s p u t e  between those  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  F i r s t  World c o u n t r i e s  
sh o u ld  g i v e  a i d  t o  T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s ;  w h i l e  o t h e r s  
b e l i e v e ,  f o r  good reasons ,  t h a t  th e y  should  n o t .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e r e  i s  th e  d i s p u t e  between th e  m i l i t a r y - m i n d e d  C a p ta in  
V e re ,  who judged t h a t  B i l l y  Budd should  hang, and P r o fe s s o r  
Winch who t h i n k s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  j u s t  what should  no t  happen.
L e t  us assume t h a t  in  th e  c o n f l i c t s  above, each p a r t y  has 
reasons f o r  th e  judgements  th ey  make but  t h a t  none admits  
t h e  r e l e v a n c e ,  o r  th e  p r i o r i t y ,  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r y  g iv e s  t o  
opposing reasons .  U n l i k e  th e  persons in  a moral di lemma,
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each  has no d o u b t  w ha t  m o r a l l y  o u g h t  t o  be do n e .  Such
a r g u m e n t s ,  we m ig h t  s a y ,  have  r e a c h e d  m o ra l  d e a d l o c k .  M ust
we go on t o  s a y ,  t h e n ,  as R. B e ard sm o re  ( 1 9 6 8 : x )  s a y s :
. . . t h e s e  ( d i s p u t e s )  a r e  n o t  d e c i d a b l e ,  e v e n  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  s i m p l y  bec au se  t h e  d i s p u t a n t s  c a n n o t  
a g r e e  o v e r  w ha t  c r i t e r i a  t o  a p p l y . ?
B e a rd s m o re  adds t h a t  we w ou ld  n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l
d i s a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  i n c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  r e s o l v e d .  He
i n v i t e s  us ( i b i d : 12 )  t o  c o n t r a s t  an i n t r a c t a b l e  m o ra l
d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  a d i s a g r e e m e n t :
. . . o v e r  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  a c a r  i n  t h e  g a r a g e . . . ( o r  
w h e r e )  . . .  a and b d i s a g r e e  o v e r  t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  on 
t h e  A i r  M i n i s t r y  r o o f .
C l e a r l y  t h i s  i s  n o t  c o m p a r in g  l i k e  w i t h  l i k e .  A c o m p a r a b le
e x a m p le  -  t o  c a r s  i n  g a r a g e s ,  o r  t h e  a i r  t e m p e r a t u r e  -
a b o u t  w h ic h  we a r e  e q u a l l y  c e r t a i n ,  i s  o u r  g e n e r a l  a g r e e m e n t
t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  no c o m p a r a b le  d a n g e r  t o  t h e  r e s c u e r ,  t h e
d r o w n in g  c h i l d  o u g h t  t o  be f i s h e d  o u t  o f  t h e  pond.  E q u a l l y
c l e a r l y ,  we do d i s a g r e e  a b o u t  some s e e m i n g l y  i n t r a c t a b l e
e m p i r i c a l  i s s u e s .
H o w ever  t h i s  i s  a s i d e - i s s u e .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  n o t  one  
o f  how much a g r e e m e n t  o r  d i s a g r e e m e n t  t h e r e  i s  b e tw e e n  t h o s e  
who en g a g e  i n  a m o ra l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  
w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  m ora l  d i s p u t e s  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  c a p a b l e  o f  an 
o b j e c t i v e  s o l u t i o n .  We w ou ld  n o t  t h i n k  t h a t ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
e m p i r i c a l  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  i n c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  so r e s o l v e d .  
The r e a s o n  why e m p i r i c a l  d i s p u t e s  a r e  d e c i d a b l e  i s  t h a t  
t h e r e  can be g e n e r a l  a g r e e m e n t  a b o u t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
r e s o l v i n g  th em .  I f  Jones and Brown d i f f e r  as t o  w h e t h e r  
t h e r e  i s  a c a r  in  t h e  g a r a g e  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  a way i n  w h ic h  
t h e y  can d e c i d e  t h e  m a t t e r  once and f o r  a l l ,  n am e ly  by g o in g  
and l o o k i n g .  T h e r e  a r e ,  s i m i l a r l y ,  a c c e p t e d  p r o c e d u r e s  by 
w h ic h  m ost  e m p i r i c a l  d i s p u t e s  a r e  r e s o l v e d ,  so t h a t  we do 
n o t  need t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  a d i s a g r e e m e n t  t o  know 
t h a t  one p a r t y  i s  r i g h t  and t h e  o t h e r  i s  wrong ( o r  i n  some 
e m p i r i c a l  d i s p u t e s ,  t h a t  b o th  a r e  w r o n g ) .  R a r e l y  w o u ld  we 
s ay  t h a t  b o th  v i e w s  a r e  e q u a l l y  w e l l - f o u n d e d .  T h i s  does n o t  
mean t h a t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  w i l l  be e a s y  t o  f i n d ,  n o r  eve n  t h a t
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in  p r a c t i c e  i t  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  t o  f i n d  a s o l u t i o n .  What 
i t  does show however i s  t h a t  i t  does not  make sense t o  say  
" T h is  d i s p u t e  has no s o l u t i o n " .
Beardsmore goes on t o  say t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no such c r i t e r i a  
w i t h  which t o  s e t t l e  moral d i s p u t e s . 207 However I  have  
argued  t h a t  t h i s  i s  not  so. In  moral m a t t e r s ,  we a r e  no t  a t  
l i b e r t y  t o  judge  in  any way we choose, on p a in  o f  
i r r a t i o n a l i t y . We cannot  make a r a t i o n a l  judgement t h a t  we 
would no t  o r  cou ld  not  u n i v e r s a l i z e  j_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . 
When we make a make a moral judgement we cannot  p ic k  and 
choose which f a c t s  a re  r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  moral q u e s t io n  a t  
i s s u e .  The reasons in which th e y  occur  have t o  be 
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g .  N e i t h e r  do we dec id e  
t h e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  app ly  he re .  The s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  our  needs  
( a )  and ( b )  e x p l a i n s  th e  purposes f o r  which moral p r i n c i p l e s  
e x i s t  and such reasons a re  good reasons f o r  pr ima f a c i e  
c o r r e c t  moral judgements .  They a re  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  reasons  
in  p r im a  f a c i e  c o r r e c t  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgements .  F u r t h e r ,
I  have argued t h a t  where needs c o n f l i c t ,  t h e r e  i s  an 
o b j e c t i v e  b a s is  f o r  w eigh ing  th e  d i f f e r e n t  needs in v o lv e d .  
Thus I  am m a i n t a in i n g  t h a t  many, though not  a l l ,  o f  our  
moral  d i s p u t e s ,  l i k e  e m p i r i c a l  d i s p u t e s ,  can be r e s o lv e d ;  
o r  r a t h e r ,  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  we a re  cap ab le  o f  r e s o l v i n g  them.
Of course  t h e r e  may come a p o i n t  in  a moral d i s p u t e  when 
o f f e r i n g  f u r t h e r  argument is  not  e f f e c t i v e .  T h is  does not  
show t h a t  r e s o l u t i o n  is  im p o s s ib le .  We cannot  f o r c e  our  
a d v e r s a r y  t o  acc ep t  th e  w e i g h t i e s t  reasons.  T h is  i s  e q u a l l y  
t r u e  o f  any e n q u i r y .  To overcome t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  we have 
assumed t h a t  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  a re  engaged in  a j o i n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  They a re  concerned t o  f i n d  t h e  t r u t h  d e s p i t e  
t h e i r  a n te c e d e n t  v iew s.  Then, i f  my argument in  the  
p r e c e d in g  c h a p te rs  is  c o r r e c t ,  we can d is c a r d  as in s ta n c e s  
o f  f a u l t y  reason in g  judgements ( i )  which th e  ju d g e r  is  
u n w i l l i n g  or  unable  to  u n i v e r s a l i z e  ±n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a ; 
( i i )  which a r e  not  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  in  t h a t  th e y  depend upon 
v a l u e  assumptions which cannot be r a t i o n a l l y  defended;  ( i i i )
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which a r e  n o t  impersonal  i . e .  no t  based upon c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  reasons;  ( i v )  where due w e ig h t  has 
n o t  been g iven  t o  th e  d i f f e r e n t  needs i n v o l v e d ;  o r  ( v )  where  
t h e  two opposing reasons,  o r  t h e i r  outcomes, a r e  so e q u a l l y  
w e ig h te d  t h a t  we a re  not  in  a p o s i t i o n  t o  draw a moral  
ju d g em en t .  In  t h i s  l a t t e r  case ,  we a r e  fa c e d  not  by
d e a d lo c k  but  by a moral di lemma. L e t  us see i f  t h i s  
response t o  Beardsmore i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y .
To i l l u s t r a t e  ( i )  c o n s id e r  a ga in  th e  d i s p u t e  between th e  
s u p p o r t e r  o f  A p a r th e id  and h is  a d v e r s a r y  ( o r  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  
between th e  l a t t e r  and anyone who i s  p rep a re d  t o  a c t  in  ways 
t h a t  r e s t r i c t s  th e  l i b e r t y  o f  o t h e r s ,  o r  who t a k e s  more 
l i b e r t i e s  than o t h e r s  on th e  ba s is  o f  h is  own p o l i t i c a l ,  
moral  o r  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s ) .  By U.R.  a l o n e ,  we saw t h a t  we 
can c o n v i c t  th e  r a c i s t  o f  in c o n s is t e n c y  i f  he i s  not  w i l l i n g  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . No doubt  th e  r a c i s t  
would be th e  f i r s t  to  compla in  i f  th e  t r e a t m e n t  he is  
a d v o c a t in g  f o r  o t h e r s  was i n f l i c t e d  on him. H is  
u n w i l l i n g n e s s  would show h is  argument t o  be r a t i o n a l l y  
f a u l t y .  We would accuse him o f  h o ld in g  double  s ta n d a rd s ;  
one s t a n d a rd  f o r  h i s  group, c o n f e r r i n g  on i t  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  p r i v i l e g e s  t h a t  he den ies  t o  o t h e r  persons who do 
n o t  have h i s  s k in  c o l o u r .  T h is  f a u l t ,  we have seen,  i s  a 
fo rm  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y . "But what o f  th e  c o n s i s t e n t  w h i t e  
r a c i s t " ,  i t  w i l l  be asked, "who would be w i l l i n g  to  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  h is  judgement and t o  be s i m i l a r l y  d e p r iv e d  i f
he were b lack?" .
We can f a u l t  h is  judgement in  a more p r e c i s e  way. On my 
a n a l y s i s ,  th e  s u p p o r te r  o f  A p a r th e id  can m o r a l l y  j u s t i f y  h is  
c l a i m  t o  f reedom ( t o  make h is  p o l i t i c a l  judgem ents )  because  
l i k e  eve ryone  e l s e ,  he has th e  need t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  
i n  pursuance o f  h i s  purposes and p r o j e c t s .  In  o t h e r  words,  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  an u n d e r ly i n g  need-reason  f o r  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  judgem ent.  However h i s  p r o j e c t
i n v o l v e s  th e  dom ina t ion  o f  one race by a n o th e r .  His  
p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  he d en ies  th e  same need(b )
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f o r  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  s i m i l a r  cases ,  v i z .  th e  v i c t i m s  o f  
h i s  p o l i c y .  So we can c o n v i c t  th e  r a c i s t  o f  in c o n s is t e n c y ;  
o n l y  in  t h i s  case ,  h i s  f a u l t  would concern a n e e d -rea so n  he 
must a c c e p t  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  own r i g h t  t o  f reedom from  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  but  t h a t  he i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  a p p ly  t o  a l l  l i k e  
c a s e s .
No doubt  a r a c i s t ,  i f  he were p repared  t o  argue w i t h  us,  
would t r y  t o  defend h i m s e l f  a g a in s t  in c o n s is t e n c y  o f  t h i s  
s o r t .  One o f  th e  arguments t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  i s  o f f e r e d  here  
runs a lo n g  th e  l i n e s :  'Any m i n o r i t y  group which f e a r s  t h a t  
t h e i r  way o f  l i f e  w i l l  be a d v e r s e ly  a f f e c t e d  by a n o th e r  
" l e s s  deve loped  race"  ( s i c ) ,  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  dominate  th e  
o t h e r  race  in  o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  t h i s ’ . Among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  
t h e  reason appea led  t o  c o n trave n es  ( i i )  th e  n e u t r a l i t y  
r e q u i r e m e n t .  I t s  s t a t u s  as a moral p r i n c i p l e ,  as w e l l  as 
i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  cases,  i s  h i g h l y  c o n t e n t i o u s .  
One group who do not  see th e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  th e  ind igenous  b lack  m a j o r i t y  in  South  
A f r i c a ,  (who a r e  t y p i c a l l y  t ra d u ced  as be ing  ' a  less  
d eve lo ped  r a c e ’ and whose conduct  i s  supposed t o  be
r e g u l a t e d ) .  However i t  i s  not  th e  f a c t  t h a t  no t  everyone  
w i l l  a g ree  w i t h  i t  which g iv e s  a v iew  i t s  n o n -n e u t r a l
s t a t u s ;  i t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  s e e in g  how any such 
v iew  cou ld  be r a t i o n a l l y  defended as an answer t o  th e  
q u e s t i o n  'Which moral judgements ought  anyone t o  make?’ ,
w i t h o u t  re co u rs e  t o  c o n t e s t a b l e  v a lu e  assumptions .  When the  
r a c i s t  t r i e s  t o  defend judgements  o f  t h i s  k in d ,  a t  some 
p o i n t  he i s  forced  to  appeal  t o  " th e  t r u t h ” ( s i c )  o f  v a r io u s  
b e l i e f s  about  ' l e s s  developed r a c e s ’ , ' t h e  r i g h t s  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  r a c i a l  g r o u p ’ , e t c . 208 F u r t h e r  d i s p u t a b l e  
assum ptions  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  a r e  needed t o  j u s t i f y  the
p a r t i c u l a r  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n c lu s io n .
I  do no t  want t o  suggest  t h a t  f a u l t i n g  h is  judgem ent ,  as 
b e ing  non-un i  v e r s a l i z a b l e  o r  n o n - n e u t r a l ,  w i l l  conv ince  the  
r a c i s t  t h a t  h is  v iews a re  unsound. However I  do not  know
how he cou ld  deny th e s e  arguments. (What happens u s u a l l y
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o f  c o u rs e ,  i s  t h a t  o t h e r  b e l i e f s  a r e  then  employed in  th e  
a t t e m p t  t o  j u s t i f y  th e  p o s i t i o n . )  I f  we r e s t r i c t  o u r s e lv e s  
t o  t h e  arguments  above, however,  what  th e y  do suggest  i s  
t h a t  pace Beardsmore,  we can f a u l t  a judgement  i f  we can 
show t h a t  i t  i s  non-uni  v e r s a ! i z a b l e  o r  i n e v i t a b l y  
c o n t e n t i o u s .  These a re  c r i t e r i a  we can use t o  s e t t l e  moral  
d i s p u t e s .
L e t  us t u r n  now t o  th e  c o n t r o v e rs y  between th e  d o c t o r ,  
who urges th e  use o f  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ,  and th e  C a t h o l i c  
h o u s e w i fe .  Does i t  make sense t o  say t h a t  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
d i s p u t e  'has  no s o l u t i o n ’ ? We cannot  know t h i s  in  absence  
o f  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  We need t o  c o n s id e r  in  more 
d e t a i l  what i s  in v o lv e d  in  e i t h e r  a s s e r t i o n .  We need t o  
s e e ,  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  what has led  each o f  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  t o  
t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i s  moral r e f l e c t i o n  and n o t ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  
i r r e l e v a n t  ap p ea ls  t o  a u t h o r i t y  o r  h a b i t .  L e t  i s  s u f f i c e  
t o  say here  t h a t  ( i i i )  f o r  a reason t o  be impersonal  i t  
can n o t  s im p ly  r e s t  upon th e  u n c r i t i c a l  accep tance  o f  an 
a u t h o r i t y ;  i . e .  on, say ,  ' d i v i n e  r e v e l a t i o n ’ r a t h e r  than  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  argument.  Only i f  t h e r e  a re  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  reasons f o r  a d v o c a t in g  or  
p r o h i b i t i n g  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ,  i s  th e  d o c t o r ’ s o r  the  
h o u s e w i f e ’ s judgement m o r a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .
I f  what  I  have argued i s  c o r r e c t ,  n eed -reasons  a re  
c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t i n g  reasons .  We may 
c o n s i d e r ,  th e n ,  what need-reasons  a r e  in v o lv e d  in  e i t h e r  
a s s e r t i o n .  I  have argued t h a t  t h e r e  would be no moral  
d i s p u t e  i f  i t  was not  seen on both s id e s  t h a t  th e  woman may 
d i e  w i t h  th e  burden o f  an o th e r  b i r t h ,  o r  t h a t  th e  woman may 
be s e r i o u s l y  unhappy because she has to o  many c h i l d r e n ,  or  
t h a t  h e r  c h i l d r e n  may s u f f e r  due t o  th e  m o t h e r ’ s unhappi ­
ness ,  and so on; o r  t h a t  th e  p o v e r ty  which may r e s u l t  from  
to o  l a r g e  a f a m i l y ,  i s  g e n e r a l l y  regarded as h a r m f u l .  There  
would be no moral d is p u t e  i f  i t  were no t  seen on both s id e s ,  
a l s o ,  t h a t  th e  C a t h o l i c  mother needs t o  be lo y a l  t o  her
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f a i t h ,  t h a t  d i s l o y a l t y  i s  a moral p a in  as w e l l  as a
r e l i g i o u s  s i n .
W i t h o u t  w an t in g  t o  appear  t e n d e n t i o u s ,  I  have t o  add in
p a s s in g  t h a t  l o y a l t y ,  l i k e  g r a t i t u d e ,  can be m is p la c e d .  I t
i s  m is p la c e d ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  i f  th e  m ot ive  f o r  l o y a l t y  i s  
f e a r .  (We may c a l l  t h i s  ' l o y a l t y ’ i f  we must,  but
' o b e d i e n c e ’ would be a more a c c u r a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  
d i s p o s i t i o n . )  Sometimes we a re  l o y a l / o b e d i e n t  due t o  th e  
f e a r  o f  t h e  consequences o f  no t  be ing  so.  Here  th e  
r a t i o n a l e  i s  prudence.  I  had b e t t e r  be l o y a l / o b e d i e n t  o r  so 
much t h e  worse f o r  me. However,  w hatever  we c a l l  i t ,  i t  i s  
n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  s e n t im e n ts  o f  t h i s  k ind  p r e s u m p t iv e ly  imply  
a moral  ought  o r  du ty ;  n e i t h e r  does i t  c o n f e r  th e  
c o r r e s p o n d in g  r i g h t  t o  o t h e r s  t o  e x p e c t  l o y a l t y .  What 
m is p la c e d  l o y a l t y  shows, r a t h e r ,  i s  a la c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  
and a la c k  o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r  people  on the  p a r t  o f  those  
who i n s i s t  on i t .  I f  t h i s  i s  th e  ba s is  f o r  t h e  h o u s e w i f e ’ s 
l o y a l t y ,  ( i v )  then  due w e ig h t  has not  been g iven  t o  her  
needs on th e  p a r t  o f  those  who demand i t ,  o r  by th e  
h o u s e w i fe ,  f o r  her  n ee d (b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  Someone 
who i s  overdependent  in  t h i s  way, would be b e s e t  a l s o  by 
v a r i o u s  o t h e r  forms o f  i r r a t i o n a l i t y .
L e t  us assume, however,  t h a t  th e  C a t h o l i c  hou sew ife  f e e l s  
g en u in e  l o y a l t y  t o  her  f a i t h .  How a r e  we then  t o  weigh the  
needs in v o lv e d ?  ( T h is  i s ,  o f  co u rse ,  a v e r y  com p! ica ted  
i s s u e  and I  hope I  w i l l  be f o r g i v e n  f o r  n o t  going i n t o  i t  in  
any d e t a i 1 ) .  What we can say,  f rom a commonsense p o i n t  o f  
v iew  as s p e c t a t o r s , i s  t h a t  we a r e  1 i ke 1 y t o  g iv e  most 
w e ig h t  t o  he r  n ee d (b )  t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  I n  terms of  
our  c a l c u 1 us o f  needs,  when weighed a g a i n s t  o t h e r  needs , the  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  th e  housew ife  i s  regarded  as 
b a s ic  and c e r t a i n . I f  her  ch o ice  in  such a m a t t e r  i s  in 
some way o r  a n o th e r  den ied  ( e . g .  e n fo r c e d  s t e r i 1i z a t i o n ,  
th e n  we a re  e r o d in g  her  n a tu r e  as a person.
However we might  then p o i n t  o u t  le s s  c e r t a i n  but  e q u a l l y  
b a s ic  needs t h a t  r e s t  upon her  d e c is i o n ;  i f  she becomes
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p r e g n a n t  she may d i e ,  she may be s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e d ,  o r  
unhappy because she a l r e a d y  has to o  many c h i l d r e n .  We m ight  
su g g e s t  t h a t  she g iv e s  w e ig h t  a l s o  t o  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s  
which r e s t  upon her  d e c is io n  ( i . e .  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  th e  
needs i n v o l v e d ) ,  l i k e  the  f a c t  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  may ( m e n t a l l y )  
s u f f e r  due t o  t h e i r  m o th e r ’ s death or  i n j u r y ,  t h a t  p o v e r ty  
and o ve rc ro w d in g  w i l l  p roba b ly  r e s u l t  f o r  her  f a m i l y  which,  
i n  t u r n ,  cou ld  r e s u l t  in  t h e i r  unhappiness,  and so on. We 
m ig h t  suggest  a l s o  t h a t  she g iv e s  w e ig h t  t o  th e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
t h a t  surrounds  th e  m a t te r  o f  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ,  in  cases such as 
h e r ’ s ,  in  c u r r e n t  C a t h o l i c  t h i n k i n g .
These a r e  not  m ere ly  ex t ran e o u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In  o r d e r  
t o  be a b l e  t o  say t h a t  a moral d i s p u t e  has no s o l u t i o n ,  
s u r e l y ,  i t  i s  necessary  t o  probe th e  u n d e r ly in g  assumptions ,  
t o  see j u s t  what i s  be ing argued on a l l  s i d e s .  Fur therm ore  
we can say ,  pace Beardsmore, t h a t  th e  bas ic n e s s ,  c e r t a i n t y ,  
e x t e n t ,  o f  th e  needs in  q u e s t io n  serv e  as n e u t r a l  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e .  We a re  a b le  t o  say t o  the  
h o u s e w i fe ,  t o  paraphrase  Bentham, t h a t  o n ly  i n s o f a r  as her  
judgem ent  g iv e s  due w e ig h t  t o  a l l  o f  th e  needs i d e n t i f i e d ,  
w i l l  h e r  judgement be a r a t i o n a l  one. (Even so, in  such 
c a s e s ,  s tubbornness and s e l f - d e c e p t i o n  a r e  no t  unknown.)
L e t  me t r y  t o  show how th e  uni v e r s a !  i z a b le -n e e d s  c a l c u l u s  
a p p l i e s  in  an o th e r  o f  th e  c o n f l i c t s  we have c o n s id e r e d .  I  
m ent ioned  e a r l i e r  how the  Nauras In d ia n s  o f  New Grenada  
k i l l e d  and then  a t e  t h e i r  Spanish e n e m ie s ’ h e a r t s  in  the  
b e l i e f  t h a t  th ey  would th e re b y  t a k e  possession o f  the  
1 a t t e r s ’ courage and c h i v a l r y .  The I n d i a n s ,  we might  say ,  
r e g a rd e d  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  as a form o f  s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t .  I  
observed  a t  th e  t im e ,  how c o m p le te ly  d i f f e r e n t  our  (and no 
doubt  t h e i r  v i c t i m s ’ ) c o n v ic t i o n  i s  on t h i s  m a t t e r .
U n less  we were t o  adopt  th e  k ind  o f  r e l a t i v i s m  t h a t  
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  a l l  b e l i e f s  a re  on a par  w i t h  one a n o th e r  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e i r  c r e d i b i l i t y ,  v i z .  what any group 
b e l i e v e s  i s  t r u e ,  makes i t  so, 209 we have t o  say t h a t  we know 
t h e  Naurus b e l i e f  i s  f a l s e ,  or  a t  any r a t e  t h a t  th e  causa!
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c l a i m  i s  h i g h l y  i m p l a u s i b l e .  A l though t h e  I n d i a n s ’ v iew  is  
f a l s e  o r  i m p l a u s i b l e ,  o f  course i t  can be unders tood and 
made i n t e l l i g i b l e  by r e l a t i n g  i t ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  t o  o t h e r  
Naurus b e l i e f s .  I t  i s  f a l s e  by c o n t e x t - in d e p e n d e n t  
c r i t e r i a ;  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  we, and i n c i d e n t a l l y  th e  a n t h r o ­
p o l o g i s t ,  would need to  employ t o  understand  th e  Naurus  
b e l i e f  system. To say t h i s ,  i s  no t  t o  doubt  t h a t  th e  
I n d i a n s  co n s id e re d  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  p r a c t i c e  t o  be c e r t a i n  
and no doubt  i t  he lped  to  e x p l a i n  any subsequent  courageous  
f e a t s  t h e y  m ight  happen t o  have per fo rm ed .  However we too  
can e x p l a i n  any d i s p l a y s  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  courage in  terms o f  
t h e  p laceb o  e f f e c t  t h a t  accompanies such a p r a c t i c e .  We 
would need much more ev idence  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  by e a t i n g  h is  
organ one l i t e r a l l y  took possession o f  a n o t h e r ’ s courage.
So f a r  our  d isagreem ent  w i t h  the  I n d i a n ,  which a g a in  is  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by th e  moral s c e p t i c  as i r r e s o l v a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  
o f  moral  p r i n c i p l e s ,  t u r n s  ou t  to  be a d i f f e r e n c e  o f  the  
t r u t h  o r  f a ls e h o o d  o f  a non-moral p r o p o s i t i o n s .  However I  
have argued a l s o  t h a t  th e  c e r t a i n t y  o f  some needs compared 
w i t h  o t h e r s  i s  an o b j e c t i v e  ground on which t o  dec id e  which  
needs m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be met.  O ther  t h in g s  being e q u a l ,  
between a need t h a t  i s  more and one t h a t  i s  le s s  c e r t a i n ,  we 
r a t i o n a l l y  p r e f e r  the  fo rm e r .  The c e r t a i n t y  o f  the  
S p a n i a r d ’ s need t o  s u r v i v e  when weighed a g a i n s t  th e  
i m p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t r u t h  o f  the  I n d i a n ’ s b e l i e f  about  the  
cause o f  s e l f - im p r o v e m e n t ,  would be one ( o f  many) reasons  
f o r  r a t i o n a l l y  choosing the  f o r m e r .
F u r th e rm o re ,  f o r  th e  Nauras In d ia n s  t o  d e s t r o y  a l i f e  -  
and a l l  t h a t  goes w i t h  i t  -  f o r  such a f a l s e  o r  im p la u s ib l e  
re a s o n ,  we can j u s t i f i a b l y  condemn. T h is  i s  not  s im p ly  a 
m a t t e r  o f  be ing wrong ' f o r  u s ’ . W hi le  some v a lu e s  t h a t  we 
t a k e  un c o n s c io u s ly  f o r  g ran ted  may be t o t a l l y  c o n d i t io n e d  by 
t h e  s o c i e t y  in  which we were brought  up and would be q u i t e  
s t r a n g e  f o r  members o f  ano ther  s o c i e t y ,  w i t h  due a p p l i c a t i o n  
we can b r in g  o u r s e lv e s  to  understand t h i s .  However i f  what  
I  have argued i s  c o r r e c t ,  s o c ia l  p r a c t i c e s  which deny or
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which f r u s t r a t e  a p e r s o n ’ s need t o  s u r v i v e  -  o r  we m ight  
add,  t h e i r  need f o r  food ,  s l e e p ,  t o  a v o id  unnecessary  
s u f f e r i n g ,  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  p o i n t l e s s l y  d i m in i s h  a 
person s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  t h e i r  s e l f - e s t e e m ,  th e  
deve lopm ent  o f  t h e i r  t a l e n t s ,  o r  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  undermine  
r e s p e c t  o r  concern f o r  o t h e r s ,  t h a t  do not  p r i z e  g r a t i t u d e ,  
l o y a l t y ,  t r u s t ,  i n t e g r i t y ,  e t c .  -  a re  r a t i o n a l l y  i n f e r i o r  t o  
th o s e  t h a t  do n o t .
L e t  us c o n s id e r  a n o th e r  d is p u t e  which h inges upon th e  
w e ig h in g  o f  needs.  Should a id  be g iven  t o  such c o u n t r i e s  as 
E t h i o p i a ,  Sudan, Bangladesh by F i r s t  World c o u n t r i e s ?  Most  
o f  us t h i n k  t h a t  i t  should ;  we t h i n k  t h a t  a f f l u e n t  n a t io n s  
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  h e lp .  W i th o u t  t h i s  h e lp ,  thousands o f  
p e o p le  w i l l  d i e  u n n e c e s s a r i l y ;  m i l l i o n s  more w i l l  c o n t in u e  
t o  l i v e  in  hunger ,  d iseas e  and in  a b s o lu te  p o v e r t y .  However 
a c c o r d in g  the  opposing a rg u m e n t ,210 s in c e  th e y  have no way o f  
s u s t a i n i n g  t h e i r  p re s e n t  p o p u la t io n s  (poor  lan d ,  no n a t u r a l  
m in e r a l  w e a l t h ,  no i n d u s t r i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , e t c . ) ,  th e  a id  
t h a t  i s  g iven  now by a f f l u e n t  n a t io n s  he lps  t o  cause  
o v e r p o p u l a t i o n  and even g r e a t e r  p o v e r ty  in  th e  f u t u r e .  
P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 7 5 )  t e l l s  us:
By th e  end o f  the  c e n tu r y ,  E t h i o p i a ’ s p o p u la t i o n  is
expec ted  t o  r i s e  from 29 t o  54 m i l l i o n . . .
W i th  a p o p u la t i o n  o f  t h i s  s i z e ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be no 
p r o s p e c t  o f  t h i s  c o u n try  becoming s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ;  (and  
s i m i l a r  arguments app ly  t o  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  E t h i o p i a ) .  
H e lp i n g  t h e  poor and s t a r v i n g  now, w i l l  p ro b a b ly  r e s u l t  in  
more poor and s t a r v i n g  in the  f u t u r e .  T h e i r  nee ds (b )  w i l l  
be even g r e a t e r  in th e  f u t u r e .
We have seen t h a t  what I  am c a l l i n g  th e  opposing
a r g u m e n t ’ goes on to  suggest  t h a t  i f  we were t o  ta k e
s e r i o u s l y  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  meet th e  needs o f  peop le  in  these
c o u n t r i e s ,  one day the  a f f l u e n t  n a t io n s  w i l l  be unable  to
look  a f t e r  them se lves .  Our c r i t e r i a  f o r  w e ig h ing  needs do 
n o t  r e q u i r e  th e  j u d g e r  to  s a c r i f i c e  any comparable needs o f  
h i s  own. And by g iv in g  a id  now we a re  j e o p a r d i z i n g  our own 
and our  c h i l d r e n ’ s l i v e s  and w e l l - b e i n g  in  th e  f u t u r e .  The
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poor o f  E t h i o p i a  e t  aj_ should be l e f t  t o  s t a r v e  to d a y ,  f o r  
o t h e r w i s e  th e y  w i l l  drag F i r s t  World c o u n t r i e s  down w i t h  
them tomorrow.
How does my needs t h e s i s  he lp  in  t h i s  d i s p u t e ?  One
q u e s t i o n  we must ask i s :  how c e r t a i n  a r e  th e  f o r e c a s t s  o f
g r e a t e r  f u t u r e  d i s a s t e r s ,  which a re  c la im ed  m ight  r e s u l t  t o
both F i r s t  and T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  as a r e s u l t  o f  th e
l a t t e r  s r e c e i p t  o f  a s s is t a n c e  now? P r e d i c t i o n s  con cern ing
p o p u l a t i o n  growth and d e c l i n e  a re  n o t o r i o u s l y  f a l l i b l e .  An
a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o j e c t i o n ,  which i s  j u s t  as p l a u s i b l e ,  i s  t h a t
improved economic c o n d i t io n s  and e d u c a t io n  reduce p o p u la t i o n
g ro w th .  As P . S i n g e r  ( i b i d :177 )  w r i t e s :
The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  s a n i t a t i o n ,  modern medical  
t e c h n iq u e s ,  and o t h e r  improvements, reduces th e  
dea th  r a t e  in  a c o u n t r y ,  but  i n i t i a l l y  t h i s  has 
l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on the  b i r t h  r a t e .  Then th e  
p o p u la t i o n  grows r a p i d l y .
Most T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  are  a t  t h i s  s ta g e  o f  r a p id
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h . 211 However as S in g e r  p o i n t s  o u t  ( i b i d ) ,
i f  t h e i r  m a t e r i a l  s tanda rd  o f  l i v i n g  c o n t in u e s  t o  r i s e ,
f a c t o r s  l i k e  in c r e a s in g  economic s e c u r i t y ,  improved
e d u c a t i o n ,  th e  em anc ipa t ion  o f  women, and so on, cause a
s te a d y  r e d u c t i o n  in  the  b i r t h r a t e .  W i th in  an i n c r e a s i n g l y
a f f l u e n t  s t a t e ,  th e  p o p u la t io n  growth l e v e l s  o f f . 212 Most
r i c h  n a t i o n s  a re  in  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  now.
T h i s  i s  a l l  s p e c u l a t i v e ,  o f  course;  what m ight  o r  might  
n o t  happen in  th e  f u t u r e .  We cannot  w a i t  f o r  one o r  o ther  
t h e o r y  o f  p o p u la t io n  growth to  be conf i rm ed b e fo r e  doing  
a n y t h i n g .  People in  T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  need a i d  now. I f  
t h e y  a r e  no t  he lped t h i s  year  they  w i l l  not  be around nex t  
y e a r  t o  b e n e f i t  from an a id  programme. By our  needs 
c r i t e r i a ,  t h e i r  needs are  b a s ic ,  c e r t a i n ,  u rg e n t  and th e re b y  
w e i g h t i e r  than  those concerned w i t h  remote and by no means 
c e r t a i n  f u t u r e s .  Most F i r s t  World c o u n t r i e s  cou ld  g ive  
ad e q u a te  and a p p r o p r ia t e  a id  now w i t h o u t  th e  s a c r i f i c e  o f  
a n y t h i n g  o f  comparable s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  them selves .  And i f  
I  have argued c o r r e c t l y ,  t h i s  is  a p r im a  f a c i e  good reason  
f o r  j u d g i n g  t h a t  we m o r a l ly  ought to  do so.
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F i n a l l y  l e t  us t u r n  t o  a case where two o r  more 
c o n f l i c t i n g  need-reasons  seem t o  be e q u a l l y  w e ig h te d .  T h is ,  
I  have a rgued ,  i s  no t  moral deadlock but  a moral di lemma.  
To see t h i s ,  c o n s id e r  aga in  th e  d is p u t e  between M e l v i l l e ’ s 
C a p t a i n  Vere  and P ro fe s s o r  Winch. Le t  us assume i n i t i a l l y  
t h a t  u n l i k e  th e  persons in  a moral di lemma, both Vere  and 
Winch have no doubt what ought t o  be done. One says t h a t  
hang ing  B i l l y  Budd in the  c i rcum stances  i s  m o r a l l y  
j u s t i f i e d ,  th e  o t h e r  t h a t  Budd ought not  t o  hang s in c e  he is  
' i n n o c e n t  b e f o r e  God’ . The argument seems t o  have reached  
a d e a d lo c k .  Are we t o  say t h a t  t h e r e  can be no s o l u t i o n ?
B e fo r e  I  answer t h i s ,  l e t  us c o n s id e r  how th e  u n i v e r s a l -  
i z a b l e - n e e d s  t h e s i s  he lp  us ou t  he re .  I  have c la im e d  t h a t  
one v a l u e  o f  my account  i s  t h a t  i t  he lps  us t o  see th e  
n a t u r e  o f  c o n f l i c t s  more c l e a r l y .  Winch suggests  t h a t  Vere  
saw h i s  obedience to  naval  laws as a moral du ty  and,  
p resu m a b ly ,  th e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  m a in ta in in g  d i s c i p l i n e  ove r  the  
men under  h i s  command as m o r a l ly  im p o r ta n t .  (A l tho ugh  Winch 
does n o t  t e l l  us what he tak e s  the  n a tu r e  o f  V e r e ’ s moral  
commitment t o  b e . )  One reason f o r  th e  fo rm e r  moral  
o b l i g a t i o n  e v i d e n t l y ,  i s  V e r e ’ s p ledge t o  th e  navy as an 
o f f i c e r ,  t o  ' a b i d e  by the  im p e r ia l  c o d e ’ . A more genera l  
reason m ight  be t h a t  Vere thought  t h a t  g i v i n g  p r i o r i t y  t o  
n av a l  laws was h is  p a t r i o t i c  d u ty .  P a t r i o t i s m ,  nowadays, i s  
o f t e n  r e p r e s e n te d  as th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  one should  be p repared  
t o  f i g h t  and t o  k i l l  f o r  o n e ’ s c o u n t r y ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the  
cau se .  L e t  us assume t h a t  Vere i s  not  t h i s  s o r t  o f  p a t r i o t .  
I n  M e l v i l l e ’ s s t o r y ,  he does not  appear t o  r e l i s h  the  
p r o s p e c t  o f  k i l l i n g  h is  c o u n t r y ’ s enemies.  And he appears  
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  h is  c o u n t r y ’ s cause i s  j u s t .  I f  t h i s  i s  so,  
t h e  moral  b e l i e f s  in  q ue s t ion  would seem t o  be an o f f i c e r ’ s 
l o y a l t y  t o  th e  navy he serves  and, behind t h i s ,  the  
r e s p o n s i b l e  love  o f  o n e ’ s c o u n t r y .  Maybe t h i s  is  how we 
s h o u ld  unders tand  Winch’ s c la im  t h a t  Vere saw h is  j o b  as the  
c a p t a i n  o f  th e  In d o m i ta b le  ' i n  moral t e r m s ’ . Perhaps i t  is  
l o y a l t y  and p a t r i o t i s m  t h a t  a re  a t  the  h e a r t  o f  Vere s
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ju dgem en t  t h a t  Budd is  g u i l t y .  (We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  Vere  
s h o r t l y . )
Winch s a l t e r n a t i v e ,  j u s t  as p l a u s i b l e  v iew i s  t h a t  Budd, 
i n n o c e n t  b e f o r e  God, m o r a l ly  ought  t o  be a c q u i t t e d .  Once 
a g a i n ,  Winch does not  t e l l  us why he holds t h i s  moral v iew .  
We need t o  know why e x a c t l y  Winch t h i n k s  t h a t  hanging in  
Budd s case cannot  be j u s t i f i e d .  My o b j e c t i o n  t o  hanging  
Budd i s  t h a t  he i s  a c e n t r e  o f  consc iousness ,  l i k e  
o u r s e l v e s ,  whose nee d (a )  t o  s u r v i v e  i s  b a s ic ,  c e r t a i n ,  and 
f e c u n d ;  and i t  i s  a need(b )  f o r  a l l  o f  th e  o t h e r  t h in g s  t h a t  
Budd deems w o r t h w h i le .  I t  i s  on w e ighty  assumptions such as 
t h e s e  t h a t  we judge  t h a t  i t  i s  pr ima f a c i e  m o r a l l y  wrong t o  
k i l l  anybody. Some people  may do th in g s  o r  th e y  may be in  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  which i t  i s  thought  t h a t  t h e i r  s u r v i v a l  
m o r a l l y  ought  t o  y i e l d  to  w e i g h t i e r  needs; but  no t  a person  
l i k e  Budd, who is  innocent  o f  murder,  o r  o f  any o t h e r  
p r e m e d i t a t e d  c r im e .  The s t r i c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  naval  law,  
o r  p a t r i o t i c  d u ty ,  do not  seem t o  Winch t o  c o n s t i t u t e  
w e i g h t i e r  nee d -rea so n s .  Presumably t h i s  i s  why Winch t h in k s  
(no doubt  l i k e  most o f  us) t h a t  Budd should no t  hang.
Perhaps we would a l l  be less  c o n f i d e n t ,  i f  hanging Budd 
i s  c e r t a i n  t o  p re v e n t  k i l l i n g  and s u f f e r i n g  o f  f a r  g r e a t e r  
m ag n i tu d e .  T h is  b r in g s  us to  a second s e t  o f  p o s s ib le  
reasons  Vere  may have had f o r  f i n d i n g  Budd g u i l t y .  I t  
s h o u ld  no t  be f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  the  s t o r y  concerns th e  t im e  
when England was a t  war w i th  France.  V e r e ’ s s h ip  was 
d e ta c h e d  from th e  f l e e t .  There had been a number o f  
m u t i n i e s  in  th e  navy. There were impressed and d i s a f f e c t e d  
men aboard  th e  I n d o m i t a b l e . French sh ips  were exp ec ted .  
The p r e v e n t i o n  o f  m u t in ie s  in  such a s i t u a t i o n  m ight  be a 
s e r i o u s  moral demand. V e r e ’ s concern,  l e t  us assume, i s  f o r  
t h e  needs o f  th e  r e s t  o f  h is  crew, t h e i r  l i v e s  and s a f e t y .  
O th e r  l i v e s  e lsew here  a ls o  might  be saved i f  th e  sh ip  
rem ains  in  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e .  We might  e x t r a p o l a t e  upon the  
e x t e n t  o f  th e  needs in vo lved  even f u r t h e r .  F a i l u r e  to  
e n f o r c e  d i s c i p l i n e  could  be a d i s a s t e r  f o r  England in the
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w ar .  Had Vere  a l lo w e d  a pr ima f a c i e  mutinous a c t  t o  go 
unpunished on h is  s h ip  he m ight  have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a 
g e n e r a l  d i s a f f e c t i o n  th roughout  th e  B r i t i s h  navy.  T h is  in  
t u r n  may have r e s u l t e d  in  th e  d e f e a t  o f  England,  which would 
r e s u l t  in  th e  loss  o f  a g r e a t  many more l i v e s  and d i r e  
consequences f o r  th e  n a t i o n .  Th is  too may be what i s  
i n v o l v e d  in  V e r e ’ s see ing  h is  r o l e  in  moral te rm s .  In  a 
n u t s h e l l ,  t o  save the  l i v e s  and i n t o l e r a b l e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  
many o t h e r s ,  hanging a person,  a l b e i t  ' i n n o c e n t  b e f o r e  God’ , 
Ve re  th o u g h t  t o  be m o r a l ly  j u s t i f i e d .
Once a g a in ,  these  a re  not  merely  e x t ran e o u s  considet— 
a t i o n s .  In  o r d e r  t o  make a moral judgement,  v i z .  t o  see  
which  needs a re  a t  s ta k e  and to  be a b le  t o  weigh those  
i n v o l v e d ,  i t  i s  necessary  t o  probe a l l  moral c la im s  and 
background assumptions.  Fur therm ore ,  we cannot  choose to  
read  t h i s  background in any way we l i k e .  Most o f  th e  
c r u c i a l  f a c t s  which depend upon th e  u n d e r ly in g  human needs,  
a r e  g iv e n  in  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i t s e l f .
I f  my e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  the  s o - c a l l e d  ' d e a d l o c k ’ is  
c o r r e c t ,  then  any r a t i o n a l  d is p u t a n t  -  l i k e  those  engaged in  
a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  -  w i l l  understand the  opposing p o in t s  
o f  v ie w .  I t  i s  not  a m a t te r  o f  th e  d i s p u t a n t s  no t  a g re e in g  
a b o u t  which needs a p p ly .  Both can see the  d i f f e r e n t  needs 
i n v o l v e d ,  and both can see which are  th ought  t o  be the  
w e i g h t i e s t  by t h e i r  a d v e rs a ry .  Each w i l l  adm it  the  
r e l e v a n c e  o f  th e  o t h e r ’ s need-reasons in  th e  c o n t e x t .  How 
th e n  do we e x p l a i n  th e  disagreement?
I  t h i n k  t h a t  th e  answer is  t h a t  n e i t h e r  adm its  t o  ' t h e  
p u l i ’ o f  th e  o t h e r ’ s reasons.  The d i f f e r e n c e  here  i s  t o  be 
e x p l a i n e d ,  perhaps,  by such i n d e t e r m in a te  m a t te r s  as the  
d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e i r  backgrounds, e x p e r ie n c e s ,  s e n s i b i ­
l i t i e s ,  f e e l i n g s ,  hunches, and so on. I f  t h i s  i s  so, we a re  
no lo n g e r  d e a l i n g  w i th  r a t i o n a l  grounds, (a l th o u g h  
s e n s i b i l i t i e s ,  f e e l i n g s ,  e t c .  a re  respons ive  to  r a t i o n a l  
argument  (see  pp. 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 ) .  From th e  p o i n t  o f  view o f  a 
j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  the  bes t  we can say i s  t h a t  th ey  both
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see on t h e  one hand, th e  f o r c e  o f  th e  argument which s t a t e s  
t h a t  an in n o c e n t  person should not  hang, r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  
p o l i t i c a l l y  e x p e d ie n t  r e s u l t s  which may f o l l o w ;  on th e  o t h e r  
hand,  t h e  f o r c e  o f  th e  argument t h a t  hanging a seaman who 
has k i l l e d  a s u p e r io r  o f f i c e r ,  in  these  p o l i t i c a l l y  
t h r e a t e n i n g  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  may be m o r a l ly  j u s t i f i e d  i f  i t  i s  
c e r t a i n  t o  p r e v e n t  f u r t h e r  massive k i l l i n g  o r  s u f f e r i n g .
So f o r  a l l  o f  th e  c o m p lex i ty  o f  u n i v e r s a l  i z a b le -n e e d s  
t h e o r y ,  have we r e a l l y  advanced beyond th e  p o s i t i o n  s e t  ou t  
o r i g i n a l l y  by P r o fe s s o r  Winch? I  t h i n k  we have.  I  have 
c la im e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  occasions o f  s e r io u s  moral di lemma in  
which t h e  j u d g e r s ,  w h o l ly  i n t e n t  upon d i s c o v e r in g  what  
anyone m o r a l l y  ought  to  do, may not  be a b le  t o  make a moral  
ju d g e m e n t .  The need-reasons may seem so e v e n ly  ba lanced  
t h e y  may no t  be a b le  t o  make a judgement.  Owing t o  th e  
p r e s s u r e  o f  c i rcum stance s ,  as we have seen,  th e y  may be 
f o r c e d  t o  a c t .  However to  dec ide  t o  a c t  in  such-and-such a 
way i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  to  dec ide  what anyone m o r a l l y  ought  
t o  do. I t  i s  not  th e  same, t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  as making a 
moral  judgem ent .
I f  t h i s  i s  so, in  the  l i g h t  o f  a l l  o f  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
needs in  th e  B i l l y  Budd example, a p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  
response  t o  th e  q u e s t io n :  “What m o r a l ly  ought  anyone t o  do 
i n  t h i s  c a s e ? ’ i s  ”We have no idea  . And i f  we cannot  make
a moral  judgem ent ,  t h i s  i s  not  a d is p u t e  ove r  i r r e c o n c i 1 a b le
p r i n c i p l e s ,  as Beardsmore suggests .  The moral issue  f o r  
V e r e ,  Winch and th e  r e s t  o f  us, i s  in  th e  form o f  a moral  
d i lem m a,  not  dead lo ck .  Where ( v )  two s e ts  o f  need-reasons  
seem t o  be e q u a l l y  w e l l - fo u n d e d ,  as we noted we should  be 
c a u t i o u s  in  drawing any judgement.  However we s t i l l  cannot  
say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no r i g h t  answer.  For th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
s e a r c h  f o r  t h e  w e i g h t i e s t  need-reason does not  have t o  come
t o  a h a l t .
However i t  i s  t im e  f o r  t h i s  d iscu s s io n  o f  moral deadlock
t o  come t o  a h a l t  and f o r  us to  take  s to c k .
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I  began t h i s  essay by ask ing  i f  t h e r e  cou ld  be an answer  
t o  t h e  q u e s t io n  ‘ Which moral judgements ought  anyone to  
make? t h a t  does not  depend upon c o n t e s t a b l e  moral  
a s s u m p t io n s .  In  response to  t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  I  have argued
( i )  t h a t  t o  be a r a t i o n a l  judgement,  a p a r t i c u l a r  moral
ju dgem en t  must be U.R.  u n iv e r s a l  i z a b l e  in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  
must be f u l l y  c o n s is t e n t  A. Th is  means a t  l e a s t  t h a t  the  
j u d g e r  must be w i l l i n g  to  accept  h is  judgement f o r  a l l  cases  
i n  p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . By U .R . ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  th e  j u d g e r  
r a t i o n a l l y  cannot  accept  t h a t  he or  anyone e l s e  m o r a l l y  
o u g h t  t o  a c t  in  a way towards o t h e r  persons which,  i f  th e  
j u d g e r  were in  t h e i r  p la c e ,  he would not  be w i l l i n g  to  
a c c e p t .  We can d i s c a r d ,  then ,  as bad judgements those  which  
t h e  j u d g e r  i s  u n w i l l i n g  to  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i_n p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a . 
We can d i s c a r d  a ls o  those he is  unable  t o  a c c e p t ;  those  
which le a d  t o  i n c o n s is t e n c ie s  or  a re  in  some o t h e r  way 
r a t i o n a l l y  f la w e d  when he does t r y  to  u n i v e r s a l i z e  i_n
p r o p r i a  p e r s o n a .
As we saw, ( i )  i s  inadequate  as the  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  m o r a l ly  
r e l e v a n t  judgements,  to  say no th ing  o f  m o r a l ly  good 
ju d g e m e n ts .  For by U.R. the  j u d g e r  appears t o  be a b le  t o  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  a lmost  a ny th ing  he l i k e s  in  th e  name o f  
m o r a l i t y ,  such as judgements based on reasons t h a t  u n iq u e ly  
name one i n d i v i d u a l ,  or  which a re  concerned w i th  
i r r e 1e v a n c ie s  l i k e  look ing  a t  hedgehogs in  th e  m o o n l ig h t .  
We would no t  n o rm a l ly  cons ider  such reasons t o  be m o r a l ly  
r e l e v a n t  l e t  a lone  t h in k  them to  be m o r a l ly  good reasons.
We re c o g n iz e d  t h a t  f o r  the  judgements in  which they  occur  
t o  co u n t  as m o r a l ly  r e l e v a n t ,  reasons must a t  l e a s t  be 
im p e r s o n a l .  To say t h a t  a reason i s  im persona l ,  I  argued
( i i )  means t h a t  i t  is  c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and t h a t  i t  
e l u c i d a t e s  th e  judgement.  Reasons which f a i l  in  these  
r e s p e c t s  and the  judgements in  which they  occur ,  a re  a ls o
c o n s id e r e d  f a u l t y .  However we had to  say what p r e c i s e l y
c o u n ts  as a c o n t e x t u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  reason.
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As a f i r s t  s tep  in  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  I  d e f i n e d  a m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  reason w id e ly  enough t o  cover  a l l  d i f f e r e n t  e t h i c a l  
v ie w s .  T h is  gave us one p o s s ib le  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U . R . ,
( i i i )  a j u d g e r - r e l a t i v e  v e r s io n ,  U . R . I .  A lso  I  argued t h a t  
a reason i s  m o r a l ly  r e l e v a n t  i f  i t  can be seen t o  be so by 
e v e r y  r a t i o n a l  j u d g e r .  Th is  gave us a second p o s s ib le  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  U . R . ,  ( i v )  a j u d g e r - n e u t r a l  v e r s i o n ,  
U . R . I I .  I  argued t h a t  on e i t h e r  r e n d e r in g ,  th e  r u l e  U.R.  
would n o t  depend upon c o n te s ta b le  v a lu e  assumptions and in  
t h i s  sense i t  r e t a i n s  i t s  n e u t r a l i t y .
We found t h a t  U.R. I  w i l l  not  g iv e  us i n d i s p u t a b l e ,  
m o r a l l y  c o r r e c t  judgements . Indeed some abom ina t ions  cou ld  
be U . R . I  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  in the  name o f  m o r a l i t y ,  i n c l u d in g  
judgem en ts  which a s s e r t  t h a t  i t  i s  m o r a l ly  r i g h t  t o  k i l l ,  
maim, dom inate  o r  co m p le te ly  d is r e g a r d  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s .  
T h i s  i s  t o  i n t e r p r e t  U . R . I ,  as i t  i s  u s u a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  
as a fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e .  Regarded in t h i s  way, however,  we 
found t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  i s  a t r i v i a l  p r i n c i p l e .  
M u t u a l l y  in c o m p a t ib le ,  c o n t r a r y  and even c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
judgem ents  s a t i s f y  the  formal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . So t h a t  when 
a p p l y i n g  U . R . I  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  judgement,  a l l  o f  th e  burden  
o f  moral  d i s t i n c t i o n s  is  p laced upon the  a d d i t i o n a l  moral  
assum ptions  t h a t  a re  re q u i re d  t o  d e r i v e  a moral c o n c lu s io n .
I f  th e  u n i v e r s a l  i zabi 1 i t y  r u l e  is  t o  have any d i r e c t  
b e a r i n g  on our  judgements, I  argued ( v )  i t  must be g iven  a 
m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Th is  is  t o  say ,  th e  r u l e  by 
i t s e l f ,  o r  t o g e t h e r  w i th  o t h e r  n o n -c o n te s ta b le  prem ises ,  
must be used t o  d e r i v e  m o ra l ly  c o r r e c t  c o n c lu s io n s .  We saw 
t h a t  both R . M . H a r e ’ s and M . S i n g e r ’ s a t te m p ts  t o  g iv e  t h e i r  
v e r s i o n s  o f  U . R . I  a m a t e r ia l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  p ro v id e  a poor  
a c c o u n t  o f  our  everyday moral b e l i e f s  (such as the  
p r o h i b i t i o n  on k i l l i n g  o th e r  persons)  and, more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  
both  a l l o w  c o n te s ta b le  moral assumptions i n t o  t h e i r  
a c c o u n ts .  Th is  is  to  say, t h e i r  accounts do not  p ro v id e  a 
n o n - c o n t e s t a b l e  answer to  the  ‘ which moral judgem ents? ’
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q u e s t i o n .  We then  asked i f  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  v e r s io n  o f  U.R.  i s  p o s s ib le .
I n  P a r t  Two, we saw ( v i )  t h a t  any person has a w ide range  
o f  n o n - v o l i t i o n a l  b o d i l y ,  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  and s o c i a l  needs.  
I  o r g a n is e d  th ese  i n t o  those s t a t e s ,  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a b i l i t i e s ,  
e m o t io n s ,  f e e l i n g s ,  d r i v e s ,  we nee d (a )  in  o r d e r  to  f u n c t i o n  
and th o s e  we need (b )  t o  f l o u r i s h ,  o r  w i t h o u t  which a person  
a i l s .  I  argued t h a t  these  a re  b o d i l y ,  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  and 
s o c i a l  t h i n g s  we need; they  a re  not  ' m o r a l ’ needs.
However we found ( v i i )  t h a t  an e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  many o f  the  
moral  b e l i e f s  t h a t  we o r d i n a r i l y  t h i n k  o f  as r i g h t  and 
o b l i g a t o r y  can be g iven  in  terms o f  such needs.  T h is  is  
q u i t e  a s t r i k i n g  r e s u l t .  An adequate e x p la n a t i o n  o f  many o f  
o u r  moral b e l i e f s  u l t i m a t e l y  i n v o lv e s  r e f e r e n c e  -  though  
sometimes more e x p l i c i t l y  than o th e r s  -  t o  ( u n d e r l y i n g )  
n e e d - r e a s o n s .  Thus I  argued t h a t  an e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  our  
commonsense moral b e l i e f s  ' I t  i s  pr ima f a c i e  m o r a l l y  wrong 
t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  a n o th e r  p e rs o n ’ , 'One m o r a l l y  ought  to  
f e e l  and t o  express  g r a t i t u d e  f o r  b e n e f i t s  one has r e c e i v e d ’ 
e t c .  can be g iven  in  terms o f  n ee d -rea so n s .  S ince  they  
presuppose n ee d s (a )  and (b )  f o r  any person,  we can see why 
such moral b e l i e f s  m a t te r  t o  us. By a c t i n g  upon them, we 
meet c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  we need t o  s a t i s f y  in  o r d e r  t o  f u n c t i o n  
o r  t o  f l o u r i s h .  I t  i s  not  s u r p r i s i n g  then t h a t  d e s c r i p t i o n s  
o f  such needs m a t te r  to  us, and t h a t  they  a re  c o n t e x t u a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  reasons.  I  argued a ls o  ( v i i i )  t h a t  need-reasons  
QP0 p r  i ma f a c  i e good reasons f o r  th e  s i n g u l a r  moral  
judgem ents  in  which they  occur ;  t h e r e  i s  a s ta n d in g  
presu m p t ion  between need-reasons  and moral judgements .  We 
found t h a t  th e  p u t a t i v e  co u n te r -exa m p les  t o  t h i s  presumption  
can be a d e q u a t e ly  e x p la in e d  in terms o f  needs. We wanted 
th e n  t o  see i f  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form o f  such judgements are  
j u d g e r - n e u t r a l ;  ( v i z .  ' I f  in my s i n g u l a r  judgement I  judge  
t h a t  X m o r a l ly  ought t o  do F f o r  the  need-reason R, then  
must any r a t i o n a l  person judge t h a t  anyone to  whom R a p p l i e s  
m o r a l l y  ought  to  do F? ) .
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I n  P a r t  Three we cons idered  a j o i n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  where 
we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  answer th e  'which moral judgem ents? ’ 
q u e s t i o n .  We found t h a t  ( i x )  need-reasons a re  j u d g e r -  
n e u t r a l  reasons in  the  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral judgements in  
which t h e y  occur .  Th is  is  to  say,  they  occur  in  judgements  
t h a t  any in fo rm ed ,  r e f l e c t i v e  person -  who is  g iven the  
a p p r o p r i a t e  reason and conc lus ion  -  must accept  as the  
jud g em en t  t h a t  anyone m o ra l ly  ought t o  make. One way we 
c o n f i r m e d  t h e i r  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l i t y  was by c o n s id e r in g  the  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  d e n ia l s .  I  t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  the  
h y p o th e s iz e d  s i t u a t i o n s  im p l ied  are  in c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  a 
d e f e n s i b l e  v iew  o f  human moral p r a c t i c e s .  We concluded t h a t  
u n l e s s  t h e r e  is  an o v e r r i d i n g  need-reason to  the  c o n t r a r y ,  
a u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgement o f  th e  form ' ( X ) ( X  m o r a l ly  ought  
t o  do F because o f  a need-reason R ) ’ i s  a pr ima f a c i e  
c o r r e c t  judgement.
We co n s id e re d  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  not  a l l  o f  our  
n e e d s ( a )  and (b )  serve  in t h i s  way. However the  examples o f  
s o - c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs ( t o  dominate,  t o  be a g g re s s iv e ,  
t o  be m a l e v o l e n t )  were g r i s t  f o r  our m i l l .  I  argued ( x )  
t h a t  such " u n i v e r s a l i z e d  moral judgements" ( s i c )  f a i l  
h o p e l e s s l y  as d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  something which could be s a id  
t o  be an i n t e l l i g i b l e  account  o f  a moral p r a c t i c e .  And we 
saw why i t  i s  reasonable  to  argue t h a t  the  burden o f  p ro o f  
i s  on anyone t o  s p e l l  out  the  kind o f  human moral p r a c t i c e s
t h e y  have in  mind.
I  th en  put  fo rward  another  s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  my 
a c c o u n t ,  namely ( x i )  a method by which we can e s t im a te  which 
needs a r e  c e n t r a l  and given t h a t  need-reasons w i l l  c o n f l i c t ,  
how we m ight  weigh them when they  do. I  m a in ta ine d  t h a t  the  
c r i t e r i a  p ro v id ed  preserve  the  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  my account ,  
moreover  th e y  enab le  us t o  o b j e c t i v e l y  r e s o lv e  some moral  
argum ents  when th e  l a t t e r  appear  to  be in  dead lock .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  th in g s  are  seldom t h i s  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .  We 
saw t h a t  ( x i i )  moral judgement-making i s  u s u a l l y  a complex 
m a t t e r .  A need-reason may not  be the  a c tu a l  or  s u r fa c e
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reason  f o r  a moral judgement.  The a c t u a l  reason may o n ly  
i n d i r e c t l y  r e f e r  t o  th e  needs o f  those i n v o l v e d .  However  
even though i t  i s  th e  a n c i l l a r y  reason, we found t h a t  ( x i i i )  
P r 1 roa f a .c i e  c o r r e c t  moral judgements can be supported  by 
u n d e r l y i n g  need -reasons .
We then  saw t h a t  ( x i v )  not  any r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a moral 
d i f f i c u l t y  counts  as a moral judgement.  F i n a l l y ,  I  argued  
( x v )  t o  r e s o l v e  a moral di lemma, i f  you and I  judge  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i t  is  not  i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  hold  t h a t  both  
judgem ents  a r e  m o r a l ly  c o r r e c t .
A long w i t h  th e  r a t i o n a l  e r r o r s  ment ioned e a r l i e r  ( o f  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,  u n iq u e ly  naming, e t c . ) ,  we can i d e n t i f y  o t h e r
d e f e c t s  which f u r t h e r  l i m i t  the  scope o f  what can count  as
an autonomous, m o r a l ly  c o r r e c t  judgement.  We can f a u l t  
ju d g e m e n ts ,  f o r  in s ta n c e ,  t h a t  have o m i t te d  t o  g iv e  any 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  the  needs o f  those i n v o lv e d ,  o r  where the  
judgm ent  f a i l s  to  deal  w i th  th e  c o m p lex i ty  o f  the  needs 
i n v o l v e d ;  we can f a u l t  a judgement t h a t  i s  b iased in  the  
w e ig h t  g iven  to  c o n f l i c t i n g  needs, or  in c i rcum stances  where 
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d is c e rn  which o f  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  and
c l o s e l y  ba lanced needs weighs most, i t  may be t h a t  we have
made a snap d e c is io n  r a t h e r  than a genuine judgement about  
what ought  t o  be done. The arguments above I  r e a l i z e ,  do
n o t  a l l  have th e  f o r c e  o f  a c o n c lu s iv e  d e m o n s tra t io n .  But
I  hope t h a t  enough has been s a id  to  show t h a t  ( i ) - ( x v )  g iv e  
us a imposing b a t t e r y  o f  t e s t s  w i t h  which t o  answer the
'w h ic h  moral judgem ents? ’ q u e s t io n .
I f  t h e  arguments ( i ) - ( x v )  a re  c o r r e c t ,  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
we noted  a t  th e  con c lu s ion  o f  Chapter  One and Chapter  Six  
have been r e s o lv e d .  Let  us see t h i s .  Cons ider  f i r s t  the  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a t  th e  c lo s e  o f  Chapter  One. By c o n d i t io n s  ( i )  
and ( i i )  we have the  bas is  f o r  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  
moral  and th e  non-m ora l .  Someone’ s judgement  is  a Pr ima 
f a c i e  r a t i o n a l  judgement,  by ( i ) ,  i f  he i s  a b le  to
u n i v e r s a l i z e  i t  j_n g r o p r i a  person a but i t  i s  a moral
judgem ent  by ( i i ) ,  where the  reason he g ives  i s  c o n t e x t u a l l y
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r e l e v a n t  and e l u c i d a t o r y .  More i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  by arguments
( i v ) - ( v i i i )  we can i d e n t i f y  moral from immoral judgements.  
For  by ( v i ) ,  ( v i i )  and ( v i i i )  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  th e  nee ds (a )  
and ( b )  o f  persons a re  p r ima f a c i e  good reasons f o r  moral 
ju d g e m e n ts .  And when u n i v e r s a l i z e d ,  the  r e s u l t i n g  judgement  
i s  j u d g e r - n e u t r a l , s a t i s f y i n g  ( i v ) .  T h is  p re s e n ts  us w i th  
c e r t a i n  moral t r u t h s  t h a t  a re  not  dependent  on personal  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o r  p a r t i c u l a r  s o c ia l  p r a c t i c e s ,  but  can be 
c o n f i r m e d  by any moral ju d g e r  app r ised  o f  th e  f a c t s ,  which  
s a t i s f i e s  c o n d i t i o n  ( v ) .
I  have answered those who, l i k e  M a c In ty re  and Winch,  
c l a i m  t h a t  no t  a l l  moral judgements a re  uni v e r s a ! i z a b l e , by 
argum ents  ( x i v )  and ( x v ) .  At  the  end o f  some d e l i b e r ­
a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  more s e n s ib le  t o  accept  t h a t  we a re  s t i l l  
f a c e d  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e s  none o f  which i s  more o b v io u s ly  
w e i g h t i e r  than  th e  o t h e r s .  When t h i s  is  so, we cannot  make 
a gen u in e  judgement.  And I  have d e a l t  w i t h  the  o b s e r v a t io n  
t h a t  t h e r e  always may be some aspect  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  
judgm ent  t h a t  cannot  be u n i v e r s a l i z e d  and some asp ec t  o f  any 
n on-m ora l  o r  immoral judgement t h a t  can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d ,  by 
arguments  ( x i i )  and ( x i i i ) .  According t o  argument ( x i i )  
moral  judgements  a re  u s u a l l y  complex and, by ( x i i i ) ,  what we 
have t o  a s c e r t a i n ,  f o r  the  purpose o f  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g ,  is  th e  
under  l y i n g  n e e d - r e a s o n . And I  have d e a l t  w i th  th e  problem  
t h a t  many moral p r i n c i p l e s ,  l i k e  the  d u t i e s  o f  p a re n ts  to  
t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  do not  app ly  to  everyone a l i k e ,  by a rg u in g  
( x i i i )  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  u n d e r ly in g  needs, such as th e  need(b )  
f o r  a c t i v e  sympathy, t h a t  is  th e  p o i n t  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r
t h e  r u l e  U . R . I I .
A ls o  I  have defended my account  a g a in s t  th e  problems
m ent io ned  a t  th e  c lo s e  o f  Chapter  S ix .  By argument ( x )  I  
showed t h a t  in  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i z e d  form, examples o f  
s o - c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e  needs f a i l  t o  d e s c r ib e  co h eren t  
p o s s i b l e  moral p r a c t i c e s .  And I  d e a l t  w i t h  th e  rem ain ing  
problem s o f  moral deadlock by argument ( x i ) ,  which o f f e r s  a 
method by which we might  weigh r i v a l  need-reasons .  L a s t l y
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I  have s up por te d  my p o s i t i o n  a g a in s t  t h e o r i e s  which a t te m p t  
t o  acc o u n t  f o r  moral judgements, b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s  in  
te rm s  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  and r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  I  
c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  fo rm e r  by a rgu ing  t h a t  i t  does not  do j u s t i c e  
t o  o u r  psycho1o g i c a l  na tures  and the  l a t t e r  by a rg u in g  t n a t  
i t  does n o t  g iv e  an adequate account o f  our  o r d i n a r y  moral  
b e l i e f s .  And I  showed t h a t  both concept ions o f  moral agency  
a r e  marred by in c o n s is t e n c ie s .
I n  a r g u in g  f o r  the  above I  have a ls o  made some 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  which,  i f  they a re  r i g h t ,  s e r i o u s l y  undermine  
some r e c e n t  accounts o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  moral judgement.  They 
underm ine  p a r t i c u l a r l y , u n iv e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t ! vism and the  
m e t a - e t h i c a l  r e l a t i v i s m  to  be found in th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  
'm o ra l  p r a c t i c e s ’ . Both s ta n d p o in ts ,  I  m a in ta in ,  f a i l  to  
t a k e  account  o f  th e  o v e r a l l  purpose o f  moral d is c o u rs e  and 
a l s o  t a k e  too  la x  a view o f  the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  u n i v e r s a l ­
i z e d  judgements as an i n t e l l i g i b l e  p i c t u r e  o f  moral  
p r a c t i c e s .  In  consequence, they  do not  do j u s t i c e  to  the  
i d e a  o f  a m o r a l ly  r e l e v a n t  judgement.
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  I  hope to  have sketched th e  rudiments  o f  a 
moral  t h e o r y ,  th e  core  o f  which contends t h a t  t h e r e  is  a 
t h e o r y —n e u t r a l  r u l e  w i th  which an autonomous ju d g e r  may 
d e t e r m in e  m o r a l ly  r i g h t  and wrong judgements .  i he r u l e  in 
q u e s t i o n ,  U . R . I I ,  i s  a m a t e r ia l  1n t e r p r e t a t i on o f  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y  r u l e  U .R . ,  based upon human needs. I t  
s t a t e s :
I f  I  judge  t h a t  X m o r a l ly  ought t o  do F because o f  
t h e  need-reason R, then any r a t i o n a l  person must 
ju d g e  t h a t  anyone to  whom R a p p l i e s  ought  to  do F. 
And I  hope t o  have s u c c e s s fu l ly  defended my t h e s i s  a g a in s t  
some m a jo r  o b j e c t i o n s  to  which i t  appears v u l n e r a b l e .
I n  no case ,  o f  course,  does th e  answer I  have given  
r e s o l v e  and th e r e b y  c lo s e  an issue from f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n .  
On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  the use fu lness  of  t h i s  essay i s  much more 
l i k e l y  t o  l i e  in a d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n .  I f  a n y th in g ,  i t  
p r o v i d e s  some advances in moral theory  on the  past  d is p u te s
c o n c e r n in g  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i  1 i t y  r u l e  and on th e  c u r r e n t  
exchanges con cern ing  needs in  human n a t u r e .  H o p e f u l l y ,  my 
t h e s i s  w i l l  open up some o f  these  issues f o r  f u r t h e r  
d i s c u s s i o n .
ENDNOTES
N o tes  t o  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main s u p p o r t  amongst B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e rs  f o r  t h i s  
app ro ach  can be found in  th e  w r i t i n g s  o f  R .M.Hare (see  
b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .
Among o t h e r s  G.Anscombe ( 1 9 5 8 ) ,  P .Foot  (see  b i b l i o g r a p h y )
I .M u r d o c h  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  M .Midgley (1979 )  p ioneered  th e  r e t u r n  to  
s u b s t a n t i v e  e t h i c s .
The v e r s i o n s  o f  i t  g iven here are  by no means e x h a u s t iv e  o f  
a l l  t h e  r e n d e r in g s  o f  the  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  t h e s i s .  For  
d i f f e r e n t  v e r s io n s  o f  th e  e t h i c a l  co n s is ten cy  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
se e ,  f o r  example, M.Tanner ( 1 9 6 4 : 7 1 ) ,  R.Bambrough 
( 1 9 6 6 : 1 5 9 ) ,  A.MacLean ( 1 9 8 4 : 2 2 ) .  See a ls o  R.M.Hare  
( 1 9 6 3 : e s p . 1 2 / 1 5 ) .  (However as we s h a l l  see, Hare seems to  
s l i d e  from c o n s t r u in g  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  in  t h i s  sense, to  
t a k i n g  i t  t o  be a t h e s i s  about the  i m p a r t i a l i t y  o f  moral  
j u d g e m e n t s . )
For  examples o f  the  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  r u l e  v e r s io n  see 
M . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 6 1 : 6 6 ) ,  N. G i 11esp ie  (1 9 7 4 :8 7 /9 1  ) .  A .G e w ir th  
( 1 9 7 8 : 1 0 5 ) .
For  examples o f  the  c a t e g o r i c a l  im p e r a t iv e  v e r s io n  see  
A .C .E w in g  ( 1 9 5 3 : 1 6 / 2 9 ) ,  P . D i e t r i c h s o n  ( 1964 :143 /1  7 0 ) ,  
H . C u r t l e r , ( 1 9 7 1 : 2 9 5 / 2 9 7 ) .
For  t h e  Golden Rule v e rs io n  see A.Cadoux ( 1 9 1 2 : 2 7 2 / 2 8 7 ) ,  
K . B a l e r  ( 1 9 5 8 : 2 0 0 / 2 0 3 ) ,  W. T . B1ackstone ( 1 9 6 5 : 1 7 1 / 1 7 2 ) ;  a l l  
o f  whom understand  the  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  r u l e  to  ask:'How  
would  you l i k e  i t  i f  o th e rs  d id  i t  t o  you?’ .
For  examples o f  the  i m p a r t i a l i t y  form o f  u n i v e r s a l i  z a b i 1i t y  
see L .K o h lb e rg  ( 1 9 6 3 : 6 3 0 / 6 4 6 ) ,  P .S in g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 / 1 2 ) ,
D .Locke  (1 9 8 0 :1 6 8 /1 7 1  ) .
For  examples o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  in  terms o f  a p r i n c i p l e  
o f  j u s t i c e  see B .W i l l i a m s  ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 2 8 / 9 ) ,  R .S .Downie  and
E . T e l f e r  ( 1 9 6 9 : 5 0 ) ,  J .Rawls  ( 1 9 7 2 : 2 5 3 ) .
For  examples o f  ' T r e a t i n g  l i k e  cases a l i k e ’ see D.Emmett  
( 1 9 6 3 : 2 1 4 / 2 2 8 ) ,  R. Wasserstrom ( 1 9 6 4 : 6 3 4 / 6 3 5 ) ,  R.Montague  
( 1 9 6 5 : 1 9 8 / 2 0 2 ) .
For  examoles o f  'What i f  everyone d id  t h a t ? ’ v e rs io n s  see 
M .R obins  ( 1 9 7 5 : 8 9 / 1 0 8 ) ,  K. Bach ( 1 9 7 6 : 4 6 4 / 4 8 1 ) ,  G .M e i la e n d e r
( 1 9 8 0 : 1 2 5 / 1 3 4 ) .
The same d i s t i n c t i o n  is  made by c a l l i n g  / ormal 
' n o n - s u b s t a n t i v e ’ and m a t e r ia l  p r i n c i p l e s  s u b s t a n t i v e  , 
e . g .  R .E d g le y  ( 1 9 6 5 : 2 8 / 2 9 ) .
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Notes t o  C h ap te r  One
12. T h is  schema i s  based upon D .H .M o n r o ’ s ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 4 7 )  p r o p o s a l .
13. I t  has been suggested  t o  me t h a t  e v e r y  p a r t i c u l a r  judgement
i n v o l v e s  a g e n e ra l  reason .  I f  I  say " I  w i l l  n o t  buy sp inac h
because I  do no t  want t o  e a t  i t  f o r  d i n n e r  today"  t o  what
g e n e ra l  reason am I  t h e r e b y  committed? Presumably we would 
have t o  say "Everyone w i t h  t h e  same p e c u l i a r  l i k e s  and 
d i s l i k e s  as me does not  want  t o  e a t  sp inach  f o r  d i n n e r
t o d a y " .  Now i f  t h i s  i s  a g e n e ra l  reason i t  i s  n o t  g e n e ra l
in  th e  sense in  which o t h e r s  a r e ,  t h a t  a r e  d iscus sed  in  th e  
t e x t .  The s t a t e m e n t  can not  be s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by c i t i n g  o t h e r  
pr im a  f a c i e  l i k e  cases ,  e . g .  " I  do no t  want  t o  e a t  sp inach
t h e r e f o r e  S m ith ,  Brown o r  Jones, do n o t " :  no g e n e r a l i z a t i o n
supposed ly  in v o lv e d  in  such a reason would s e rv e  as ev id e n c e  
f o r  i t s  t r u t h ,  e t c .  We can c a l l  such reasons ' i m p l i c i t l y
g e n e r a l ’ i f  we must.  But i t  seems t o  me t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g
them in  t h i s  way i s  vacuous.  (However n o th in g  o f  substance  
t o  my t h e s i s  hangs on t h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y . )
14. The v e r s i o n  a p p l i e s ,  o f  co u rs e ,  t o  d e s c r i p t i v e  judgem ents ,  
th u s :  I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  X i s  a ra c e h o rse  because i t  has a
c e r t a i n  p e d ig r e e  and runs f a s t ,  then  I  must judge  t h a t  
a n y th in g  w i t h  a c e r t a i n  p e d ig r e e  t h a t  runs f a s t  i s  a l s o  a 
r a c e h o r s e .
15. T h is  v e r s i o n  a l s o  a p p l i e s  t o  non-moral  c o n t e x t s .  We can 
und ers tand  th e  f o l l o w i n g  schema I ’ t o  be a l o g i c a l l y  
e q u i v a l e n t  form o f  c o n s is te n c y  A;
I *  I f  I  ju d g e  t h a t  F i s  s o -a n d -s o  f o r  X, because o f  
th e  reason R, then  I  must judge  t h a t  F i s  so-and  
- s o  f o r  a n y th in g  e l s e  t o  which R a p p l i e s .
I f  a l l  l e g i t i m a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  i n t o  schema I  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t
A, so a r e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  i n t o  schema I ’ . For example ,
I f  I  judge  t h a t  smoking c i g a r e t t e s  i s  a danger  t o  
t h e  h e a l t h  o f  Sm ith ,  because i t  w i l l  damage h i s
lungs ,  h e a r t ,  e t c .  then  I  must judge  t h a t  smoking
c i g a r e t t e s  i s  a danger  t o  th e  h e a l t h  o f  anyone
because i t  w i l l  damage t h e i r  lungs ,  h e a r t ,  e t c .
16. See e . g .  R . Wasserstrom ( 1 9 6 4 : 6 3 4 / 6 3 5 ) .  For f u r t h e r  argument  
on t h i s  p o i n t ,  see N . G i l l e s p i e  ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
17. T h is  way o f  p u t t i n g  th e  m a t t e r  i s  due t o  C . H . W h i t e l e y  
( 1 9 5 9 : 1 4 4 ) .
18. T h is  i s  t a k e n  t o  f o l l o w  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e ,  
a t  l e a s t  by i m p l i c a t i o n ,  g e n era l  in  scope. I f  a moral  
p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  t o  one case ,  then  i t  must a p p ly  t o  a l l  
r e l e v a n t l y  s i m i l a r  cases .  "To u n i v e r s a l i z e "  ( s i c )  in  t h i s  
case ,  would be t o  s t a t e  a p r i n c i p l e  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a 
s t a t e m e n t  o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c i rcu m stan ce s  in  which th e
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p r i n c i p l e  i s  t o  be a p p l i e d  and, s u b j e c t  t o  th e  normal r u l e s  
o f  i n f e r e n c e ,  th e  a c t i o n - g u i d i n g  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i s  d e r i v e d  
f rom i t ;  see e . g .  R .M .H are  ( 1 9 5 2 : 5 6 ) .
19. Peop le  do change t h e i r  minds about  moral m a t t e r s .  To be 
c o n s i s t e n t  B however,  one cannot  in  th e  same c h a in  o f  
reas ons ,  argue in  t h i s  manner.
20 .  In  a moral d is c u s s io n  one can f a i l  t o  make judgements  
w i t h o u t  t h e  d is c u s s io n  th e r e b y  l o s i n g  i t s  p o i n t .  An 
A f r i k a a n s  group d i s c u s s in g  m o r a l i t y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  can f a i l  
t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  w i t h o u t  d i s q u a l i f y i n g  t h e i r  d is c u s s io n  f o r  
t h e  t i t l e  o f  moral d i s c o u r s e .  They s im p ly  may be t r y i n g  t o  
d i s c o v e r  w hether  t h i s  o r  t h a t  r u l e  o f  t h e  Broederbond  
a p p l i e s  in  a g iven  s i t u a t i o n .  See Downie and T e l f e r  
( 1 9 6 9 : 1 5 4 / 1 5 5 )  f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  a s i m i l a r  p o i n t .
21 .  T h is  c l a i m  I  t h i n k  would meet w i t h  g e n e ra l  app ro va l  among 
p h i l o s o p h e r s .  See, f o r  example ,  J . S . M i l l  ( 1 8 5 1 : 1 3 1 ) ,  
K . B a i e r  ( 1 9 5 8 : 2 2 2 ) ,  M .S in g e r  ( 1 9 6 1 : 5 5 / 5 7 ) ,  C .Ca ton  
( 1 9 6 3 : 5 0 / 5 1 ) ,  R .M .H are  ( 1 9 6 3 : 3 6 / 3 7 ) .
22 .  The same r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  assumed, but  no t  argued f o r ,  in  a
number o f  r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;  see e . g .  M .S in g e r  
( 1 9 6 1 : 3 5 3 ) ,  D.Emmett ( 1 9 6 3 : 2 1 7 ) ,  J .R a w ls  ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 3 1 ) ,  
R .M .H a re  ( 1 9 7 5 : 7 6 ) ,  W.Rabinowicz  ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 ) .
23 .  See e . g .  A . M a c I n t y r e  ( 1 9 5 7 )  and P.Winch ( 1 9 7 2 )  f o r  an 
e x p r e s s io n  o f  th e  doubt  t h a t  a l l  moral judgements a re  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e ; see e . g .  P . Nowel1- S m i th  (1 9 5 4 :1 7 7  and 3 0 9 ) ,  
D.Locke ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  J . G i l b e r t  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  who m a i n t a in  t h a t  th e  
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e  i s  t r i v i a l .
24 .  I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  what  Kant  ( 1 7 8 5 : 8 6 / 8 7 )  had in  mind when
he w ro te  t h a t  some a c t i o n s  a r e  so c o n s t i t u t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
maxim cannot  be conce ived  as a u n i v e r s a l  law o f  n a t u r e  
w i t h o u t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  l e t  a lo n e  w i l l e d  t h a t  i t  ought  t o  
become one. For a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  see 0 . O’ N e i l l
( 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 7 / 1 7 2 ) .
25 .  What t h e  p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  o f  moral judgements  commits us t o
h e r e ,  p resum ably ,  i s  t h a t  our  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e ,  our  o v e r a l l  
p r e f e r e n c e ,  be a c te d  upon. Hare  i s  no t  a lo n e  in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
uni v e r s a l  i zab i  1 i t y  in  t h i s  way, see e . g .  S .Tou lm in  
( 1 9 5 0 : 1 5 6 / 1 5 7 ) ,  W.Kneale  ( 1 9 5 0 : 6 9 3 ) ,  K . B a i e r  ( 1 9 5 8 : 2 0 0 ) .
26 .  S i d g w i c k ’ s assumption f a i l s  t o  pass a t  l e a s t  one o f  the  
t e s t s  t h a t  he proposes any a p p a r e n t l y  s e l f - e v i d e n t
p r o p o s i t i o n  must pass b e f o r e  we a r e  j u s t i f i e d  in  a c c e p t in g  
i t .  S i d g w i c k ’ s f o u r t h  t e s t  ( 1 9 0 7 : 3 4 1 / 3 4 2 )  o f  a s e l f - e v i d e n t  
p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  must be g en era l  agreement by
e x p e r t s  on i t s  t r u t h .
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27 .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  i t  i s  no t  to o  c l e a r  what H a r e ’ s 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h e s i s  c o n s i s t s  i n .  H is  p o s i t i o n  i s  open 
t o  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; see ,  f o r  exam ple ,  
D.Monro ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 4 7 / 2 0 7 ) ,  D .Locke ( 1 9 6 8 : 2 5 / 4 4 ) .  However,  
i n s t e a d  o f  t r y i n g  t o  d e te rm in e  what H a r e ’ s r e a l  p o s i t i o n  i s ,  
we s h a l l  assume t h a t  th e  v e r s io n  o f f e r e d  h e re  i s  c o r r e c t .
28 .  Hare  ( 1 9 6 3 : 5 6 )  w r i t e s :
. . . a n o t h e r  i m p o r ta n t  ( d i f f e r e n c e )  between ' o u g h t ’ 
and d e s c r i p t i v e  judgem ents ,  which d i s t i n g u i s h e s  them 
f rom i m p e r a t i v e s  and d e c is i o n s  ( i s )  namely t h a t  
' o u g h t ’ i s  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  and th e y  a r e  n o t .
29 .  Hare  ( i bi  d :7 1 )  says ,  a l s o ,
I t  i s  in  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  t h a t  v a lu e  
judgements  d i f f e r  f rom d e s i r e s . . . .
3 0 .  Hare  ( i b i d :1 5 7 )  no tes :
To want t o  have something does not  commit th e  w an te r  
t o  w an t ing  o t h e r  p e o p le ,  in  t h e  same c i rc u m s ta n c e s  
t o  have i t .
31 .  I  am g r a t e f u l  t o  E l i z a b e t h  T e l f e r  who p o in t e d  o u t  a s e r i o u s  
e r r o r  in  my d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  in  a p r e v io u s  d r a f t .
32 .  T h i s  ana log y  i s  h i n t e d  a t ,  but  no t  argued f o r ,  by M .S in g e r .  
He w r i t e s  ( 1 9 8 5 : 5 2 )
I  spoke o f  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . . . in  e t h i c s . . . l a r g e l y  by 
ana logy  w i t h  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  in  m athem at ics  and l o g i c  
and th e  process o f  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  in  language.
33 .  I t  i s  w e l l  known t h a t  Hume th o u g h t  t h a t  r u l e s  o f  t h i s  k ind  
a r e  w i t h o u t  r a t i o n a l  f o u n d a t i o n .  The m ajor  problem Hume 
p o in t e d  t o  i s ,  o f  cou rs e ,  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  moving from a 
f i r s t  judgement  ' A l l  observed Xs a r e  F ’ t o  th e  g en era l  
c o n c lu s io n  ' A l l  Xs w i t h o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n  have been, a r e ,  and 
w i l l  be F s ’ . T h is  i s  not  th e  same as s a y in g  ' I f  we b e l i e v e  
t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  X i s  F because o f  R then we cannot  h e lp  
s a y in g  t h a t  any X t o  which R a p p l i e s  w i l l  be F ’ , which  
c o n s is te n c y  A r e q u i r e s .  Hume was more concerned w i t h  th e  
problem o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p ro d u c t  o f  the  
process  o f  g e n e r a l i z i n g  than th e  process i t s e l f ;  ( f o r  t h i s  
l a t t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  see M .B lack  ( 1 9 5 2 : 2 8 1 ) ) .  No doubt  Hume 
would have th o u g h t  t h a t  c o n s is te n c y  A la c k s  r a t i o n a l  
f o u n d a t i o n .  He would have i n s i s t e d  t h a t  such a p rocess ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i s  grounded in  th e  deepest  i n s t i n c t s  o f  human 
n a t u r e .
3 4 .  I t  m ight  be asked: "Are M a c I n t y r e  and Winch r e a l l y  denying
what  I  have c a l l e d  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  thus f a r ,  ( v i z .  
U . R . ) ? "  A . M a c I n t y r e ’ s ( 1 9 5 7 )  paper  i s  in te n d ed  t o  r e f u t e
H a r e ’ s ( 1955)  t h e s i s ,  o f  which M a c I n t y r e  (op c i t :326 )  
w ri  t e s :
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The crux  ( t h e n )  o f  H a r e ’ s p o s i t i o n  i s  th e  c o n t e n t i o n  
t h a t  whenever anyone says " I ,  you o r  he ought  t o  do 
s o - a n d - s o , "  th ey  a re  th e r e b y  com m it t ing  them selves  
t o  th e  maxim "One ought to  do s o -a n d -s o " .
T h i s  i s  c o n s is te n c y  A. And M a c In ty re  says t h a t  t h i s  
component o f  H a r e ’ s account  is  m is tak en .  C l e a r l y  he would  
deny U.R .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, P.Winch (1 9 7 2 )  sees h i m s e l f  as 
b e in g  a t  odds w i t h  S idgw ick .  He p laces  a q u o t a t i o n  from  
S id g w ic k  (1 9 0 7 )  a t  th e  f o r e f r o n t  o f  h is  d is c u s s io n .  P a r t  o f  
t h i s  passage (see  Winch o£ c i t : 151) ^eads:
I f  ( t h e r e f o r e )  I  judge any a c t i o n  t o  be r i g h t  
m y s e l f ,  I  i m p l i c i t l y  judge i t  t o  be r i g h t  f o r  any 
o t h e r  person wr.ose n a tu r e  and c i rcum stances  do not  
d i f f e r  f rom my own in  c e r t a i n  im p o r ta n t  r e s p e c ts .
T h i s  a g a in  i s  th e  demand f o r  c o n s is te n c y  A. C l e a r l y  Winch 
would deny U.R.  f o r  c e r t a i n  types  o f  moral judgement.  For  
f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  see Chapter  E ig h t  ahead and see J .K ov es i  
( 1 9 6 7 : 8 3 ) .
Notes  t o  Ch apter  Two
35 .  As J . L . M a c k i e  p o in t s  o u t ,  t h i s  is  no t  q u i t e  a c c u r a t e .  A 
judgem en t  may be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , i f  i t  c o n ta in s  p rope r  
names used as v a r i a b l e s .  As Mackie ( 1 9 7 7 : 8 4 )  w r i t e s
I f  John Doe has c o n t r a c t e d  w i t h  R ichard  R o e . . . t h e n  
John Doe ought  t o  . . .
S i m i l a r l y ,  words l i k e  ' y o u ’ and 'me’ can be h a r m le s s ly  used 
as v a r i a b l e s  in  much th e  same way, e . g .  'W h a t ’ s r i g h t  f o r  
you i s  r i g h t  f o r  me’ .
36 .  Hare  t h i n k s  t h a t  r ig g e d  d e f i n i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  such as ( 3 )  
and ( 5 ) ,  a r e  exc luded by the  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  t e s t .  I  cannot  
see why. Even on H a r e ’ s ' i d e a l  o b s erve r  r e v e r s i b i 1 i t y  t e s t ’ 
th e y  a r e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i e .
3 7 .  For  s i m i l a r  l i s t s  see W.D.Ross ( 1 9 3 0 : 2 2 ) ,  D.Raphael (1981 :  
4 4 ) .
38 .  T h i s  way o f  p u t t i n g  th e  p o i n t  i s  due t o  J . L . M a c k ie  (1977 :  
8 6 ).
39 .  For  exam ple ,  we might  say t h a t  a C h r i s t i a n  p la c e s  a premium 
on reasons l i k e  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  and h u m i l i t y ;  th e  m i l i t a r y -  
minded person w i l l  emphasize th e  importance o f  courage,  
s t r e n g t h  o f  w i l l ,  and so on.
4 0 .  I t  i s  an e r r o r  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
s t a t e s ,  l i k e  g u i l t  and remorse, a re  c r i t e r i a  f o r  say in g  t h a t  
someone possesses a moral b e l i e f ;  s t a t e s  o f  g u i l t  and 
remorse presuppose th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  moral b e l i e f s ,  no t  v_i ce
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For  f u r t h e r  argument on t h i s  p o i n t  see M .S in g e r  ( 1 9 6 1 - 1 3 /  
3 2 ) ,  A .G e w i r th  ( 1 9 6 9 : 1 2 3 / 1 3 5 ) .
T h i s  i s  B . R u s s e l l ’ s ( 1 9 1 8 :5 5 )  sense o f  a l o g i c a l  name; see 
a l s o  S . K r i p k e  ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 3 5 / 1 6 4 ) .
The t e s t  proposed by R .M .H a r e ’ s ' u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m ’ 
and by M . S i n g e r ’ s ' g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  argum ent ’ , f o r  in s t a n c e ,  
make moral a c c e p t a b i l i t y  c o n t in g e n t  upon what i s  wanted by 
t h e  a g e n t .
See J .R a w ls  ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 3 6 / 1 4 2 ) .
I  may be wrong about  the  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  th e  w a lk e r  o f  course .  
He may p r e f e r  t o  g e t  wet .  In  which case my s i n g u l a r  
judgem ent  ( 7 )  does not  app ly  to  him in th e  way in te n d e d .  
But I  c ou ld  express a d i f f e r e n t  judgement,  in  th e  same form  
o f  words as ( 7 ) ,  on the  grounds o f  prudence. Even so, the  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  c o n te x tu a l  re levan c e  r u l e s  ou t  ( 7 )  as a pr ima  
f a c i e  moral judgement.
I t  i s  i m p o r ta n t  to  s t r e s s  t h a t  we make t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between s u b j e c t i v e  and o b j e c t i v e  judgements in  moral  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  even i f  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  m is tak en .  Th is  
i s  t o  say even i f ,  as some p h i lo so p h e rs  argue ,  th e  s o - c a l l e d  
o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  judgements is  no more than a consensus  
gen t iu rn . A l l  t h a t  I  am c la im in g  here is  t h a t  our o r d i n a r y  
a t t e m p t s  a t  moral reasoning recog n ize  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .
T h i s  i s  H a r e ’ s view o f  the  m a t te r  when, in  h i s  l a t e r  works,  
he says t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  ' o u g h t ’ - judgem ents  express  the  
o b j e c t i v e  s id e  o f  the  o b j e c t i v e / s u b j e c t i v e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  I t  
p e r m i t s  us t o  say t h a t  the  judgement i s  independent  o f  th e  
i d i o s y n c r a s i e s  o f  the  ju d g e r  or  o f  o t h e r  k inds  o f  
a r b i t r a r i n e s s . Hare ( 1 9 8 1 : 8 1 / 8 2 )  makes th e  p o i n t  most 
c l e a r l y  in  a f o o t n o t e  where he ch ides  B . M i t c h e l l  f o r  f a i l i n g  
t o  g rasp  i t .
See f o r  in s t a n c e  R.Bambrough ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 5 ) .
Notes  t o  Ch apter  Three
See J . Bentham (1 7 8 9 )  in  Warnock, M. ( 1 9 6 2 : 3 5 ) .
See J . S . M i l l  ( 1 8 6 1 )  in  Warnock, M. ( 1 9 6 2 : 2 5 6 / 2 7 8 ) .
T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  between a formal  and a m a t e r i a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  
i s  due t o  J .F e i n b e r g  ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 0 0 ) .  Only  Fe inbe rg  w r i t e s  o f  








J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 8 3 / 9 7 )  g ives  p l e n t y  o f  o t h e r  examples o f  
t h e  k in d s  o f  judgements ru le d  out  by th e  U . R . I  v e r s io n  o f  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1 i t y  r u l e .
Hare  must a l lo w  t h a t  he cannot  c la im  any more r a t i o n a l i t y  
f o r  h i s  a n t i - N a z i  p r i n c i p l e s  than h is  opponent can c la im  f o r  
Nazi  p r i n c i p l e s .  In  re c e n t  works, however,  Hare observes  
( 1 9 8 1 : 4 4 / 5 3 )  t h a t  a t  an i n t u i t i v e  l e v e l  o f  moral t h i n k i n g  he 
may condemn h is  opponents. But th ey  can r e t u r n  th e  
com p l im e n t .  The v a l i d i t y  o f  e i t h e r  condemnation w i l l  be 
r e l e v a n t  o n ly  t o  H a r e ’ s or  the  N a z i ’ s moral b e l i e f s .
A f a n a t i c ,  Hare ( 1 9 6 3 :1 7 5 )  t e l l s  us, i s  a person who is  so
committed  t o  an id e a l  t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g
. . . t o  o v e r r i d e  a l l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  o f  p e o p l e ’ s
i n t e r e s t s ,  even the  h o l d e r ’ s own in  a c t u a l  or  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  cases.
I  can f i n d  nowhere in h is  w r i t i n g s  where Hare i n d i c a t e s  t h a t
he has changed h is  mind about  the  t h e o r y - n e u t r a l  i t y  o f
u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  in  any fundamenta l  r e s p e c t .  In  h is  
l a t e r  work (1 9 8 1 :1 7 0 )  he on ly  concedes t h a t  he has 
. . . s e e n  some d i s t i n c t i o n s  more c l e a r l y . . .
I t  i s  worth  n o t in g  H a r e ’ s con fus ion  in  a b i t  more d e t a i l .  
Th e re  a r e  grounds f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  when he w ro te  Freedom 
and Reason (1 9 6 3 )  Hare was not  a b s o l u t e l y  convinced t h a t  the  
r o l e - r e v e r s a l  and id e a l  o bserver  t e s t s  (and th e r e b y  
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m )  are  a l o g i c a l  e x te n s io n  o f  U . R . I .  As we
saw, g iven  o n ly  the  i n  p r o p r i a  persona t e s t  Hare t h i n k s  t h a t  
t h e  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  Nazi f a n a t i c  i s  in  an u n a s s a i l a b l e  
p o s i t i o n .  (See a l s o ,  f o r  in s ta n c e ,  h is  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  
c r e d i t o r / d e b t o r  example ( i b i d : 9 4 ) . )  S ix  yea rs  l a t e r ,  
however,  Hare suggests t h a t  the  r o l e - r e v e r s a l  t e s t  p ro v id e s  
an answer to  the  N a z i .  Hare ( 1 97 0 :50 )  t e l l s  us t h a t  th e  
f a n a t i c  must put  h im s e l f
. . . i n  the  s i t u a t i o n  o f  h is  v i c t i m  w i t h  h i s  v i c t i m ’ s
des i res
We can see a s i m i l a r  s l i d e  ( 1 9 7 8 : 7 7 / 7 8 )  from one t e s t  t o  
t h e  n e x t  in  H a r e ’ s t r e a tm e n t  o f  w h i te  r a c i a l i s m  in South  
A f r i c a .  Using the  in. p r o p r i a  persona s t r a t e g y ,  he t h in k s  
t h a t  u n i v e r s a l  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  can e s t a b l i s h  why we cannot  
t r e a t  s k i n  c o lo u r  as a m o r a l ly  r e l e v a n t  p r o p e r t y .  However,
Hare  ( i b i d : 81)  then adds
. . . w e  have to  make i t  ( t h e  judgement)  in  f u l l  
knowledge and awareness o f  a . . . m a t e r i a l  f a c t ,  namely 
what i t  was l i k e  f o r  h is  v i c t i m  t o  d e s i r e  no t  t o  be
t r e a t e d  in  a c e r t a i n  way.
T h i s  i s  e v i d e n t l y  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  r o l e  r e v e r s a l  t e s t .
In  ( 1 9 7 6 : 2 8 / 2 9 )  we a re  t o l d  e x p l i c i t l y  t h a t
. . . I  have t o  c o n s id e r  my own d e s i r e s ,  e t c .  qua 
a f f e c t e d  p a r t y ,  on equal terms w i t h  those o f  a l l  the  
o t h e r  a f f e c t e d  p a r t i e s .
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And in  h i s  l a t e r  works,  see e . g .  ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 0 ) ,  Hare makes no 
bones about  th e  way he unders tands  t h e  r e v e r s i b i 1i t y  
c o n d i t i o n .  We must c o n s id e r  th e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  case in which  
we have th e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  l i k e s  and d i s l i k e s ,  v a lu e s  and 
i d e a l s ,  o f  those  a f f e c t e d  by our  judgem ents .  For  a f u l l  
c r i t i c i s m  o f  H a r e ’ s t r a n s i t i o n , see H .HcCloskey ( 197 9 :63  
/ 7 6 ) ,  D.Locke ( 1 9 8 1 : 5 3 1 / 5 5 9 ) .
5 7 .  H a r e ’ s u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  is  not  to  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  forms o f  u t i l i t a r i a n  t h e o r y ;  v i z .  maximum 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  no t  t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  
maximum happ iness .  A lso  f o r  Hare ,  a person a c t s  as he ought  
i f ,  on t h e  b es t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  he u n i v e r s a l l y  p r e s c r i b e s  th e  
maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  even i f  t h e  consequences  
t u r n  o u t  t o  be bad.
58 .  See,  f o r  example ,  M.Neumann ( 1 9 8 0 : 3 5 / 3 6 )  who proposes t o
g i v e  dead persons a happiness r a t i n g  (what  he c a l l s  th e  
'h e d o n ic  i n d e x ’ );  someone who is  k i l l e d  should  be regarded  
as hav ing  a z e ro  r a t i n g .
59 .  M .S in g e r  c a l l s  h is  v e r s io n  o f  th e  t h e s i s  ' t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  
p r i n c i p l e ’ and wants t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  f rom H a r e ’ s 
' uni v e r s a ! i z a b i  1 i t y  p r i n c i p i e ’ ; see e . g .  ( 1 9 8 5 : 4 9 / 5 3 ) ,  I  do 
n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  the  d i s t i n c t i o n s  S in g e r  and Hare ( 1 9 5 5 : 3 1 1 /  
3 1 2 )  appeal  t o  in  t h e i r  d is p u t e  amount t o  much. I  am using  
' uni v e r s a 1 i z a b i 1 i t y ’ because,  as S in g e r  ad m i ts ,  i t  has 
cau ght  on as th e  s tan d a rd  term f o r  the  t o p i c .
60 .  We should  n o t i c e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  S i n g e r ’ s j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f
h i s  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  ( G . P . )  i s  weak. I t  i s  founded  
on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  in moral c o n t e x t s ,  reasons a re  i m p l i c i t l y  
g e n e r a l ;  see ( 1 9 6 1 : 4 4 ) .  A p a r t  f rom t h i s ,  S in g e r  ( i b i d : 3 4 /  
3 5 ) t h i n k s  t h a t  h is  p r i n c i p l e  r e q u i r e s  no f u r t h e r  p r o o f ,  
i . e .  t o  e x p l a i n  why s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  G.P.  i s  both necessary  
and s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a s ta te m e n t  t o  count  as a moral  
judgem ent .  Th is  d i s r e g a r d s  M a c I n t y r e ’ s and W inch ’ s c o n t r a r y  
p o s i t i o n .  We should  n o t i c e  a ls o  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t
G .P .  and P.C.  y i e l d  G. A . , because ' n o t  e v e r y o n e ’ i s  not  
( s e m a n t i c a l l y )  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  'no o n e ’ .
6 1 .  T h is  way o f  p u t t i n g  the  m a t te r  i s  due t o  P . S in g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 8 0 ) .
62 .  The example i s  t o  be found in P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 7 4 / 1 7 9 ) .
6 3 .  R .M .H a r e ,  M .S in g e r  and many o f  th e  o t h e r  p h i lo s o p h e rs  
c o n s id e r e d  in  t h i s  essay ,  r a i s e  many issues  w i t h  which I  am
n ot  concerned and which I  e i t h e r  c o n s id e r  o n ly  i n d i r e c t l y  or
i g n o r e  c o m p l e t e l y .  I  am o n ly  concerned w i t h  th e  t h e o r i e s  o f
Hare e t .a l_ .  i n s o f a r  as they  bes t  i l l u s t r a t e  t e n d e n c ie s  in
moral  p h i lo s o p h y .
64 .  The e s s e n t i a l  i s t  would need t o  be a b le  t o  show t h a t  the  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i d e n t i f i e d  a re  h i s t o r i c a l l y  unchanging and
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c u l t u r a l l y  i n v a r i a n t .  Moreover  he needs t o  show t h a t  they  
a r e  m o r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  For t h e r e  cou ld  be such 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which have no s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  moral  
judgem en t .
65 .  T h i s  example i s  due t o  J .F e in b e r g  ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 0 2 ) .
Notes  t o  Ch apter  Four
6 6 . We can a l s o  make th e  same k ind  o f  c la im  in  re v e rs e  v i z .  'X 
wants G even where he does not  need i t ’ . I n  o t h e r  words,  
t h e r e  a r e  some t h in g s  t h a t  we may t h i n k  t h a t  we need about  
which we a r e  m is taken ;  f o r  example,  a person may t h i n k  he 
needs i n s u l i n ,  a l th ough  he i s  not  d i a b e t i c  and i t  i s  the  
l a s t  t h i n g  t h a t  he needs. On th e  o t h e r  hand, we might  need 
some t h i n g s  and have no views about  whether  we need them or  
n o t .  Do we need a r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f ?
67 .  As A .W h i te  ( 1 9 7 4 :1 6 3 )  p o in t s  ou t  'm u s t ’ i s  the  term more 
b r o a d ly  used t o  handle  n e c e s s i t y .  Thus he notes:
I  must have dropped my g love  somewhere cannot  be 
rephrased I  need to  have dropped i t  somewhere.
6 8 . See a l s o  B .B a r r y  ( 1 9 6 5 : 4 7 / 4 9 ) ;  R . P l a n t ,  H .L e s s e r ,  P . T a y l o r -  
Gooby ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 9 ) .
69 .  The s logan  suggests t h a t  s o c ia l i s m  is  a p o l i t i c a l  system in  
which a l l  n ee d s (a )  and (b )  can be met.  See a ls o  G .V la s to s  
( 1 9 6 2 : 4 0 ) ,  A.M.Honore ( 1 9 7 0 : 7 8 ) ,  D . M i l l e r  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 4 9 )  on t h i s  
poi n t .
70 .  For t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' a b s o l u t e ’ and ' i n s t r u m e n t a l ’ 
needs,  see e . g .  D .Wiggins ( 1 9 8 5 : 1 5 4 / 1 5 5 ) .  See a ls o
D . M i l l e r  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 2 2 / 1 5 3 ) ,  D .Braybrooke ( 1 9 8 7 : 3 1 )  on t h i s  
p o i n t .
71 .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  due t o  H . F r a n k f u r t  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  see a ls o
R.Goodwin ( 1 9 8 5 : 6 1 5 / 6 2 4 )  f o r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n .
72.  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  Marxism, see f o r  
i n s t a n c e  K.Marx ( 1 8 5 7 : 4 0 9 / 4 1 1 )  and H.Marcuse ( 1 9 6 4 : 6 ) .  
S u r p r i s i n g l y  we f i n d  Hare using something l i k e  th e  same 
d i s t i n c t i o n ;  see e . g .  ( 1 9 7 0 : 5 0 / 5 1 )  and ( 1 9 7 6 : 2 8 ) .  'T ru e  
w a n t s ’ a r e  those  t h a t  a person would have i f  he had a l l  the  
r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a lways reasoned w i t h  g r e a t e s t  c a re  and 
was in  a s t a t e  o f  mind most conducive t o  r a t i o n a l  ch o ic e .  
See a l s o  J .H a r s a n y i  ( 1 9 7 7 : 6 3 9 ) .
73 .  For f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  see e . g .  
R .W o l lh e im  ( 1 9 7 5 : 1 6 9 / 1 7 7 ) ,  C.Bay ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 4 6 ) .
74.  See D .Braybrooke  ( 1 9 6 8 : 9 2 / 9 6 ) ,  D .W iggins  and S.Dermen 







McCloskey ( 1 9 7 6 : 6 / 7 )  n e v e r t h e le s s  a rg u e s ,  in  th e  same 
b r e a t h ,  t h a t
Where th e  c o n d i t io n s  a re  such t h a t  t h e  possessor  
. . . w o u l d  be im p a ire d ,  marred,  s t u n t e d ,  as a person  
i f  th e  c o n d i t io n s  a re  no t  met,  we speak o f  h i s  needs 
and th e  t a l k  about  im p a i re d ,  marred,  s t u n t e d ,  i s  to  
be e x p la in e d  in terms o f  what i s  n a t u r a l  to  human 
n a t u r e .
A bevy o f  b e h a v io u ra l  p s y c h o lo g is ts  have argued t h a t  human 
n a t u r e  can be e x p la in e d  on a s t im u lu s - r e s p o n s e  model; needs 
c o n s t i t u t e  th e  s t im u lu s ,  w h i l e  e f f o r t s  t o  s a t i s f y  them a re  
t h e  response.  In  p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c  t h e o r y  a l s o ,  needs p la y  a 
c e n t r a l  r o l e .  At  one t im e  S .F reud  (1 9 1 5 )  i d e n t i f i e d  th e  
need t o  pursue p le a s u re  and avo id  p a in  as b a s ic ;  see a l s o
E.Fromm (1 9 5 5 )  and A .Maslow (1 9 7 1 )  who c la im  t o  i d e n t i f y  
needs in  a whole range o f  p e c u l i a r l y  human powers and 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .
For  i n s t a n c e ,  S.Benn and R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 4 3 )  w r i t e :
. . . w h a t  in  genera l  we mean when we a t t r i b u t e  t o  
anyone 'a  nee d ’ . . . ( i s ) . . t o  i n d i c a t e  th e  la c k  o f  
something which i t  would be i n j u r i o u s  or  d e t r i m e n t a l  
t o  th e  s u b je c t  not  t o  s u p p l y ; . . .
See a l s o  J . F e i n b e r g  ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 1 1 ) ,  H.McCloskey ( 1 9 7 6 : 6 ) ,
D . M i l l e r  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 3 0 ) ,  R. Wol lheim ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 6 2 ) .
For f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  c la im  t h a t  human needs a r e  not  
something f i x e d ,  but  a re  h i s t o r i c a l l y  and c u l t u r a l l y  
r e l a t i v e ,  see P.Winch ( 1 9 7 2 : 7 3 / 8 9 ) .  However Winch ( i b i d : 
8 4 )  i n v e s t i g a t e s  developmenta l  asp ec ts  o f  human n a t u r e  t h a t  
he seems t o  t h i n k  very  f i x e d .  A lso  see A .M a c I n t y r e  (1967 :  
265 )  and ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 7 4 / 1 8 9 ) ;  K .Soper ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
I t  m ight  be s a id  t h a t  I  have misunderstood M s ,S o p e r ’ s p o i n t .  
I n  say in g  t h a t  ' th e s e  judgements  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  and 
r e l a t i v e ’ c o u ld n ’ t  she mean ( a )  t h a t  everyone would always  
have agreed but  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es  would have meant 
d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  by ' s e c u r i t y ’ ; o r  (b )  t h a t  people  h aven ’ t  
always thought  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y .
L e t  us c o n s id e r  ( a ) .  Presumably th ey  cou ld  no t  have 
meant something e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  by ' s e c u r i t y ’ in  the  
s t a t e m e n t  ' A l l  c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y ’ . They must have 
meant something l i k e  'u n t r o u b le d  by danger  o r  f e a r ’ O x fo r d 
E n g l is h  D i c t i o n a r y  ( 1 9 8 4 ) .  I f  they  d id  n o t ,  why should  we
suppose they  were r e f e r r i n g  to  ' s e c u r i t y ’ , o r  why t r a n s l a t e
t h i s  as ' s e c u r i t y ’ ? Of course what g iv e s  r i s e  to  f e e l i n g s
o f  danger o r  f e a r  may be q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  in  d i f f e r e n t
s i t u a t i o n s .  A c e r t a i n  p r a c t i c e  may make f o r  i n s e c u r i t y  in  
one s o c i a l  env ironm ent  y e t  not  in  a n o th e r .  But t h i s  would 
n ot  undermine the  e m p i r i c a l  c la im  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  i s  a
u n i v e r s a l  need(b )  f o r  c h i l d r e n .
As f a r  as (b )  i s  concerned ( v i z .  people  haven t  a lways  
th o u g h t  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  need s e c u r i t y ) ,  i t  s u r e l y  i s  not
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m ere ly  a m a t t e r  o f  what  most peop le  t h i n k  a t  a g iven  t im e  
t h a t  makes an e m p i r i c a l  c la im  ipso  f a c t o  t r u e .  Or a r e  we t o  
say t h a t  what th e y  b e l i e v e  i s  t r u e ,  makes i t  so? I f  we d id  
say t h i s ,  i t  would make i t  im p o s s ib le  f o r  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  
b e l i e f s  in  a s o c i e t y  t o  be m is taken  because o f  th e  
c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  a b e l i e f  i s  t r u e ,  (see  t h e  d is c u s s io n  
p p . 4 2 1 /4 2 3  o f  t h i s  e s s a y ) .
8 0 .  See R .S .Downie  ( 1 9 8 4 : 4 8 1 / 4 8 6 )  f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n .
8 1 .  The id e a  t h a t  th e s e  a re  needs m ight  be f u r t h e r  supported  by 
p o s s i b l e  w or ld  sem a nt ics .  A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  a de re  
n e e d (a )  o f  persons i f ,  no m a t te r  which p o s s ib le  w or ld  is  
c r e a t e d  o r  i n s t a n t i a t e d ,  when persons e x i s t  in  t h a t  w o r ld ,  
t h e y  w i l l  possess th ese  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . For i n s t a n c e ,  see 
W .Rabinowicz  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
8 2 .  See f o r  example E .W i lson  ( 1 9 7 5 : 4 )  who m a i n t a in s  t h a t  our  
i n s t i n c t  f o r  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  i s  due t o  th e  human b r a in  
which has been g e n e t i c a l l y  programmed t o  ensure  th e  maximum 
p r o l i t e r a t i o n  o f  u n d e r ly i n g  genes; but  see a ls o  M .M id g ley  
( 1 9 7 8 : 1 5 2 / 1 5 5 )  who p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  o t h e r  a n im a ls ,  w i th  less  
b r a i n ,  a r e  p ro b a b ly  more e f f i c i e n t  a t  p r e s e r v in g  them se lves .
8 3 .  See f o r  example R . P l a n t ,  H . Lesser ,  P .T a y lo r -G o o b y  ( 1 9 8 0 : 3 8 ) :
. . . i f  human be ings have moral d u t i e s  a t  a l l  they  
have a need to  s u r v i v e ,  which in t u r n  i m p l i e s  a duty  
t o  he lp  each o t h e r  t o  s u r v i v e  and t o  p r e s e rv e  l i f e .  
See a l s o  E .D .W a t t  ( 1 9 8 2 : 5 4 1 )  who imputes th e  same e r r o r  to  
K.Minogue (1 9 6 3 :4 6  and 1 03 ) .
8 4 .  H .R o ls t o n  ( 1 9 8 2 : 3 3 7 )  t h i n k s  t h a t  spontaneous somat ic  
f u n c t i o n s  ( e . g .  those  found in someone in a i r r e v e r s i b l e  
coma) ought  t o  be g iven  moral r e s p e c t .  O thers  argue t h a t  
o t h e r  s e n t i e n t  be ings ,  (my dog, a ch im panzee ) ,  o r  o t h e r  
o b j e c t s  (Ben N e v is ,  S t . P a u l s ) ,  o r  a r t i f a c t s  (L e o n a rd o ’ s 
' L a s t  S u p p er ’ , my computer)  o r  ' t h e  b iosystem as a w h o le ’ 
a r e  p a r t  o f  the  moral f o l d ;  see f o r  example ,  K .Goodpaster  
( 1 9 7 8 : 3 2 3 ) .  The more usual v iew is  t h a t  th e  spontaneous  
f u n c t i o n  i s  on ly  o f  in s t r u m e n ta l  v a lu e  and t h a t  i t  i s  
consciousness which i s  o f  moral v a lu e ;  see f o r  example 
W.Frankena ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 4 / 1 5 ) .  The q u e s t io n  o f  where to  draw the  
l i n e  t o  demarcate th e  moral domain, i s  no t  one t h a t  I  can 
c o n s id e r  h e re .  We w i l l  assume t h a t  w hatever  I  do t o  any 
non-person c o n s t i t u t e s  a moral s i t u a t i o n  a t  l e a s t  when 
persons ( i n c l u d i n g  m y s e l f )  a re  a f f e c t e d  by my a c t i o n .  A i l  
persons have moral s t a n d in g .  T h is  a t  l e a s t  seems to  be non 
c o n t e n t i  o u s .
85 The cases I  am r e f e r r i n g  t o  i s  where a person knowingly
t a k e s  'h is  own l i f e  because he regards  i t  as r a t i o n a l l y  
p r e f e r a b l e  t o  the  o t h e r  e v i l s  t h a t  he f a c e s .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  
some people  a re  d r iv e n  to  s u i c i d e  by mental i l l n e s s .
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8 6 . For  e m p i r i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  c l a i m  see O .K l i n e b e r g  ( 1 9 5 4 ) .  
A p p a r e n t ly  K l i n e b e r g  s t u d ie d  numerous c u l t u r e s  t o  d is c o v e r  
t h a t  human be ings in  e ve ry  c u l t u r e  w i t h o u t  e x c e p t io n  need 
fo o d ,  w a t e r ,  r e s t  and s l e e p ,  t o  e l i m i n a t e ,  t o  b r e a t h e ,  e t c .  
I t  seems odd t o  suppose t h a t  th e s e  were e m p i r i c a l  
d i s c o v e r i e s .  Would K l in e b e r g  have been i n v e s t i g a t i n g  human 
be ings  i f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  he s t u d i e d  d id  no t  need such 
t h i  ngs?
8 7 .  C l e a r l y  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n s  o f  needs t o  b o d i l y  organs is  a
v a l u e - l a d e n e d  m a t t e r ,  f o r  i t  i s  dependent  on t h e  idea  o f  the  
f l o u r i s h i n g  o f  th e  organism as a whole .  For f u r t h e r  
d i s c u s s io n  see J . F e i n b e r g  ( 1 9 7 0 : 2 5 3 / 2 5 5 ) .  However,  u n l i k e
F e i n b e r g ,  I  w i l l  argue t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  
d is a g re e m e n t  r e g a r d in g  th e  f l o u r i s h i n g  o f  n e e d s ( b ) .
8 8 . See R .M .H are  ( 1 9 6 4 a : 3 2 / 4 2 )  f o r  a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  
poi n t .
89 .  T h is  way o f  p u t t i n g  th e  p o i n t  i s  due t o  P h i l i p p a  Foot  
( 1 9 5 8 : 1 2 6 ) .
90 .  I  am in d e b te d  t o  E l i z a b e t h  T e l f e r  f o r  t h i s  o b s e r v a t io n .
91 .  P h i l l i p s  and Mounce argue f o r  what  G.Harman ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 4 3 / 1 4 4 )
c a l l s  'n o r m a t i v e  moral r e l a t i v i s m ’ . See W.Frankena
( 1 9 6 3 : 9 3 )  and R .B r a n d t  ( 1 9 6 7 : v o l . 3 : 7 6 )  f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  
t h i s  v iew  and see Harman (op ci_t: 1 5 2 /1 5 6 )  f o r  a defence o f  
i t .
92 .  See a l s o  R.Beardsmore ( 1 9 6 9 : 2 2 )  who notes  t h a t  W i t t g e n s t e i n  
th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  p o s s ib le  i n j u r y  or  death  t h a t  cou ld  r e s u l t  
t o  G .E .Moore  due t o  t h e i r  hav ing  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  d is c u s s io n  
when Moore was s e r i o u s l y  i l l ,  was q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  when
compared t o  th e  im portance  o f  t h e  d is c u s s io n .  I  am a rgu ing
t h a t  one m ight  be w e ig h ted  as be ing le s s  im p o r ta n t  than the
o t h e r ,  but  no t  as ' q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t ’ .
93 .  See G.Harman (op c i t : 1 5 4 /1 5 5 )  who I  t h i n k  a ls o  makes t h i s  
mi s t a k e .
94 .  Simone de B e au vo i r  ( 1 9 8 4 : 4 2 5 / 4 3 2 )  notes  t h a t  S a r t r e  regarded  
h i s  b l in d n e s s  as a s e v e re  d e p r i v a t i o n .  He viewed i t  as a 
l o ss  o f  h i s  f reedom.
Notes t o  C h ap te r  F iv e
95 .  D u rk he im ’ s ( 1 9 5 2 : 2 8 8 / 2 8 9 )  p i c t u r e  o f  th e  anomic person i s  
one in  whom d e s i r e s ,  im pu lses ,  purposes,  come and go and ge t  
nowhere.  The s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  anomic person i s  in f a c t  
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104.
N o th in g  c o r re s p o n d in g  t o  t h i s  a b i l i t y  i s  d i s c e r n i b l e  in  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  o t h e r  e n t i t i e s , from which we d i s t i n g u i s h  
p e rs o n s .  Though I  m ight  say ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e , o f  some 
non-autonomous t h i n g  t h a t  what  i t  d id  made a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  way t h e  w o r ld  goes on -  as one m ight  say o f  th e  ic e b e rg  
t h a t  sunk The T i t a n i c  -  t h i s  would no t  mean t h a t  i t  made a 
di f f e r e n c e  because th e  i ceberg ' ju d g e d *  t h a t  i t  m o r a l l y  
sho u ld  s i n k  the  s h i p .  Si nee n o th i  ng c or res pond i  ng to  moral  
judgem ent-m ak ing  is  di  s c e r n i b l e  in  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h i s  reason  
a lo n e  seems t o  be s t ro n g  grounds f o r  r e j e c t i n g  a t  l e a s t  hard  
d e te rm in is m .
E l i z a b e t h  T e l f e r  drew my a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  
em phas iz ing  t h i s  p o i n t .
Hume does a l lo w  t h a t  passion can be unreasonab le  when i t  i s  
based on f a l s e  b e l i e f .  However Hume ( 1 7 4 0 : 1 9 1 / 2 0 4 )  d id  ta k e  
a l i m i t e d  v iew  o f  reason,  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  i t  i s  p a s s io n le s s .  
T h is  does not  seem to  be c o r r e c t .  To t a k e  a s im p le  example,  
a person who u n i v e r s a l i  zes must ' f e e l  s t r o n g l y  ’ t h a t  reasons  
must be e x p lo r e d  and f o l l o w e d ,  ' c a r e ’ t h a t  judgements be 
made based on where th e  reasons le a d ,  and so on.
I f  p a i n f u l  exp e r im e n ts  were t o  be performed on people  
randomly e v e r y  Sunday, as P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 5 2 )  no tes :
The r e s u l t a n t  t e r r o r  ( o f  Sundays) would be a form o f  
s u f f e r i n g ,  a d d i t i o n a l  t o  th e  pa in  o f  th e  e x p e r im e n t .
As M i l l  ( 1 8 5 1 : 1 8 7 )  w r i t e s  ( t o  make a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
poi n t ) ,
. . . t o  conform t o  custom m ere ly  as custom, does not  
. . . d e v e l o p  ( i n  him) any o f  th e  q u a l i t i e s  which are  
th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  endowment o f  a human be in g .
See f o r  example 'K lep to m an ia *  in  R.Goldenson ( 1 9 8 4 : 4 0 5 ) .
See f o r  example ,  'P a r a n o id  S t a t e s ’ in  R .H a r r e  and R . Lamb 
( 1 9 8 3 : 4 4 3 / 4 4 4 ) ;  see a ls o  T .Mi  1 I o n ’ s 'P a r a n o id  P e r s o n a l i t y ’
( 1 9 8 4 : v o l . 2 ,  p . 4 7 8 ) .
See f o r  example W.Mendel ( 1 9 8 4 : v o l , 3 ,  p p . 2 6 6 / 2 6 8 ) .  To g ive  
to o  many examples o f  types  o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  d e f e c t s  would 
n e c e s s i t a t e  w r i t i n g  a t h e s i s  on p s y c h o -p a th o lo g y .  I  hope I  
have s a i d  enough t o  show th e  e m p i r i c a l  b a s is  f o r  th e  c la im  
t h a t  a la c k  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  regarded  as a severe  
p e r s o n a l i t y  d i s o r d e r .  See S.Benn ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 1 2 / 1 1 7 )  f o r  a more 
d e t a i l e d  p h i lo s o p h i c a l  d is c u s s io n ;  and see ' P e r s o n a l i t y  
D i s o r d e r s ’ in  R .H a r r e  and R.Lamb ( 1 9 8 3 : 4 6 1 / 4 6 3 )  who l i s t  
most o f  th e  p a t h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s  in  q u e s t io n .
For an e m p i r i c a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  how th e  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  tu rn ed  
ups ide  down in  bra in -w ashed  cases,  see G .A l l  p o r t  ( 1965:  
1 8 8 / 1 9 2 ) .  A lso  see W .Sargant  (1 9 5 7 )  and R . J . L i f t o n  ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
450




1 0 9 .
C u l t u r e s  as d i s p a r a t e  as those  o f  a n c i e n t  Ch ina and Greece  
regarded  c e r t a i n  human be ings as non -pe rs ons .  In  the  
f o r m e r ,  non-Chinese  were th o u g h t  t o  be d e v i l s ,  r a t h e r  than  
p e o p le ,  w h i l e  in  th e  l a t t e r ,  s l a v e s  were regarded  as ' l i v i n g  
t o o l s ’ . We m ight  remember a l s o  t h a t  even to d a y ,  some 
r e l i g i o u s  groups appear to  regard  women as being somehow 
l e s s  than  persons .  R e s t r i c t i n g  the  term t o  o n ly  p r e f e r r e d  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h i s  way is  t o  use ' p e r s o n ’ as a c o u r te s y  
t i t l e .  However none o f  the  cases above, o f  human be ings who 
a r e  th o u g h t  t o  be non -persons ,  a r e  th o u g h t  t o  be so because  
th e y  la c k  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
For e m p i r i c a l  su p p o r t  o f  t h i s  c la im  see ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
J . K l e i n  (1 9 6 5 )  who p u r p o r t s  to  d is c o v e r  a s t u n te d  c a p a c i t y  
f o r  c h o ic e  among E n g l is h  w o r k in g - c la s s  s u b c u l t u r e s .
Compare t h i s  w i t h ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  S a r t r e ’ s (1 9 4 8 )  v iew o f  
p o u r - s o i , which suggests  t h a t  t o  o p t i m i s e  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  is  
a human e x c e l l e n c e .
In  v a r i o u s  p u b l i c a t i o n s  A .G e w i r th  ( 1 9 7 8 : 4 8 / 6 4 ) ,  ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 2 5 /
129) argues t h a t  we can c lo s e  th e  gap between the  need f o r  
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and the  moral r i g h t  to  i t .  The gap is  
c lo s e d ,  once we s i t u a t e  o u r s e lv e s  in  th e  i n t e r n a l  s t a n d p o in t  
o f  th e  a g e n t .  Accord ing t o  G ew ir th  ( 1 979 :129  ) t o  say ' I  
reg a rd  my freedom as a necessary  good in  o r d e r  t o  pursue my 
p r o j e c t s ’ commits me, the  pu rp o s iv e  a g e n t ,  t o  th e  c la im  t h a t  
I  have a moral r i g h t  t o  f reedom. A g a in s t  G e w i r th ,  I  am 
a rg u in g  t h a t  i f  we probe th e  i n t e r n a l  s t a n d p o i n t ,  t o  regard  
my freedom as a necessary  good f o r  me t o  ac h ie v e  my purposes  
i s  t o  say n o th in g  more than ' I  n e e d (a )  o r  (b )  F ’ . Whether  
or  no t  I  t h i n k  t h a t  th e  n e e d (a )  ought  to  be s a t i s f i e d  w i l l  
depend upon my e v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  end a t  which i t  is  
d i r e c t e d .  I  could  r a t i o n a l l y  choose not  to  c o n t in u e  to  
f u n c t i o n  as a person f o r  th e  sake o f  some h ig h e r  purpose,  or  
t o  a v o id  a more f e a r f u l  a l t e r n a t i v e  end. And regarded as a 
n e e d ( b ) ,  t h e r e  is  n o th ing  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  here  in r e g a r d in g  
m y s e l f ,  in  more c i rcu m sp ec t  moments, as hav ing too  much 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  A case in  p o i n t  would be A r i s t o t l e ’ s 
( 1 9 5 3 : 8 9 / 9 2 )  wicked person who is  so p e r v e r t e d  t h a t  even in  
h i s  own mind, he i s  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  in  e r r o r  in h is  moral  
judgem ents .  He possesses th e  g e n e r ic  f e a t u r e s  o f  agency.  
He needs t o  be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  t o  make h is  e v i l  judgements .  
However t h e r e  seems to  be n o th in g  s e l f -  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  in  h is  
denying  t h a t  t h i s  e n t a i l s  t h a t  he has a moral r i g h t  t o  be 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g .  Would he be g u i l t y  o f  a l o g i c a l  f a u l t  i f  
he d id?  As f a r  as I  can see ,  he would n o t .
For e m p i r i c a l  sup por t  f o r  t h i s  c l a i m  see ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,
G A11 p o r t  ( 1965:1 1 0 / 1 3 8 ) .  A l l p o r t  ( i b i d : 137) a s s e r t s :
I t  i s . . . a  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  f a c t  t h a t  th e  human mind 
i s  a b le  t o  regard  i t s e l f  as an o b j e c t . . .
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A l l  p o r t  i n c l u d e s  in  ' s e l f - k n o w l e d g e ’ : awareness o f  b o d i l y  
s e l f ,  o n e ’ s p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  s e l f - e s t e e m  ( p r i d e f u l  
i n v o l v e m e n t ) ,  s e l f - e x t e n s i o n  ( t o  o n e ’ s f a m i l y ) ,  s e l f - i m a g e ,  
r a t i o n a l  agency,  lo n g - r a n g e  g o a ls .  See a l s o  R .W y l ie  (1984 :  
2 8 2 / 2 8 5 ) .
110 .  T h is  d i s t i n c t i o n  -  v i z .  a person i s  no t  o b v io u s ly  o r  w h o l ly  
th e  same t h i n g  as a human be ing -  has a long p e d ig re e  in  
P h i lo s o p h y .  See e . g .  J .Lock e  ( 1 6 8 9 : 2 1 0 / 2 1 1 ) ,  P .F .S t ra w s o n  
( 1 9 5 9 : 1 0 2 / 1 1 6 ) ;  A .Q u in to n  ( 1 9 6 8 : 3 9 3 ) ;  D .W igg ins  ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 3 1 /  
1 5 8 ) ;  P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 7 4 / 7 6 ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  however,  see the  
b eh a v io u r is m  in  e . g .  N .Malcolm ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 5 7 / 1 6 0 ) .
111.  Strawson ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 0 2 )  w r i t e s  t h a t  a person
. . . ( i s )  a t y p e  o f  e n t i t y  such t h a t  both p r e d i c a t e s  
a s c r i b i n g  s t a t e s  o f  consciousness and p r e d i c a t e s  
a s c r i b i n g  c o r p o re a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . .  a re  e q u a l l y  
a p p l i c a b l e . . .
112 .  Kant  ( 1 7 8 1 : 9 4 )  w r i t e s :
The I  t h i n k  must accompany a l l  my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , 
f o r  o t h e r w is e  something would be r e p re s e n te d  t o  me 
which cou ld  no t  be th o u g h t ;  in  o t h e r  words, the  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  would e i t h e r  be im p o s s ib le ,  o r  a t  
l e a s t  be in  r e l a t i o n  t o  me, n o th in g  t o  m e . . .
113.  C o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  th e  s c h i z o p h r e n i c , whose b e l i e f  s t r u c t u r e
in  reg a rd  t o  t h e i r  own i d e n t i t y  i s  deranged.  He lacks  what  
R . D . L a i n g  ( 1 9 6 5 : 3 9 )  c a l l s  ' o n t o l o g i c a l  s e c u r i t y ’ ; v i z .
. . . a  sense o f  h is  i n t e g r a l  s e l f - h o o d  and personal  
i d e n t i  t y . .
114.  For  a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  the  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  c la im  here  see,
f o r  example ,  A .H .Maslow (1954 :  C h ap .5 ) ,  D .M c C le l la n d  e t . a l . 
( 1 9 7 6 )
115 . For a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  "an a r t i f i c i a l  person" ( s i c )  see,
f o r  exam ple ,  P . C a r r u t h e r s  ( 1 9 8 6 : 2 4 0 / 2 4 8 ) .
116 .  C o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  th e  a u t h o r i t y  g iven  t o  reason by 
A r i s t o t l e .  H is  c la im s  a re  based on an erroneous argument  
co n c e rn in g  man’ s ergon ( f u n c t i o n  or  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
a c t i v i t y ) .  A r i s t o t l e  ( 1 9 5 3 : 3 8 )  w r i t e s :
The f u n c t i o n  o f  a man is  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h is  
n o n -c o r p o r e a l  f a c u l t i e s  o r  ' s o u l ’ in  accordance  
w i t h . . . a  r a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e . .
R a t i o n a l i t y  i s  no t  m ere ly  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  p r o p e r t y  o f  a 
person ,  i t  i s  man’ s f u n c t i o n  as w e l l .  The b e t t e r  he
per fo rm s  t h i s  f u n c t i o n ,  th e  more he i s  how he ought t o  be. 
T h is  argument need not  d e t a i n  us. Let  i t  s u f f i c e  to  say 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  some t h in g s  which,  w i t h  regard  t o  t h e i r
f u n c t i o n ,  such an i n f e r e n c e  can be drawn, e . g .  a k n i f e .
Human b e in g s ,  however,  a r e  no t  i tems o f  i n t e n t i o n a l
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c o n s t r u c t i o n .  ( A t  l e a s t ,  I  cannot  argue so and p r e s e r v e  th e  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  my needs t h e s i s . )
117.  A w ork in g  l i f e  spen t  t u r n i n g  a screw on an assembly l i n e  o r
s p e n t  s h o v e l l i n g  coal  a t  th e  c o a l - f a c e  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  be
o c c u p a t io n s  in  which much s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  occ u rs .  In  
c o n t r a s t ,  a work ing  l i f e  spent  as an a c t o r ,  a r t i s t ,  au th o r  
o r  p h i lo s o p h e r ,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  g iv e  a person ample o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  e x e r c i s e  h is  t a l e n t s  o r  r a t i o n a l  powers.
118 .  M a r x ’ s ( 1 8 4 4 : 1 4 0 )  p o i n t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c l e a r  in  the  
f o l l o w i n g  passage:
The o b j e c t  o f  work i s . . . t h e  o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  
s p e c i e s - l i f e  o f  man; f o r  he d u p l i c a t e s  h i m s e l f  not  
o n ly  i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,  in  h is  mind, but  a ls o  a c t i v e l y  
in  r e a l i t y .
For  a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  Marx on genuine human needs and 
a r t i f i c i a l  needs,  see P .S p r in g b o rg  ( 1 9 8 1 : 9 4 / 1 1 7 ) .
119 .  The p o i n t  here  can be made in  a n o th e r  way. A t e l l i n g
o b j e c t i o n  t o  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  work i s  a n e e d (a )  o r  (b )  i s  t h a t  
t h e  im portance  we g iv e  to  work i s  c u l t u r a l l y  s p e c i f i c .
C e r t a i n l y ,  i t  i s  i m p o r ta n t  in  modern i n d u s t r i a l  c u l t u r e s .  
However in  some n o n - i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s ,  work f o r  the  
p r o d u c t io n  o f  t h in g s  t o  meet b o d i l y  needs seems t o  be kep t  
t o  a bare  minimum. T h is  p la c e s  a s t r a i n  on th e  c la im  t h a t
work i s  a n e e d ( b ) .  Y e t  th e  p o i n t  remains t h a t  some way o f
o b t a i n i n g  th e  means o f  s u b s is te n c e  i s  a n e e d ( a ) .  I t  i s  
t h i s ,  v i z .  th e  method in  any c u l t u r e  by which a person  
produces th e  t h in g s  t h a t  he b i o l o g i c a l l y  needs, which g ives  
work t h e  s t a t u s  o f  a n e e d (a )  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s .
120 .  See, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  K .J a s p e rs  ( 1 9 7 1 : v o 1 . 3 ,  p p . 2 0 5 / 6 )  who, i f
I  have understood him c o r r e c t l y ,  m a in ta in s  t h a t  something  
fundam enta l  in  th e  human c o n d i t i o n  can be re v e a le d  to  a
person when th e y  a r e  in  u l t i m a t e  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  s u f f e r i n g  
v i z .  f o u n d e r in g .
121 .  For an a l t e r n a t i v e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  account  o f  t h i s  need, see 
R .H in d e  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
122 .  See a l s o  C . B a t t e r s b y  ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 7 1 / 2 7 3 )  f o r  a s i m i l a r  o b j e c t i o n .
123 . For  f u r t h e r  e m p i r i c a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t  see,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  *S c h i z o p h r e n i c s ’ in  R.Goldenson ( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  see a ls o
H .L e s s e r  ( 1 9 8 0 : 5 0 ) .  We m ight  add t o  our  e a r l i e r  d iscu s s io n  
t h a t  mental s u f f e r i n g  ( l i k e  extrem e p h y s ic a l  p a in )  renders  
one v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a la c k  o f  s e l f - r e s p e c t .  I t  is  more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  ho ld  o n e s e l f  t o g e t h e r .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i f  
th e  s u f f e r i n g  i s  s e v e re  i t  w i l l  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h a t  p e rs o n ’ s 
c a p a c i t y  f o r  p u rp o s iv e  a c t i o n .
124. For  an a l t e r n a t i v e  ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l )  d is c u s s io n  o f  the  same 
p o i n t  see D .W r ig h t  ( 1 9 7 1 :9 0 /9 1  and p . 2 2 3 ) .
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125.  See G.Dunstan ( 1 9 7 4 : 1 4 / 1 5 )  f o r  an e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
arg u m e n t .
126 .  E.Fromm’ s e x i s t e n t i a l  needs f a l l  under  f i v e  head ings:  
r e l a t e d n e s s ,  t ra n s c e n d e n c e ,  ro o ted n e ss ,  i d e n t i t y ,  a f rame  
o f  o r i e n t a t i o n ;  see ( 1 9 5 5 : 3 0 / 6 6 ) .
127.  B . W i l l i a m s  ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 0 8 / 1 1 8 )  makes a s i m i l a r  p o i n t  in h is  
argument a g a i n s t  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .
128. I t  i s  o b v ious ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  t h a t  many forms o f  p le a s u r e  are  
n ot  s e n s a t io n s  t h a t  we f e e l  in  some p a r t  o f  our  body, or  
even d i f f u s e d  th ro u g h o u t  our body, which i t  would be, i f
p l e a s u r e  i s  a s e n s a t io n .  T h is  i s  q u i t e  u n l i k e  pa in  which is
f e l t  as a s e n s a t io n .
129.  The d is c u s s io n  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  though not  th e  m is ta k e s ,  
owes much t o  E l i z a b e t h  T e l f e r  ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 / 3 6 ) .  She d e s c r ib e s  
( i b i d : 5 )  th e  happy person,  in  a h e d o n i s t i c  sense,
. . . a s  one who has e v e r y t h i n g  major  t h a t  he wanted 
and has n o th in g  major  t h a t  he wishes o t h e r w i s e ; . . .
130 .  See a l s o ,  f o r  example ,  G.Warnock ( 1 9 7 1 : 9 0 / 9 2 ) .
131.  Some form o f  sexual  p le a s u r e  appears t o  be such a need(b )
f o r  most,  i f  no t  a l l ,  a d u l t  persons.  T h is  v iew ,  o f  course ,  
i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  S .F re u d ,  who in ' " C i v i l i z e d "  Sexual  
M o r a l i t y ’ ( 1 9 5 8 : v o l . I X , p a r a . 16) w r i t e s
A c e r t a i n  amount o f  d i r e c t  sexual  s a t i s f a c t i o n  seems 
t o  be in d is p e n s a b le  f o r  most o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and a
d e f i c i e n c y . . . must be regarded  as an i l l n e s s .
132. T h is  i s  no t  t o  say t h a t  he w i l l  a lways be p leased  w i t h  what 
he th o u g h t  he wanted;  and sometimes he w i l l  be p leased  w i th  
t h i n g s  which he d id  no t  o r i g i n a l l y  want .
133. As A r i s t o t l e  ( 1 9 5 3 : 2 8 / 2 9 )  argued,  t o  say t h a t  an a c t i v i t y  is  
engaged in  f o r  th e  happiness i t  g i v e s ,  i s  t o  put  i t  in  a 
c l a s s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  which a r e  pursued f o r  t h e i r  own sake.
134 .  See J .H o s p e rs  ( 1 9 6 1 : 6 3 )  f o r  f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  
n o t i o n .
135 .  See A r i s t o t l e  ( 1 9 7 0 : 3 0 3 / 3 0 9 ) .  See a l s o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
J . S . M i l l ’ s ( 1 8 6 1 : 2 5 7 / 2 6 2 )  r a t i o n a l  hedonism, where he speaks  
o f  ' h i g h e r  p l e a s u r e s ’ and ' a  f u l l y  human l i f e ’ . In  recent
t im e s ,  R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 6 6 : 1 1 4 / 1 6 6 )  has prov ided  a more
d e t a i l e d  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  genera l  c l a i m .  However i t  is  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a p p ly  P e t e r s ’ argument t o  c r e a t i v e  a e s t h e t i c  
a c t i v i t y ,  o r  t o  see t h a t  i t  shows the  worth o f  e . g .  
f r i e n d s h i p .  A s i m i l a r  p o i n t  i s  suggested a ls o  by Downie and
T e l f e r  ( 1 9 6 9 : 7 4 )
Even i f  th e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  p o e t r y  i s  not  a 
r e a l i s t i c  o b j e c t i v e  f o r  most peo p le ,  i t  i s  a ls o  t r u e
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t h a t  th e y  a r e  not  going t o  a c h ie v e  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  
as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  c h o i c e f u l  p u r s u i t  o f  pushpin .
136. See W.G.Maclagan ( 1 9 6 0 a : 2 1 0 /2 1 2 )  who makes a s i m i l a r  
di  s t i  n c t i o n .
137 .  E .W i ls o n  ( 1 9 7 5 : 1 2 0 )  c la im s  t h a t  such a c t s  ' i n c r e a s e  g e n e t i c
f i t n e s s ’ . I  t h i n k ,  however,  t h a t  empathy has as much t o  do
w i t h  n u r t u r e  as w i t h  n a t u r e .
138.  T h is  k in d  o f  ad hominem argument i s  q u i t e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
between two d is p u t a n t s  in a moral d is a g re e m e n t .  One shows 
o n e ’ s a d v e rs a ry  t h a t  h is  moral b e l i e f  leads  t o  co n c lu s io n s  
t h a t  th e  opponent h i m s e l f  would t h i n k  repugnant .
139. See M .L e rn e r  and C.Simmons ( 1 9 6 6 : 2 0 3 / 2 1 0 )  f o r  e x p e r im e n ta l  
s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  a d u l t  s u b je c t s  tend  t o  r e j e c t  the  
v i c t i m  when th e y  b e l i e v e  they  a r e  power less  t o  h e lp .
140 .  See I . P i l i a v i n ,  J .R o d in ,  J . Pi 1 i a v i n  ( 1 9 6 9 : 2 8 9 / 2 9 9 )  f o r  
e x p e r im e n t a l  su p p o r t  f o r  th e  c l  aim t h a t  we a re  less  ready  
t o  h e lp  a person who has c o l l a p s e d  through  drunkenness.
141 .  See a l s o  E .W i lso n  ( 1 9 7 5 :1 2 0 )  who c la im s  t o  o f f e r  
s o c i o b i o l o g i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  such a c ts  a re  
s e 1f - i  n t e r e s t e d .
142 .  See a l s o  J .R aw Is  ( 1 9 7 2 : 4 6 4 )  on t h i s  p o i n t .
143 . Such s e n t im e n ts  and conduct  a r e  not  t r a n s i t o r y .  They are  
s e n t im e n ts  which exp ress  an u n d e r ly i n g  commitment t o  the  
c h i l d .  A p a r e n t  may admire o r  e n jo y  one o f  h is  c h i l d r e n  
more than  a n o th e r .  He may judge  t h a t  one has more m e r i t  
than  a n o th e r .  However p a r e n t a l  love  i s  n o t  a l t e r e d  by such 
f l u c t u a t i o n s .  P a r e n ta l  lo v e ,  t h i s  i s  t o  say ,  i s  c o n s ta n t .  
See G .V la s t o s  ( 1 9 6 2 : 4 4 )  f o r  more d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t ,
144 .  I  am in d e b te d  to  E l i z a b e t h  T e l f e r  f o r  t h i s  o b s e r v a t io n .
145. I n  c o n t r a s t  f o r  th e  K a ~ t ’ Srv t * e  s tu d e n t  re co g n iz e s  -
though Kant cannot  t e ' i  us why he should  -  t h a t  a son has a 
s p e c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  not  because ^e eves her
o r  because she i s  s i c k  and c *d  and he f e a r s  -.'-sc - - g - t  
happen t o  h e r  i f  he n e g l e c t s  h e r  e t c . For t h e  K a n t ia n ,   ^ the  
judgement  i s  a moral one o n l y  i f  he s t a y s  w i t h  b s mother  
f rom a sense o f  duty' .  As am i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  why people  
r a t i o n a l l y  make t h e  moral judgements t h a t  th e y  in  f a c t  make, 
t h i s  seems t o  me t o  be s u p e r f i c i a l .
Notes t o  Chapt er  S ix
146.  The t o p i c  o f  g r a t i t u d e  has not  been c o m p l e t e l y  n e g le c te d .  













t h e  'most  h o r r i d  and u n n a t u r a l ’ o f  a l l  c r im es  t h a t  human 
be ings  a r e  ca p a b le  o f  c o m m it t in g .  A lso  Kant ( 1 7 9 7 : 1 2 8 / 1 2 9 )  
l i s t s  i n g r a t i t u d e  as one o f  t h r e e  v i c e s  t h a t  a r e  th e  essence  
o f  v i l e n e s s  and w ickedness .  See a l s o  W.D.Ross ( 1 9 3 0 : 2 7 )  who 
i n c l u d e s  g r a t i t u d e  among h is  pr ima f a c i e  d u t i e s .  In  r e c e n t  
t i m e s ,  F . B e r g e r  ( 1 9 7 5 )  argues f o r  a p o s i t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  
mine,  though h i s  a n a l y s i s  i s  not  in  terms o f  needs.
T h is  phrase  i s  borrowed from J . L . A u s t i n  ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 5 )  who used 
i t  t o  make a p o i n t  about  i n d i r e c t  p e r c e p t i o n .
The a f f e c t i v e  component in  g r a t i t u d e  was, in  f a c t ,  
re c o g n iz e d  by Kant ,  see ( 1 7 9 7 : 1 2 7 ) .
D.Hume ( 1 7 3 9 : 2 7 3 / 2 8 8 )  c la im s  t h a t  l o y a l t y  i s  a v i r t u e  t h a t  
ho lds  le s s  o f  reason than o f  b i g o t r y  and s u p e r s t i t i o n . On 
th e  o t h e r  hand J .Royce ( 1 9 0 8 : 1 7 )  a s s e r t s  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
v ie w .  The o b j e c t  o f  l o y a l t y  i s ,  we a r e  t o l d ,
. . . a  cause beyond your p r i v a t e  s e l f ,  g r e a t e r  than  
you a r e . . .  s u p e r p e r s o n a l .
See H .S id g w ic k  ( 1 9 0 7 : 2 4 4 )  f o r  an a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n .
See P .A .H u tc h in g s  ( 1 9 7 8 : 6 1 )  f o r  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .
Accord ing  t o  Royce a p e r s o n ’ s w h o le h e a r te d  l o y a l t y  t o  a 
cause i s  eo i pso good. The supreme good, he says,  is  
l o y a l t y  f o r  l o y a l t y ’ s sake .  He (op c i t : 1 21 ) w r i t e s :
. . . s o  choose and so serv e  your  i n d i v i d u a l  cause as 
t o  secure  t h e r e b y  th e  g r e a t e s t  measure o f  l o y a l t y  
amongst men.
T h is  seems t o  o v e r lo o k  th e  f a c t  t h a t  people  can be lo y a l  to  
q u i t e  e v i l  causes.
See, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  E .W i lso n  ( 1 9 7 8 : 8 6 / 8 7 ) .
We e x p e c t  such l o y a l t y  even in  t r y i n g  c i rc u m s ta n c e s .  We 
have noted too  t h a t  l o y a l t y  i n c lu d e s  s e l f - f i d e l i t y .
The d is c u s s io n  here  a p p l i e s  no t  m ere ly  t o  p rom is ing  t o  pay 
back loans but  a l s o  t o  th e  more g en era l  r u l e  o f  making 
prom ises in  o r d e r  to  o b t a i n  a s e r v i c e ,  when I  know t h a t  I  
can not  keep th e  promise .
See a l s o  H . P r i c h a r d  ( 1 9 4 9 : 1 6 9 / 1 7 9 )  and J .R aw ls  ( 1 9 7 2 :3 4 5 )  
f o r  s i m i l a r  acc o u n ts .  For i n s t a n c e ,  Rawls ( i b i d )  w r i t e s :
I t  ( p r o m is i n g )  i s  no t  i t s e l f  a moral p r i n c i p l e  but  
a c o n s t i t u t i v e  c o n v e n t io n .
See a l s o  J . S e a r l e  ( 1 9 6 9 : 5 7 / 6 2 ) .
See a l s o  H.O.Mounce ( 1 9 7 3 : 2 9 / 3 0 ) .
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158. Hume p u r p o r t s  t o  prove t h a t  p ro m is e -k e e p in g  i s  an a r t i f i c i a l  
v i r t u e  by p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  a promise i s  no t  b in d in g  when 
made under  du res s .  He w r i t e s  ( 1 7 4 0 : 2 5 3 )  o f
. . . t h e  f o r c e  which i s  supposed t o  i n v a l i d a t e  a l l
c o n t r a c t s  and t o  f r e e  us from t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n .
T h is  does not  show t h a t  p r o m is e -k e e p in g  i s  no t  due t o  a 
n a t u r a l  m o t i v a t i o n .  I t  shows, r a t h e r ,  t h a t  prom ise-making
must be f r e e  o r  v o l u n t a r y .  One must be, so t o  speak,  in  a
f a i r  b a r g a in i n g  p o s i t i o n .
159. See a l s o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  K.Popper  ( 1 9 6 6 : 6 1 )  f o r  th e  same 
poi n t .
160. For a s i m i l a r  p u z z l i n g  c la im  see W.V .Quine  ( 1 9 6 1 : 4 3 ) ,  who 
s p e c u l a t e s  t h a t  l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t s  cou ld  d i f f e r  f rom one 
language t o  a n o th e r .
161. O . H a n f l i n g  ( 1 9 7 4 : 1 9 / 2 4 )  o v e r lo o k s  t h i s  p o i n t  when he c la im s  
t h a t  a promise must be wanted by th e  prom isee .  I t  would be 
wrong a l s o  to  assume t h a t  in  e v e ry  case th e  p rom iser  t h i n k s  
t h a t  th e  t h i n g  promised i s  wanted by th e  promisee .  For  
exam ple ,  I  can promise a s t u d e n t  t o  r e p o r t  him t o  th e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  i f  he c o n t in u e s  t o  c h e a t .
162. For a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  say in g  " I  promise"  
see O . H a n f l i n g  (op c i t : 1 5 / 1 9 ) .
163 . The example here  is  o f  someone say ing  " I  i n te n d  t o  do F"
( v i z .  go t o  th e  t h e a t r e )  and f u l f i l l i n g  t h a t  i n t e n t i o n .  I t
has been suggested t o  me t h a t  a more d i f f i c u l t  case i s  where 
someone, say Smith ,  says t h a t  he in te n d s  to  do F and someone 
e l s e ,  Brown, wants him t o ,  and then Smith does not  do F. I s  
Brown j u s t i f i e d  in f e e l i n g  resentm ent  in  t h i s  case? I  t h i n k  
n o t ,  f o r  th e  reasons g iven  in  th e  t e x t .  So long as a 
promise i s  not  suggested by th e  s ta te m e n t  o f  i n t e n t i o n .
164. Some r i g h t s ,  such as freedom o f  r e l i g i o n  or  o f  a r t i s t i c
e x p r e s s i o n ,  appear t o  be less  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  R a w ls ’ d e c is i o n
p ro c e d u re .  For in s t a n c e ,  a person who has no r e l i g i o u s  
b e l i e f s  m ight  be u n d is tu rb e d  i f  a w e l l - o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  l e f t  
o u t  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  in  th ese  a r e a s .
165. See J .R a w ls  (1 9 7 2 :1 5 0 /1 6 1  and p . 302)  f o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to
th e  p r i n c i p l e s .
166 . See R .M .H are  ( 1 9 7 3 : 2 4 6 / 2 4 7 )  who a l s o  c la im s  t h a t  on R aw ls ’
account  o f  them, th e  cho ice s  made in th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  
a r e  m o r a l l y  p r e s c r i p t i v e .
167. See J .R a w ls  ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 1 ) .  There  i s  n o th in g  in  R a w ls ’ o r i g i n a l
p o s i t i o n  t o  p r e v e n t  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  ad o p t in g  a judgement  
l i k e  'each i n d i v i d u a l  must g iv e  w e ig h t  to  h is  own needs 
o n l y ,  w hatever  th e s e  t u r n  ou t  t o  b e ’ .
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168.  In  Southern  A f r i c a ,  f o r  example ,  some p e o p le ,  q u i t e  
r e a s o n a b ly ,  argue t h a t  b la c k  s t u d e n ts  who r e c e iv e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  economic and s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s ,  such as a 
u n i v e r s i t y  e d u c a t io n ,  n o n e th e le s s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  in not  
s u p p o r t in g  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h e y  have b e n e f i t t e d  f rom.
169.  I t  has been p o in te d  out  to  me t h a t  our eve ryday  response  
here  may be due m ere ly  t o  our  hum anity .  However on R aw ls ’ 
ac c o u n t ,  our sense o f  f a i r n e s s  -  which,  presumably ,  would  
r e q u i r e  t h a t  we p r o v id e  f o r  th e  b a s ic  needs o f  c r i m i n a l s  -  
r e s u l t s  f rom r a t i o n a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  no t  humanity .  I  am 
a r g u in g  t h a t  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  here  would need t o  be 
supplemented by a c t i v e  sympathy.
170. I t  has been suggested t o  me t h a t  my dau ghter  might  have 
regarded  th e  dog as ' s im p ly  n a s t y ’ , not  u n f a i r ,  t o  behave in  
t h i s  way. But presumably  th e  dog was thought  t o  be nas ty  
f o r  a reason.  I  can t h i n k  o f  no more obv ious reason than  
i t s  b e h a v io u r  was seen as u n f a i r .
171. As M .P r i c h a r d  ( 1 9 7 7 : 7 1 )  p o i n t s  o u t ,  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
t h e o r i e s  t h a t  Rawls uses as th e  bas is  o f  h is  th e o r y  do not  
h e s i t a t e  t o  appeal  t o  th e  c a p a c i t y  o f  sympathy. Kohl b e r g ’ s 
( 1 9 7 1 )  account  o f  moral deve lopment ,  f o r  example,  c i t e s  the  
im por tance  o f  sympathy in  a d e v e lo p in g  sense o f  j u s t i c e .
172. One can make sense o f  th e  idea  o f  someone h e lp in g  a 
p o l i t i c a l  cause,  l i k e  t h a t  o f  b r i n g in g  about  democracy in  a 
c o u n t r y ,  not  f o r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  reasons or  as payment f o r  
th e  advantages  one has en joyed  o n e s e l f .  H e lp in g  t o  r i g h t  
p o l i t i c a l  i n j u s t i c e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o f t e n  w i l l  not  be t o  the  
advantage  o f  the  r e f o r m e r .
173. For  a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  c l a i m  see W.Kaufmann 
( 1 9 6 8 : 1 7 9 ) .
174 .  For  a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  c l a i m  see S . Freud ( 1915 )  
' I n s t i n c t s  and t h e i r  V i c i s s i t u d e s ’ , in  Sigmund F r e u d .
( 1 9 5 8 : v o l . 14 ) .
175. See s e l e c t i o n s  from The Marqu is  de Sade in Simone de 
B e a u v o i r  ( 1 9 6 2 ) .
176.  I f  m o r a l i t y  i s  re p r e s e n te d  as normal f u n c t i o n i n g  and these  
o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  as a f a i l u r e  t o  a t t a i n  i t ,  then n e u t r a l i t y  
i s  s u r r e n d e r e d .  For an example where t h i s  m is take  is  made,
see E.Fromm ( 1 9 4 9 : 2 6 0 )
. . . a  judgement  t h a t  a person i s  d e s t r u c t i v e ,  greedy,  
j e a l o u s ,  env iou s  i s  no t  d i f f e r e n t  from a p h y s i c i a n ’ s 
s ta te m e n t  about  a d y s fu n c t io n  in  th e  h e a r t  o r  the  
1ungs .
See a l s o  E.Fromm ( 1 9 7 3 : 2 6 0 ) .
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177.  See f o r  i n s t a n c e  D .Braybrooke  ( 1 9 8 7 : 2 6 1 / 3 0 3 ) ,  who admits  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  a p o i n t  where h is  needs t h e o r y  breaks down.
Notes t o  C h ap te r  Seven
178.  We d iscussed  e a r l i e r  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  when we a t te m p t  to  
g iv e  th e  p r e f e r e n c e - s t a t i n g  U . R . I  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
( s e e  p p . 11 6 /1 3 0  a b o v e ) .  Both th e  a t te m p ts  we co n s id ered  
f a i l  t o  p r o v id e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some o f  our 
o r d i n a r y  moral b e l i e f s  (such as th e  pr ima f a c i e  wrongness o f  
k i l l i n g )  and, in  bo th ,  t o  o b t a i n  a m a t e r i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
th e  ju d g e r  has t o  im p or t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  moral assumptions  
i n t o  th e  a cc ount .
179 .  See M.Warnock ( 1 9 6 0 : 1 1 2 ) .  She w r i t e s :
. . . i t  i s  f a r  f rom c l e a r  t h a t  th e  process o f  d e c id in g  
what t o  do i s . . . e x a c t l y  l i k e  the  process o f  
j u d g i n g . . .
See a l s o  J . A t w e l l  ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 3 0 / 1 3 3 )  f o r  f u r t h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  
t h i s  p o i n t .
180. See R .M .H are  ( 1 9 5 2 : 1 8 6 )  f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  n o t io n .
181. O f te n  th e  moral q u e s t io n  and reasons a r e  cons idered  
a l o n g s id e  each o t h e r ,  in  such a manner t h a t  th e  form er  
l o c a t e s  and d e s c r ib e s  th e  moral problem w h i l e  the  l a t t e r  
r e p r e s e n t s  a p o s s ib le  s o l u t i o n  t o  i t .
182 . Some p h i lo s o p h e r s ,  see e . g .  Hare ( 1 9 5 2 : 1 6 4 ) ,  suggest  t h a t
o n ly  a command o r  o r d e r  can answer the  q u e s t io n  'What  
m o r a l l y  ought  anyone t o  do? ’ I t  i s  not  a req u e s t  t o  be 
t o l d  what i s  th e  case .  However i f  I  am c o r r e c t ,  i t  is
p e r f e c t l y  p l a u s i b l e  t o  see th e  q u e s t io n  as a req u e s t  f o r  
i n f o r m a t i  o n .
183. As A .Q u in to n  ( 1 9 7 5 : 3 0 )  says ,  ( t o  make a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
poi n t ) ,
One s ho u ld ,  no doubt ,  be a b le  and, when o n e ’ s 
e x p e r ie n c e  p r o v id e s  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  be w i l l i n g  to  
c r i t i c i s e  g e n e r a l l y  accepted  o p i n i o n s ,  both in  
s c ie n c e  and in  m o ra ls .  But t o  say t h a t  is  not  to  
endorse  a gen era l  f r e e - f o r - a l 1 , in  sc ie n c e  o r  in  
m o r a l s .
184. See, f o r  e x a m p l e ,  R . S . P e t e r s  ( 1 9 6 6 : 1 2 1 ) ,  A . P h i l l i p s  
G r i f f i t h s ,  ( 1 9 6 6 : v o l . 8 , p . 1 7 8 ) .  H o w e v e r  see a ls o  R . S . Downie 
a n d  E . T e l f e r  ( 1 9 6 9 : 1 5 3 / 1 5 5 )  f o r  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  o v e r ­
d e p e n d e n c e  on t h i s  s t r a t e g y .
185.  Does th e  Nazi no t  see th e  importance o f  th in g s  l i k e
' s e 1f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ’ , ' s e l f - i d e n t i t y ’ , 'sym pathy ’ to  the  
concept  o f  a person? I f  he r e c o g n iz e s  such needs f o r  j u s t
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one o t h e r  person,  y e t  re fu s e s  t o  countenance them in  Jewish  
p e o p le ,  then  we can accuse th e  Nazi o f  hav ing  f a i l e d  to  
u n i v e r s a l i z e  p r o p e r l y .
186. Someone who knows th e  meaning o f  M e s s e r ’ o r  ' g r e a t e r ’ must 
know t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between n e e d in g (b )  something ' a  l i t t l e ’ 
o r  ' g r e a t l y ’ . They w i l l  know t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  ra n k in g  a t  
l e a s t .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, when we compare, we may want to  
know which o f  two i n d i v i d u a l s  has th e  nee d (b )  t o  th e  g r e a t e r  
d e g r e e .
187. I t  m ight  appear  f rom th e  example t h a t  when w e ig h ing  needs
Smith i s  no t  r e q u i r e d  t o  look beyond h is  own, f o r  a
judgement  about  what  i s  r i g h t  o r  wrong. I f  t h i s  was the
case ,  my t h e s i s  would be c o m p a t ib le  w i t h  Egoism. I  w i l l
u n t a n g le  th e  u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e - n e e d s  th e o r y  from Egoism in  the  
n e x t  c h a p t e r .
188 .  See A .Q u in to n  ( 1 9 7 3 : 3 3 )  on t h i s  p o i n t .
189 .  I t  m ig h t  be o b je c t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  not  enough t o  show t h a t
th e s e  a r e  th e  r a t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  we do employ,  I  must a ls o  
say why th e s e  c r i t e r i a  m o r a l l y  ought  t o  be employed. For  
th e  q u e s t io n  remains:  do we employ th e  ( m o r a l l y )  r i g h t
c r i t e r i a ?  My response t o  t h i s  i s  t o  p la c e  th e  burden on my
opponent  who suggests  t h a t  t h in g s  cou ld  be o t h e r w is e ,  to  
show t h e  n o n -c o n te n t io u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  he has in mind.
190 . The moral b e l i e f s  p r e v a l e n t  in  our  f a m i l y ,  o r  community,  a re  
u s u a l l y  t a u g h t  t o  us no t  as b e l i e f s  but  as f a c t s .  L a t e r  we 
come t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  th e y  a re  o n ly  f a m i l y  o r  group 
c o n v i c t i o n s  and t h a t  they  may be wrong.
Notes t o  C h ap ter  8
191 .  T h is  i s  not  S a r t r e ’ s view o f  th e  m a t t e r .  He has no doubt  
t h a t  u n i v e r s a l i z i n g  i s  l e g i t i m a t e .  When e x p l a i n i n g  the  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  a n g u is h ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  S a r t r e  ( 1 9 4 8 : 3 0 )  w r i t e s :
. . . a  man commits h i m s e l f  t o  a n y th in g ,  f u l l y  
r e a l i s i n g  t h a t  he i s  no t  o n ly  choosing what he w i l l  
be, but  i s  t h e r e b y  a t  th e  same t im e ,  a l e g i s l a t o r  
d e c id i n g  f o r  th e  whole o f  mankind.
See a l s o  ( i b i d :5 2 )
. . . a l t h o u g h  th e  c o n te n t  o f  m o r a l i t y  i s  v a r i a b l e ,  a 
c e r t a i n  form o f  t h i s  m o r a l i t y  i s  u n i v e r s a l .
192. B.Cohen ( 1 9 6 7 : 2 5 0 / 2 5 9 )  makes a s i m i l a r  p o i n t .  She says t h a t  
th e  d e c i s i o n  in  such a case must be ' a  m a t te r  o f  personal  
f e e l i n g ’ no t  a moral judgement.
193. For more d i s c u s s io n  on t h i s  p o i n t  see A.MacLean (1984:21  
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See a l s o  G.Harman ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 4 6 / 1 4 8 ) ,  W. F r a n k e n a ( 1 9 6 3 :1 0 9 )  and 
R .B r a n d t  ( 1 9 6 7 : 7 5 )  f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  same v iew .
P.Winch ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 6 3 / 1 6 4 )  w r i t e s :
The s t o r y  seems t o  me t o  show t h a t  Vere  d id  what  
was, f o r  him, th e  r i g h t  t h i n g  t o  do.
Winch i s  no t  making here  th e  banal and obv ious p o i n t  t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  peop le  may make d i f f e r e n t  judgements  about  the  
same a c t i o n .  What he in te n d s  c l e a r l y  i s  t h a t  Vere  d id  the  
m o r a l l y  r i g h t  t h in g  in  c o n v i c t i n g  Budd as he, Winch, would 
be doing in  no t  c o n v i c t i n g  him.
K .Ko lenda  ( 1 9 7 5 : 4 6 1 )  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  m is ta k e  f o l l o w s  from  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  W inch ’ s n o n - u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e  ' o u g h t ’ is  
' m o r a l l y  em pty ’ . H is  main argument (op. c i t :465 )  a g a in s t  
Winch i s :
To be (a  moral judgement)  i t  would have t o  be 
j u s t i f i e d  and not  m ere ly  encountered  as a personal  
i n c l i  n a t i o n .
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  Winch does not  t e l l  us e x p l i c i t l y  why Vere  
ju d g e s  t h a t  Budd should  hang o r  why he judges  t h a t  Budd 
shou ld  be a c q u i t t e d .  However we can s p e c u la te  what V e r e ’ s 
and W inch ’ s reasons m ight  be.
The consequences no ted ,  f o l l o w  o n ly  i f  o v e r r i d i n g n e s s  i s  a 
nec essa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a moral b e l i e f .
See D .W r ig h t  ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 4 0 / 1 4 1 ) .  Some r e c e n t  p h i lo s o p h i c a l  
t h e o r i e s  a l s o  argue f o r  a form o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  egoism. For  
in s t a n c e  R . F i r t h  ( 1 9 5 2 : 3 1 7 / 3 4 5 ) ,  who sees an i m p l i c i t  use o f  
e g o c e n t r i c  terms in  e v e ry  moral judgement.  See a ls o  
G.Harman ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 5 1 / 1 5 2 ) .
See f o r  in s t a n c e  E .W i lso n  ( 1 9 7 5 : 3 8 1 ) .  A lso  see W.Hamil ton  
in  D .Barash ( 1 9 8 2 : 6 9 / 7 3 ) .
F o l lo w in g  A r i s t o t l e  ( 1 9 5 3 : 2 7 3 / 2 7 6 )  we must d i s t i n g u i s h  here  
between ' s e l f i s h ’ and ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ’ . By s e l f i s h  conduct  
we mean those  a c t i o n s  which a r e  performed a t  the  expense of 
o t h e r s .  T h is  i s  not  th e  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  e g o i s t ’ s d o c t r i n e .  
He wants t o  say t h a t  m ot ives  or  a c t i o n s  must be such t h a t  
t h e y  a r e  a lways in te n d e d  t o  b e n e f i t  the  j u d g e r .
See, f o r  in s t a n c e ,  R . T r i v e r s  ( 1 9 7 1 : 3 5 / 5 7 ) ,  a s o c i o b i o l o g i s t  
who accounts  f o r  a l t r u i s m  a long these  l i n e s .
S idgw ick  i s  u s u a l l y  co n s id e re d  t o  be a u t i l i t a r i a n ,  o f  
co u rs e .  (However h i s  views d i f f e r  c o n s id e r a b ly  from those  
o f  Bentham and M i l l . )  R a t i o n a l  egoism is  one o f  the  t h r e e  
e t h i c a l  t h e o r i e s  -  th e  o t h e r s  a re  u t i 1 i t a r i a n i s m  and 
i n t u i t i o n i s m  -  which can be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  developed and 
where i t  i s  re a s o n a b le  t o  a c t  in  accordance w i th  i t s  
c o n c lu s io n s .  See J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 4 1 / 1 4 4 )  f o r  f u r t h e r  
di scussi  o n .
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As we can see ,  th e  v iew  I  am c a l l i n g  ' r a t i o n a l  ego ism ’ 
connects  w i t h  th e  c l a i m  t h a t  an adequate  account  o f  our  
moral b e l i e f s  and o f  pr ima f a c i e  c o r r e c t  judgements  can be 
g iven  on th e  assumption o f  n o th in g  more than r a t i o n a l  
( h y p o t h e t i c a l  o r  a c t u a l )  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  See, f o r  in s t a n c e ,  
t h e  d is c u s s io n  o f  Rawls p p . 3 0 2 /3 1 5 .  See a l s o  A .G e w ir th  
( 1 9 7 8 : 1 4 6 )  who c la im s  t o  have shown a d e r i v a t i o n
. . . f r o m  th e  p r u d e n t i a l  t o  th e  moral a t  th e  p o i n t  
where,  through  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i 1i t y  
th e  agent  l o g i c a l l y  must acknowledge th e  g e n e r ic  
r i g h t s  he c la im s  f o r  h i m s e l f  a r e  a ls o  had by a l l  
p r o s p e c t iv e  p u rp o s iv e  a g e n ts .
However th e  a g e n t ’ s r i g h t s - c l a i m , a j_a G e w i r th ,  would f o l l o w  
f rom a p r u d e n t i a l  judgement,  no t  a moral one. What in  h is  
s i n g u l a r  judgement he would u n i v e r s a l i z e ,  i s  a r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  reason.  The u n i v e r s a l i z e d  judgement would 
be o f  th e  form: each person p r u d e n t i a l l y  ought  to  regard  h is  
o r  he r  f reedom as a necessary  good in o r d e r  t o  pursue h is  or  
h er  own p r o j e c t s .  See a ls o  J . L . M a c k i e  ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 7 3 ) .
J . K a l i n  ( 1 9 7 0 : 6 4 / 8 7 )  argues t h a t  one can s t a t e  u n i v e r s a l  
e t h i c a l  egoism c o n s i s t e n t l y  by a d v o c a t in g  i t  f o r  each 
i n d i v i d u a l ,  thus  'Sm ith  should  a c t  on h is  own i n t e r e s t ’ , 
'Jones should  a c t  on h i s ’ , 'Brown on h i s ’ , e t c .  Thus the  
t h e o r y  i s  prom ulgated  t o  eve ryo n e .  However th e  p o i n t  
rem ains ,  i f  he a d v is e s  Jones to  a c t  in  h is  own s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t ,  then  Smith may not  be s e r v in g  h i s  own.
See B .M e d l in  ( 1 9 7 0 : 5 6 / 6 3 )  f o r  a s i m i l a r  o b j e c t i o n .
The ana log y  i s  due t o  J . K a l i n  (ojq c i t ) .
See P h i l l i p s  and Mounce ( 1 9 7 0 : 1 0 4 / 1 1 2 )  f o r  a s i m i l a r  v iew .
See e . g .  J . D e g e n a a r ’ s ( 1 9 8 7 : 2 4 7 )  p u z z l in g  argument in  t h i s  
r e g a r d ,  f o r  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t s  o f  groups,  
( i . e .  t o  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o r  freedom o f  a s s o c i a t i o n ) ,  over  
and above i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s .
See e . g .  B .Barnes and D .B lo o r  ( 1 9 8 2 : 2 2 ) .
See P . S i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 9 : 2 3 0 )  f o r  advocates  o f  th e  t r i a g e  argument  
in  t h i s  c o n t e x t .
I n  T r a n s k e i , f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  women d u r in g  th e  c h i l d - b e a r i n g  
age,  g i v e  b i r t h  t o  an ave rage  o f  6 c h i l d r e n .  And t h i s  is  a 
low b i r t h - r a t e  f o r  A f r i c a .
As S i n g e r  ( i b i d ) says:
. . . c o u p le s  beg in  t o  r e a l i s e  t h a t  t o  have the  same 
number o f  c h i l d r e n  s u r v i v i n g  t o  m a t u r i t y  as in  the  
p a s t ,  th e y  do not  need t o  g iv e  b i r t h  t o  as many 
c h i l d r e n  as t h e i r  p a r e n ts  d i d .
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